2012年4月29日星期日

金管局及證監會之—監管失職


根據資料顯示,在03年至08年期間,證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)審批了29次由 Pacific International Finance Ltd. 發行的迷你債券(迷債)、21次由Constellation Investment Ltd. 發行的Constellation Structure Retail Note (星債)和15次由Victoria Peak International Finance Ltd. 發行的 Octave Note (精債),所牽涉的產品系列共超過200個,而所牽涉的投資金額以百億計。

證監會的網頁披露她們的一個法定規管目標是「向投資於或持有金融產品的公眾提供保障」,但基於下列多項事件,證監會從審批到監管產品在市面上流通和善後都有多項的嚴重性失誤,因而沒有採取合理和可行的措施而導致投資者的利益受損:

(一)在03年至08年期間,證監會共審批了65次牽涉過百系列的迷債、星債和精債的金融產品,即是在0308年期間每個月平均有超過一種產品在16間分銷銀行的數百間分行公開給公眾認購,而產品的認購期通常維持23個星期,也即是說差不多每一天在數百銀行的分行都有上述產品給公眾認購,根據金管局的資料顯示有大概50,000投資者參與認購!如此大規模的銷售行動,證監會根本沒與合理的辯解說不知情。這反映證監會徇私枉法,默許銀行把不適合於一般投資者的金融產品以零售方式銷售與普羅大眾。
(二)產品的資料簡介單張中註明證監會認可資料簡介的發出,但證監會對簡介內容並不承擔任何責任,這是違反常理,而銀行更以證監會認可作招徠以圖誤導投資者。如果產品沒有證監會的認可,投資者很可能不會參與,但證監會在事件中除沒有達到公眾的期望外,還被銀行利用而變成幫兇。
(三)證監會既然認可簡介資料的發出,而星債是以「結構性零售債券」命名,證監會不可能不知道該產品是以零售方式銷售與普羅大眾,而在雷曼事件後,證監會才說上述產品是不適合於零售層面的,證監會無疑是失職。
(四)證監會既然認可簡介資料的發出,在資料簡介單張中曾以贈品誘使投資者投資,在雷曼事件後監管當局才批評此方式不適當,證監會無疑是失職。
(五)大部分的上述產品因牽涉衍生投資產品,所以都是高風險的產品,但各分銷銀行都把產品以中風險和甚至低風險評級向客戶推介。而在2010710日,在有關監管當局與星展香港達成的Constellation債券協議中顯示證監會認為三十多個系列的星債產品是不適合於銷售與低至中風險承擔能力的投資者,因此星展香港要向大概3000名投資者作出10成的賠償,加上迷債回購協議所牽涉的大概30,000名投資者,種種事實都證明證監會沒有監管產品的銷售,所以證監會在監管中完全失職,因而違反其「向投資於或持有金融產品的公眾提供保障」的法定規管目標。
(六)證監會認為以集體和解協議代替執法對投資者更為有利,所以她們與16分銷銀行、星展香港,渣打香港和花旗香港進行集體和解協議談判,但在談判前既沒有與投資者溝通和收集意見,也不容許投資者參與談判,整個過程都是閉門造車和黑箱作業,因而和解協議的條款完全不能反映投資者的關注和利益,此舉與其法定規管目標中「向持有金融產品的公眾提供保障」背道而馳,也違反了其聲稱要提高透明度的目標。
(七)證監會認為以集體和解協議代替執法對投資者更為有利,但她與迷債16分銷銀行達成迷債協議後就停止對星債、精債和ELN等產品採取相同處理手法,其實大部分的迷債16分銷銀行都有參與星債、精債和ELN的分銷,而也是由同一批職員負責銷售,所以在迷債銷售上的違規行為也同樣發生在其它產品,證監會選擇性達成協議對數以千計的星債、精債和ELN等的投資者不公平。
(八)監管當局有責任向公眾披露金融機構違規或違法的事實,以便公眾對不良金融機構提高警惕,從而達到保障投資者的目標,但證監會對迷債的16分銷銀行、星展香港,渣打香港和花旗香港的調查報告都不公開,以便她們以「在不承擔任何責任下」與客戶作和解,證監會此舉除包庇和隱瞞各銀行違規和甚至違法的事實外,更與其提高透明度的目標背道而馳。
(九)金管局曾把多個個案轉介證監會跟進,部分違規銷售個案可能牽涉刑事成份,證監會沒理據向公眾及投訴人隱瞞刑事事件,並在沒有得到投訴人的同意下撤銷向刑事罪犯執法,這完全超越職權和違反法律常理。
(十)證監會在沒有公開銀行的違規事實和相關資料就向投資者推介其與銀行達成的和解協議,這對投資者既不公平,也有誤導成份,更違反了其聲稱要提高透明度的目標。

香港金融管理局(金管局)的其中一項職能就是監管香港的銀行業務,所以她在確保銀行遵從持牌人或註冊人操守準則中有不可推卸的責任,但在03年至08年期間,16分銷銀行違規銷售,以致有差不多5萬名投資者受到波及。由於上述產品在5年內廣泛地在數百間分行銷售,當中不少違規銷售個案都牽涉沒有投資經驗人士、文盲、長者、沒有風險評價客戶、風險承擔能力低於產品的風險評級人士及退休人士等,單是迷債的回購協議已牽涉銀行向大概30,000名投資者作出賠償,這反映銀行濫售的程度已失控,金管局根本沒有合理的辯解說對上述情況不知情。
金管局在雷曼事件前既沒有向投資者發出有關上述產品的風險警告,也沒有確保銀行在銷售金融產品上遵從持牌人或註冊人操守準則,更沒有採取合理和可行的措施糾正和控制濫售和失控的現象,這無疑是包庇和默許銀行進行違規銷售、徇私枉法和損害投資者利益,所以金管局在監管銀行遵從持牌人或註冊人操守準則上完全失職。
再者,金管局在審議民事投訴時採用類似審理刑事案件的「無疑點」原則,此舉比法院審理民事案件更嚴格,這反映金管局的審議機制存在向金融機構傾斜的現象,在情理和法理上都對投訴人不公平,也完全違反了其聲稱的持平原則。

2012年4月28日星期六

頭條日報 頭條網 - 高官避嫌 懸疑未解

頭條日報 頭條網 - 高官避嫌 懸疑未解


  • Member, Advisory Committee on Human Resource Development (Financial Services), HKSAR, 2004 - present.
  • Member, Investor Education Advisory Committee, Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, 2004-present.





社論——高官避嫌 懸疑未解
2007-07-04

特區政府新班子昨天上班,其中由科大空降政府、出任財經事務及庫務局局長的陳家強備受傳媒關注,因為他的太太是摩根士丹利的執行董事,兩夫妻的工作旋即引起多個疑問,包括主要官員利益申報機制是否完備,陳家強日後執行敏感財經政策時如何避嫌,以及如何確保關乎整體利益的金融政策可以貫切落實。

        主要官員利益申報制度分兩部份,一是填報《行政會議成員利益登記冊》,申報個人資產、出任公司職位等六項資料,但不包括配偶及子女的職業資料,公眾可查閱;二是官員須填報《供公眾查閱的利益和政黨背景登記》,就其在香港及海外的投資和其他利益、政黨聯繫等作出申報。

        陳家強已根據機制申報資料,但由於沒要求他把太太任金融界高層的資料公開,難免引起猜疑。事件經傳媒披露後,特首辦發言人說,陳家強已就太太職務一事,向特首申報,目前正在處理,稍後公佈。而財經事務及庫務局發言人亦補充,指陳家強作為主要官員,受到《官方保密法》監管,確保敏感資料不會向任何人外泄。

        獲特首委任為主要官員者,應具有極高誠信,但仍須向公眾闡明,以陳家強今次需要再作交代,對這官場新丁,可說上了一堂政治問責課。

        事件亦凸顯申報機制仍有改善之處。出任主要官員者,其直屬親人的職業是否需要公開呢?現行機制沒要求,可能是要保障高官私隱,但卻未能教公眾釋疑,要進一步讓公眾見得到的避嫌。

        瓜田李下,極其敏感,尤其亞洲金融風暴期間,多家外資大證券行有參與炒賣,陳家強的職責亦涉及特區重大的金融決策,他以及其他財金官員的利益關係怎樣才可以「陽光化」,這個問題更不是單靠申報便能簡單了事。

        李一飄



政情:陳家強夫婦電話維繫親子情

香港人工作繁忙,親子時間愈嚟愈少,不過財經事務及庫務局局長陳家強完全冇呢個問題。佢兩位公子依家喺美國住,而佢任職摩根士丹利高層嘅太太胡翠萍,日日同囝囝通電話,佢自己都一星期同阿仔傾一次偈。佢哋兩公婆一個係高官,一個係投行高層,平時咁忙,但親子工夫做到足。



掌握囝囝作息時間

陳家強話,大仔依家喺美國工作,細仔就讀緊芝加哥大學三年級,同陳家強一樣,都係讀Finance。
太太同兩個仔嘅關係一向好好,但要做到日日通電話都唔易,秘訣係掌握晒阿仔嘅作息時間,夾定佢哋日日最得閒嘅時間打電話畀佢哋。所以話,父母同子女嘅關係疏離定親近,同付出嘅努力息息相關。
講起芝加哥大學,陳家四口都係芝大校友,而且都係讀Finance,成為一時佳話。記得○七年底芝大香港舊生會聚會,當時細仔啱啱獲芝大取錄,眨吓眼細仔已經讀三年級,最近為咗搵投行做暑期工,聖誕節啱啱飛返香港見工,跟住又要去紐約見多次工,都幾頻撲。


不信任陳家強動議


親愛的議員們:
             
陳家強局長處理迷你債明顯角色衝突,懇請徹查

自雷曼迷你債券事件發生以來,陳局長不斷把這產品合理化”認為苦主們是貪圖利益而購了相關產品,疚尤自取”,亦不斷將責任推卸給金管局及銀行銷售手法,意圖更進一步的把這種不應銷售給散戶的投資產品合理化,然而各位議員們你們可知道以下事情:
1.        陳家強局長太太為摩根士丹利的高層人員
(附件一 相關新聞)
當陳家強局長首次公開對迷你債券事件表態是用上:巿民不認購買自己不認識及不能承担風險的的產品,直至曾俊華司長才用上:對苦主深表同情的字眼

2.        摩根士丹利以’精明債券’的名稱,透過Victoria Peak International Finance Limited這獨立公司發行多達二十多系列的迷你債券,結構跟雷曼担保的迷你債券或星展的結構性票據,可謂一脈相承
(附件二 有關報導)
曾司長曾表示回購大部份苦主可取回六成,曾蔭權特首表示回購有六至七成收回時,陳局長毎急不及侍表示政府並無估計,亦提醒買了迷你債券的散戶,可能遠低於本金.陳局長何以能拿握得如此準確,其資來源又從何來,真的跟他太太没關係嗎?我們都好想清楚.

3.        在這次雷曼破產事件中,其中精明債券系列十至十二的結果也近似星展公布的結果,亦即我們苦主當中亦有陳局長太太銀行銷售的債券產品
(附件三 今次雷曼事件有關精明債券新聞報到二則)
在此次雷曼事件中,摩根士丹利發行的精明債券十至十二亦跟星展的迷你債券同樣下塲,陳局長在星展公佈掛勾雷曼的票據等於零時,陳局長馬上澄清跟雷曼担保的迷你債券不同,可謂此地無銀,同時亦強化了日後相同處理手法的合理性,為精明債券舖路.

由於以上各點的存欵,懇請徹查及還苦主一個公道,亦還金管局與銀行一個公道,亦希望立法會有關專責小組可引用特權法,徹查局長的職責是否能公平公正地處理事件.

迷你債券的苦主們,其實我們並不分離的無論是中了那種地雷,問題都是一樣:為何有毒投資產品可以出售?還大家一個公道


2012年4月27日星期五

Revealed: who paid what in race for chief - The Standard

Revealed: who paid what in race for chief - The Standard

Half of Leung Chun-ying's campaign chest of HK$14.84 million in his winning run for chief executive came from a low-profile association and six individuals, according to expense statements.
The documents submitted to the Registration and Electoral Office showed that the Association of Experts for Modernization, of which National People's Congress deputy Maria Tam Wai-chu is honorary chairwoman, donated just over HK$1 million to Leung.
"The donations were all made voluntarily," association chairman Patrick Tse Kwing-chuen said yesterday.
Tam also donated to Leung, Tse said.
Leung has been close to the association, showing up at its general meeting last year, where two officials from the central government liaison office were also present.
But Tse stressed that no one from the liaison office had forced them to make the donation.
The six individuals chipping in HK$1 million each include tycoon Li Ka- shing's sister-in-law Catherine Chong Yuet-ngai, Cammy Poon Kwok-ling, Albert Li Chee-man and Lei Ioc-heng.
Six other individuals and companies each donated HK$500,000.
Among them was Sun Hung-kai Properties former chairman Walter Kwok Ping-sheung.
Chow Tai Fook Nominee Limited, chaired by Henry Cheng Kar-shun, also donated HK$500,000. Cheng was earlier criticized for changing support from Henry Tang Ying-yen to Leung.
Of the HK$14.84 million Leung raised for his election campaign, he spent HK$11.2 million.
The biggest chunk, HK$3.3 million, went for rental
, office expenses and transportation; HK$2.5 million went to agents and election assistants.


Compared with Leung, Tang received fewer large-sum donations, with the biggest amount just HK$200,000.
Ten people each donated HK$200,000 to Tang, with three of them having close relationships to Li Ka- shing.
They include Grace Woo Chia-ching and Justin Chiu Kwok-hung, who are both executive directors of Cheung Kong (Holdings).
Canning Fok Kin-ning, managing director of Hutchison Whampoa, also donated HK$200,000.
Those who donated HK$100,000 to Tang include Lifestyle International Holdings boss Thomas Lau Luen-hung, Liberal Party honorary chairman James Tien Pei-chun, and Macau casino tycoon Stanley Ho Hung-sun and his daughter Pansy Ho Chiu-king.
Tang raised HK$11.29 million for his election campaign, of which he spent HK$10.97 million.
The biggest items of expenditure were also rental, office and transportation, at HK44.45 million.
Tang also spent almost HK$3 million on hiring agents and election assistants.
Both Leung and Tang have said they will donate the unspent campaign money to charity


2012年4月24日星期二

立會雷曼報告批任志剛 - 東方日報

立會雷曼報告批任志剛 - 東方日報

立法會虛耗超過三年光陰及千萬元計公帑進行的雷曼迷債事件特權法調查,將於短期內發表報告,據悉報告會狠批涉嫌違規發售雷曼迷債的多間銀行及把關不力的監管機構,包括極可能點名譴責前金融管理局總裁任志剛。但以雷曼小組副主席黃宜弘為首的個別委員,擬想力保任志剛和銀行聲譽,堅拒「少數服從多數」,威脅會發表「小眾報告(minority report)」,公開與獲多數委員認同的正式報告唱反調。黃宜弘接受查詢時未有否認事件。學者批評立法會對雷曼事件「賊過興兵」,如最後因委員內訌而無一致結論,肯定會令人覺得浪費公帑。


銀行方面,由於並非所有曾銷售雷曼產品的銀行都有被傳召作供,小組起初為免引起法律問題,一度考慮不點名批評個別銀行,但最後大部分委員認為報告只是鋪陳事實,故此決定指名道姓。
美國雷曼兄弟於○八年九月十五日宣布破產,引發第一波金融海嘯,並連

個別委員揚言拒絕簽名

據了解,個別小組委員不認同報告狠批任志剛及點名批評銀行,揚言不會在報告內簽名,甚至威脅會發表小眾報告公開唱反調,藉此打擊正式報告的公信力和殺傷力,當中的主力人物正是小組副主席、立會「四大懶蟲」之一的中總立法會代表黃宜弘。
本報昨向黃宜弘求證,黃聞言即說「我唔會答呢個問題」,強調小組的閉門會議內情不能公開。問及是否有意發表小眾報告,黃更索性掛斷電話。
截至今年四月,小組已花費約一千六百萬元公帑。城市大學專業進修學院學術統籌宋立功形容,金管局和證監會經已相繼換人,小組至今才能提出報告,實令人唏噓,有「賊過興兵」之感;若小組又發生內訌、意見不合,導致只能作出一些不倫不類的結論,更加令人覺得立法會大花公帑根本沒有需要。

記者呂浩然
累全球無數購買了雷曼相關產品的投資者損失慘重,本港亦出現數以萬計的雷曼苦主,部分更因而家破人亡。立法會在○八年底通過授權雷曼小組,動用「尚方寶劍」《立法會(權力及特權)條例》調查事件,小組自○九年起先後傳召多名港府高官、兩個監管機構金管局和證監會的主管、六家有發售雷曼產品的本地銀行高層和前線職員,以及多名雷曼苦主作供。

用譴責遺憾失望等字眼

去年五月最後一場公開研訊結束後,小組花近一年時間撰寫包括八個章節的報告,將於短期內公布。消息指首當其衝的是監管機構主管,當中不乏「譴責」、「遺憾」和「失望」等字眼,尤其是主責監管銀行的任志剛,極可能會遭到譴責


遏金融海嘯不力 冰島前總理罪成 - 東方日報

遏金融海嘯不力 冰島前總理罪成 - 東方日報
【本報綜合報道】○八年金融海嘯衝擊全球各國,首當其衝的冰島更一度瀕臨破產。時任冰島總理的哈爾德(Geir Haarde)不僅因此下台,更被告上法庭,前日更被判一項罪名成立,成為全球首名因金融海嘯而被定罪的國家領袖。哈爾德直斥判決荒謬,不排除向歐洲人權法庭上訴。



冰島特別法庭判決指,六十一歲的哈爾德沒及時召開緊急內閣會議解決金融危機,應為此負上罪責,但哈爾德毋須監禁或罰款,法庭並下令政府替哈爾德繳交訟費。哈爾德另被控三項控罪,包括沒適當監管金融機構、沒縮減銀行業過度膨脹的規模,沒能確保國有銀行Landsbanki旗下在英國和荷蘭的戶口轉至其他子公司,但罪名全部不成立。

罪成但無須入獄罰款

罪成但無須入獄或罰款的哈爾德被定罪後表示:「我一直認為這項控罪比其他的更為無稽,這與金融危機或與我的處理手法無關。」哈爾德指審訊冗長而耗費資源,認為法官屈服於政治壓力下,判決「反映司法制度的恐怖一面」,正考慮向歐洲人權法庭上訴。
一度面臨兩年監禁刑罰的哈爾德,早前否認所有控罪,並直指審訊是政治迫害。哈爾德與另外三名政府部長,同被指摘引致金融業崩潰,但只有他一人受審。
哈爾德支持者指審訊並不公平,冰島政府沒法防禦金融海嘯,判決只是安撫民心之舉。但有冰島民眾說:「我們希望判他有罪,如果他及時預警和採取措施,後果不會如此嚴重。」
哈爾德於○六年上台,金融海嘯爆發後,冰島三大銀行一周內相繼倒閉,國家幣值暴跌、失業率激增,他○九年在抗議聲中辭職。

2012年4月23日星期一

殺一儆百懲保薦 提升監管唱慢板 - 太陽報

殺一儆百懲保薦 提升監管唱慢板 - 太陽報


○九年底上市三個月「爆煲」的洪良國際,其保薦人兆豐資本被證監重懲,罰款四千二百萬兼「永久釘牌」,是首宗對保薦人永久釘牌的案例。事件遍獲好評,證監此舉似乎既攞威又攞彩,攞威是以往罕有的強硬,罰款是創紀錄,永久釘牌又是破天荒,使市場對證監整治市場有揭開新篇的感覺,正因如此,讓投資者認為保護神形象再現,尤其在民企風潮當頭的時候,重懲保薦人的確攞足景。

且慢,事件攞威、攞彩及攞景的背後,留下的懸念尚多。其一,是一時發狠還是制度決定。市場有猜測,證監是為回應民企風潮的關注,並且為月底發布加強保薦人監管諮詢,預先擺定強硬姿態造勢。事實上,就洪良向投資者退款仍在排期開庭,進行相關法律程序,先實施對保薦人的紀律處分,很難說沒有時機的選擇。

市場能否理解,今次前無先例的重懲將會成為制度?關於此問題,站在保護投資者立場,當然是歡迎的,甚至外界引入刑事化呼聲不絕。但證監總要聽聽保薦人聲音,一邊是兆豐已否認證監一切指控;另一邊是保薦人同業會否反彈尚待回應,因此證監這一套武裝牙齒以強監管的動作,能否有頭威有尾陣仍須拭目以待。如果虎頭蛇尾,攞威可能變攞醜。

其二,前線監管的職能未充分發揮。過去十年處分保薦人缺失,幾乎年年皆有,對投資者來說,賊過興兵般的處分,即使有懲戒效應,無補於他們已造成的損失,最希望是這樣的事不發生或少發生,但這樣的希望如奢望。投資者要問,前線監管的把關作用何在?港交所作為前線監管者表明,依賴專業人士進行盡職審查,前線監管重責實際落到保薦中介之上,十足事不關己的態度。

過往經驗顯示,每一輪民企上市大潮過後,都出現一些「走樣」的企業,令投資者蒙受損失,有的終至「爆煲」。從中讓人質疑的是,前線監管在生意和監管上,沒有合理的平衡,即為攬生意而疏忽監管,使前線監管形同虛設。譬如有的事後被發現提交偽造及誤導文件,這樣的伎倆輕易瞞過前線監管,恐怕與依賴中介疏於查證有關。監管要求中介「盡職」,自己不是先要盡職嗎?

其三,監管保薦人亡羊補牢唱慢板。唱慢板睇兩層;一是監管保薦人說多做少。監管保薦人的理念,不要說到歐亞農業爆煲那麼遠,近十餘年來幾乎例有發生,但始終未有成事,月底發布有關諮詢,年內未知能否「結果」;二是出事處理低效。以洪良事件為例,○九年平安夜上市,一○年三月被證監勒令停牌,花兩年餘才指控保薦人「五宗罪」,斷然稱不上有效率。

維繫香港國際金融中心聲譽,確保企業來港招股上市的質素,保障投資者利益,這些口頭禪,當局沒少講,但落到行動上,事不關己及唱慢板的態度,正無形縱容同類事件一再發生,損害敗壞着香港的聲譽。完善法制基礎、提升監管執法,卻講多做少,以致現今政策調整改革日益迫切

Low expectations should spur Leung to aim high

When Hong Kong’s first chief executive, Tung Chee-hwa, took office in 1997, he brought with him a public support rating of 65 points out of 100. His successor, Donald Tsang Yam-kuen, started off even more popular, with a support rating of over 70 points. Leung Chun-ying, who takes over in just over 10 weeks, has a support rating of just over 50 points. He also has a negative approval rate; barely a third of the people polled approve of him, while a bit over half disapprove. Is this a challenge, or an opportunity? The last two leaders failed to live up to the public’s high hopes, and their ratings went downhill during their time in office. As Leung prepares to take charge with such low public expectations, could it be that his ratings have nowhere to go but up? I believe people will judge him by his actions. A warm and charismatic personality is nice, but any politician who demonstrates that he can make life better for ordinary people will see his ratings go up, once people are convinced. Leung and his advisers need to question accepted wisdom and think out of the box. If people perceive a real shift in government policy away from what seems like a bias in favour of the talked-about tycoons, they will be impressed. (One way is to follow US examples by introduction of progressive tax and anti-trust law instead of competition laws that work against small business) One problem Leung faces is that he needs to assure business interests (evil bankers and developers ) that he is not a danger to them (by being a socialist to cut housing price and punish the bankers that controlled SFC). That is why he has been playing down the prospects of serious change – which in turn is probably one reason why many parts of the community doubt he will make a difference. I am more confident. Cynics may assume that the population must bow to the wishes of a privileged minority (1% of the rich ), but I think that is changing. I think the new administration will have Beijing’s approval to shift the current, unequal balance of economic advantages. I also believe that the tycoons and others are realistic enough to accept and adapt to that (as professionals and middle class in HK are fighting back). What sort of things should the new administration question? It is impossible to get away from the issue of land as a source of so many of our problems. The last administration showed great reluctance to free up land supply, even as queues for public housing lengthened, the sandwich class was priced out of the market and rents rose for businesses, especially smaller ones. It also showed no willingness to intervene as low real interest rates and high demand from mainland buyers pushed housing prices up. Its attitude was that there was nothing much the government could do except wait. Leung shows a refreshing ability to think differently on this subject. He and his advisers seem to realise that Hong Kong does not have a shortage of land; the problem is how we use (or don’t use) it. And they must know that there is a serious mismatch between what property developers put on the market and what local people want and can afford. If they can fix that, the public opinion ratings will follow. Another area where the incoming leadership can demonstrate an ability to think out of the box is the subject of government expenditure. In a speech around a year ago, Legislative Council president Tsang Yok-sing asked some blunt questions. Why does government throw billions around on one-off handouts every year? Why do we spend so much less than other developed economies on education and health (should follow Canada examples to turn out more doctors with lower grades students while reserve the higher grades students to technology research)? What is so special about the level – 20 per cent (should be increased to 22-25%) of gross domestic product – that officials see as the ceiling for public spending? Fiscal prudence is a wonderful thing, and most Hong Kong people themselves reject welfare “socialism” and waste. The old government created amazing budget surpluses and huge reserves, but – as with land – it missed the chance to put them to good use. Now Leung has the opportunity. Indeed, many would say he has an obligation, because these things really cannot wait any longer. If he now lets the people benefit – sensibly – from their own city’s resources, he will be the first chief executive to leave with higher ratings than he began with. SCMP Article Bernard Chan

2012年4月22日星期日

CY Leung supporters that angry with Henry Tang

部分挺唐選委撐場 - Yahoo! 新聞香港


CY Leung supporters consist of many Lehman bonds victims that are angry with Donald Tsang covering up of Henry Tang roles in mis-management of derivatives products selling in Hong Kong . Right now Lehman is starting to pay back around 20-30% of the money involved :

ELNs in HK (and other places around the world) only get around 27% of the claim amounts. This is what LB Treasury estimated in their notice to us last month (any one can read that on line from their web site). If the securities are not ELNs they may get more or less, depending on the nature of the security one holds. It varies from 100% to 16%. ELNs in HK have 2 parts: one under class 5 in the liquidation plan and the second one is the LBT claim Vs LBHI is under class 4A, I think.

The LBHI liquidation plan is for securities that were either sold or guaranteed by LBHI or their subsidiaries around the world. As far as I know ELNs in HK were sold to us by LB Treasury (Holland) but guaranteed by LBHI. Unless one was either a customer of LB HK directly or he/she bought securities other than ELNs directly from LBHI, the recovery amount should not be that high

The head office of Lehman Brothers sending out the first round of money to all ELN holders by wire transfer or by cheque yesterday (17 April) as promised in their liquidation plan earlietr this year. This is related to the claims all filed back 2 years ago. 

This is NOT money paid by the HK banks. this is the money made available as LBHI sells their asset and gives the money back to all creditors , the ELN holders. These holders are all over the world.

LB Treasury, where ELN victims bought the ELNs, should also receive money from LBHI and they will in turn give the money back to the victims. The claim filing process with LBT treasury (the one in Holland) has not started but they said it will start 2nd part of this year.



(綜合報道)(星島日報報道)候任行政長官梁振英的答謝會上有多名政商界人士出席,除競選辦成員及堅實「梁粉」外,部分曾提名及支持唐英年的選委亦有現身,包括「福建幫」元老、兩名福建社團聯會永遠榮譽會長盧文端及施子清、新世界集團主席鄭家純、合和集團主席胡應湘及金融界選委張華鋒等。
另外,恒生銀行副董事長梁高美懿與滙控前執行董事鄭海泉亦有撐場。福建幫核心人物出席昨日的答謝會約有六百多人出席,除前梁振英競選辦主席張震遠、主任羅范椒芬及頭號支持者劉夢熊等骨幹成員外,多名支持者如港區人大代表馬逢國及中大亞太研究所副所長王卓祺等都有到場。
此外,部分曾提名及支持唐英年的選委如全國政協常委余國春、新世界集團主席鄭家純、合和集團主席胡應湘均有出席。選舉期間有傳支持唐的「福建幫」倒戈投梁,昨日現場所見,「福建幫」核心人物、兩名福建社團聯會永遠榮譽會長盧文端及施子清都有現身。
其他出席者包括施子清之子施榮忻、胡應湘之子胡文新、前滙豐銀行執行董事鄭海泉、恒生銀行副董事長梁高美懿及前嶺南大學校長陳坤耀等。競選期間全力支持梁振英的民建聯及工聯會亦相當「畀面」,民建聯副主席李慧琼及蔣麗芸、立法會議員黃容根、北區區議劉國勳,以及工聯會副會長潘佩璆、立法會議員葉偉明等都有出席。據了解,民建聯內大部分支持梁振英的選委,昨日都有到場。
鄭海泉梁高美懿否認入梁朝
梁班子疑似人選滿天飛,不過當事人昨日守口如瓶。被指是財政司司長人選之一的梁高美懿與鄭海泉昨日異口同聲指,梁振英無邀請他們加入新政府;盛傳是文化局局長人選的馬逢國亦指梁有沒有找他,但被問到覺得自己能否勝任時,他回應指只要有機會,認為自己做得來,就會義不容辭去做。
陳坤耀表示,他不會加入行政會議或新政府,亦不評論誰適合擔任教育局局長,只希望新政府更關注學前及幼兒教育。記者 譚浚熙

2012年4月14日星期六

No news from Iceland… why?

為什麼看不到冰島新聞?因為他們: - 辭退整個政府 - 把銀行國有化 - 公投,讓國民決定經濟債務方案(結果93%反對還款給英國及荷蘭,因為他們的借貸充滿問題及漏洞) ⋯⋯ ... - 拘捕主要的銀行家及總裁,要他們為經濟崩塌付上責任 - 人民重寫憲法 - 抗爭都是和平進行,並且達成目標。 為什麼媒體不報導?如果其他國家的人民都以此為參考發起行動,這是當權者及銀行家的末日吧。 恢復調查求證、求救、待救不如自救,當時雷曼亦是滙豐單一最大股東,證監及金融管理局等,與任志剛、纪勤、王冬勝、鄭海泉、李國寶、王守業等早已證實是順藤摸瓜,上下其手,互相包庇,多年來以機制及行政手段來延誤,更已證實是蛇鼠一窩 No news from Iceland… why? How come we hear everything that happens in Egypt but no news about what’s happening in Iceland: … In Iceland, the people has made the government resign, the primary banks have been nationalized, it was decided to not pay the debt that these created with Great Britain and Holland due to their bad financial politics and a public assembly has been created to rewrite the constitution. And all of this in a peaceful way. A whole revolution against the powers that have created the current crisis. This is why there hasn’t been any publicity during the last two years: What would happen if the rest of the EU citizens took this as an example? What would happen if the US citizens took this as an example. This is a summary of the facts: 2008. The main bank of the country is nationalized. The Krona, the currency of Iceland devaluates and the stock market stops. The country is in bankruptcy 2008. The citizens protest in front of parliament and manage to get new elections that make the resignation of the prime minister and his whole government. The country is in bad economic situation. A law proposes paying back the debt to Great Britain and Holland through the payment of 3,500 million euros, which will be paid by the people of Iceland monthly during the next 15 years, with a 5.5% interest. 2010. The people go out in the streets and demand a referendum. In January 2010 the president denies the approval and announces a popular meeting. In March the referendum and the denial of payment is voted in by 93%. Meanwhile the government has initiated an investigation to bring to justice those responsible for the crisis, and many high level executives and bankers are arrested. The Interpol dictates an order that make all the implicated parties leave the country. In this crisis an assembly is elected to rewrite a new Constitution which can include the lessons learned from this, and which will substitute the current one (a copy of the Danish Constitution). 25 citizens are chosen, with no political affiliation, out of the 522 candidates. For candidacy all that was needed was to be an adult and have the support of 30 people. The constitutional assembly starts in February of 2011 to present the ‘carta magna’ from the recommendations given by the different assemblies happening throughout the country. It must be approved by the current Parliament and by the one constituted through the next legislative elections. So in summary of the Icelandic revolution: -resignation of the whole government -nationalization of the bank. -referendum so that the people can decide over the economic decisions. -incarcerating the responsible parties -rewriting of the constitution by its people Have we been informed of this through the media? Has any political program in radio or TV commented on this? No! The Icelandic people have been able to show that there is a way to beat the system and has given a democracy lesson to the world

2012年4月12日星期四

香港特別行政區候任行政長官梁振英先生台鑒:

我們是一群退休人士、家庭主婦及老年人,因為購買了由摩根士丹利經銀行出售的高風險結構產品---精明債券,導致本金盡失苦主們惶惶不可終日,遊行、請願三年多,事情仍未解決,大部分精明債券的苦主仍未得到賠償,現任政府官員及証監會對我們這班苦主置之不理,令我們生活痛苦萬分。 梁先生,當我們知道你當選為下屆特首,我們這班苦主都非常欣慰,因為這是我們唯一的希望,你可以幫助我們這班苦主,取回合理的賠償及債券的本金。 梁先生,在這裏我們寫下一些有關精明債券的重點,望梁先生察閱: (1)精明債券在銀行售賣的單張是寫明若果有任何一間機構出現違約,則購買者會損失部分本金,但現在卻是全部失去本金。 (2)精明債券在單張上列明有八間主要機構,但郤沒有列明其實還有要負起120間以上的其他公司違約的風險。 (3)精明債券是由摩根士丹利製造的高風險產品,但郤將賠償責任全部推卸到各售賣銀行的身上。 (4) 香港証監會在審查及要求16間銀行賠償給雷曼迷你債券的苦主後,便停止 其他審查,因此摩根士丹利及精明債券的銷售銀行能避過審查,無需賠償, 對精明債券的苦主極不公平。 (5) 在雷曼銀行破產後,香港分別有雷曼產品,包括迷你債券、 星債、渣打ELN、花旗ELN已有全面賠償,惟獨是精明債券郤沒有全面集體賠償,我們同是由於証監會的疏忽大意,沒有嚴謹把關,將極度複習,風險極高的金融產品,刻意地被國際投資銀行大鱷,包裝成低風險,適合一般為求安全,安份收定期派息,就像買了國家級及大公司的債劵一樣安全,批准在零售銀行出售。我們成為了証監,金管局的疏忽及投行大鱷的犧生品。 (6)到目前為止,還有60%的精明債券苦主全無賠償,只有40%的苦主得到銀二 成半至四成的賠償。這種片面及個別賠償的情況,是有別於其他雷曼產品---迷你債券、 星債、渣打ELN、花旗ELN等的集體賠償,為何只有精明債劵不作如以上產品的系統性調查,因而有望集體賠償。其實精明債劵的結構及銷售與迷你債劵及星展銀行的星債是完全一樣,只是規模較小,難道監管當局是怕大騙小。現時金管局的處理方法是以所謂 “加強版” 處理餘下的雷曼個案,此方法是以個別案件處理,而一旦苦主與銀行和解 ,金管局立即停止該案的調查,縱使銀行巳被金管局查出違規。這樣銀行逃避了被罰,對那批沒有賠償的苦主不公平,他們是銀行用同一手法被騙,只可惜沒有掌握實際証據,如果証監循系統性調查,所有苦主得到相同的賠償,這才是全面的解決。      親愛的梁先生,我們是一群無助的苦主,是獅子山下的一群小市民,憑著數    十年的辛勞而積蓄的退休金錢,已經失去。望梁先生體察我們的處境,上任後要   求証監會恢復調查,摩根士丹利及各精明債券銷售銀行,為我們爭取全面和合理賠償。梁先生,於此謝謝您的幫助,我們定當感恩不已。            為香港的繁榮、未來努力                         精明債券苦主聯盟 謹上                                2012

2012年4月4日星期三

Regulators Penalize JPMorgan Over Lehman Ties - NYTimes.com

Regulators Penalize JPMorgan Over Lehman Ties - NYTimes.com


When Lehman Brothers collapsed at the height of the financial crisis,JPMorgan Chase was at the center of the storm. The bank was a major lender to the firm, which filed the biggest bankruptcy in United States history.
Now, more than three years later, regulators have penalized JPMorgan for actions tied to Lehman’s demise.
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a civil case against JPMorgan on Wednesday, the first federal enforcement case to stem from Lehman’s downfall. The bank settled the Lehman matter and agreed to pay a fine of approximately $20 million.
The Lehman action stems from the questionable treatment of customer money — an issue that has been at the forefront of the recent outcry over MF Global. JPMorgan was also intimately involved in the final days of that brokerage firm.


JPMorgan extended the credit using an inaccurate evaluation of Lehman’s worth, improperly counting Lehman’s customer money as belonging to the firm. Under federal law, firms are not allowed to use customer money to secure or extend credit.
The trading commission accused JPMorgan of overextending credit to Lehman for roughly two years leading up to its bankruptcy in 2008.
The arrangement worked well for both parties. Lehman wanted a larger loan, and suggested counting money from the customer account to justify it. JPMorgan complied, treating the money as part of Lehman’s coffers.
In a statement on Wednesday, JPMorgan noted that the size of this customer account was small relative to the overall relationship with Lehman.
The trading commission also accused JPMorgan of withholding separate Lehman customer funds for nearly two weeks, rather than turning them over to authorities. In the course of resolving that matter, regulators became aware of JPMorgan’s questionable credit to Lehman, a person briefed on the matter said.
“The laws applying to customer segregated accounts impose critical restrictions on how financial institutions can treat customer funds, and prohibit these institutions from standing in the way of immediate withdrawal,” David Meister, the agency’s enforcement director, said in a statement. “As should be crystal clear, these laws must be strictly observed at all times, whether the markets are calm or in crisis.”
It is unclear whether JPMorgan knew the money belonged to clients. The agency did not charge JPMorgan with intentionally breaking the law. But in the view of regulators, the bank should have known — the customer funds were kept at a JPMorgan account. The funds belonged to investors trading in the futures market.
The actions did not in and of themselves cause Lehman to fail. JPMorgan neither admited nor denied wrongdoing as part of the settlement.
“The firm cooperated with the investigation and is pleased to have resolved this matter with the C.F.T.C.,” the bank said in the statement.
Lehman Brothers collapsed in Sept. 2008.Peter Foley/European Pressphoto AgencyLehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008.
In some ways, the commission’s case echoes the situation involving MF Global, which is the biggest financial collapse since Lehman. In the case of MF Global, JPMorgan received money belonging to the brokerage firm’s customers, who are still out $1.6 billion. The money vanished in the final week before the firm went under and its disappearance is the subject of a federal investigation. Unlike the MF Global fiasco, however, customer money never went missing from Lehman. JPMorgan is not accused of any wrongdoing in the MF Global case.
In addition to being an investment bank, JPMorgan and Bank of New York Mellon are the two big institutions that process transactions for most other Wall Street firms. As a result, JPMorgan is often at the center of financial maelstroms. So-called clearing banks have a great deal of leverage over the firms they serve, because they play central roles in their financial solvency.
This role is particularly important when a company is under duress. In the case of Lehman Brothers, JPMorgan grew nervous as questions about Lehman’s capital and real estate holdings mounted in the late summer and fall of 2008. The bank asked Lehman to post more than $8 billion in collateral to continue clearing its trades, a condition that if not met might have expedited Lehman’s collapse.
Those collateral calls — issued in the week before the firm collapsed — drained Lehman of money it could have used to stay afloat. And that money is the subject of a 2010 lawsuit Lehman’s estate has filed against JPMorgan that accuses the bank of hastening its demise.
State and private lawsuits have emerged after Lehman’s bankruptcy, including one from the New York attorney general against Lehman’s auditor, Ernst & Young. But federal regulators have not previously filed Lehman-related actions, even though its collapse was at the center of the financial crisis.
The trading commission’s action against JPMorgan is the latest prominent action filed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which once had a reputation as a sleepy regulator. On Monday, the agency sued the Royal Bank of Canada, accusing it of operating a major trading scheme that it used to reap lucrative tax benefits.
The agency’s enforcement division has experienced a makeover under its current chief, David Meister, a former federal prosecutor. The division filed a record 99 enforcement actions last fiscal year, 74 percent more than the previous year.
The MF Global case presents a bigger test for the agency. In the firm’s final days, MF Global tapped $175 million in customer money to patch an overdrawn firm account at JPMorgan.
The bank, suspicious about the origin of the money, sought assurances from MF Global that the money did not belong to customers. In testimony before Congress last week, a JPMorgan official said MF Global never signed a letter verifying that the transfer was legitimate

The Royal Bank of Scotland Hong Kong

The Royal Bank of Scotland Hong Kong


The Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS), founded in 1727, is one of the world's largest Financial Services Providers offering a range of private and corporate banking world-wide.
SFC HK is still investigation this bank about selling of CMS, Minibonds 
and other Lehman related derivative products.

Global Banking & Markets
The Royal Bank of Scotland is a leading banking partner to multinational corporations and financial as well as governmental institutions around the world.
It provides an extensive product range to its customers, including risk management and balance sheet management solutions as well as investment service

China's premier calls for breaking bank monopolies » Ventura County Star

China's premier calls for breaking bank monopolies » Ventura County Star


Premier Wen Jiabao, China's top economic official, says its state-owned banks are monopolies that must be broken up, acknowledging mounting economic and political pressure to reform an industry whose vast profits are fueling public anger.
Wen's comments Tuesday suggest Beijing sees a growing political danger from its failure to carry out long-promised reforms of state banks, which pay minimal interest on deposits and made tens of billions of dollars in profit last year. Public resentment has risen as China's rapid economic growth slows and fears of job losses rise.
Speaking Tuesday to businesspeople, Wen said Beijing has launched reforms aimed at serving entrepreneurs better by opening up banking to private investors, China National Radio reported. It gave no indication of a possible timeline for further reforms.
"Our banks make money too easily. Why? Because a small number of big banks have monopoly status," Wen said, according to a transcript on the CNR website. "To allow private capital to flow into finance, basically, we need to break the monopoly."
Wen spoke during a visit to Fujian province in the southeast, a center for export-driven private enterprise. The government announced last week it will launch a pilot project to expand private lending in Wenzhou in neighboring Zhejiang province after a wave of defaults on underground lending that supported businesses there.
"I think those elements in Wenzhou that succeed need to be expanded nationwide and can immediately be introduced nationwide," Wen said, according to the transcript.
Communist leaders have long used Chinese banks to subsidize state industry, shifting wealth from savers to politically favored companies. Entrepreneurs produce most of China's new jobs and wealth but get only a small percentage of bank loans.
That has fueled resentment, especially as the "big four" major state-owned commercial banks, which account for about half of deposits, report record profits.
China's biggest lender, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China Ltd., earned $33.1 billion in 2011, ranking it among the world's most profitable companies. Other major banks - Bank of China Ltd., Construction Bank of China Ltd. and Agriculture Bank of China Ltd. - reported similar windfalls.
The government sets deposit and minimum lending rates, giving banks a guaranteed margin of about 3.5 percent. It has begun allowing lenders to charge more for some commercial loans, which has increased profit margins still further.
The World Bank and the Chinese government's own researchers have added to calls for reform, warning economic growth could slow sharply unless banks become more efficient and lend more to support the dynamic private sector.
The government has repeatedly promised over the past decade to make banks more market-oriented and to pay higher deposit rates but has yet to make major changes. Analysts expect little progress for at least another year until a once-a-decade transfer of power to a younger generation of leaders is complete in early 2013.
Wen was seen as a reformer with the public's interests at heart when he became premier in 2003. But change has been slow and entrepreneurs and foreign businesses complain Beijing has backtracked in some areas as it tries to build up dominant state-owned companies in industries from energy to banking.
Wen, due to step down as premier in early 2013, apologized last month in a nationally televised news conference held at the end of China's annual legislative session for failing to move faster on reform.


Read more: http://www.vcstar.com/news/2012/apr/04/chinas-premier-calls-for-breaking-bank/#ixzz1r5MmyO8i
- vcstar.com