2009年7月29日星期三

與“迷債”極相似的星展“CONSTELLATION”零售債券

一直公眾都被引導誤會星展銀行所出的“CONSTELLATION” 零售債券與“ELN”屬同一種類的掛鈎票據, 其實是錯誤的。原則上“CONSTELLATION” 零售債券與“雷曼迷債”結構同出一轍,表面上都是與一系列高評級的國際知名機構作信貸掛鈎以招徠,內裡其實包含了兩種不同的信貸衍生工具,結構十分複雜。第一種信貸衍生工具的結構是信貸違約掉期(CDS),即是投資者向產品發行人收取保費,為多家指定企業做保險。如果指定企業出現信貸問題,投資者將損失本金,只能取回該企業某種指定債權的市值;另外發行人從集資所得購買一些抵押品,但沒有指明是甚麼抵押品,只由星展星加坡提供全面擔保。換言之,投資者需要承擔第一種信貸衍生工具兩方面的風險,即指定企業的信貸風險及抵押品的信貸風險。第二種信貸衍生工具是合成抵押債券證券(Synthetic CDO),把超過100家企業組成一個投資組合,如果該組合中的企業出現財政困難,投資者將失去所有本金,只能索回該投資組合的企業某種指定債權的市值;這類合成CDO仿如把一連串的信貸違約掉期(CDS)組合而成的CLN。

換言之,”CONSTELLATION” 零售債券投資者購買這種二合一產品後,要承擔四重風險,包括:第一層結構中指定企業(一般是7-8家較知名的企業)的信貸風險、以及第一層結構中的掉期對手違約風險,第二層結構中超過100 家指定企業的信貸風險,以及第二層結構中的最終抵押品的信貸風險。

然而,銀行職員在銷售”CONSTELLATION” 零售債券時手法與”迷債”一樣同樣聲稱是十分安全的投資,假如七至八間的國際知名機構中即使其中一間發生信貸違約事件,亦只是損失投資金額的七至八分之一,事實上並非如此,損失是可達百分百。星展及其他零售銀行在銷售這個產品時沒有道出真正的產品結構及風險,情況與”迷債”十分相似。讓我們分析一下兩種產品相同的地方:

1. 與一系列高評級的國際知名機構作信貸掛鈎,只要是其中一間發生信貸違約事件便會觸發提早贖回。但銀行職員在銷售時說明假如七至八間的國際知名機構中即使其中一間發生信貸違約事件亦只是損失投資金額的七至八分之一,事實上並非如此,只要其中一間發生信貸違約事件便會損失全部本金。現時 “CONSTELLATION”零售債券的情況就是其中一間信貸掛鈎機構”雷曼” 發生了信貸違約事件;

2. 第一層的信貸風險:與信貸違約掉期(即簡稱CDS)掛鈎,銀行職員在銷售時並沒有提到這個風險的嚴重性,亦沒有解釋什麼是“信貸違約掉期”, 甚至直至現在星展沒有明確向客戶解釋CDS的內容;

3. 潛在風險便是掉期對手發生信貸違約事件亦會導致投資損失,就如”雷曼迷債”一樣。作為”雷曼迷債”掉期對手的”雷曼”便申請了破產保護而導致投資者損失本金。至於“CONSTELLATION”零售債券,據我們所知星展銀行星加坡總行是“CONSTELLATION”的掉期對手,發行商是星展集團附屬的空殼公司,星展銀行香港及一眾香港銀行是分銷行、發行商。掉期對手及零售行三者間關係非常密切, 星展銀行星加坡分部亦設在星展銀行香港的辦公大樓內。如此親密關係,星展銀行香港在銷售“CONSTELLATION”產品時完全談不上對該產品有不清楚的地方,因此,星展銀行香港應該對誤導投資者的銷售手法上負上全部責任;

4. 第二層的信貸風險: 超過一百間的合成扺押債券證券(即簡稱CDO)。銀行出售產品時並沒有說明這一系列扺押品的狀況,令投資者誤會扺押品是宣傳單張上所列的七至八間的國際知名機構所發行的債券,甚至銀行職員本身亦有同樣的誤會。事實上CDO是由一百間以上的公司合成的扺押債務責任,只要六至七間公司發生信貸違約事件便可能導致損失所有本金,這一個重要環節銷售銀行並沒有向投資者說明。

星展苦主核心自救組編寫

2009年7月27日星期一

HK minibonds special police

To UBS, Swiss Consulate Business Affairs hon.vertretung@eda.admin.ch,
IFC (world bank) Andrew Mak 25098110,Cell:92770706, Email: amak@ifc.org
Re: Hong Kong banks ,HKMA fruads and HK police related actions to cover up of Minibonds frauds and curbing demonstrations.

This is to inform you about the incident in your UBS lobby 26th June . I had called your bank around 12 am and your secretary had listened the phones and I had informed her that I was in your lobby waiting for meeting with HKMA. I was waiting in your UBS lobby for a meeting with HKMA which was using your lobby Building conference room in matters concerning timeline of HKMA in investigating of DBS Constellation series Notes.

I might also want to go to your UBS office to have my bonds purchuse information in your bank such as low risk Town Gas bonds, Goldman Sach bonds which paid up to 6-6.5% interest to show to Legco members that HK public banks were mis-selling Minibonds that were not bonds but high risk structures products that paid merely 4.2-4.8% as false bonds. HK banks in fact were selling 120M of minibonds since 2003 with HKMA protection of not cheching any bank frauds by Joseph Yam in 2003 while these banks were hiding real bonds purchase in HK such as Hutchison bonds that sold in HK to banks themselves in these period. By hiding these bonds purchase under banks own assets while selling false bonds - Minibonds in HK, the banks could made 2% profit each year for huge profit growth starting in year 2003.

At 3:00 pm, I was in the upper lobby taking photos for Lehman victims and one of six to more securities blocked my way. After I told the security in front that I was going to UBS, he walked away but one other security in the escalator suddenly rush in and one lay on the floor. The securities should have security licenses and be trained and registered in police station and this should not be actions trained by security courses. Also other securites came and blocked my way.Then up to four policemen suddenly came to arrest me together with security guards of up to a dozen people surrounding me.I called you Helen Lo about these securities in the upper floor of lobby were blocking the path for me to enter into you bank lobby and on half past three to your bank executive directory Mr. Philippe Adler about this matter.

The following is the link of the photos of securites involved in this incidence:

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1173&fid=19

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1174&fid=19

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1175&fid=19

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1176&fid=19

http://hk.mybloyg.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1177&fid=19

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/photo?pid=1177&fid=19


Only in four o'clock I did learn about the false allegation of the building security guards in assault charge from three uniform policemen and blocking of pathway for me to enter into your bank, the CID section of the Police that came three hours later to question me about the blocking and false allegations of your bank securities then advised me to write this complaint letter to you to inform MTR that in charge of building to take necessary actions against these security guards. And there were up to fifteen policemen and security guards all lying and arrangement of these false assults charge. This is the most crazy incidence happened in the whole world and so unbelievable that in order for me to stop taking photos of HKMA bank frauds in HK, fifteen HK police and security guards stop just one man to take photos in order to force assults charges on him.Even the two policemen that laid the charges only knew that they would follow the order from the HK minibonds special police to curb the Minibonds victims and these were happening also with special banks security guards especially for Bank of China guards and DBS bank of Singapore.And Shanghai Commercial banks manager also informed me since 2003 that all HK public banks were allowed to do same kind of private banking business as Swiss Banks at that time by HKMA chief Joseph Yam - (self regulation in all derivative products )and HK was then the Switzerland of Asia, and now HKMA is covering up these HK bank frauds up.The facts were that most HK banks were selling derivative products as bonds and term deposits products after year 2003.


Meanwhile I could not joined the meeting with HKMA in the afternoon to talk about the time needed for Constellation notes holders to get the investigating time of the Singapore DBS bank Constellation series Notes and the giving of very important documents of Shanghai Commercial Bank Minibonds sales records to HKMA with file no. xx57 for investigations and only the CID of HK police did take a copy of my documents which should also be given to Police commercial crimes investigation units and HKMA.

The despicable actions of MTR (HKMA controlled) security guards also blocked my meeting with DP member N.W. Kam at 7:30pm in government house concerning the mis-selling of high risk Victory Peak series Notes with my shares of the notes and in actions of returning the money back up me.

The police actions were as follows:

A police was stopping people from going upstair from UBS lobby after HKMA borrowed a building conference room and HKMA people did not show up and later on force his police to lay charges on assaults on me using telephones.

A Lehman ELN victim was charging the MTR security guard was pushing him around.

People were gathering in UBS lobby to wait for HKMA people to come in the next lobby.

The securities were watching downstairs at UBS lobby while people were walking down the stair.

The security told me not to take photo and I told him I am going to UBS and he walked away.

A security lay on the floor and others charged me to step on him but I took this fool photo and walked away from him. The photo showed there were space next to him to walk past.

The security was talking to the lobby desk while I was taking the photo and other security started to block my way.

The securities were blocking my way to stair to go to UBS.

In taking the photo, the security wanted to push me back.

Three police came and I wanted to complain to police that the building securities were blocking my entrance to UBS, I took out my telephone to call Helen, the Assist. director of UBS that their building securities were blocking my way to UBS lobby. But three policemen walked me away. Then half an hour later, they carried me away in a police car saying their police chief did not wanted me to stay in the building.

In the police stations, they did not record my statement and the police wrote false statements in assaults charges in the next room for they never told me I was arrested in UBS . The police in charge told me that nobody called the police in telephone and they were just next by and watched everybody there and came. The three policemen kept on implied to me that they were ordered by their cheif and told me nothing but only to coorporate and stand still. They told their chief in telephones for few times I was going to UBS lobby but their chief wanted to charge me on assult as a Minibonds demonstrator in HKMA building next lobby. I force them to let me wrote my statement in English for I refused to copy their false statement in Chinese.

Only in three hours later, the police CIDs arrived to take my true statement. I gave them informations from Shanghai Commerical Banks documents that I would like to give to Police business crimes unit and HKMA and that the reason I went to HKMA as HKMA were asking for new evidence from me in letters. Also government financial service informed me that my cases of charges against Shanghai Commercial Bank was in HKMA sent by police to them. I told the CID's about false assault charges in the statement about these securities but the CID said that these were recorded in my statement in assault charge. Also I wanted to print out bonds informations from UBS as I bought bonds in UBS before but there were no bonds sold in Shanghai Commercial bank thru the banks informed me that I could buy bonds there but the policemen did not allow me to go to my UBS bank for bond informations. And there were nobody in HKMA to handle these complaints as nobody came down to meet us.

Hong Kong was now run by the police state with Tsang as their leaders of doing nothing to protect properties of common citizens and Donald Tsang said that he is also one of the police family.

For UN Human Right Commission, HK police CID in fact had delayed the charges for 6 hours time, lying that the assault charges include my complaints of these security forces of HKMA stopped me taking photos of banks frauds. And only during 9pm they did ask if I want to file complaints. The independent police complaint council would be useless council to HK people eyes in controlling police abuses of power. The police also delayed the investigations for three months in order to apply mental tortures to Lehman victims during protesting and I had checked with most Lehman minibonds victims that suffer under brutality of the security forces of the banks, such as Mrs. Chan that bought DBS Constellations Notes and faced the same consequences.This is the standards procedures of these special minibonds police task forces.

Please see the following links on HK victims fight with HK government on their cover up of HK bank frauds:

http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/E28098down-with-donald-tsangE28099-E28093-a-july-1st-manifesto-of-the-alliance-of-lehman-brothers-victims-in-hk3720.php





2009年7月25日星期六

FS welcomes Minibonds agreement
The Financial Secretary, Mr John C Tsang, today (July 22) made the following statement in response to the re-purchase agreement jointly announced by the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) and 16 distributing banks regarding Lehman Brothers Minibonds:


(Media-Newswire.com) - The Financial Secretary, Mr John C Tsang, today ( July 22 ) made the following statement in response to the re-purchase agreement jointly announced by the Securities and Futures Commission ( SFC ), the Hong Kong Monetary Authority ( HKMA ) and 16 distributing banks regarding Lehman Brothers Minibonds:

"We welcome the agreement reached among the SFC, HKMA and the distributing banks for the re-purchase of Lehman Brothers Minibonds. It represents a reasonable settlement that has taken account of the interests and rights of the investors concerned.

If the agreement is accepted, the vast majority of investors will be able to get back 70 per cent or more of their original investments.

The agreement will put an end to more than 10 months of distress for investors. It will also enable the banks to resume their normal operation.

The decision of the SFC is taken after a thorough and fair investigatory process, reflecting that an effective channel exists in our regulatory structure to ensure that investors' interests are protected.

Nevertheless, we will learn from experiences gained in the Lehman Minibonds issue and improve our regulatory system so that investor protection can be further strengthened."

Lehman inquiry to call SFC chief again

The Legislative Council subcommittee investigating the Lehman Brothers minibond debacle will again summon the head of the Securities and Futures Commission to explain the HK$6.3 billion deal to repay thousands of investors.
Speaking after a closed-door meeting yesterday, the subcommittee's chairman, Raymond Ho Chung-tai, said it decided to summon the regulator's chief executive, Martin Wheatley, for an open hearing as early as Friday or early next month.
It's because after announcing the repurchase proposal, we need to understand the deal thoroughly ... and ask about the terms, which are unclear, Mr Ho said.
The 16 banks that sold Lehman Brothers minibonds will send letters to investors early next month, and investors will have 60 days to decide whether to accept the deal.
Mr Ho said the legislators therefore hoped to hold the hearing as soon as possible to obtain more information about the repurchase arrangement. The subcommittee also decided that Financial Secretary John Tsang Chun-wah would be the next to be summoned, Mr Ho said.
The SFC announced on Wednesday the HK$6.3 billion buyout deal, which covers 29,000 investors of Lehman Brothers minibonds.
Under the agreement, those who are over 65 years old will get 70 per cent of the value of their initial investment back, while those below 65 will get 60 per cent back. They will receive at least a further 10 per cent of their initial investment from the residual value of the collateral. Despite their name, minibonds are not corporate bonds but credit-linked derivatives whose worth depends on the health of the underlying assets.
Mr Ho said the subcommittee members had also agreed to extend the area of investigation to include investors' protection, the complaint mechanism and the penalty system for any violation of the law during the selling of financial products.
The subcommittee chairman reiterated that the agreement would not interrupt the subcommittee investigating the matter.
Unlike previous Legco inquiries, this time the incident is developing and we need to make plans accordingly. But it will not halt our investigation, he said.
Although the subcommittee decided earlier to take a break next month, Mr Ho said that as a result of the latest development, meetings would continue during the summer as long as there were enough lawmakers on hand.
A lot of members have told me they won't be in Hong Kong in August. But because this is something which has got very wide public attention and interest, we will try our best to find enough members, he said


立會研討迷債協議 傳召曾俊華韋奕禮

(明報)2009年7月25日 星期六 05:10

【明報專訊】證監會 已跟銀行就雷曼迷債達成和解協議,立法會 雷曼迷債事件小組委員會決定盡快傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮再出席公開研訊,以便深入了解和解協議,並研究投資者保障、投訴機制及制裁機制如何協助投資者。小組委員會亦會首次傳召財政司曾俊華出席研訊作供。明報記者

有委員明言會追問證監會到底基於什麼數據,衡量出這是對事主最好的方案。委員之一的民主黨 甘乃威表示,雖然銀行拿出63億元作最少六成賠償,但他估計賣出抵押品後,銀行實際損失一定會低於28億元,懲罰性遠遠不夠,證監會要解釋為何接納這個懲罰性不足的和解方案。他又批評,該黨日前邀約財經事務及庫務局 陳家強 討論和解方案,但陳家強拒絕會面。

最快下周五向韋奕禮取證

由於韋奕禮現不在港,小組暫定7月31日(下周五)或8月初向他取證。小組主席何鍾泰 相信,雖然不少小組委員都在8月休假及外遊,但由於事關重大,委員都會盡量參與會議,不擔心出現出席法定委員人數不足以致會議無法召開的情况。

事主不滿接受方案即終止調查

小組委員會除了會再傳召韋奕禮外,亦會傳召曾俊華出席公開研訊,並希望盡快安排。何鍾泰稱,小組已從財經事務及庫務局、證監會及金管局 取得不少資料,由於「很多金融監管機構議會的決定,都由他(曾俊華)作出」,而這一方面一直未有探討,故希望曾俊華補充資料。

何鍾泰指出,小組在向財金官員取證後,第二階段會向銀行、前線銷售人員或投資者取證,問及何時向銀行取證,他表示暫未有討論。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽昨日在商台 節目訪問中表示,不能接受事主若接受賠償方案,證監會便會終止調查的條文;他又認為有關「經驗投資者」的定義欠清晰。


《王岸然》「失實陳述」在雷曼事件的應用


《王岸然》「失實陳述」在雷曼事件的應用

雷 曼迷債事件發展到今天,可謂完全背離一個法治社會應有的做法。筆者其實只想問一個簡單得無法再簡單的問題,銀行當初的銷售手法是否違法,若然是,是銀行錯 了,買賣合約無效了,銀行就應當全數賠償,但若然銀行沒有錯,一切已經做足手續,解釋的清清楚楚,那就是雷曼小投資者自己的錯,是自己投資失誤,猶如我們 購買一件商品之時自己沒有看清楚商品的品質及性能就買下來,這自然是自己的責任。

但 雷曼迷債最終的解決建議,卻明顯只是強權,沒有公義。早幾個星期香港的證監會才清楚表明立場,除小數專業投資者外,雷曼苦主應可獲十足回購,而事實上證監 在自己的權限所及已經成功迫令多家證券商全數回購雷曼迷債,但今天在政府的壓力之下,證監會、金管局及16家迷債分銷銀行達成和解協議,同意銀行可以以 「六成」之低的價錢回購投資者手上的迷債。

只有六成的回購價,道理何在?選擇接納和解的苦主,將不可再追究銀行,理由又何在?對無權無勢的小投資者而言,就算明知道理與法律百分之一百在自己一邊,又可以如何?他們對銀行還有信心嗎?對政府還有信心嗎?

筆 者在三份報紙的專欄不下十數篇文章批評事件,皆只在法律的角度出發,文章皆放上網誌,有不少苦主留意及回應,亦直接收到不少報章轉寄而來的讀者來信。到這 一刻,實有欲語無言之感。我無法對苦主提出簡單有力的建議,是接受還是不接受六成和解,筆者只知道,對大多數苦主而言,這是一項不平等條約,可憐的是你們 求助無門,政客都已經放假去了。

筆 者這裡簡單介紹在合約法之中,所謂失實陳述(Misrepresentation)的定義。所謂失實陳述,是合約的一方提出並非事實(facts)的資 料,目的是誘導(induce)另一方接受合約的訂立。在合約訂定過程之中若然有一方有]失實陳述,法律的後果是另一方(被誤導的一方)有權選擇視合約無 效(Voidable at the election of the party being induced)。

受誤導的一方只需證明:

(一) 有失實事實的表達過程(a representation of facts)。放到雷曼的事件中,就是銀行介紹有關迷債的情況是否皆是事實?例如曾經形容迷債非常安全,其性質是一種收息的「債權」,有沒有收藏這是一類高風險衍生工具的事實?

(二) 這是有關事實的陳述,而不是對產品的形容詞,因為一般而言,形容詞無法下定義,例如我形容一隻股票或基金的回報理想,理想就只是形容詞,但我說不會少於百分之五的回報,則是一項事實。

(三) 有關的事實是否對被誤導者決定訂約是重要的事實考慮。

(四) 受害人合理地依賴這些陳述。

亦所以,專業投資者不應依賴銀行單方面的陳述,合約有效。小投資者欠缺專業知識,會完全依賴銀行的職員的解說,只要這些解說之中重要的地方有失實的資料,合約會失去效力,結果就是小投資者有權取回十足的合約本金。法例是這樣的清楚,但現在見到的結果,何其荒謬?

轉載自:我係王岸然 2009年7月24日(五)

http://wongonyin.mysinablog.com/index.php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=1842539

2009年7月19日星期日

Hong Kong Promotes Chan to Be Chief Banker

HONG KONG -- The Hong Kong government appointed Norman Chan as chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, elevating a top political aide and veteran of the agency to run the city's de facto central bank after a year of financial stress.

Mr. Chan, who will succeed longtime Chief Executive Joseph Yam on Oct. 1, said Friday that the most important task will be to maintain the stability of Hong Kong's monetary and banking systems, and the functioning of credit markets.

As head of the authority, which also serves as the city's banking regulator, Mr. Chan said he would aim to "strike a very delicate balance" between investor protection and financial innovation.

Mr. Chan, 55 years old, worked 12 years at the authority and was deputy chief executive when he left to join Standard Chartered PLC as Asia vice chairman in November 2005. He took over as director of the office of Hong Kong's chief executive two years later.

Mr. Yam turns 61 in September and has headed the authority since it was founded in 1993.

Mr. Chan's appointment had been expected. The Hong Kong government said Friday that Mr. Chan had been shortlisted for the job earlier this year and first approached in May.

Mr. Chan won't be as well compensated as his predecessor, who earned more than US$1.5 million last year. The government said Mr. Chan's annual base salary will be six million Hong Kong dollars ($774,000), though a discretionary bonus and benefits could increase his compensation.

Mr. Yam's salary had become an issue in the Chinese territory, though Financial Secretary John Tsang denied Friday that there were any political considerations behind the salary cut.

Mr. Tsang said Mr. Chan was one of 39 candidates for the position, rebutting speculation that Mr. Chan was picked for the job because of his close relationship to Hong Kong's chief executive, Donald Tsang, who isn't related to John Tsang. Mr. Chan's tenure will be five years and is renewable when the term expires, John Tsang said.

Mr. Chan said he had no plans to change the local currency's peg to the U.S. dollar, which he said was a "cornerstone" of Hong Kong's financial success. He also highlighted Hong Kong's role in the internationalization of mainland China's yuan. The development of Hong Kong's yuan-services business is a focus for the monetary authority, he said.

"It is crucial we enhance the competitiveness of Hong Kong's financial-services sector," Mr. Chan said.

The authority has come under attack recently for not doing enough to protect investors in structured-finance products. Thousands of people in Hong Kong lost money investing in minibonds backed by the now-defunct Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and distributed by a number of Hong Kong banks.

"The Lehman-minibond incident reflects a need to tighten regulation," said Ronny Tong, a Hong Kong legislator.

—Aries Poon contributed to this article.

Write to Jonathan Cheng at jonathan.cheng@wsj.com and Chester Yung at chester.yung@dowjones.com

SFC Lehman Brothers Minibonds Incident Report


Dear Legco Member, Dear SFC Officer,



We are writing to you to express our questions and disagreements with the “SFC Lehman Brothers Minibonds Incident Report” (“the SFC Report”) revised version since Feb 12. We respectfully request that Legco Lehman Incidence Investigation Committee investigates questions below regarding Banks’ wrong-doing in conjunction with the sale of minibonds to retail investors, and moves towards proper compensation for minibond victims. We respectfully request that SFC addresses each question below to the Legco Committee and to the public.


The key issue with Minibond is not about if it declared “principal protected” or not. The key issue is about misrepresentation and omission of the true nature and risk of the so-called “Minibond”. Lehman bankruptcy only triggered an awakening call. It made the public and minibond holders realize that the true nature and risk of minibond was not being disclosed in the past few years.


It is not uncommon for banks to find all the possible loophole even lame excuse to hide the truth of minibond sales, in the name of the best interest of Hong Kong as Financial Center or in the name of the best interest of shareholders. The Government must try its best to protect the public's interest, especially when public does not have much legal way to†challenge†banks. A thorough investigation on the minibond sales will help to restore the tarnished trust in banks, and will be for the best interest of Hong Kong as a financial center in the long term. Even right now after SFC has proven HK banks to public in all mis-selling of Minibonds, these banks still refuse to admit their frauds with the help of HKMA old chief Joseph Yam in covering up of bank frauds which could be proven by my emails of "Joseph Yam speech in 2003" to Legco on HKMA went easy on banks in their banking practice.



Minibond


1. Minibond is “Secured collateral and Swap” per SFC summary.
- Most minibond collateral was AAA-rated securities. The AAA-rated securities were mostly AAA-rated CDO/Synthetic CDO. While Shanghai Commercial bank said that for Minibonds series 20 on my first buy that these were European market funds while the older series were Lehman bonds that were every high risks if Lehman failed.
- Swap agreements included Credit Default Swap (CDS) with 5-7 well-known companies as reference entities. While Shanghai Commercial Bank manager Thomas Lo described that these reference entities were bonds of these well-known companies. This information was also passed by me to HKMA but no actions was taken by HKMA. The bank manager informed me that these very safe bonds helped Lehman to trade in other securities that were also AAA rated and Shanghai Commercial Bank checked many securities involved.
- Most CDO collateral included CDS with 100-155 reference entities whose credit rating in the category of AAA to CCC. It was rated as AAA after enhancement and its average portfolio credit quality was usually at BBB/BBB. A CDO portfolio with 125 reference entities (Series #19 collateral), would lose 100% principal upon the 10th credit event in respect of reference entities. And Shanghai Commercial bank wrongly described these as double protection on Minibonds as a way of investment using our money paid to the Lehman bank and PIFL controlled by HSBC for more profit in these swap arrangement, only more than 12 companies failed there might be some lost to the collateral, but our money that bought the bonds should still remained.


Product Description and Disclosure



We assume that a reasonable person’here refers to persons who are not credit derivative product experts such as 黃元山,迷宗.


- As reported in news:“證監會行政總裁韋奕禮表示、證監會角色並非要監察投資產品價格是否穩定, 而是要確保所批核之投資產品, 有全面市場披露”.
(2.2) William Pearson of SFC said in 2005: “(…). We are seeing more complicated products come on to the scene, but I think as long as the disclosure is clear, accurate and not misleading, we will be happy to see that carry on”, in the Asian Structured Products Review 2005,http://www.pacificprospect.com/downloads/asian_structured_products_review.pdf )


3. The SFC Report failed to point out that the prospectuses misled retail clients with the prominent “credit-linked to 7 reference entities”.


By choosing Synthetic CDO as minibond collateral, the prospectuses should have been fully aware that minibond’s value would be greatly decided by credit risk of its collateral’s portfolio holding. However, the prospectuses never clearly stated that minibond was in fact credit linked with “7 AND MANY Other” reference entities. The prospectuses failed to†disclose where the risks truly lie.

For Octave Notes series 6,10,15 and Constellation notes , all the banks I knew of involved in selling these products such as Shanghai Commercial Bank and Bank of China never gave me the two pages brochures for me to read first for these brochures were quit easy to read and Shanghai Commercial Bank did all Octaves Notes sales thru telephone in order not to let me to read these brochures. I later found out from Legco sessions, and my wife brochures of Octave Note series 20,21 there these products were high risk and these were listed in brochures. These banks were hiding out these products were high risks by not letting me to see the brochures before the sales and they all pretended these products were low risk bonds and these bonds should be safe and this was a complete lie. In Legco session, I also found out listening legco sessions that the detail prospetus and documents of Octave Notes listed these entities as low risk and very safe but in brochures that these products were listed as high risk. This should be the reason the banks did not want to give out these Octave Notes brochures that they could not lie to customers that Octave Notes were bonds.



Why did the SFC Report fail to find the prospectuses not meeting SFC’s “Clear, Accurate, No misleading” requirement?



4. The SFC Report Section 16.3.1 made biased observation on the prospectuses.

The SFC Report quoted the declaration of “not principal protected”. But the SFC Report failed to notice the following statements in the page 9 (of Series #27) of the Issue Prospectus:


“Are our Notes principal protected?


Our Notes are not principal protected: if a credit event happens to any one of the 7 reference entities before the maturity date, you will lose part, and possibly all, of your investment”.And for Shanghai Commercial Bank, in Minibonds 20 the bank manager said to us (me and three others clients of SCB that did not bought the Minibonds) that this only meant that only 1/7 of the minibonds were lost, and for Octave Notes and Constellation, this proved to be wrong)


Above statements effectively suggested that the “not principal protected” was conditioning on the credit event of 7 reference entities. Banks staff did not offer any other advise on such understanding.



What was the reason that the SFC Report did not identify above inaccurate and misleading statement?


Why were most (or all) banks staff having the similar misunderstanding on the condition of “not principal protected”?


5. The SFC Report Section 16.3.2 made biased observation on the prospectuses.

The SFC Report quoted “Our Notes are not suitable for everyone. (…). Before applying for any of our Notes, you should consider whether our Notes are suitable for you in light of your own financial circumstances and investment objectives. If you are in any doubt, get independent professional advice.” from the Prospectuses.


However, the SFC Report failed to notice the following statements in the Issue Prospectus (Series #20,21):


“Who should buy our Notes? Are they suitable for everyone?
Our Notes are not suitable for everyone. (…).
Our Notes are only suitable for investors who are:†
looking for fixed rate quarterly interest income (…),
confident that none of the 7 named reference entities will be affected by a credit event. (….)”.


Above statements in plain English clearly suggested (to retail clients) that, if you were confident on the 7 reference entities, the Notes was for you.

What was the reason that the SFC Report did not identify above misleading and inaccurate statements in the prospectuses?


6. A prospectus must disclose where the money would be invested into and where the interest and repayment of principal would be coming from. The SFC Report failed to identify that the Prospectuses never clearly disclosed such information. Why did the SFC Report consider the prospectuses disclosure as sufficient and acceptable?


The prospectuses only stated that “We use the money which you invest in our Notes to buy a package of assets.” (page 19, “What happens to my money? How can Pacific International Finance Limited pay me back? and so Shanghai Commerial Bank manager could use all kind of lies to mislead customers”).


The brand name of minibond and the term “credit linked to 7 reference entities” gave retail clients false illusion that the minibond money would be invested into debt/loans of 7 reference entities as told by Shanghai Commercial bank manager that these money were buying bonds. The truth was that, the Minibond†money was not invested inhto the 7 reference entities or any of the undisclosed 100+ reference entities that comprised of the minibond CDO collateral.There were no such things as double protection of the money invested into Minibonds that made Minibnds lower risk than bonds as Shanghai Commercial Bank said. There were no corporate bonds sold in most HK local smaller banks in order to lure customers mainly retiree with sum of USD100,000 or more to buy these Minibonds to replace bonds sales and HKMA was also intentionally to cover this up as told by HKMA Choi in Legco session that these minibonds were first intended for customers with less than USD100,000 capital and would willing to take higher risk to buy minibonds for more interest and I had sent these information to Legco on HKMA voodoo economics team members. These minibonds paid less interest 4.8% than corporate bonds 6-6.5%. The only way to stop bonds sales on market were all smaller banks joined together to stop bonds sales in order to push these high risk low yield Minibonds.



(7.1) Plenty of credit rating information on the 7 reference entities was disclosed. The prospectuses mentioned the AAA-rating on the CDO. But there was no mentiotraning on the credit rating information/or guideline on the reference entities that comprised of CDO collateral. The Prospectuses at least should be able to state clearly about credit linked to many other referen ce entities, and to disclose some guideline on the criteria for selection of the reference entities such as the expected number of reference entities and the expected percentage of reference entities below BBB/or BB /or B-/etc.In Minibond series 6 and older versions, there were informations about these CDO sold by six HK smaller local banks, and these informations were hide away in Minibonds 7 by these six banks and SHK agents that issued these brochures and later on these were issued by PIFL For Constellation Notes and Octave Notes, these Notes listed high risk in brochures but the bank - Shanghai Commercial Bank use telephones calls to sell these products so their customers had no chance to look at these brochures.


(7.2) The prospectuses at least should be able to disclose that a Synthetic CDO usually would experience 100% principal loss when 8% (or less) of the reference entities has default event. It does not need 10% or more of the reference entities to have default event for the 80%-100% principal loss.


The prospectuses did not provide “sufficient information” on minib on, and obviously were way off the “Clear, Accurate and non misleading, Disclosure (全面市場披露 )” requirements. We contend that the prospectuses consistently omitted material fact and gave misleading statement, so that a reasonable person would not be properly informed of the true nature and risk of minibond.


Why did the SFC Report consider the prospectuses disclosure as sufficient and meeting SFC requirements?


Code of Conduct at Point of Sale


The SFC Report Section 2.5 listed requirements on regulated body (banks) or HKMA/SFC registered staffs.


8. The SFC Report failed to identify that banks provided clients with incomplete material information.


The CDO collateral information held the most important material information on the Minibond. The diminished collateral value also proved the critical of such collateral information. The prospectuses were only part of minibond information. Detailed Information about the collateral, including evidence of the rating and the terms and conditions of the collateral, would have provided Minibond buyers with a 2nd chance to know what the Minibond was really comprised of.


Such collateral information was not available to minibond purchaser when they signed the purchase agreement. However, such collateral information usually would be made available prior to the issue date. Banks should have requested such information after offer closed. Banks should have sent such CDO collateral information documents /or notice of such documents’ availability to minibond purchasers. Banks are required to provide clients with relevant material information for derivative products, according to SFC’s Code of Conduct. But Banks failed to do so. Why was this not mentioned in the SFC Report? In fact, the bank manager informed us that structure products were not derivative products, but another type of new products similar to funds and much more safer than bonds for the low risk bonds might lost some of the values if the companies or US government had no money to pay back the money,what he meant put structure products were near zero risk as some of the 0% lost protection funds or insurrance products.


9. The SFC Report failed to identify that Banks’ due diligence was insufficiently thorough over the past few years’ minibond sale. Evidence is as follows:


- Banks should have cautioned us that minibond was not invested into any debt / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities.


- Banks should have cautioned us that AAA-rated securities (or AAA-rated CDO), may not be the same as AAA-rated conventional bond, and should have cautioned†us about the nature and risk related to CDO collateral. $10 million cash or cash equivalent is very different from $10 million worth of combined asset value of cash / stock /commercial real estate / residential real estate / machinery


- It was never mentioned to us what CDO was comprised of and what kind of risk CDO may have.


- It was never pointed out to us that the key asset of CDO collateral was CDS with many entities, and its value was decided by the credit risk or default event of its portfolio holding.


- It was never mentioned to us that† a†AAA-rated Synthetic CDO may have average portfolio credit quality at BBB/BBB-.


- We were never told to be aware that minibond was, in fact, not only credit linked with 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked with many other entities at various rating categories from AAA to CCC. A 8% (or less) default rate in the CDO collateral would result 100% principal loss.


- And, we were never and even wrongly and criminally explained about the First-To-Default with the 7 reference entities, nor the credit event redemption amount. Constellation is an example about how crucial to understand such terms prior to purchase. In fact for example Minibond series 6 did listed that if one of the 7 entities failed, the values of the minibonds might go to zero, these informations were hidden intentionaly in series 20 where the bank manager, Thomas Lo told me that if one reference entities failed, I would still have the values of the remaining entities hold inside Minibonds that made Minibonds safer than coporate bonds, that proved to be wrong for related Minibonds such as Octave Notes and Constellation notes. '


- Shanghai Commercial Bank had promise before they knew about collateral information for it was one of the six banks that sold Minibonds series one to series 6 that had collaterial informations printed in the documents and in fact banks did not disclose any collateral information for they themselves are looking closely into them as they said that these are their responsibilty to look into collateral information for customers and no need for us to fear the risk of these so called (bonds) and are still checking these collateral information. Shanghai Commercial Bank has just called to inform me about Victory Peak International finance Ltd. Octave Notes 6 that because of default of Nortel Network and Smurfit-Stone Contaier enterpries. The bank said that these 7 reference entities owned these (bonds, stocks) that I should sell these notes at 60% loss. These banks are still lying to customers for they knew what was behind these minibonds, octave notes, constellation series before the sales and still are lying to customers about CDO and CDS.


We contend that, instead of exercising due diligence, Banks† in fact collaborated, we would suggest fraudulently, with the minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the Synthetic CDO from the bank's retail clients since Minibonds series 7 for the hiding of the information raised Shanghai Commercial Bank sales of Minibonds much more than 10 times , refusing to sell bonds such as Hutchison bonds to retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the minibonds.(according to my source in KCR/HK procecutors that used HSBC and from UBS that the two public bank that had Hutchison bonds for sold was HSBC and CitiBank) and Banks such as Shanghai Commercial bank / Wing Hang Bank /etc, rated the inibond as “Low to Medium Risk”, considerably downplaying the product’s risk level, is another proof of banks’ faulty due diligence. In the only customer risk profiling form done by the bank done on 13Dec 05, the bank destroyed my original low risk bonds buying requests with three others customers requesting bonds sales requests from bank in customer risk profiling against rule of SFC, fill the profiling form themselves, and asked me to come to bank to sign the new form saying they were required by their top management from central, mostly directors that required them to commit this criminal acts of bank frauds. I had told this to HKMA on their first telephone call to me, and HKMA is still covering this up with no investigating and put my complaints as 3B.


The SFC Report failed to identify this, and so SFC should study this informations once more for more severe punishments against the banks.


10. What was the SFC Report’s conclusion on the banks minibond sales related training and procedures?


- (10.1) What was the understanding of banks staffs regarding all the risks listed in the SFC Report Section “16.4”? Did banks staff explain all these risks to their clients at the point of sale, other than credit-linked to 7 reference entities and no liquidity / long lockup period?


- (10.2) The SFC Report Section 2.3.1 stated “2.3.1 ..... Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling and ensure it was suitable". Does SFC consider that the mentioning of “credit-linked to 7 reference entities and no liquidity / long lockup period” was sufficient for fulfilling such requirements?


- (10.3) The SFC Report Section 2.5.2 stated“2.5.2. The Code of Conduct also imposes obligation on intermediaries to ensure their staff are properly trained and supervised”. To what extent, was this demonstrated by SFC’s investigation? In fact, after finding wrong doing during the sales of Minibonds, SFC had started 30 training lessons for 300 banks and stock trading staffs each.But for Shanghai Commercial bank, the banks not only did not warned their customers about mis-selling, but continue with more mis-selling thru telephones just to hide away these mis-selling for the banks had to hide away further HKMA inspections of mis-selling by using telephones sales. In 2006,2007,2008 most sold of Lehman derivatives notes were thru telephones or in offices of bank customers.


- (10.4) How would SFC define banks / banks staff’s Honesty and Fairess, Care to their Clients? Should it be defined as:


"For a complex credit derivative product like minibond, the responsibility of Bank's staff is limited to: passing the Issuer Prospectus to the client after the sales few weeks later, hide away the brochures if there were high risk products listed so customers could think these products were low risk, and telling clients with wrong information, misrepresenting and misleading on true nature and risk of the product, stole the coupons after the sales as Bank of China did to my Octave Notes 15”? SFC require proper training and qualified bank staffs to sell the Minibonds. But Shanghai Commercial Banks Jenny Cheung promised in telephone calls in selling Octace Notes and Constellation to come to explain the new products as Insurrance agents did for trust funds but she never came and added false informations to all sales document after the sales thru mails.All the customer risk profile were added later by banks as B.G. by the bank. Before signing, these were blanks and I called Jenny Cheung to ask why this were blank and not filled in by me, and she lied that this were for bank use only. In fact, any add on items will falsfied the documents in Insurrance agents training and Jenny Cheung Should be trained in this.Right now only police CID in HK waterfront central station hasd files on this customer risk profile form.

notes:
2.6 根據Saphir在零八年推出的2008-8合成CDO的銷售章程顯示,雷曼把超過100家企業組成一個投資組合,如果該組合中的企業出現財政困難,雷曼 將會減少向Saphir投資者派發的利息,當出現財困的企業超過一定數目,Saphir投資者將失去所有本金,只能索回該投資組合的企業某種指定債權的市 值。換言之,這類合成CDO妨如把一連串的信貸違約掉期(CDS)組合而成的CLN。由於Saphir集資所得不會直接購買該投資組合,資金將會購買一些 例如市場基金等抵押品。(參考圖2)

2.7 正如第一種信貸衍生工具,投資者既要承擔投資組合內的100家企業的信貸風險,亦要承擔抵押品的風險。投資者從中換取利息回報。

2.8 迷你債券系列10至36把上述兩種產品合而為一。方法是利用第一種衍生工具集資所得購買第二類衍生工具,並以此作為迷債的抵押證券(參考圖3)。

2.9 換言之,迷債投資者購買這種二合一產品後,要承擔三重風險,包括:第一層結構中指定企業(一般是6家較知名的企業)的信貸風險、第二層結構中超過100家指定企業的信貸風險,以及第二層結構中的最終抵押品的信貸風險。

2.10 當我們比較HSBC CLN系列12、Mahogany票據,及雷曼迷債系列19的產品結構及銷售章程,即能看見雷曼迷債披露資料方面的嚴重缺失。

----------------------------------------------------------------------

雷曼產品本身就有很大的欺騙性。 若說迷你債券是一個騙局, 亦非虛言。 迷你債券(簡稱「迷債」)本身名稱的設計就是要引君入局, 令買者以為這是將債券拆細, 或將大戶專用的債券拆細為適合散戶的債券。 由於迷債名稱的誤導, 令三萬多個散戶紛紛墮網。 是以當證監會總裁韋奕禮說: 「迷你債券只是品牌」, 全港輿論嘩然, 以為韋氏是外星人, 要驚動特首澄清說「迷你債券不是債券」。香港這個「亞洲世界之都」, 一時間時光倒流, 返回二千多年前「白馬非馬」、「飛矢不動」的詭辯世界中。

迷債表面上與六、七間大公司, 甚至中國國債作信貸掛鈎(Credit-linked), 銀行的銷售單張都以此作為招徠。 前線銷售人員千篇一律, 異口同聲說: 「即使其中一間大公司信貸破產, 買主只損失七份一。」 實際上並非如此, 其中一家破產, 則本金可能全失。 而且, 更大的禍害, 隱藏在所謂墊底証券(underlying securities), 有時則乾脆稱為抵押品(Collaterals), 與超過一百間公司的CDS(Credit Default Swap 信貸違約掉期)掛鈎, 成為所謂的合成 CDO (Synthetic Collateralized Debt Obligation抵押債務責任)。 只要其中六、七家公司發生信貸事件, 亦足以令投資者本金全軍盡墨。 這個隱藏的禍害, 並無如實的披露, 稱之為包藏禍心, 實不為過。

2009年7月1日星期三

上海商業銀行無良,政府監管不力,官員應當下台


大姐明炮轟高官卸責

2009-07-02


雷曼苦主之一的藝人林建明參加遊行。


輪椅使用者王小姐不忍八十多歲的祖父祖母遊行,稱「我幫佢哋行埋」。

【東方日報專訊】雷曼苦主之一的藝人「大姐明」林建明,昨日亦有刻意穿上寫着「不再沉默的羔羊」的T恤到維多利亞公園,參加雷曼苦主大聯盟的遊行,只是低調地走在龍尾。不過,她對政府處理雷曼事件的態度相當勞氣,批評官員一直互相卸責,更激動地稱「政府搞唔掂,曾蔭權(相關)就下台啦!」

在烈日當空下,遊行人士均汗流浹背,自言因雷曼迷債事件而損失高達八位數字金額(a sure case of private banking crimes by putting all eggs in one baskets in Lehman related ELI, Minibonds, CLN for uneducated customer with bank loans) 的林建明昨日亦有單人匹馬到場,她稱以往曾做腦部手術,酷熱天氣下,身體狀況未能應付整段遊行過程,但強調「捱到幾耐,就行幾耐」。


u86歲苦主行足全程


她 說自己是經上海商業銀行買入一千萬元的雷曼迷你債券,對於現在一切已化為烏有感到很不滿,她昨日一手拿住寫着「上海商業無良」牌子,另一手拿着「曾蔭權下 台」的標語,以示抗議,而身上的T恤亦特別寫上了「不再沉默的羔羊」字眼以明志,她說實在看不過眼政府「監管唔得、處理唔好」,「銀行賠晒都唔使蝕啦!」 她稱政府監管不力,官員應當下台。她又說今次更已透過電郵,呼籲了過百名朋友到場。而她行至半途時,一雙波鞋的鞋底已見甩底。

由於天氣炎熱,有參加者暈倒,但亦有八十六歲的廖先生,堅持到場並行足全程,希望可討回本金。






In 2008, SCB were selling LEBR 10Y, 15Y Callable Transatlantic Range Accural Notes from Lehman brothers instead of bonds. These notes were from offshore companies of Lehman brothers in Europe which was similar to Lehman ELN with no guarantee as from Minibonds. SCB knew that notes were traded between banks and corporation, while bonds were for customers of banks. Unlike what Joseph Yam was saying in Legco, Notes were not more safer in risk level than bonds, in 2008, US banks notes sales between banks should be very slow for these were high risk in most bankers minds, and that why SCB committed bank frauds in selling those notes to their unsupected customers that did not watch US news.
http://blogs.moneycentral.msn.com/topstocks/archive/2008/06/05/will-lehman-crash-and-burn.aspx

http://www.toomre.com/taxonomy/term/30/1

http://optionarmageddon.ml-implode.com/2007/12/24/telegraph-10-trillion-of-losses/

Only Asian corporate bonds and government were low risks during that periods because of 2007 credit crunch and these can be sold thru private banking in HK such as UBS.

CNN money, which was responsible for the high tech bust in around 2000, also had this articles that everybody saw in Internet and watched on CNN in TV and that the articles that made me worry about CDO at that time. May be the voodoo economy follower Joseph Yam (not expert, because he is only a statistician) never learnt from experience and believed in this article and let the Minibonds busted later as he admitted in Legco sessions:
http://money.cnn.com/2007/11/28/magazines/fortune/fortune500/eavis.creditfix.fortune/?section=money_topstories

Further informations on HSBC wanted to take over Lehman in 2008:

http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/11/lehman-treasury-fed-markets-cx_er_0911outlook.html

http://www.marketwatch.com/story/hsbc-which-bank-is-it-buying-today-press-1-for-no-comment?pagenumber=1

The following rumor was started in 2007, and Lehman was not in good business climate either for banks to trade their notes:

http://dealbreaker.com/2007/05/has-lehman-lost-its-mojo.php




I only sent these information to Legco members on 19th May 09 for their investigating of Shanghai Commercial Bank frauds that they should knew about CDO information and also Lehman Brothers was in troubles since 2006 for they had managers to research into financial markets. And also on 23rd May 09 I sent one more letter similar to the letter to Legco members with more informations after Legco members (

Regina Ip, 涂謹申踢爆 金管局遲鈍 風險通告遲發九個月) attacked HKMA in Lehman inquiry to CEO HK, HKMA, SFC and Legco members for investigating bank frauds of SCB.


We should also ask HKMA, SFC to take similar actions against all HK banks that sold these structure products.




Accraul notes:

Your product is under Protection


Protect your capital whilst enhancing your potential returns.


Products allocated to the “Protection” category are
aimed at investors with a low to moderate risk tolerance.
All the products in this category offer a substantial
capital protection component, meaning that when
the investment comes to maturity you will receive a
minimum repayment relating to the nominal capital
invested. If you sell such a product prior to maturity
you will, however, forfeit the benefit of this capital
protection. These products also have a yield component
which, depending on your preference, can be unlimited,
limited or stipulated in advance. The high degree of
capital protection offered – for most products between
90 and 100% of the invested capital – does, of course,
affect the maximum potential return delivered by the
product when compared to a direct investment in the
relevant underlying itself.
By far the largest selection of products offering 100%
capital protection are in the “fixed-income” segment.
The most popular investment instruments include
Callable Step-Up Notes (CSUN) and Callable Daily Range
Accrual Notes (CDRAN). Both of these products combine
100% capital protection with an option strategy.
With a CSUN, you get a maximum-term bond with
coupon payments that rise in stages as this term
progresses. In effect, the noteholder sells a periodic
call option to the issuer (hence the “callable” part of
the name), and in return, the investor receives an option
premium, so that when the note reaches maturity the
overall yield is greater than on comparable bonds of the
same maturity/rating. CDRANs, meanwhile, are bonds
that can be redeemed before maturity by the issuer.
Unlike CSUNs, the coupon payments are not fixed in
advance, but depend on how many days during the
coupon period a specified index (e.g. an interest rate or
interest rate differential) remains within a predefined
range. Depending on the number of days on which
the relevant condition is met, a higher return can be
achieved compared to an equivalent traditional bond.
Capital protection products based on equities and
currencies are also very popular. The most well-known,
and in fact the oldest, is the GROI (Guaranteed
Return Of Investment). This instrument, developed by
UBS, was one of the first structured products to be
distributed internationally. The “Protection” category
now offers the most varied range of all, with products
affording capital protection on almost every conceivable
underlying asset. As well as bonds, equities, equity
baskets, indices, interest rates and currencies, there are
an increasing number of capital protection solutions
based on precious metals, commodities or credit baskets,
not to mention interest differential curves and real
estate, all featuring a range of possible maturities,
payout models and income/participation structures.
UBS’s “Protection” category does not include any
product that only offers conditional capital protection,
i.e. a risk buffer that disappears as soon as a specified
price limit or threshold is reached.

eg. for UBS private banking:

For private banking,dd the advisor would follow these examples set by the bank management. The advisor would never ask their customers to put all money in one basket. Private banks would take responsible for any mistakes their advisors made:

Opportunities
If his expectations prove correct, the investor ends
up with a higher return than on a traditional bond
investment.
Risks
If interest rates fall, the Note may be redeemed prior
to maturity for cash, leaving the investor to invest the
repaid capital elsewhere. However, the return achieved
prior to early redemption should still be higher than
that available on a comparable alternative bond with
the same maturity and rating.
Protection
Example
Scenario
75% bonds, 10% equities, 10% alternative
investments, 5% money market.
The investor expects yields to be relatively stable or
to rise slightly. For 10% of his bonds about to mature,
he seeks an investment solution with 100% capital
protection.
Solution
The investor invests the repaid capital in UBS Callable
Step-up Notes.
UBS offers a range of solutions with capital protection
to investors wishing to minimize their risk exposure.
This keeps the likelihood of loss to an absolute minimum.
Investors should note that the above charts and examples are purely for
illustrative purposes and do not give any indication of actual conditions
or profits. These examples do not take account of dividend payments or
standard securities trading costs (brokerage, etc.).