2010年7月31日星期六

DBS unit posts growth although goodwill charge hits earnings

DBS unit posts growth although goodwill charge hits earnings


The Hong Kong operations of DBS Group Holdings, Singapore's largest bank, posted a 36 per cent increase in interim net profit despite booking a one-time goodwill impairment charge and expenses related to compensation over products linked to Lehman Brothers.

Net profit in the first six months rose to HK$1.36 billion from HK$1 billion a year earlier.

However, earnings for the second quarter plunged 31 per cent year on year, owing to a 72 per cent increase in expenses from the previous quarter after an agreement with the Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority to pay out HK$651 million to customers of high-risk constellation notes earlier this month.

The bank said it had no firm forecast for any further expenses related to the remainder of the cases, and it would continue to approach each customer on a case-by-case basis.

DBS also booked a goodwill impairment charge of S$1.02 billion (HK$5.81 billion) for its Hong Kong operations, attributing the decision to noticeable and persistent strains in wholesale funding markets that meant interest margins would continue to fall.

Group chief executive Piyush Gupta said the writedown put the bank's Hong Kong assets at 2.2 times book value, compared with an average of 2 times among Hong Kong banks.

The dollar market is extremely tight, and there is very aggressive pricing for deposits in Hong Kong, he said. But this does not mean we have a bearish view of Hong Kong.

Amy Yip, chief executive of DBS Bank (Hong Kong), said the reduction in book value was necessary because the bank predicted that its cash flow position over the next five years is not as good as we had assumed.

The goodwill cannot be written up again later even if the carrying value of the book increases.

Loan margins have not expanded but the cost of funding has, Yip said, pointing out that competition was so intense that some banks were offering deposit rates of up to Hibor plus 100 basis points.

Net interest income in the first six months fell 4 per cent from the year before to HK$2.22 billion as low interest rates continued to weigh on net interest margins, but non-interest income soared 44 per cent to HK$1.84 billion on the back of strong loan syndication and sales of treasury and wealth management products.

The bank said pressures on margins were somewhat offset by strong loan growth, mainly driven by corporate demand and residential mortgages. Its market share in Hong Kong for loans increased 0.2 points from the previous quarter to 5.6 per cent.

Overall net profit for the group fell to S$300 million in the second quarter owing to the goodwill impairment charge. Stripping out the one-time charge, earnings grew 30 per cent year on year to S$718 million.

2010年7月28日星期三

經濟民生交白卷 管治信心亮紅燈

經濟民生交白卷 管治信心亮紅燈


港府管治無方,市民信心持續在低位徘徊。有項關於「特區政府管治信心」的民調顯示,十九項管治評分有十六項不合格,十一項較三月份的評分下跌。

調查要求受訪者就港府的十九個管治項目評分,以一分代表完全沒有信心、四分為普通、七分為非常有信心計,其中只有三項評分稍高於四分,其餘皆不合格。在五大範疇中,港府在「民生政策」和「經濟發展及規管」兩方面的表現最差,分別只得三點二二及三點二分。

民調結果一針見血地指出,港府施政乏善可陳,碌碌無為,尤其是在發展經濟及改善民生方面頻頻交白卷,引起市民極大不滿。當局再不設法改善,民望只能繼續下跌,管治危機只能更趨惡化。

就以經濟發展及規管來說,金融海嘯期間爆發的雷曼迷債風暴,便充分暴露當局對金融機構及金融產品的監管嚴重不足。事後,港府煞有介事進行檢討,揚言要改善業內「金管局不管,證監會不監」的權責不清現象,然而事過境遷,所謂檢討猶如泥牛入海,沒了下文。在此情況下,誰敢保證同類事件不會再次發生?當局又如何保障金融業的長遠發展,打造媲美紐約倫敦的國際金融中心?
除了對金融業監管不足,最近旅遊業爆出多宗導遊罵客、趕客,甚至激死旅客的醜聞,亦揭發旅遊業監管上的巨大漏洞。對此,各界輿論莫不關注,紛紛促請當局從旅遊業議會手上收回監管權,徹底改變旅遊業的監管模式,從根本處杜絕歪風。可惜言者諄諄,聽者藐藐,商務及經濟發展局局長劉吳惠蘭日前提出補鑊措施,仍堅持由旅遊業自我規管,僅以治標不治本的「補鑊四招」敷衍過去。難怪大部分受訪者認為,港府做事但求自保,不願接納市民意見。

發展經濟不力,改善民生無方,以致貧窮人口愈來愈多,是必然的結果。回歸十三年來,本港貧窮人口與日俱增,迄今已超過一百二十萬人,尤其是在金融海嘯後,月入少於四千元的貧窮戶不減反增,突破十九萬戶大關,比回歸初期激增一倍。然而,他們還要面對新一輪通脹打擊,生活負擔日益沉重,生活水平每況愈下。

與此形成強烈對比的是,隨投資市場轉趨活躍、樓價地價節節高升,政府庫房猶如豬籠入水。港府昨日拍賣一幅山頂聶歌信山道地皮,成交價高達一百零四億元,成為歷來成交價第三高的地皮。單計本財政年度首四個月,賣地及補地價收入已經高達四百二十七億元,遠遠超出財政預算案預計的全年三百四十一億元。窮人嗷嗷待哺,官府水浸金山,是今日香港的最真實寫照。

港府扶貧不力,正是深層次矛盾的根源。常說有錢好辦事,賣地收益遠超預算,正好為政府扶貧紓困提供充裕財源。當局聲稱將在十月的《施政報告》中落實發展經濟及改善民生措施,關鍵是說到就要做到,必須能夠真正紓緩中下階層市民的生活壓力,否則,君視民如草芥,則民視君如寇仇,政府對貧苦大眾見死不救,市民怎可能對政府的管治有信心?

2010年7月26日星期一

Octave Notes investors slam ICBC for providing ‘misleading’ information

Octave Notes investors slam ICBC for providing ‘misleading’ information


Ian Sio Tou

The local branch of the mainland’s Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) has landed in hot water after a group petitioned the local government yesterday to crack down on what they say was “misleading” information provided by the lender regarding credit-linked notes issued by Morgan Stanley, known as “Octave Notes”.

A representative of the roughly dozen investors in the Octave Notes acquired through ICBC also accused the Monetary Authority of Macau (AMCM) of “delinquency” in its supervision of the notes, which have plunged in value following links to suspect investment firms, such as Lehman Brothers, which were used as a reference entity for some series of the notes.

The representative, surnamed Mok, made the comments after handing in a petition to an official representative outside Government House yesterday, accompanied by directly-elected grass-roots lawmaker Au Kam San.

Mok, who has allegedly lost around one million patacas investing in the ill-fated notes, told reporters that her group had filed a complaint with the AMCM about ICBC staff deliberately concealing the risks of investing in the aggregated debt obligations.

“When the bank staff introduced the Octave Notes, I was misled into believing that this product is secure and it is a bond connected with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). As the staff continuously described Octave Notes as associated with PRC bonds, so I believed it was a bond issued by the PRC,” Mok said.

“I believed that they [Octave Notes] had the same security as a deposit, so I decided to buy them in 2007,” she added. “And then the bank told me my Octave Notes were worth nothing.”Mok also stated that both the AMCM and the local ICBC branch ignored her complaint, and said the AMCM failed to ensure investors had access to proper information about the investment product.

“I made the complaint to the AMCM last October and AMCM replied, but just said that they had informed the bank about my complaint. I also made a complaint to the bank, which just told me ‘you have already complained to AMCM,’” she said.

“I believe the AMCM has not fully exercised its supervisory powers in guaranteeing investors were informed about the risks of these investment products,” she added.

Meanwhile, Au told reporters that the AMCM was refusing to release the guideline that sets out procedures banks must follow when they sell investment products, claiming it was just an internal guideline for financial institutions.

“This guideline would give customers enough information to assess the risks involved. After examining the guideline, investors would know whether the banks have been complying with the guideline when promoting the new investment products. Obviously, the banks have not been complying with the guideline in introducing the Octave Notes,” Au said.

2010年7月24日星期六

How well do investors understand CFD risks?

How well do investors understand CFD risks?

2010年7月23日星期五

Low interest Rate Policy Punishes Retirees / Savers, Rewards Speculators / Banks / GLC’s

Low interest Rate Policy Punishes Retirees / Savers, Rewards Speculators / Banks / GLC’s

HK monetary authority still investigates 169 Lehman-related cases

HK monetary authority still investigates 169 Lehman-related cases

English.news.cn 2010-07-23 17:42:20 FeedbackPrintRSS

HONG KONG, July 23 (Xinhua) -- The Hong Kong Monetary Authority said Friday investigation of over 99 percent of 21,674 Lehman- Brothers-related complaint cases has been completed while the remaining 169 cases were still under investigation.

According to the HK Monetary Authority, of those finished complaint cases, 13,078 cases which have been resolved by a settlement agreement, 2,492 cases which have been resolved through the enhanced complaint handling procedures, 2,561 cases were closed because of insufficient prima facie evidence of misconduct, 2,818 cases which are under disciplinary consideration.

Around 43,700 Hong Kong people invested nearly 15.7 billion HK dollars (2.02 billion U.S. dollars) in products issued or guaranteed by Lehman Brothers.

Most of these products were called mini-bonds, although they were not bonds but complex and high-risk structured products. When Lehman Brothers collapsed in September of 2008, many of these products became worthless or nearly worthless.

Earlier this month, DBS Bank Hong Kong unit had agreed to pay 651 million HK dollars (83.7 million U.S. dollars) to its customers who purchased constellation notes and who were classified by the bank, at the time of purchase, as low-risk customers.

2010年7月21日星期三

Fitch Warns China Government of Financial Crisis

Fitch Warns China Government of Financial Crisis
Submitted by Parminder Singh on 2010, June 24 - 17:13 EconomyFeaturedTNMChina
Fitch ratings has affirmed the National Bank of Egypt's with a stable outlook by upgrading the bank’s individual rating to ‘D’ from ‘D/E’.

China is again heading towards the financial crisis as Fitch Ratings indicate. Increasing loans and the repackaging and selling of debt by its banks had taken the credit risk to higher levels.

Charlene Chu, Fitch’s Senior Director of Financial Institutions for China, said “Credit is disappearing from bank balance sheets, resulting in a pervasive understatement of credit growth and credit exposure”.

Last year, China’s Government had lent 9.59 trillion Yuan ($1.4 trillion) thus, accelerating the economy when whole of the world’ economy was suffering from crisis.

The credit products of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. also called as Minibonds have been sold by banks in Hong Kong and Singapore.

Many of the individual investors had lost money on the notes.

Refusal of Chinese banks to unveil the loan information clearly indicates the depth of the problems.

Chinese banks have recorded the average recovery rate of 34% on corporate non-performing loans, while 72% of the loans are backed by collateral, guarantees or pledged assets.

By end of December 2009, NBE's capital adequacy ratio has significantly improved to 12.6%, where as bank's equity/assets ratio remained low at 3.4%.

Octave Notes 15

Bank of China bank frauds in selling Victory Peak Octave Notes 15

I told the bank sales person that I did not want to buy any bonds related to US housing market and she pointed out at the brocedure and asked me if there are any companies related to US, and pointed out that these were mainly Asia companies such as

HSBC
DBS
Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation Ltd.
China Developement Bank
Swire Pacific Ltd.
Standard Chartered Bank
The People Republic of China

Since she is working for a mainland controlled bank that appearing to be selling mostly mainland bank bonds so I believed in her saying. But she later said the photocopying machine was not working well and refused to give me the brochure. The sales document could only issued to me few days later after the sales. Bank of China and its staffs in fact were hidding all the document and risk level after the sales so I could not read all the fine prints that were important.

In fact the CDO related to this Octave Notes were very high risk as what I told her such as :

US housing mortage companies:
Federal Home Loan Mortage Corporation
Federal National Mortage Association
Ambac is an insurance company that insured mortgage-backed securities purchased by investors from EMC
Syncora Guarantee Inc. delivers credit enhancement for the obligations of debt issuers worldwide. We guarantee US municipal bonds; asset-backed securities; debt backed by utilities and selected infrastructure projects; specialized risks, including future flow securitizations and bank deposit insurance; and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).

終於意識到這個Octave Notes其實是為“7+100多個公司”提供的保險金。根本就跟那7個公司的資產毫無關係。這些,都是銀行當初應該給我們講的或提醒的事。這就是為甚麼我們說銀行的盡職審查是完全失職,銀行的對於客戶 Care of Duty 的也是完全失職。而銀行的這些3-4年的關於Octave Notes的失職,是由於銀行內部的審查措施和職員培訓的失誤造成的。不只是個別銷售人員的失誤。是銀行系統性的失誤。為了推銷Octave Notes, 銀行要麼有意誤導客戶,要麼有意忽略對Octave Notes的真實風險的不理解。

然而,無論是大摩還是分銷銀行都未把這一事實、債券操作的原理、特定的風險向客戶予以詳細披露。尤其是大摩並未向投資者披露資產池中究竟有哪些信用主體,平均評級是多少,多少信用主體發生信用違約事件即開始吃到本金——這正是「精明債券」最大風險的關鍵所在。由於不知道抵押物是為何物,加上銷售人員的熱情推薦,這使得投資者誤認為所承擔的只是宣傳廣告上那幾個信用主體的信用風險,而根本不知還要承擔抵押物的信用風險。這簡直就是故意蒙蔽投資者,形同欺騙。而且中銀應知道US Mortage related 抵押物的信用風險為高.

剖析《證券及期貨條例》第107條

《證券及期貨條例》第107條(下稱第107條)的第1及第2段的原文是這樣的:

(1) 任何人為誘使另一人作出以下作為而作出任何欺詐的 失實陳述或 罔顧實情的 失實陳述, 即屬犯罪—
(a) 訂立或 要約訂立—
(i) 旨在 取得、 處置、認購或 包銷證券的 協議; 或
(ii) 受規管投資協議; 或
(b) 取得或 要約取得集體投資計劃的 權益, 或 參與或 要約參與集體投資計劃。

(2) 任何人犯第(1)款所訂罪行—
(a) 一經循公訴程序定罪, 可處罰款$1000000及監禁7年; 或
(b) 一經循簡易程序定罪, 可處第6級罰款及監禁6個月。

首先,這是一條定義刑事罪行的條例。按照法例,任何人被法庭裁決干犯此條例,則須負上刑事責任。並且,事主還有很大的可能性依照《證券及期貨條例》第108條去追討干犯者的民事責任,而第108條的民事責任的判定門檻是比第107條為低的。

那麼,作為雷曼苦主如何去理解此兩條條例呢?

從調查,及所接觸的苦主所反映,許多的銀行銷售職員把雷曼相關結構性產品說成是定期存款,或另類定期存款,或定期存款的代替產品,不一而足;又例如將迷你債券說成是債券,而沒有解釋這是一種結構性產品;又有甚至不作任何解釋,只是說該產品的利息是多少,有超級市場的購物券之類,等等。到今天,相信大部份雷曼苦主都應該知道,這些說法都是罔顧實情的失實陳述。

作為證券的銷售職員,及其所屬商業機構、機構負責人,是須領取牌照的專業人士及專業機構,法律是明確地規定他們應該,及有責任去了解他們所銷售的產品的性質、結構以及風險,並且如實地向銷售對象陳述。如果他們沒有如此做,例如如上一段所描述的情形,那麼不但是罔顧他們的職責,也是罔顧他們所銷售產品的實情,罔顧投資者的意願,罔顧投資者的資產安全,也就是干犯了第107條所定義的罪行。

作為普通市民,面對此刑事罪行,最直接的方法應是通過警方去進行偵訊,及進一步的公訴程序,以使罪行得到應有的懲罰。

以上只是個人對第107條的理解,而有關罪行的定義,可按以下鏈接到香港法例的網頁去閱讀。另外,任何人能否被定罪,還是要由法庭去作出判決。

2010年7月20日星期二

Hong Kong to tighten credit rating regulation

Hong Kong to tighten credit rating regulation
By Polly Hui (AFP) – 1 day ago

HONG KONG — Hong Kong's financial watchdog on Monday proposed to tighten the monitoring of the city's credit rating agencies to meet new standards set by the European Union and other overseas jurisdictions.

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) said it planned to launch the regulatory regime by end of January next year, including a new licensing regime for agencies and their analysts, which currently operate in an unregulated environment.

According to the consultation document the SFC released Monday, Hong Kong-based credit rating agencies (CRAs) and their analysts would have to disclose how they assess companies and investment products to obtain a licence.

That licence could be revoked if they did not follow assessment procedures, or were found to have invested in products that they themselves had rated.

"We consider that it would be in the public interest to establish a regulatory regime to enhance investor protection and to enable credit ratings prepared by Hong Kong-based CRAs to be serviceable in other jurisdictions," Julia Leung, the city's Undersecretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, told lawmakers.

Starting in June 2011, the European Union will prohibit any credit rating issued by a non-EU agency, unless it operates within a regulatory regime that is equivalent to or as stringent as the EU regime.

Leung said the licensing system must be in place before the EU policy takes effect, adding that the United States, Japan and Australia had already announced strengthened regulation of CRAs in recent months.

Stephen Tisdall, senior director of intermediaries licensing and conduct at the SFC, said the proposed regime was more stringent than other jurisdictions, which do not require rating analysts to be licensed.

Revoking an analyst's licence "would create problems for him going to other jurisdictions even within the same organisation," Tisdall added.

To smooth the transition, the SFC proposed that existing rating analysts would only be required to take a refresher course on local regulations, while newcomers to the profession will have to sit a regulatory exam to obtain a licence.

The global financial crisis shone a light on the failure of many CRAs to fully consider -- and highlight -- the inherent risks of complicated financial instruments for investors as market conditions deteriorated.

At present, there are three global credit rating agencies -- Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's -- and three smaller multinational CRAs with operations in Hong Kong.

"It is clear that these CRAs have accepted, as inevitable, the global move to more rigorously regulate them," the SFC said in a paper submitted to the city's legislature.

Fitch group, the DBS Constelation rating agency :
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/09/fitch-group-constellation-rating-firm.html

Fitch launch derivative group in Singapore (for DBS and other banks such as HSBC in issuing high risk structure products)
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/09/fitch-ratings-launches-new-rating.html

2010年7月19日星期一

HK Securities Watchdog Proposes Regulation Of Rating Agencies

HK Securities Watchdog Proposes Regulation Of Rating Agencies

HONG KONG (Dow Jones)--Hong Kong's securities watchdog Monday proposed a plan to regulate credit rating agencies, following in the footsteps of regulators in major world markets.

The Securities and Futures Commission said it is seeking market feedback on a plan to create a regulatory regime to license and supervise the activities of credit rating agencies in the city, the base from which the three major multinational rating agencies do business in Asia.

The proposal, under which both the agencies and their individual analysts would be subject to licensing requirements, is intended to ensure credit rating activities are "conducted in accordance with principles of integrity, transparency, responsibility and good governance," according to the consultation paper.

The plan also aims to make sure ratings prepared in Hong Kong remain valid in other jurisdictions.

The need for enhanced supervision of credit rating agencies was raised following the global financial crisis, when some of the agencies were criticized for failing to warn investors of risks linked to complicated financial instruments.

The SFC said it hopes the new regime will come into effect by the end of January 2011 and that the process of licensing agencies and their analysts will start "almost immediately."

"Amidst the global clamor to regulate credit rating agencies, we have formulated what we consider to be a pragmatic and sensible approach for public comment," said SFC Chief Executive Martin Wheatley in a statement.

The U.S. last week passed a bill enabling the most sweeping financial overhaul since the 1930s: it empowers the government to expand oversight of hedge funds and credit-rating agencies and to create a new consumer-protection regulator, among other measures.

Japan, Australia and India have also stepped up supervision of credit ratings agencies recently.

-By Kate O'Keeffe, Dow Jones Newswires; 852-2802-7002; kathryn.okeeffe@dowjones.com

Bankers beware in Hong Kong

Bankers beware in Hong Kong
By Kent Ewing

HONG KONG - This city's capitalist mantra of "buyer beware" is about to become far more consumer-friendly. "Bankers and brokers beware" could be the new commercial caveat. Or at least that is what some worried banks and brokerages fear will come about this September.

That's when a new "mystery-shopper" scheme, hatched by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Security and Futures Commission, is scheduled to swing into action, with actors hired to play the roles of vulnerable investors similar to those who were duped by unscrupulous sales tactics during the 2008 financial crisis.

The HKMA and SFC have identified senior citizens, young people and - for some reason - pregnant women as primary targets for unethical sellers of investment products, and an unidentified "service provider" is busy hiring and training thespians to play those parts.

The aim is to prevent anything like a repeat of the 2008 fiasco involving the sale and purchase in the city of supposedly safe Lehman Brothers minibonds, but bankers, brokers and financial advisors are screaming "intimidation" and "entrapment" - albeit often from safely behind a veil of anonymity in the Hong Kong media. After all, while they may be fuming, these masters of finance are not stupid enough to have their names and the names of their employers directly linked to an attack on regulators who could, in their dystopian nightmares, revoke their licenses and throw them in jail.

Assurances by the HKMA and SFC that their scheme will focus only on sales of unlisted securities, futures products and structured deposits - exempting listed stocks, futures and warrants - have done little to assuage this furor. That other countries, including Australia and the United Kingdom, have already adopted similar schemes has gone almost unnoticed.

Indeed, judging by the hue and cry emanating (again, mostly anonymously) from the high-flying czars of Hong Kong's investment world, the scheme is not only a terrible affront to the integrity of city's financial system but also a gross apostasy in the history of capitalism in general.

One of the few high-flyers who actually had the courage to speak on the record - Glenn Turner, chairman of the Independent Financial Advisors Association - declared in the South China Morning Post last week that the HKMA and SFC were treating those working in the city's financial services industry like "drug or arms dealers"." Another - Christopher Cheung Wah-fung, chairman of the Hong Kong Securities Professionals Association - went so far as to compare the mystery-shopping scheme to acts of "white terror" committed by the Nationalists against the Communists during the Chinese Civil War.

But complaints like these, coming in the same week that the US Securities and Exchange Commission announced that Wall Street investment giant Goldman Sachs had agreed to pay US$550 million as a settlement against fraud charges related to mortgage-related investments, ring rather hollow, even in capitalist havens like Hong Kong. This was also the week that the US Congress, after a drawn-out legislative fight, approved the biggest overhaul of the American financial system since the Great Depression, with Wall Street kicking and screaming all along the way.

Wall Street's excesses cut deeply in this city, where more than 20,000 investors have claimed that they were misled by banks or brokerages about products linked to Lehman Brothers, the once-proud global investment firm that shocked the world with its declaration of bankruptcy in 2008.

DBS Hong Kong, the local division of Southeast Asia's biggest bank, agreed on Wednesday to repay HK$651 million (US$84 million) to Hong Kong clients who had bought products linked to Lehman Brothers, becoming the first bank to refund the original investment plus interest to customers who purchased risky credit derivatives called Constellation Notes.

According to the agreement the bank reached with the HKMA and SFC, however, only those clients judged to be investors with a low- or medium-level risk profile (2,160 in all) will receive refunds; an additional 1,240 investors with more aggressive risk profiles will be denied.

Hong Kong investors dished out HK$6.5 billion for Constellation Notes, with DBS accounting for HK$1.3 billion of that.

The DBS deal with regulators comes a year after another settlement in which 16 Hong Kong banks agreed to a HK$6.3 billion buy-back from investors burnt in the Lehman's minibonds disaster. The buy-back was, at least in part, a result of street protests by minibonds investors who claimed to be victims of unethical sales practices, while a subsequent HKMA investigation revealed that these complex, high-risk derivatives had been sold to some of the city's most vulnerable citizens - the elderly, the uneducated and even the mentally disturbed.

It was no surprise, then, that a raft of new investment rules followed the HKMA probe. The mystery-shopping scheme is intended to monitor compliance with these rules.

Starting in September, for example, the common Hong Kong practice of offering gift coupons to potential investors as bait will be banned. In addition, banks and brokerages will be required to give a five-day grace period to clients who buy long-term products, during which time their investment can be canceled and their money must be returned. And, as of next January, first-time investors and those over 65 must be allowed a two-day "cooling off" period before the sale of any product goes through.

While the HKMA and SFC may have seriously underestimated the investment savvy of the average pregnant woman, overall these are humane, common-sense rules aimed at taking the ruthless bite out of Hong Kong's most predatory peddlers of investment products. So one has to wonder why so many in Hong Kong's financial sector are in such high dudgeon about the mystery-shopping scheme. The new rules are simple, long-overdue consumer protections - like laws prohibiting false advertising or deceptive sales practices in any other field - and mystery shoppers are a way of keeping bankers and brokers honest. As long as everyone is following the law, what's to fear? Entrapment? But that, too, let us not forget, is against the law.

The overreaction to just about any proposed form of regulation by many in Hong Kong's business class shows, sadly, that they have learned nothing from the financial meltdown that brought the world to its knees two years ago. An unregulated Wall Street ran amok, and we are all still paying for it. Of course, tighter controls must follow.
The bad news about the new regulations in Hong Kong, however, is that they would have done nothing to stop the sale of minibonds to unsuspecting old ladies who lost their life savings in the crash. Before Lehman Brothers went bust, minibonds carried a double AA rating for protection: You couldn't have asked for a better bet - until, of course, the rating agencies turned out to be totally wrong.
Perhaps "buyer beware" is worth remembering, even in a new era of tighter regulation.

Kent Ewing is a Hong Kong-based teacher and writer. He can be reached at kewing@hkis.edu.hk.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

2010年7月18日星期日

黃明:非理性視角下的監管新思維

黃明:非理性視角下的監管新思維


美國金融監管改革的反思與示《21世紀》:您對此次美國金融監管改革有怎樣的評價?此次金融監管法案是否針對監管缺陷給予了有效解決?

黃明:我認為這次改革是非常正確、非常必要的。此次金融危機的原因之一,是場外金融衍生產品缺乏透明度,導致美國金融體系當中隱藏了很多爆炸性的風險,而監管層對此卻毫不知情。這是金融監管改革首先要觸及的問題。在此次的法案當中,首先是針對產品市場的改革,提高一些場外衍生產品的透明度,約束了這些產品的市場集中度,將金融衍生產品儘量多的放在場內,進行集中清算。

其次是對金融機構監管,採取了比較嚴厲的“沃爾克法則”。當前金融機構的主要業務是中介業務,在融資、投資雙方之間起中介橋樑的作用,經濟的運轉就離不開這些金融機構,因此在這些金融機構破產的時候,政府就非救它們不可。另外,此次方案增加了監管部門對金融機構進行清算解散的權力,這是很有意義的。否則當危機發生的時候,政府唯一的牌只有出手救。現在多了一個可能性,可以有序的對金融機構進行清算。

再次是消費者保護。在此次危機之前,一些貸款公司、信用卡公司等金融機構利用了消費者金融知識的缺乏,實行違規、違法操作,給金融體系裡面注入了大量有毒現金流,比如零首付次級債等產品。我認為對消費者的保護是非常必要的,在這方面美國甚至已經落後于很多其他國家了,在中國多年來對按揭首付比例都有著嚴格的要求。

另外,在參議院和議院達成的法案最後版本裡面,銀行需要至少保留打包銷售金融產品5%的權益。這就好比讓所有牛奶公司的老闆,每天早上讓自己的孫子先喝當天產出的牛奶,然後再往外銷售,自然就不會有三聚氰氨了。

當然,這次改革還在系統性風險監控、私募與對沖基金監管等等方面有所作為。遺憾的是,此次改革沒有在金融機構高管的激勵方式及其道德風險問題方面有任何舉措。

《21世紀》:美國上世紀30年代出台的《證券交易法》主旨是為了穩定金融市場、創建公平的交易制度,那麼此次美國金融監管改革的靈魂又是什麼?這其中有什麼值得中國借鑒的地方?

黃明:我們應該看到,美國的金融監管和中國的金融監管是有區別的。中國當前還處於基礎建設階段,重點工作是股票、債券市場的基礎建設,中國國內還沒有形成完善的、有活力的衍生產品市場。而美國此次危機,反映的是大量場外衍生品、結構性產品市場,以及房地產信貸和金融機構的問題;而傳統的股票、債券市場、簡單的衍生品市場,尤其是場內衍生產品市場,並沒有出現什麼大問題,而且其融資功能恢複得也很快。所以,對於美國傳統金融市場而言,危機的時間其實是非常短暫的。從這個層面來說,美國出了問題,並不意味著其傳統的股票和債券市場就不值得我們學習了。

此次美國金融監管改革其實是在穩定和活力,而非在穩定和效率之間尋求平衡,其目的依然是要儘量提高金融市場對經濟長期貢獻的效率。我們知道,泡沫對於經濟活力的摧毀力量是巨大的,好的經濟應該是穩定增長的經濟,好的金融市場也應該是能夠幫助經濟穩定發展的市場,而不是通過大起大落的泡沫來拉動經濟。所以,此次美國金融監管改革的核心就是恢複金融市場的穩定、控制系統性風險。這個平衡可能會有損于銀行的短期利潤,但最終將有利於長期經濟發展的效率。因此,我並不讚成對此次改革給予“監管過度會損害經濟活力”的評價。

當然,美國金融市場的系統性風險與其程度較深的經濟民營化有關,而在中國,大的金融機構包括地方融資平台都牢牢掌握在政府手里,最後必然由政府買單,所以還不至於有大的突發式的系統性金融市場風險。但中國這種模式的代價是非常高昂的,它會極大地犧牲經濟的效率,使整個社會的資金源源不斷地流入到這些低效率的投資中去,從而金融市場無法起到優化社會資源配置的作用。所以,中國當前所面臨的仍然是金融體系乃至整個經濟的效率問題,我們沒有理由為了穩定去加強控制或放緩創新。

《21世紀》:此次法案中也有涉及消費者保護的條款,您認為這對於中國的投資者權益保護有何借鑒?

黃明:此次美國金融監管法案在消費者權益保護方面確實有值得我們借鑒的地方。一方面,我們要加強金融市場的基礎設施建設,促進資本市場健康發展,形成合理的市場價格,使投資者享受到回報;另一方面,我們也需要加強對比較複雜的結構性產品的監管。

當前,國內很多銀行向消費者兜售了一些不保本的結構性產品,對此,我的一個疑問是,為什麼在美國這種金融創新十分自由的國家,居然沒有銀行敢把這樣的產品賣給老百姓?這說明中國在這方面是創新過度的。監管層應要求這些銀行對這類產品逐個做出詳細的信息披露,其中應包括銀行從中賺取的利潤比例。據我所知,有時消費者一旦和銀行簽了合約,購買了這類產品,銀行就從中賺取了5%-10%的利潤,倘若把這個披露出來,消費者可能就會重新考慮它的購買行為;此外,銀行還應向消費者披露產品的真實風險。

這一點,香港可以作為我們的前車之鑒。香港實行的是極端自由的資本市場路線,所以才會出現“雷曼迷你債”這種結構性產品的風暴,美國卻沒有出現類似的情況,美國的老百姓並沒有在這種複雜的場外結構性產品上虧損。因此,對消費者的權益保護也是值得我們借鑒的。

從理性到非理性:監管思路嬗變《21世紀》:此次的美國金融監管法案,遭到包括中國學者在內的很多人的反對。這些反對者的理據是什麼?

黃明:美國主流學術界以及中國很多崇拜美國傳統理論的學者,都反對此次的金融監管改革。傳統理論的有效性已經不再,但是很多學者還抱著這些理論不放。諾貝爾獎得主默頓·米勒是現代金融理論的創始人之一。在1996-1998年,我在芝加哥商學院教學,當時米勒健在,他經常提到,美國證監會最應該做的一件事,就是把自己取締了,因為市場不需要他們監管,他們只能幹壞事。傳統理論認為,市場是理性的,每個投資者也是理性的,不會被騙,上市公司及其他參與者想做壞事,會被市場識破,只會自討沒趣,因此不需要政府監管。幾十年來,傳統理論影響了大批的美國、中國學者以及監管層。在傳統理性理論的指導下,以美國為代表的很多國家都對市場與金融機構有些放任自流,導致了這次巨大危機的發生。

當然,在傳統理論的框架內,監管的作用也得到一定的承認,如信息不對稱問題。資本市場存在信息不對稱,嚴重時甚至會導致市場癱瘓,沒有買賣交易。因此,需要有監管機制強迫披露,幫助縮小信息不對稱。但像米勒等學者會進一步反駁,由於投資者是理性的,當存在信息不對稱的時候,信息少的那一方就會決定不參與,市場就會癱瘓,因此信息多的那一方就會主動披露,市場會自動形成披露機制,還是不需要監管。理性理論還意識到了代理人問題,也認為應該對老鼠倉這種代理人不當牟利進行打擊。還有道德風險問題,理性理論也是贊同的,同意作為最後買單人的監管部門有必要控制金融機構的風險。綜上,理性理論對監管也有一定的承認和指導。但是,理性理論否認泡沫的存在,認為投資者不需要保護。總的來說,理性理論認為監管者在市場上能夠起到的正面作用是非常有限的。
《21世紀》:既然理性理論不完全正確,更具有效性的理論是什麼?監管思路會相應的發生怎樣的變革?

黃明:最近幾十年來,大量的金融學研究證明,金融市場不完全是理性的,投資者會過於悲觀或樂觀,價格會出現泡沫,泡沫會破滅,這是金融市場的不可分割的一部分。一旦我們認識到金融市場的本質並不是純粹理性的,有極大的非理性成分,監管的思路就完全不同了。監管層難道還是束手無策,讓市場自由泛濫嗎?那樣的結果只能是不斷的產生泡沫。近年來,我們看到日本泡沫破滅、互聯網的泡沫破滅,和這次嚴重的金融危機,我們要承受多少次泡沫破滅的慘痛後果,才願意承認傳統的理性理論是錯的,才能夠不再依賴它去設計監管思路?

在非理性市場理論,即行為金融學的指導下,監管就能發揮重要作用,監管方有責任、有義務打壓(利用非理性投資者的)違規行為,保護普通投資者,防止投資者對市場的公平性喪失信心,同時加強市場融資、交易、創新的自由度,這樣有助于促進市場的理性。理性的市場是需要通過市場參與者與監管方共同建設出來的,而不是在華麗的傳統理論中假設與推導出來的。

例如,不是所有公司都願意主動披露信息的,因為即便存在極大的信息不對稱,也有足夠多的傻投資者會參與交易,所以,監管層必須要強迫信息披露。又例如,為了保護相對來說比較缺乏金融知識的投資者被利用,要打擊市場操縱。在這些以及其它很多方面,理性理論和非理性理論對監管的必要性存在很大差異。


中國資本市場的監管設計

《21世紀》:在非理性理論的指導下,中國股市的監管框架應該如何設計?

黃明:監管就為健全完善市場的目標服務的,首先要明確如何才是一個成熟、健康的股票市場。一個成熟的股票市場有三個標準:第一,投融資比較自由,上市與再融資審批應極為簡化,只要公司按規則披露信息,市場有人願意買就可以上市融資。第二,價格相對合理,上市公司的股價基本上反映了企業長期真實的盈利能力。假如買賣不自由,很多特別優秀的企業不能上市,就會喪失擴大財富、分享增長的機會。假如價格不合理,一個好公司股價上不去、融不到資;一個壞公司,通過炒作等方式反而融到很多資,那就浪費了社會資源。第三個標準是健康的公司治理。公司治理的關鍵,在於尊重外部長期中小股東的權益。

只有滿足這幾個條件的市場,才能夠達到資源配置的優化,將社會的閑散資金集中起來,投入到真正有增長潛力、創造更多就業機會的企業手中。而企業也不會濫用資金,而是創造價值、回饋股民。這樣就形成了良性循環,是股市的理想狀態。

監管需要推動實現這三個成熟股市的目標。自由融資的目標首先會遭到監管層反駁,說如果現在實現自由上市的話,中國股市將會陷入混亂。我同意這樣的判斷。自由融資、價格合理和健康的公司治理,這三個目標不能單一先行,需要並駕齊驅。首先要把價格基本合理和健康公司治理的問題解決,這樣才能放心地腳踏實地的向著自由上市、自由融資的方向邁進。評價監管層的重要標準之一,就是要看每年向自由融資推進了多少。

要想價格基本合理,就要對違規的行為嚴格監管,引導價值投資成為市場投資的主流。價值投資指的投資者看好公司的基本面,願意長期持有以得到回報。而中國股市的“五毒”——內幕交易、利益輸送、虛假披露、操縱市場和老鼠倉,賺錢太容易、太快,把價值投資擠出去了。當價值投資不能成為主流,價格就很難趨於合理。

所以,首先必須嚴厲打擊“五毒”。投資者往往非理性,容易被操縱市場、虛假披露等行為欺騙,所以監管層在“五毒”方面的打擊力度還應繼續加大。近年來,我們看到證監會在去“五毒”方面做出了不少努力和成效,但是由於體制問題,“五毒”還不能夠被完全根除。美國股市在上世紀30年代之前也是“五毒”俱全,根本沒有人做價值投資,在大蕭條後美國證監會成立、《證券法》通過之後,價值投資才得以弘揚,之後出現了像巴菲特這樣的價值投資大師。

其次,健全市場功能。現在股指期貨已經推出,接下來應繼續推進中小板股指期貨、股指期貨期權等,更應該讓單股可以賣空。不允許單股賣空就會遭遇兩大問題:第一,只有樂觀者可以投票,悲觀者被排除在外,導致股價經常出現泡沫;第二,違規、造假、虛報業績的行為得不到抑制。如果單股可以賣空,就會有許多賣空基金專門逮人造假,上市公司一造假,賣空基金就賣空它的股票,千軍萬馬打假,而不是監管層打假。光缺了單股賣空這一條腿,就導致市場非常不健康。加上其他功能的缺失,一個缺胳膊少腿的市場是不能達到合理定價的。

最後,加強公司治理建設。一方面要打擊任何侵犯小股東和散戶利益的行為,另一方面要大力的激勵高管團隊,將他們的利益和長期中小股東的利益綁在一起。在這方面,股權分置改革是非常有魄力的,也是非常應該做的事情,股市的發展證明瞭這點。但相應的,證監會應加大對上市公司高管的激勵,採用長期股權進行激勵。如果用短期激勵,高管團隊很有可能會通過做假賬、講故事的方式實現高股價套現,賺了就跑。

把“五毒”打下去,弘揚價值投資,市場功能健全了,價格也會趨於理性;同時,加強公司治理與加強高管激勵之後,公司高管也會更加尊重、回饋股民,融資就不會被濫用。在此基礎上,我們就可以放心大膽地逐步放開自由融資。

當然,改革中也存在一些困難,這一方面來自于我們的體制,另一方面來自于國有企業在市場中的主導作用。現在中國大多數券商、基金和大的上市公司都是國企,而國企又往往與政府利益糾纏在一起,這樣就容易出現法規或股民利益與政府利益的博弈。因此,國有機構為主導的格局,對於市場長期的健康發展是一個極大的阻撓。近年來,隨著改革的推進,上市公司中的民營企業比重在逐步提高,這個趨勢對我們股票市場的發展也有正面意義。


19 Jul 2010

2010年7月15日星期四

International Adviser :: Hong Kong's DBS agrees to HK$651m Lehman payout

International Adviser :: Hong Kong's DBS agrees to HK$651m Lehman payout

2010年7月14日星期三

星展6.5億賠雷曼苦主逾六成投資者獲百分百賠償

星展6.5億賠雷曼苦主逾六成投資者獲百分百賠償


【本報訊】雷曼投資者再獲金融機構承諾賠償,證監會及金管局與星展香港達成協議,星展將向透過該行購買雷曼相關Constellation債券其中逾60%的較低風險投資者,連本帶息作百分百賠償,涉資約6.51億元。以金額計,是繼中銀香港(2388)後,本港銀行第二大的雷曼相關投資產品賠償方案,賠償比例亦較之前六至八成為高。記者:呂雪玲

星展是本港銷售雷曼相關Constellation債券份額最大的銀行,佔比約一半,故是次和解協議頗具參考意義。證監會行政總裁韋奕禮稱,是次協議可為雷曼相關Constellation債券的其他分銷商提供指引。

已和解客戶獲補差額

星展共向約3400個客戶賬戶分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券,當中涉及4380宗交易,款額約13.16億元。星展是次建議主要針對賠償予在購買該等債券時,被星展評為屬可承受低至中級風險的客戶,佔比約63%或2160人,總額約6.51億元。賠償額的釐定為債券投資總額,加上該筆投資總額在投資期間原可收取的定存利息,再減去已支付予客戶的債券票息。

該些早前已與星展達成和解的低風險客戶,亦可獲補發款項差額。至於其餘近40%被列入可承受較高風險級別的客戶,則進入加強投訴程序,星展將覆核有關投訴。

金管局副總裁阮國恒表示,已要求星展去信合資格客戶,給予他們60日時間考慮是否接受方案,若接受,星展須於30日內將款項歸還客戶,除非有關個案涉及欺詐等行為,否則金管局將不再跟進相關投訴。若客戶不接受方案,又或不符合資格的客戶在加強版投訴機制下仍解決不了事宜,金管局仍會繼續調查。

其他銀行調查仍在進行

對於渣打及花旗等會否有機會作出類同賠償方案,韋奕禮重申,其他調查仍在進行中。去年12月,大新及豐明銀行就銷售雷曼定息保本票據作出回購,是首次就雷曼迷你債券以外的雷曼產品達成和解。

星展表示,這次是在不承認責任基礎上,以重視與客戶的關係及考慮香港金融制度利益大前提下,提出解決方案。民主黨立法會議員甘乃威歡迎有關協議,認為是苦主一直鍥而不捨的功勞,並指證監及金管局應借此個案,重新考慮將其他迷債產品等賠償由過去的接近六、七成調高至百分百,令所有苦主得到公平對待。對於星展突然作出百分百和解,他不排除是該行有意藉此逃避被追究不良銷售的法律責任,因該行的違規銷售投訴個案甚多,已有兩位僱員因此被懲處。

港銀行就雷曼相關產品賠款

中銀香港涉款:40.47億元

星展香港涉款:6.51億元#

大新涉款:5.58億元*

永亨涉款:3.57億元

富邦涉款:3.33億元

創興銀行涉款:2.88億元

交行涉款:2.05億元

東亞涉款:1.41億元

大眾涉款:0.43億元

資料來源:銀行公告及08、09年年報

註:除星展外,其他銀行的賠償主要關於回購迷債

#另星展集團曾提出在星港兩地就雷曼票據賠償3.62億至4.14億元

*包括大新及豐明回購雷曼定息保本票據


15 Jul 2010

星展和解賠雷曼苦主6.5億

星展和解賠雷曼苦主6.5億


再有銀行與證監會和金管局就雷曼相關產品達成和解協議(下簡稱和解協議),星展集團(香港)將向曾購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的低至中級風險客戶,賠償共六億五千一百萬元,而較高風險級別的客戶暫不獲任何賠償。和解協議將對其他銷售雷曼非迷債產品的銀行構成壓力,其中渣打集團(香港)和花旗銀行重申不會作出集體賠償。


為銀行提供參考指引

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮【圖右】昨天表示,相信和解協議是合理和適合的解決方法,並認為這將為其他銀行提供參考指引,讓其自行決定會否和解。他強調,由於相關的個案仍在調查當中,目前不能預先判斷(prejudge)將有更多和解方案出台。他沒有透露預期完成調查的時間表,惟表示這是監管機構的當務之急。金管局副總裁阮國恒【圖左】表示,歡迎和支持和解協議,希望有關客戶積極考慮。

包括星展香港在內,曾分銷雷曼相關Constellation債券的銀行共十三家(中銀、創興、永亨、永隆、交通銀行香港分行、上海商業、富邦、工銀亞洲、大眾、集友、大新、豐明及南洋商業),以銷售金額計算,星展香港佔百分之六十以上,為十三億一千六百萬元,估計所有銀行的銷售總額約二十二億元。

不過,上述銀行至今沒有表示會與客戶進行集體和解。中銀香港(2388)發言人回應本報查詢時表示,該行注意到星展香港與證監會和金管局的有關公布,至於曾向該行購買雷曼Constellation債券的客戶,中銀香港會按照加強的投訴處理程序。

發言人強調,中銀香港銷售雷曼Constellation時,把該產品列為最高風險的級別,並已向客戶披露相關風險。

富邦銀行(636)表示,正研究星展香港的和解協議對該行的影響,鑑於經該行所購買Constellation債券的客戶人數和所涉及的金額都屬於一個小數目,故管理層相信這個協議對該行所造成的影響不大。創興銀行(1111)指出,需要時間研究和解協議。上海商業銀行現階段亦不作評論。

大新銀行(2356)和豐明銀行去年底已向合資格的雷曼定息保本票據客戶提出集體回購方案,至今星展香港亦已達成和解協議,但有分銷售雷曼相關結構性掛票據(ELN)的渣打香港和花旗銀行都表示,不評論其他銀行的情況,會繼續逐一研究每個相關的客戶個案。

根據和解協議,星展香港的賠償總額約六億五千一百萬元,母公司星展集團表示,已於之前的財政年度安排相關撥備。同時,達成和解協議後,證監會和金管局不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券個案,向該行採取執法行動,除非涉嫌刑事行為。


高風險級客戶須再覆核

是次星展香港的低至中級風險客戶(第一至三級)能夠獲得賠償,原因是證監會在調查中發現,這些客戶未適合購買雷曼相關Constellation債券,但較高風險級別的客戶(第四、五級),應該具備?生工具交易的經驗和知識。星展香港不會向較高風險級別的客戶提出和解建議,但會按照證監會制訂的加強投訴處理程序,逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴。

雷曼苦主大聯盟副召集人簡浩明認為,和解協議缺乏誠意,必須一刀切向所有相關客戶賠償,不應歧視較高風險級別的客戶


15 Jul 2010

DBS to Pay $84 Million in Hong Kong Lehman Settlement

DBS to Pay $84 Million in Hong Kong Lehman Settlement
July 14, 2010, 6:32 AM EDT
More From Businessweek

July 14 (Bloomberg) -- DBS Group Ltd., Southeast Asia’s biggest bank, agreed to repay HK$651 million ($84 million) to Hong Kong clients who bought notes linked to the collapsed Lehman Brothers Holdings Ltd.

DBS (Hong Kong) Ltd. has agreed to make the payments to clients it classified as having a low or medium investment risk profile, the Securities and Futures Commission said today.

“This will serve as a useful guide for other distributors in resolving complaints from customers,” said Martin Wheatley, the commission’s chief executive. Over 60 percent of clients who bought the so-called Constellation Notes from DBS will get back their full investment back with interest, he said.

Hong Kong investors bought a total of HK$6.5 billion worth of the notes, of which HK$1.3 billion were sold by DBS. Today’s agreement follows a settlement arrangement last July in which 16 Hong Kong banks including DBS agreed to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar, for a total of HK$6.3 billion, to buy back a batch of credit-linked notes linked to Lehman, known as mini-bonds.

“The issue over these notes appears to be largely settled, in which case it will be positive for the bank,” Harsh Wardhan Modi, a Singapore-based analyst at JPMorgan Chase & Co., said in an interview today.

Angry Investors

Hong Kong is an example of how the financial devastation resulting from Lehman’s 2008 bankruptcy rippled across the globe. As the securities plunged and allegations of mis-selling mounted, citizens who lost their savings took to the streets and lawmakers scolded the heads of the city’s central bank and securities watchdog in public.

“Resolution payments are being offered, without admission of liability, in the interests of our relationships with our customers and in the broader interests of the Hong Kong financial system,” DBS said in an e-mailed statement today.

Last month, two employees of BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd., the biggest seller of the mini-bonds, pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court to fraudulently selling the product. The judge set Nov. 8 as the date for the trial.

The minibonds, or custom-made securities linked to the credit worthiness of companies, were backed by collateralized- debt obligations and often sold to elderly, mentally ill and poorly educated people, according to a Hong Kong Monetary Authority investigation made public by lawmakers a year ago.

Wheatley declined at a press conference today to name the other banks who have sold the Constellation notes.

For Related News & Information: Top legal stories today: {TLAW } Bloomberg legal resources: {BLAW } Structured notes and OTC Derivatives: {STNT } Asia Structured Notes: {TNI STN ASIA BN }

--With assistance from Joyce Koh in Singapore. Editors: Douglas Wong, Chitra Somayaji

To contact the reporters on this story: Kelvin Wong at kwong40@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong dmao5@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Douglas Wong in Hong Kong at dwong19@bloomberg.net Philip Lagerkranser at lagerkranser@bloomberg.net

2,160 low-risk customers to get money back plus interest

2,160 low-risk customers to get money back plus interest

* Agreement to serve as guidance for future settlements (Adds details, quote)

HONG KONG July 14 (Reuters) - DBS Hong Kong, a unit of Singapore's DBS Group Holdings (DBSM.SI), will pay out a combined HK$651 million ($84 million) to some buyers of Lehman Brothers constellation notes, the territory's financial regulator said on Wednesday.

Customers classified by the bank as having a low- to medium-risk profile would have their money returned plus interest that would have been payable had it been placed in a fixed-term deposit, Hong Kong's Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) said in a statement.

"The SFC is determined to reduce the risk of mis-selling in our market," said the commission's chief executive Martin Wheatley.

"Resolutions like this reinforce the high cost to everyone if we don't get it right in the future."

Investors in Singapore, Hong Kong and Indonesia who bought the product had lost their money after the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers went under in 2008. The constellation notes are credit-linked notes related to the collapsed U.S. bank.

Some 2,160 customers that were classified as having a low risk profile by the bank will get their money back, while high-risk investors will be able to ask for a full review of their case.

The case will also serve as guidance for other banks that have sold constellation notes to its customers before the U.S. investment bank collapsed, the SFC statement said, pointing to other similar resolutions in the future. (Reporting by Kelvin Soh; Editing by Jacqueline Wong)

星展6.5億賠償 予2160雷曼苦主

星展6.5億賠償 予2160雷曼苦主

【本報訊】(記者 周紹基)證監會及金管局昨聯合公布,就星展銀行分銷與雷曼相關的Constellation債券事宜,與星展達成協議。星展在不承認任何責任下,同意和解計劃,即向已購買雷曼Constellation債券的2,160名合資格客戶共賠償6.51億元,惟這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時,獲星展評為低度至中度風險級別。星展將向該批合資格客戶,支付一筆和解款項,相等於有關客戶投資該債券的全數金額,並加上這筆款項在這段期間存放在星展的定期利息收入,再減去債券持有人已收取的票息。

十足本息90日內存入戶口

 對於那些已經與星展達成和解協議的低風險客戶,星展將提出補發款項建議,以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇。星展會盡快向客戶發信,解釋協議細則,並給予客戶60日時間考慮;如果客戶接受,在30日內將和解款項存入客戶戶口。

 至於被星展列入高風險級別的客戶,星展將以加強的投訴處理程序,逐一覆核這些交易的投訴。金管局副總裁阮國恆昨出席聯合記者會時表示,該局歡迎及支持有關和解計劃,強調該方案符合投資者利益,目前有2,160名客戶符合協議的相關條件,佔星展相關產品客戶的6成以上,和解賠償金涉資6.51億元。

倘涉刑事 兩機構續調查

 他又指出,客戶若接受和解,金管局將不會再跟進有關個案;不過,若有關個案涉及欺詐等刑事成分,無論有關客戶是否接受和解,金管局仍會繼續調查。

 證監會行政總裁韋奕禮亦表示,不會再就雷曼Constellation債券的分銷事宜,對星展及其僱員採取進一步執法行動,但若涉嫌不誠實、欺詐、欺騙等屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。韋奕禮又稱,今次和解協議是該會調查促成的結果,雖然有人或會將今次的協議,與雷曼迷債回購作比較,但他強調,Constellation債券本身並無抵押品,同時亦考慮到星展已採取檢討措施,獨立審視分銷安排,故最終達成有關協議。

 韋奕禮說,全港共有14間銀行銷售相同的雷曼產品,涉資65億元,當中星展佔13億元,當局將繼續調查其他銀行,但未知何時達成類似協議。今次是繼雷曼迷債後,證監會及金管局就另一雷曼產品與銀行達成和解協議。韋奕禮表示,迷債及Constellation債券,已佔雷曼債券相關產品的大部分。


15 Jul 2010

KPMG, the account firm involved in DBS Constellation :

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/09/kpmg.html

星展與客戶就Constellation債券達和解協議

星展與客戶就Constellation債券達和解協議
(星島)2010年7月14日 星期三 17:35
證監會 及金管局 今天公布,就星展香港分銷與雷曼相關Constellation債券的事宜,與星展香港達成協議。

繼證監會早前作出調查後,星展香港在不承認任何責任下,同意提出有關雷曼相關Constellation債券的和解計劃。根據有關和解協議:

- 星展香港將會向已購買雷曼相關Constellation債券的星展香港客戶,提出總額約6.51億元的付款建議,這些客戶必須是在購買該等債券時,獲星展香港按照其投資風險評估系統評為屬低至中級風險,即第1、2或3級風險類別的客戶(低風險客戶);

- 星展香港將會向低風險客戶支付一筆款項(和解款項),金額相等於有關低風險客戶對雷曼相關Constellation債券的投資總額,加上這筆投資總額若在投資當日以定期存款形式存入星展香港,在投資當日直至今天日期為止,星展香港就該筆款項應付予有關客戶的利息,再減去迄今已支付予他們的票息後所得款項;

- 對於那些已經與星展香港達成和解協議的低風險客戶,星展香港將會向他們提出補發款項的建議,以達至這批客戶得以與其他低風險客戶享有相同待遇;

- 至於星展香港列入較高風險級別的客戶(即評定為第4或5級風險類別的客戶)所進行的雷曼相關Constellation債券的交易,星展香港將以加強的投訴處理程序逐一覆核有關這些交易的投訴;及

- 對於星展香港在今天日期前售出的雷曼相關Constellation債券以外的非上市結構性產品,星展香港將會採用加強的投訴處理程序,覆核有關這些產品分銷事宜的客戶投訴。

證監會及金管局認為,就它們向星展香港在監管方面提出的關注,星展香港提出的和解計劃屬合理及適當;協議亦符合公眾利益。

鑑於星展香港提出上述和解計劃,證監會將不會就雷曼相關Constellation債券的分銷事宜,對星展香港及其僱員採取進一步執法行動,但有關方面涉嫌犯有不誠實、欺詐、欺騙或屬刑事性質行為的情況除外。金管局已知會星展香港,對於那些接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶,金管局不打算就該等客戶的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案,對星展香港採取執法行動。
.

商業罪案調查科接手查天匯事件.

警方商業罪案調查科數天前打電話給我, 因星期三之後會很忙, 沒有時間查中銀非雷曼精明債帣, 原來是為曾任權指去查恆基

警方商業罪案調查科,接手調查恆基地產,西半山豪宅「天匯」的交易事件。消息指,警方曾到恆基旗下的公司,取走部份文件。

引用自:http://hk.news.yahoo.com/article/100714/18/j5ob.html


警方商業罪案調查科要知的:

證監會文件, 就16間銀行銷售迷債作出報告, 當中明確承認銀行毫不例外地涉及違規銷售, 系統性問題如下5點:
1) 沒有妥善的評核風險;
2) 銷售人員無完善訓練, 對產品特性及風險一知半 解;
3) 銀行並無將銷售過程的資料及紀錄存檔;
4) 銷售人員隨意要求客戶簽訂認購文件而沒有解釋;
5) 銷售人員僅靠宣傳單張, 而不理其他文件內容, 就向客戶推銷。


《證券及期貨條例》第107條(下稱第107條)的第1及第2段的原文是這樣的:
(1) 任何人為誘使另一人作出以下作為而作出任何欺詐的 失實陳述或 罔顧實情的 失實陳述, 即屬犯罪—

(a) 訂立或 要約訂立—
(i) 旨在 取得、 處置、認購或 包銷證券的 協議; 或 (ii) 受規管投資協議; 或
(b) 取得或 要約取得集體投資計劃的 權益, 或 參與或 要約參與集體投資計劃。

第107條,現在警方採取行動,依據的正是這一條。

這條法律說任何人用欺詐(Fraudulent)或魯莽(Reckless)的失實陳述(Misrepresentation),誘使他人買賣受規管的投資計劃,皆是犯法的事情。若然銀行職員犯法,那並不會是一個人的事,一定是結構性的問題。換言之,由高層到前線僱員,有串謀犯法的責任,最終理應一併被控告。

2010年7月13日星期二

評級分析員或須領牌

評級分析員或須領牌月底諮詢嚴過歐美


金融海嘯後本港決定加強對信貸評級機構的監管。證監會建議在香港提供信貸評級服務的機構及其評級分析員,均須申領牌照,建議較其他主要市場(例如歐盟、美國等)只規定評級機構公司註冊為嚴。證監會將會在本月下旬發表有關諮詢文件,九月下旬發表諮詢結果,擬在明年一月下旬設立評級機構規管制度。
月底諮詢嚴過歐美
據證監會向立法會提供的文件顯示,目前並無信貸評級機構以香港作唯一根據地,但惠譽、穆迪及標準普爾這三家主要的環球評級機構均在香港經營業務,另有三家規模較小的跨國評級機構在香港營業。

證監會現建議在《證券及期貨條例》下增設一類新的受規管活動,即「第10類:提供信貸評級服務」。在港提供評級服務的信貸評級機構(連同其評級分析員)需要根據申領牌照,並遵從一系列規管要求,包括有關財政資源、勝任能力及備存紀錄的規定。

在制訂新制度的範圍時,證監會已考慮到需要排除若干與信貸評核有關的活動。

2010年7月12日星期一

Savantas Policy Institute

Savantas Policy Institute

Wanted: A More Passionate Commitment to Serve

Author:Mrs. Regina Ip
Source:SCMP

2010年7月11日星期日

Beware the little old lady

Beware the little old lady - she's a spy for financial watchdogs


Beware the financial watchdogs' spy

That little old lady queuing at the local bank and asking for investment advice may not be who she seems. And that has some in the financial industry worried.

Under a planned "mystery shopper" scheme, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and Securities and Futures Commission will organise senior citizens and pregnant women to act as "investors" to check on whether bank and brokerages are abiding by ethical sales techniques.

Some in the financial sector have likened the scheme to a "white terror" because of its lack of transparency and fairness. Bankers, who are reluctant to speak out openly, also have their misgivings about the scheme that will start by September.

While the practice is aimed at preventing a recurrence of the Lehman Brothers minibond fiasco, there are concerns that the information gathered by the regulators will lead to prosecutions based on the evidence of "actors".

More than 20,000 investors complained last year that they had been misled by bank staff or brokers about the risk of investment products issued or guaranteed by Lehman Brothers. After the US lender collapsed, the minibonds became worthless.

The mystery shopper scheme has its supporters, including the Democratic Party's Kam Nai-wai. "The mystery shopper scheme is very much needed as the Lehman minibonds fiasco showed there are many mis-selling practices," Kam said. "In fact, I think this scheme should go beyond investment products to other consumer and lending products to make sure retailers and bankers are treating their clients appropriately."

However, those in the financial sector have a different view. Since the SFC and HKMA issued a circular to banks, brokers and financial advisers about the scheme last month, many have expressed concerns.

In the circular, the two regulators said they had jointly engaged a "service provider" to hire the actors. However, the identity of the company was not disclosed, and nor was how it would be paid.

The unnamed service provider will use pregnant women, retirees, housewives or young people who will pose as investors buying products from banks, brokers, fund houses and investment advisers. They will check if the salesman is following new rules about selling suitable products to clients.


From January next year, the HKMA will require banks to give first-time investors, or those aged over 65, a two-day cooling off period before executing buying orders for some investment products. They will also need to obtain the age, education and investment experience of their clients to determine what products are suitable for them.

Sales men and women from September will not be allowed to offer any gift coupons as sweeteners for clients who buy structured products. Banks and brokerage staff will also need to give a five-day grace period for investors who buy long-term products. They can cancel the orders within the period and get their money back if they have second thoughts.

Kenny Lee Yiu-sun, chief executive of brokerage firm First China Financial Group, said brokers were worried that not knowing which customers were the undercover shoppers "will affect the relationships between customers and brokers".

Lee also said the scheme would be unfair to brokers, as it was being managed by a third party, and not the SFC itself.

"The mysterious shoppers are paid to do the job of a spy: how can the SFC prevent these people creating traps to lure brokerage staff?" he said. "We trust the SFC as their people are professional, but these spies are sent from this unknown service provider and are unknown to the industry."

Christopher Cheung Wah-fung, chairman of the Hong Kong Securities Professionals Association, said the SFC was creating a "white terror" by introducing the mystery shopping scheme. "Any one of our clients may be someone sent by the firm hired by the SFC, which makes us all worried," Cheung said.

One banker, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said lenders were uncomfortable about the purpose of the mystery shopper exercise.

"Some banks already have internal mystery shopper schemes that send staff from other departments to test the services of other branches," the banker said. "These schemes run by the banks are mainly for educational purposes and staff members do not receive any penalty, as the purpose is mainly training.

"If the scheme was run by the HKMA alone, we would feel more comfortable, as it would only use the data to remind the banks to do a better job. But it is a different story with the SFC, which is likely to use the information collected for enforcement purposes. Will some of our colleagues be prosecuted by the SFC because he or she says something wrong to a mystery shopper? That is scary."

In their circular, the regulators say they will use the feedback obtained to assess the compliance of financial service providers, including whether they were aware of their clients' backgrounds, had disclosed risks and given suitable advice.

The circular added: "Depending on the findings, certain cases may necessitate follow-up action with the intermediaries concerned." Neither the HKMA nor the SFC spokesmen were willing to elaborate on what "follow-up action" meant.

Glenn Turner, chairman of the Independent Financial Advisers Association, has called for the SFC to rethink the mystery shopping scheme.

"All in all, this is a mess, and the SFC should cease this programme immediately," Turner said. "This method implies that the intermediary is guilty and has to prove him or herself innocent, and he or she has to do this in front of a fake prospect.

"Does the SFC have to spy like this? Entrapment techniques have no place in the financial services industry and should be used for hunting down drug or arms dealers." Turner said the "follow-up action" mentioned by the SFC could be a long list and involve prosecutions. Alternatively, the SFC may also use mystery shopping as part of selection process for awarding or declining licences.


One financial adviser said on condition of anonymity that there was confusion over what constituted mis-selling. "There is no common standard on assessing product risks," she said. "It is therefore difficult to say that investment recommendations are improper."

Chim Pui-chung, the legislator representing the financial services sector, complained that the SFC and HKMA scheme lacked transparency.

"There were no seminars and no briefings to allow the industry to understand more about this scheme," Chim said. "The regulators also have made no announcement to the public. We are being kept in the dark." Spokesmen from both the HKMA and the SFC said the mystery shopper scheme would only focus on selling practices involving unlisted securities, futures products and structured deposits but not listed stocks, futures and warrants.

They said the scheme would help regulators understand how unlisted investment products were sold, assess compliance and identify potential issues.

They both pointed out that Britain and Australia have similar mystery shopping schemes, also offered by an external service provider.

SFC chief executive Martin Wheatley said the reason a third party was required for the job was that commission staff could not "lie" to brokers or fund houses.


12 Jul 2010

2010年7月3日星期六

调查发现:香港逾六成雷曼苦主是用养老金买迷债

调查发现:香港逾六成雷曼苦主是用养老金买迷债http://www.sina.com.cn 2009年04月24日 12:21 中国新闻网
  中新网4月24日电 据香港《文汇报》报道,根据香港民建联就雷曼苦主进行的系统性问卷调查结果发现,在未解决投诉案中,有近84%投诉者向自己开有户口的银行购买债券,近64%投诉者的原本存款用途是用作退休养老,并有近84%投诉者称银行主动向他们推销迷债产品。

  雷曼迷你债券去年9月中爆煲至今,仍有大部分苦主的投诉得不到解决。民建联促请特区政府及香港金管局,加大力度督促银行及客户进行和解。

  民建联主席谭耀宗,议员陈鉴林及李慧琼23日举行记者会,公布调查结果。民建联于今年2月至4月9日访问了994名雷曼苦主投诉者,涉及895宗投诉、1192宗迷债个案,涉及资金总额2.12亿港元。

  调查显示,在未解决的765宗投诉案中,投诉者以女性居多,占66.2%,男性占31.5%。37.4%的投诉者是退休人士,26.2%的投诉者只有小学学历,自认没文化的也占10.1%,没投资经验的占45.3%,反映苦主大部分没有投诉知识及承受高投资风险能力。

  调查发现,83.9%的投诉者向自己开有户口的银行购买债券,只有5.5%的投诉者不是银行原有客户,63.5%投诉者的原本存款用途是退休养老用,只有3.3%用作投资,83.9%投诉者称银行主动向他们推销迷债产品,54.6%是银行在投诉者的存款到期并到银行办理续期存款时主动推销迷债,也有约9.8%是银行打电话给客户推销有关产品。

  在未解决投诉案中,58.1%的投诉者是愿意协商和解,33.5%事主则要求银行作出全数款额的赔偿,不准备和解。

  民建联表示,雷曼事件进展相当缓慢,远远未能符合雷曼苦主的期望及诉求,促请特区政府及金管局加大力度督促银行及客户进行和解。民建联也要求各分销银行向60岁以上、没有投资经验、没有文化、伤残病弱的投资者及所有受误导投资者作出全数赔偿。

  民建联同时要求,有关单位应公布有关调查的全面结果,包括公开银行内部的销售守则是否存在系统性的问题,以释公众疑虑。

  另外,对于跟进事件的工作,民建联建议特区政府及金融监管机构就此事件汲取教训,从速针对监管上的不足,作出政策上的修改。特区政府应积极研究海外市场对衍生投资产品作出的监管法例和做法,制定一套因时制宜及与时并进的监管措施。

任志刚:精明债券已声明高风险

任志刚:精明债券已声明高风险http://www.sina.com.cn 2009年06月12日 08:28 新浪财经
  继续有环球企业倒闭,大摩“精明债券”等信贷挂钩票据(CLN)的“爆煲”风险不断升级。金管局总裁任志刚明言,他有看过这类产品的宣传单张,这类产品确实是“高风险”产品,相对雷曼迷债而言,“精债”的风险解释较清晰,宣传单张上列明是“不保本”及“高风险”。因此,要是有银行职员将这类产品售予只适合“低风险”产品的投资者,便属违规销售。

  据《明报》报道,香港立法会财经事务委员会昨日讨论CLN的风险问题,任志刚及证监会行政总裁韦奕礼,双双接受议员提问,但两人对问题的症结,明显各有不同的判断。任志刚多番强调,证监会对于投资产品销售文件的内容,“应该有守门口的角色”。被任志刚暗批的韦奕礼则响应,尽管产品销售文件复杂,但负责推售产品的前线人员,有责任向投资者讲解所有风险。

  产品交代风险方式各异

  “精明”、迷债及星展“Constellation”结构债券的宣传单张,全有清楚标明有关产品“不保本”。“精明”在单张上,附加了“对准投资者适合性”一栏,当中写“投资于本债券包含高度风险”。

  “Constellation”亦有列举风险因素,当中包括“投资涉及风险,阁下有可能损失全部或部分投资”。迷债有个别系列的单张,没有直接提及风险水平,只有若干系列在单张上的“一般事项”栏目,指出“购买及持有迷债涉及高风险”。“精明”、迷债及“Constellation”属同类结构产品,但在单张上交代风险水平的方法则各异,让人关注负责审阅投资产品宣传单张的证监会,是否做得不足。

  与会议员亦关注,CLN的宣传单张,为何只列明直接挂钩企业的信贷风险,但没有提及票据所持债务抵押证券(CDO)的挂钩企业一旦倒闭,票据同样有违约风险?证监会行政总裁韦奕礼解释,单张有列明产品的主要风险,进一步的资料及风险问题,应由前线职员向投资者解释。

  另外,有议员建议金管局就“精债”事件,向银行展开“主题审查”,跟进销售程序有否不妥。任志刚说可以研究,但“现时恐怕无人手做到!”

精明债券套中套

精明债券套中套http://www.sina.com.cn 2009年06月05日 00:02 21世纪经济报道
  本报记者 朱宝 香港报道

  利率掉期匹配

  “最好的状况下,投资者可能准时收取利息,并在债券到期时收回全部本金。”某外资大行债务融资部门专业人士对精明债券进行解读后称,当然,也有可能本金亏损到分文不剩。

  据该人士介绍,精明债券系列1的结构分以下几部份,首先是发行人发行债券,并以筹得的资金购买投资产品,即指定证券。指定证券可以由、或者包括以资产支持的证券或其他结构性或有抵押债项组成。

  “通常情况下,这类指定证券可能与某个公司挂钩,可能是某个公司的债券,也可能是某些公司的投资产品,在这个环节上将会与公司的信贷状况挂钩。当然,发行人发行的债券本身也可以与公司的信贷状况挂钩。”上述专业人士称。

  这点可以在精明债券系列10的章程中可见,该系列债券投资的指定证券,包括合成抵押债务证券、抵押债务平方证券、信贷商品挂钩证券及资产抵押证券,这些证券可能与相同参考实体,或相同行业或业务种类的参考实体挂钩。

  接下来,发行人需要对这些指定证券进行掉期。购买的指定证券也会收取利率,但这个利率与发行人要支付给债券持有人的利率是不匹配的。

  不匹配可能有以下几种情况。一种是利率的形式的不匹配,即,是固定还是浮动利率。举例来说,向债券持有人支付的债券利率是固定的,而购买的指定证券或投资产品的利率是浮动的,这是一种不匹配,需要用掉期进行匹配。另外,付息的时限不匹配。比如发行人向债券持有人是半年付一次息,而购买的投资产品是三个月付一次息,这时也需要利用掉期进行匹配。还有一种情况就是使用币种的不匹配。比如,发行人向债券持有人支付的利息是港元,而购买的证券或投资产品收取的是美元利息,这也需要利用掉期进行匹配。

  远期协议

  “通常来说,这种债券还有最后一个步骤,就是发行人将购买的指定证券或投资产品,与远期对手签订一个远期协议。理论上,这么做的目的,是为了转嫁投资产品或指定证券的潜在风险,也就是说,发行人与远期对手签订协议,投资产品或指定证券在出现问题后,远期对手收到指定证券与投资产品后,向发行人支付现金款项,但支付的现金额度要视双方合同而定。发行人收到这笔款项经币种掉期后,再支付债券投资者。”上述专业人士说。

  该人士称,精明债券系列1中,发行人与远期对手签订的远期协议条款究竟如何并不知道, 但从债券设计上,可以做到在远期合约环节发行人购买的指定证券的价值,在表面上看来得到“保护”,但在经过更多条款与条件后,实际价值为指定证券的本身价值,甚至可能为零。通常与公司信贷状况挂钩又与证券状况挂钩的债券,其风险将由几部分组成:首先是市场状况,债券受市场流动性影响,有市场定价风险。其次是指定证券与投资产品的风险,指定证券与投资产品本身也要受市场流动性影响,以及指定证券与投资产品挂钩的公司的信贷风险,视挂钩的方式不同都可能直接影响投资产品或指定证券的价值。

  此外,还要面对的风险在远期对手方面,首先要参考的是,发行人与远期对手签订的远期协议中,是百分之百担保,还是部分担保,又或者无担保还是担保风险转嫁。

  一旦指定证券或投资产品出现问题,比如信用状况出现问题,或者出现贬值。假如发行人当时以100元购买该指定证券或投资产品,现在价格跌到10元,需要提前赎回的话,发行人就会将这笔指定证券与投资产品让远期对手赎回,赎回的价格则要取决于之前签订的协议,如果是100%赎回,那么远期对手将会出90元,加上指定证券余留的10元,一共是100元,债券持有人的投资本金就能全额收回。100%担保的话,发行人向远期对手支付的费用显然远大于部分担保。

  但如果价格跌到10元时,远期对手本身也出现信贷状况而违约,不能按约定的赎回价格赎回指定证券,那么,发行人能从远期对手要回多少钱,就将直接影响到债券的赎回价格。

  假设投资100元的指定证券与投资产品依然只余下10元的价值,发行人与远期对手若签订的不是100%担保合约,或者无担保,而远期对手本身也出现问题,那么可赎回的可能就不到100元,甚至为零。

  发行人将指定证券或投资产品交付远期对手后,本来该拿回100元投资本金,或者80元投资本金(部分担保),但只拿回60元投资本金(远期对手出现问题),这时60元投资本金的分配方式就很重要了。比如,系列1有A、B、C与D组,并不是每组拿15元去赎回投资者本金,而是先支付A组,A组支付完以后,还有余额再支付B组,到了D组,可能60元已经分配完了,那D组的赎回价格就可能为零。

  “但如果仔细看,D组的利率一定是高于A、B、C组的,因为高收入,高风险。”该人士称。

香港勢跟隨歐美加強監管金融機構 政務司司長唐英年是香港國際金融中心罪人

香港勢跟隨歐美加強監管金融機構 政務司司長唐英年是香港國際金融中心罪人 标签: 监管 欧美 银行 证监会 金融 2010-07-04 00:10


4/9/2009


政務司司長唐英年在接受傳媒訪問時表示,香港要維持國際金融中心的地位,允許市場存在金融衍生工具是理所當然的事,只要分銷商在推銷時能提供風險透明度,至於銷售甚麼產品,政府是不會過問的。

提高香港金融市場的多元化,保持自由度,並不等於放任自流,放棄必要的管制,更不能姑息有違專業操守、損害香港金融信譽的營商行為。造成今日的局面,顯然與政府監管存有漏洞,對高風險的金融衍生產品的約束不夠有關。到目前為止,受迷你債券影響的苦主已有3,500多人,估計平均每人的損失將以數十萬計,這些人已經倍感受騙、氣憤,倘若再得不到政府有效的協助,便很可能演變成對政府管治威信的衝擊。但是,事件爆發以來,從金管局、證監會等監管部門的反應來看,又犯了政府一貫的被動、遲鈍毛病。金管局、證監會當然不能視事件是普通的投資失誤,以置身事外的態度發表一些不痛不癢的安慰說話就此了事,一定要作出實質性的介入,施加壓力,要求銀行與苦主協商,爭取一套雙方可接受的解決方法,盡可能將雙方的損失降至最低。

楊星

4/7/2010

信報財經新聞] 香港勢跟隨歐美加強監管金融機構


金融海嘯引發全球多國收緊監管要求,不少措施將在下半年陸續落實。至於年內歐美監管機構繼續針對大型金融機構窮追猛打,雖然未必與本港直接相關,但特區政府一直強調不容許監管「套戥」,意味本地監管要求很可能跟隨收緊。

雖然美國的改革與香港沒有直接關係,但可能造成深遠影響。投資銀行界人士指出,現階段香港沒有加強監管的壓力,惟當局應該密切留意改革進展;同時,研究提高金融機構的透明度,包括加強資料披露。

證監會和金管局在上半年公布多項加強保障投資者的措施,銳意防止雷曼迷債事件再次出現。其中最受市場關注的包括「前二後五」的「冷靜期」安排,即分別由金管局提出的「落單冷靜期」和證監會提出的「平倉權利」;同時,過往銀行等中介人積極以贈品吸引投資者的做法亦會大幅收緊。

自金融海嘯出現以來,不少國家逐步收緊沽空限制,歐盟區內最大經濟體的德國在5月21日突然宣布限制無貨沽空(naked short-selling);香港在這方面並沒有跟隨歐美的做法。證監會行政總裁韋奕禮(Martin Wheatley)解釋說,香港沒有全面禁止賣空是因為自亞洲金融危機以來,沽空監管制度一直行之有效。

本地銀行界人士指出,本港不時討論是否需要設立超級監管機構,以取代目前分業監管的狀態,但相信英國5月公布的改革暫不會引發本地市場新一輪相關的討論。

談及新的監管架構,今年上半年政府已完成設立投資者教育局及金融糾紛調解中心的諮詢,當局期望於下個立法年度完成有關條例的修訂。建議中的調解中心運作是通過「先調解、後仲裁」的形式進行。

展望下半年,市場期待歐盟對於收緊對沖基金和私募基金監管的修訂,之前當地經過幾輪激辯仍未有結果,最具爭議是一項─禁止非成員國的基金經理管理區內的投資組合,換言之,境外註冊的基金可能全部被拒諸門外。

與歐美一樣,本港監管信貸評級機構的工作也將於下半年推進。證監會正在草擬本港監管評級機構的守則,包括發牌和操守準則,即將展開公眾諮詢,期望能夠於明年年中落實建議。

歐美和香港金融監管新措施要點

1月: 奧巴馬建議限制銀行坐盤交易、禁止銀行經營對沖基金、地產投資或私募基金。

2月: 港府就成立金融糾紛調解中心和投資者教育局展開公眾諮詢

3月: 港府公布《有關擬將上市法團披露股價敏感資料的若干規定納入法例的諮詢文件》,計劃在2010至01年立法年度向立法會提交條例草案,將有關披露資料要求納入《證券及期貨條例》。

為了提高淡倉透明度,證監會將採納新的淡倉申報制度,期望最快在今年內實施。

4月: 香港證監會落實有關加強規管零售結構性產品的建議,公開發售這類產品將不再受《公司條例》的招股章程制度規管,轉而納入《證券及期貨條例》的監管範圍。

5月: 美國通過金融改革法案;德國突然推出無貨沽空禁令。

香港金管局推出「落單冷靜期」安排,銀行最遲於明年初實行;證監會公布多項保障投資者利益措施,包括投資產品五天售後冷靜期。

6月: 英國財相歐思邦(George Osborne)宣布,重組自1997年以來由英倫銀行、金融服務業管理局(FSA)和財政部領導的「三頭馬車」金融監管架構,讓英倫銀行擁有監察整體金融系統、防止新一輪金融危機的權力。

G20同意應收緊銀行資本要求,增加抵抗金融危機能力。


03 Jul 2010

2010年7月2日星期五

葉缺德

葉缺德簡直是人面獸心的「老狐狸」。她在立法會上顛倒黑白,竟把「超級垃圾」的星債描述成風險低的產品,企圖混淆視聽,蒙騙立法局眾議員。正如葉劉議員指責她,「咪當我地係豬」。眾所周知,葉缺德是前金管局高層要員,前總裁任刺肛的左右手,理應對金融產品的結構瞭而指掌,比任何人更清楚。她這次賣命給外資「星加坡」,詐騙本地「香港中國人」,其心惡毒如斯,世間罕見。咱們星債受害人不得不集中力量,每人呈一信給金管局要求回應:關於星債產品風險被DBS定為評級2的理據作出合理解釋。如證寶星展高層在立會作出失實陳述,金管局應立即採取行動 (Act now!!)追究其刑事責任。

我個人認為,如想取得「集體和解」, 星債苦主們要逼金管和證監應逼得比銀行更緊,方能成事。最重要的是,我們要証明銀行的[結構性銷售系統]錯誤,才有追討賠償的機會。由此,不能僅將注意力集中在銀行的[銷售人員]錯誤引導下購買星展債券,這很難取得合理賠償,也因此容易變成了個人[銷售員]的問題, 而不是銀行問題。

各位星債苦主, Act Now!! 一人一信的行動不可小!! 我們要逼金管和證監回應問題。

抗癌鬥士麥女士(金蟬婆婆)親述警方清場時對她的暴力對待