United States Bankruptcy court (Lehman) on HSBC

Chapter 11 Case No 08-13555(JMP)
Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner
Volume 4 of 9

P1066-1067

Lehman's clearing banks demanded collaterial and Lehman provison of approx. $117(HKD) to $164 billion in collateral (both in cash and securities) to clearing banks.
This size of Lehman's liquidity pool encourgated conterparties to provide financing and intraday credit to Lehman. However, by Sept. 2008, much of Lehman's reported liquidity was locked up with clearing banks, and yet this fact remained undisclosed to the market prior to Lehman's bankruptcy. The clearing banks are JPMorgan, Citi, HSBC, Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon and Standard banks.

P1068-1069

Lehman had posted illiquid and difficult-to-price CDO's that Lehman had self-prized as collateral to JPMorgan because JPMorgan was conerned about LCPI (not LBI or its holding company)to cover JPMorgan's risk-based margin. Lehamn transferred much of this collaterial from LCPI to LBHI in early August to alleviate JPMorgan's concern.

P1070
Sept 9. JPMorgan requested 38 billion(HKD) from Lehman to cover additional collateral to cover all of JPMorgan's exposures to Lehman.

P.1071
Sept 11. JPMorgan concluded that the collateral was not worth nearly what Lehman had claimed it was worth, and decided to request an additional 38 billion in cash from Lehman that day.

p.1073
the Examiner concludes that the evidence may support the existence of a colorable claim that JPMorgan breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making excessive collateral requests to Lehman in Sept 2008.

p.1074
Citi was Lehman's designated settlement member on the Continous Linked Settlement (CLS) system, a trading platform operated by a consortium of banks for the clearance and settlement of foreign exchange trades.
June 12, 2008, Citi obtained a $15.6 billion "comfort" deposit from Lehman to be maintained at Citi in a overnight call account.

p.1077
HSBC provided Lehman with clearing and settlement services for sterling-donominated trades in CREST, a clearing and settlement system for certain securities.
HSBC privided myriad other banking services to Lehman, including acting as Lehman's trustee for special purpose vehicles in the Cayman Islands (Minibonds), as Lehman's counterparty in derivatives trades and other transactions, and providing various other credit products to Lehman. HSBC's most significant credit exposure, however, derived from HSBC's role as Lehman CREST settlement bank.

p.1078
August 18, 2008, HSBC advised Lehman of its intention to withdraw from its business relationship with Lehman entirely. In addition, HSBC demanded that Lehman deposit just under 7.8 billion into accounts in HK and UK.

p.1306
The most significant aspect of HSBC-Lehman relationship are performing clearing and settlement services fo rLehman's sterling-denominated securities trades in the CREST system and prividing credit support to LBHI(mainly Asia operations) and its subsidiaries through a variety of credit products. This was governed by English laws.

p.1309
The CREST relationship between HSBC and LBIE was governed by a Facility Letter, which makes the CREST settlement facility available to LBIE, a Security Deed, which grants HSBC a security interest in LBIE's property held in connection with or derived from the CREST facility, and a list of Terms and Conditions, which are incorporated into the Facility Letter and specify the parties' rights and obligations.

p.1331
KPMG was the provisional liquidators of LBAH.

p.1332
HSBC and LBHI Stipulated to set off and return some of the funds covered by the UK Cash Deeds.

p.1336
HSBC considered withholding payments or requiring prefunding of trades in Asia-Pacific region Prior to Lehman's bankruptcy.

迷債回購方案司法覆核許可

迷債回購方案司法覆核許可

首次聆訊之我見

銀行要求苦主退回六或七成迷債回購本金的假設，須銀行沒犯錯的假設也成立

銀行向苦主提出的迷債回購邀約，是基於與證監的協議。而證監與銀行的協議，是因為銀行在銷售迷債業務中犯有過失，證監是按照法律的規定，及證監自己的判斷，從而作出的行政行動。而雷曼苦主大聯盟所協助的是次司法覆核也是針對證監的行政失當而提出的。

法官的判決可有許多假設，但每一假設都須有事實及一定條件才可成立。例如，假設司法覆核證監敗訴，銀行可能會要求取消與苦主之回購協議，及退回六或七成迷債回購本金，也即銀行不再向證監及苦主承擔任何責任。

我認為，這一假設要成立，必須滿足以下假設條件：

法官不但判證監與銀行協議無效，也判銀行與苦主的回購協議無效，或者；

法官認為銀行沒犯錯，或犯錯輕微，銀行不須承擔回購的責任；

但以上假設幾乎是無可能的：

一是，銀行與苦主之回購協議實為銀行所發之邀約，是私人的商業合約，而是次司法覆核只涉及對證監的行政失當申訴，沒有包括銀行與苦主的商業協議(也無可能包括) ，因此，不可能想像法官會作覆核範圍以外的判決，也即銀行與苦主的回購協議沒有效；

二是是次司法覆核也不涉及銀行是否有過失的事實判斷，更重要的是銀行在銷售雷曼及相關產品犯有過失是板上釘釘一般的事實，決無改變的可能。

另外，一個重要法理是，私人的商業合約如要取消，必要雙方同意或通過法定程序。假設法官判證監與銀行協議無效，也是憲法層面的判決，銀行無法定權力也無可能單方面要求取消就可取消原迷債回購協議。再者，正如銀行向苦主提出的迷債回購邀約，是基於與證監的協議，銀行無論從商譽，法理，政治層面上都無可能單方面不經與證監協商就可要求取消回購協議，因為銀行犯有過失的事實是無可改變的。同時，如果證監敗訴，這將是政府的嚴重挫敗，政府決無可能草率地做決策、方案，使自己及社會再“折騰”，政府只有檢討自身監管失敗的責任，與銀行談判一個使之與苦主全面和解的方案，才是使社會安定的不二之門。

證監辯護之“九成多人已回購”

在此事件中，銀行犯錯，但對投訴拒絕認錯。因此，苦主要討回公道及損失，一是接受回購，二是訴訟。但絕大多數人都無能力訴訟。再者，就算是向金管局投訴成立，也不能取回損失，因此大多數人無奈接受回購，是沒辦法之中的辦法，不能解讀為、更不能證明是大多數人心悅誠服地同意回購。

證監辯護之“珊之代表性”

此司法覆核有廣泛社會性，珊只為代表，一個願為公眾利益而犧牲個人利益，甚至可能遭受重大損失而站出來的代表。事實上，三萬多苦主只一半人左右有作出投訴，珊是這其中的一個代表。並且這一半人沒投訴，原因有非常多，既不能證明銀行銷售迷債時沒犯錯，也不能證明他們沒有投訴意願。

法官要求證監交出調查中銀報告的誓章，是苦主的一個勝利

正如我們當初認為，司法覆核將有可能暴光銀行犯錯的調查結果。無論證監或金管，都將調查結果捂得實實，甚至面對立法會的專責調查小組，也同樣不予披露。因此，法官的命令，是苦主的一個，也是首個勝利！

老馬
25/03/10

The crisis lesson that the HKMA still hasn't learned

The crisis lesson that the HKMA still hasn't learned


Yesterday Hong Kong Monetary Authority boss Norman Chan Tak-lam outlined his views on the future of financial sector regulation following the crisis of 2008.

It wasn't a gripping speech; no one was sitting on the edges of their seats in excitement. But excitement isn't really what you want from a central banker. Careful, cautious deliberation is nearer the mark.

On the whole that's what Chan delivered. Where he did take a policy stance, rather than making broad generalisations, most of what he said was eminently sensible.

But it was what he didn't say that was really interesting - and worrying too.

Chan, who succeeded long-time HKMA chief Joseph Yam Chi-kwong late last year, was on stage at Credit Suisse's investment conference alongside former Japanese vice-minister of finance Eisuke Sakakibara, for a post-crisis discussion on lessons learned and the road ahead.

Old Sakakibara was in no doubt which direction financial regulators should take to safeguard financial system stability in the future. The Volcker rule has to be imposed, he thundered, calling for the swift implementation of a proposal devised by former US Federal Reserve head Paul Volcker under which deposit-taking banks would be forbidden from engaging in activities deemed too risky like proprietary trading.

To his credit, Chan's view was more nuanced. Although all in favour of tighter regulation of the financial sector, he was justifiably dubious about knee-jerk responses like the Volcker plan.

As Chan pointed out, prohibiting banks from proprietary trading - dealing in markets for their own accounts rather than on behalf of customers - would be impractical. It can be almost impossible to distinguish proprietary trading from market-making from balance sheet management.

An overly heavy-handed approach to regulation, he warned, would merely push risky activities out of the banks, making them more reliant on short-term funding from the relatively unregulated shadow financial system, adding to, rather than reducing, overall systemic risk.

The key to preventing the next financial bubble, said Chan, is for regulators to limit the degree of leverage in the financial system. This is sensible thinking. It was because of the rapid build-up of leverage in the US financial system over the years leading up to 2007 (see the charts) that the damage was so devastating when asset prices began to decline.

As a result, Chan pledged to keep a close eye on the amount of credit extended to Hong Kong's property sector. We want to make sure banks don't relax their underwriting standards, he said.

Chan's approach to preserving financial system stability is commendable. What is troubling is that while discussing financial regulation after the crisis he focused exclusively on systemic stability and never once mentioned customer protection.

This is worrying, because if there is one lesson the HKMA boss really should have learned from the financial crisis, it is that while Hong Kong's supervision of banking system stability is relatively solid, our regulatory protection of bank customers is woefully inadequate, as the Lehman minibond scandal demonstrated.

In fact, the HKMA's over-emphasis on systemic stability proved actively harmful to ordinary bank customers. It was because of concerns over the financial strength of Hong Kong smaller banks' following the dismantling of the interest rate cartel in the late 1990s that the HKMA encouraged them to increase their fee income, for example by selling complex structured products to depositors. To be fair to Chan, the HKMA has no mandate to safeguard the interest of bank customers. Nor is it clear that the HKMA is the right body to look after their interests. As the minibond example shows, there is a fundamental conflict of interests between supervising systemic stability and regulating for consumer protection. What's good for banks may be bad for their customers.

As a result, Hong Kong needs a separate regulator with the teeth to supervise banks' conduct and safeguard the interests of their customers. This could be a new banking ombudsman, or possibly a beefed up Securities and Futures Commission with its responsibilities extended to cover customer protection across the whole financial sector.

This is the real lesson Hong Kong's regulators should have taken away from the financial crisis. Judging from Chan's remarks yesterday, it hasn't yet been learned.



tom.holland@scmp.com

求證監會根據證監條例571章107條,刑事檢控銀行!為什麼證監會有法不依??

求證監會根據證監條例571章107條,刑事檢控銀行!為什麼證監會有法不依??

證監條例Cap. 571 第107條

條： 107 欺詐地或罔顧實情地誘使他人投資金錢的罪行L.N. 12 of 2003 01/04/2003

(1) 任何人為誘使另一人作出以下作為而作出任何欺詐的失實陳述或罔顧實情的失實陳述，即屬犯罪—

(a) 訂立或要約訂立—

(i) 旨在取得、處置、認購或包銷證券的協議；或

(ii) 受規管投資協議；或

(b) 取得或要約取得集體投資計劃的權益，或參與或要約參與集體投資計劃。

(2) 任何人犯第(1)款所訂罪行—

(a) 一經循公訴程序定罪，可處罰款$1000000及監禁7年；或

(b) 一經循簡易程序定罪，可處第6級罰款及監禁6個月。

(3) 就本條而言—

(a) “欺詐的失實陳述”(fraudulent misrepresentation) 指—

(i) 任何陳述，而在該陳述作出時，作出該陳述的人知道該陳述是虛假、具誤導性或具欺騙性的；

(ii) 任何承諾，而在該承諾作出時，作出該承諾的人是無意履行該承諾的，或知道該承諾是不能夠履行的；

(iii) 任何預測，而在該預測作出時，作出該預測的人知道根據他當時所知的事實，該預測是沒有充分理由支持的；或

(iv) 任何陳述或預測，而在該陳述或預測作出時，作出該陳述或預測的人蓄意遺漏某項事關重要的事實，以致—

(A) (就陳述而言)該陳述成為虛假、具誤導性或具欺騙性的陳述；或

(B) (就預測而言)該預測成為具誤導性或具欺騙性的預測；

(b) “罔顧實情的失實陳述”(reckless misrepresentation) 指—

(i) 任何陳述，而在該陳述作出時，該陳述是虛假、具誤導性或具欺騙性的，並且是罔顧實情地作出的；

(ii) 任何承諾，而在該承諾作出時，該承諾是不能夠履行的，並且是罔顧實情地作出的；

(iii) 任何預測，而在該預測作出時，該預測是罔顧實情地作出的，並且根據作出該預測的人當時所知的事實，該預測是沒有充分理由支持的；或

(iv) 任何陳述或預測，而在該陳述或預測作出時，作出該陳述或預測的人罔顧實情地遺漏某項事關重要的事實，以致—

(A) (就陳述而言)該陳述成為虛假、具誤導性或具欺騙性的陳述；或

(B) (就預測而言)該預測成為具誤導性或具欺騙性的預測。

作者: 衛益勵

22 Mar 2010

Link of the report to police:

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/02/complaint-to-police.html

香港還有公義嗎?

香港還有公義嗎?




我們只是一群無知和無助的小市民, 因相信銀行, 導致銀行有機可乘卻用盡卑劣的方法, 誤導我們購買雷曼有毒產品. 金管、證監和銀行三方面為掩蓋醜事, 共同泡製了一個 ”六成和解方案”, 雖然金管和證監掌握了銀行犯事的證據, 但仍要合力把事件壓下去, 硬要苦主損失辛勤工作而賺來的積蓄, 苦主若不願被迫接受,還可以怎樣?



有些三餐不繼的苦主 要被迫接受

有些借貸度日的苦主 要被迫接受

有些不堪折騰的苦主 要被迫接受

有些情緒困擾的苦主 要被迫接受

有些年邁高齡的苦主 要被迫接受

有些急於周轉的苦主 要被迫接受

……



我們無奈接受, 但所謂「寒天飲冷水, 點滴在心頭」, 我們定當銘記於心!



人在做, 天也在看, 人民也在看 !!



當局用強權要處於困境的苦主接受這種不平等, 不公義的賠償, 簡直輕而易舉! 況且大部分迷債的抵押品已升值, 銀行已做了一門賺大錢的回購生意! 金管局和證監會利用他們的職權, 協助銀行賺大錢!!! 這就是我們的官商合作嗎?



我們向銀行投訴 銀行不瞅不睬

我們向證監投訴 證監不瞅不睬

我們向金管投訴 金管不瞅不睬

我們向警方投訴 警方不瞅不睬

我們向消委會投訴 消委會不瞅不睬


我們向申訴專員公署投訴 申訴專員公署不瞅不睬

我們向財經事務及庫務司司長投訴 財經事務及庫務司司長不瞅不睬


我們向財政司司長投訴 財政司司長不瞅不睬

我們向特首投訴 特首不瞅不睬



在這個富有香港特色的「不瞅不睬」官僚文化底下, 看著屍橫遍野, 任由人民在哀嚎慘叫, 無動於衷, 我們還能向誰申訴? 我們在香港還能在哪裡討回公道?



我們不能眼巴巴看著銀行繼續胡作非為, 不能讓監管機構尸位素餐, 令市民蒙受損失!



我們這些弱小的人民, 因為投訴無門, 所以花了九牛二虎之力籌款, 拿出僅餘的積蓄, 聘請了律師向法院申請司法覆核.



這就是人民對香港這個地方僅存的希望, 希望能投石問路: 香港還有公義嗎?




-蕭思玟-

Bridging the Communication Gap

Bridging the Communication Gap

Author: Mrs. Regina Ip (Member of Legislative Council, Chairperson of Savantas Policy Institute)


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Whether it be a seasoned politician or an appointed minister, keeping in touch with the people is never easy. In the US, critics complain from time to time about the “White House bubble” and the “perception gap” between the President and the people. In colonial Hong Kong, the late David Jeaffreson (who retired as head of the Independent Commission Against Corruption), started in the 1980s to ask the Civil service Branch to post local officers to the secretive Security Branch, moaning that the Colonial Secretariat was “like a citadel”. What is it about being in power which makes communicating with the people so difficult?

Communication involves both listening and speaking, but neither comes easily to those in power. Unfortunately, a survey of the all the building blocks of public communication shows that the government falls short on every one - ranging from the most basic and indispensable written or spoken word, to face-to-face contact, and the new digital media. Despite the pervasiveness of new digital tools, the importance of the written or the spoken word cannot be over-emphasized. The ascent to power of US President Barack Obama is a case in point. A rookie senator and a relative unknown even after his election to the US Senate in 2004, Mr. Obama was catapulted to nation-wide celebrity status thanks to a series of televised, stirring speeches, starting with his keynote speech at the Democratic National Convention in July 2004. At various critical junctures in his Presidential quest, candidate Obama saved his campaign by moving the public with inspiring speeches which speak to higher values and confront unresolved conflicts. After his campaign was set back by his long-time pastor Jeremiah Wright’s “God damn America” sermon, candidate Obama bounced back with his famous speech on “a more perfect union” in Philadelphia in March 2008. Powerful words again saved the day.

A quick scan of historical leaders shows that few great leaders have not been remembered for their powerful speeches or memorable quotes. An obvious example is China’s Chairman Mao Zedong, whose poetry and quotations remain influential up to the present day. In the West, British leader Sir Winston Churchill won widespread admiration for the numerous inspiring wartime speeches he made. Many of his most unforgettable phrases - “I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears and sweat.”, and “men will say (of the British Empire and the Commonwealth), “This was their finest hour” “, and “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by so many to so few” - continue to be quoted or adapted for use in different contexts around the world. The gift of words is so important that modern Chinese leaders, albeit hailing from a radically different political tradition from the West, never cease to impress with their pithy summaries of party or national policies, poetic quotes or passionate appeals which seek to provide emotional leadership and connect with the people.

The performance of the Hong Kong SAR government is much less impressive on this score. A handful of bureau secretaries try hard to speak spontaneously in LegCo debates, responding to points raised by legislators and the media. Yet such qualities seem lacking at the highest level. More often than not, our leaders have provided the public with soundbites which rub people the wrong way, such as “Hitler was elected by a democracy”, “Hong Kong stands or falls on financial services”, or “Shanghai can never catch up with Hong Kong”. Alternatively, some would take the easy way out by regurgitating bland, official lines to take. Since 1997, no Hong Kong leader has made any indelible, positive impact on the collective psyche of the people with the words they spoke. Speech-writing remains a core weakness of the civil service conditioned to writing anodyne papers in standard format. The addition of the politically appointed under-secretaries and political assistants has not so far yielded any significant improvements in this respect.

The communication deficit can be pinned down to a number of reasons: a lack of personal talent, vision and courage, as many have pointed out. It has also to do with the shallow education and the bureaucratic background of most Hong Kong leaders: the increasingly short-term oriented education system which does not put enough emphasis on cultivating the humanity of the students, and a bureaucratic training which is the antithesis of developing a personal voice and persona. Tough luck for bureaucrats seeking to transform themselves into political high-flyers.

溫總指金融機構過度擴張致不穩定

溫總指金融機構過度擴張致不穩定
2010-03-14 12:12:00
全國人大會議14日上午閉幕會，國務院總理溫家寶(相關)隨即舉行記者會。溫家寶認為，世界經濟失衡，主要反映一些主要經濟體消費與儲蓄的失衡，一些金融機構只顧自身利益，過度擴張而造成金融的不穩定。中央人民廣播電台提問，國際社會要求德國、日本和中國這些主要出口國家減少對出口的依賴，實現世界經濟的再平衡。溫家寶認為，世界經濟的失衡，不能把眼睛只盯在中國的貿易上。他指出，世界經濟失衡，主要是反映在一些主要經濟體消費與儲蓄的失衡，一些金融機構只顧自身利益，過度擴張而造成金融的不穩定。如果從深層次講，世界上最大的失衡是發展的不平衡。在這次金融危機當中，受害最大的是發展中國家。至於貿易，他重申，將採取措施進一步擴大進口，同時也希望發達國家能夠放開對中國高科技產品的出口。他強調，解決世界經濟失衡問題，需要各國協調一致。特別是在宏觀政策上，如何保持和穩定經濟復蘇的大好形勢，同時，對金融進行進一步的改革

雷曼「操弄」帳目 前高層難卸責 資產緊絀致命傷 投資銀行補一刀

雷曼「操弄」帳目 前高層難卸責　資產緊絀致命傷 投資銀行補一刀

08年9月中投資銀行雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）倒閉，觸發金融海嘯席捲全球。昨日破產監督人呈交「雷曼死因報告」，披露摩根大通及花旗集團等銀行提高抵押品要求，令陷入危機的雷曼資金嚴重不足，最終破產收場。

　　報告詳列雷曼前高層及負責審計的安永會計師事務所（Ernst & Young）行為疏失，可能引發大量訴訟。

　　破產監督人瓦魯卡斯（Anton Valukas）向法庭呈交長達2,200頁、措辭嚴厲的《雷曼兄弟控股公司進入破產法第11條過程的監督人報告》，揭露包括雷曼如何以會計手段隱藏巨額資產，投資銀行如何向搖搖欲墜的雷曼補上一刀，以及巴克萊銀行買入雷曼北美證券部涉及不當轉移資產。

報告或引發大量訴訟

　　委託瓦魯卡斯撰寫報告的紐約南區破產法庭法官James Park說，報告讀來像一本暢銷書。

　　報告指出，雷曼流動資產緊絀，是導致破產的核心原因，而摩根大通（JP Morgan Chase）及花旗（Citigroup）向雷曼放貸，要求雷曼增加抵押品及轉換相關條款，令其流動資金更加緊絀。

　　瓦魯卡斯報告指出，雷曼前高層成員責無旁貸。前行政總裁富爾德、前常務董事奧馬拉、前首席財務總監卡蘭及前執行副總裁洛維特，須為雷曼季度財務報告存在誤導負上一定責任。

可作銀行高管指定讀物

　　雷曼利用回購105（Repo 105）的會計制度，將08年第二季高達500億美元資產，暫列資產負債表以外資產（off balance sheet asset）。事實上，雷曼早在2001年起，已濫用回購105美化資產負債表。報告批評曾經聲稱毫不知情的富爾德是有「重大疏忽」；負責審計的安永會計師事務所，亦因未有過問相關操作而受批評。

　　持有6,390億美元巨額資產的雷曼兄弟破產，是美國史上最大規模破產案。瓦魯卡斯在09年5月至今年1月期間，訪問雷曼事件中多名重要人士，包括雷曼前高層、聯儲局主席伯南克、前財長保爾森、現任財長蓋特納、前證監會主席考克斯（Christopher Cox），並審查逾千份文件及雷曼電郵紀錄。

　　前財長保爾森接受訪時指出，聯邦政府從未承諾提供援助，富爾德同意他的說法，同時又指保爾森未有排除協助的可能性。分析認為，對話顯示兩人互相推搪，亦反映華府與投行之間的溝通存在問題。

　　路透社分析認為，富爾德等人比外界認為的更為傲慢及笨拙，而這份報告是了不起的管理指南初稿，應是現時在位及未來的銀行高層，以及監管當局的指定讀物。


13 Mar 2010

Lehman Brothers case was her first political encounter

Lehman Brothers case was her first political encounter


Starry Lee Wai-king’s first encounter with district services began when she was still a university student volunteering for a district councillor.

Encouraged by the people in the local community, Lee enlisted as a candidate and won the 1999 district council election and was re-elected four years later. She was a non-affiliated candidate on both occasions.

Through the district activities, Lee came to know Tsang Yok-sing, who was then Chairman of the Democratic Alliance for Betterment of Hong Kong, and is now President of the Legislative Council.

The party invited Lee to join them and run in the Kowloon West constituency of the 2004 LegCo election alongside Tsang, who eventually won a seat with the highest number of votes.

In 2008 Tsang moved to the Hong Kong Island constituency, hoping to regain the seat that their late party chairman Ma Lik had occupied. Thus came the opportunity and important task for Lee to head a ticket to compete in the Kowloon West election.

And she won - with more than 39,000 votes, the highest number in a wide open race with a total of 13 competing teams.

Immediately after her election triumph, Lee had to face her very first political encounter: The September 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse that surfaced amid the global financial crisis.

“So before I, being a rookie, could familiarize myself with the work of the legislature, had to handle the mammoth Lehman case,” she recalled.

Given her accounting knowledge, Lee is assigned the finance and economic portfolios by the party caucus. Working at the frontline, she encountered an endless list of victims, especially the devastated elderly who had lost their lifetime savings in the financial crisis.

At that time, the people who had purchased Lehman mini-bonds joined in a desperate public outcry calling on LegCo to investigate the incident.

Initially the party did not support the idea of an investigation, but Lee was sympathetic to the victims who had lost money through their investments in the mini-bonds.

Her influence and strong public support motivated the party caucus to vote for an inquiry with special statutory powers and privileges.

“In my opinion, we could never find out the truth if LegCo did not step into the matter and so there is a need to investigate,” she insisted.

The proceedings are now in their second year.

As a member of the investigating committee, Lee hopes that they can accelerate the process and yield results for the public to see. “The present pace worries me a bit,” she confessed.


12 Mar 2010

證監統一審批結構產品

證監統一審批結構產品

雷曼迷債爆破掀起軒然大波，證監會繼續改善結構產品審批工作。繼去年底建議改循《證券及期貨條例》取代《公司條例》審批非上市結構產品，消息指證監會內部已落實重組，由投資產品部統一負責非上市結構產品審批工作。

引證高秉忠批評 切中要害

　　證監會近期連串改善結構產品審批的行動，似引證證監會前僱員高秉忠，在立法會雷曼迷債小組聆訊上，狠批證監會不同部門，按不同法例審批投資產品，令投資產品審批準則參差的言論（見表）切中要害，現改善措施亦與他供稱當年的建議一致。

改由投資產品部 主理審批

　　有知情人士透露，證監會內部早前已決定，將非上市結構產品的審批工作，統一由投資產品部負責審批。企業融資部一直負責有關產品審批的一隊職員，亦已全數併入副行政總裁兼執行董事張灼華主管的投資產品部麾下。

　　證監會去年10月發表諮詢文件，建議全面由《公司條例》審批非上市結構產品時，一併建議新設一個跨產品的「產品諮詢委員會」，以取代現有的單位信託委員會及投資有關的壽險計劃及集資退休基金委員會。

　　據了解，該個新成立的委員會是設於投資產品部之下，當時已鋪路統一由投資產品部負責非上市結構產品審批。

證監拒評分工 指審批標準同

　　證監會發言人接受查詢時，不願評論證監會就產品審批的內部分工，但強調是按同一標準進行審批。在去年10月的市場諮詢有結果，並通過相關法例修訂前，暫仍按《公司條例》審批結構產品申請。

　　在高秉忠今年1月底兩度出席雷曼迷債小組聆訊後，證監會行政總裁韋奕禮（Martin Wheatley）於2月初應小組傳召再出席聆訊時，只表示即使不同部門按不同法例審批投資產品，亦不見得投資者保障因而減少，當時未有提及證監會內部已決定統一結構產品審批。

　　「證監會低調處理統一投資產品審批的決定，是避免加強外界對過去處理不理想的印象。」知情人士如此分析。

　　金融服務界立法會議員詹培忠則認為，證監會就結構產品的審批或有須進一步改善的需要，無論是否同一部門負責，最重要是按同一標準，並以公平、公開原則讓市場參與者了解。他又認為證監會審批失當，並非爆發雷曼迷債的主因，關鍵在於金管局對銀行銷售監管鬆馳。 相關文章:

結構產品市場 冰封18月



11 Mar 2010

衍生工具炸彈 愈拆愈驚心

衍生工具炸彈 愈拆愈驚心

一般投資者對衍生工具（derivatives）的認識，過往可能只限於期指、窩輪及牛熊證，更說不定只懂它們的玩法，又或者只聽過它們的名字。

爆煲浪接浪 大國損失慘重

　　直至07年美國捲起次按風暴，金融機構相繼披露在債務抵押債券（CDO）、結構投資工具（SIV）、信貸違約掉期（CDS）等「字母湯」項目的撥備及損失，連同之後雷曼兄弟倒閉觸發迷你債券爆煲，市場突然驚覺這堆衍生工具的破壞力之強，足以滅整個金融市場。

　　可惜禍不單行，當歐美發達國仍未想出，如何有效監管這個千變萬化的衍生工具市場之際，希臘為首的歐洲多國又被揭發在多家投資銀行協助下，涉嫌以利率或貨幣掉期合約（swap）來隱瞞債務。原來高至國家層面，衍生工具同樣已被廣泛使用。

　　近期更有不少歐美地方政府被揭發，這幾年因貪圖短期低息，或能先收取一筆可觀的預付金，不斷與投行訂立對己方極為不利的利率掉期合約，但此刻卻有如年前不少城中富豪，買了累計股票期權（accumulator）一樣進退不得。

意國掉期合約 涉350億歐元

　　以人口約為2,800人的意大利小鎮Baschi為例，財務官Dominici女士便正為一紙價值2,500萬歐元的利率掉期合約而煩惱；究竟應付出龐大「分手費」，果斷地終止這「不平等合約」，及早止蝕？還是寧願每日膽戰心驚，面對最終可能須承受難以預料損失的危機，等待20年讓這紙合約期滿？

　　當然，她亦有另一選擇，就是與這家投行對簿公堂，看看對方有否不法行徑。不過，無論她最終選擇怎樣做，她已斷言「衍生工具應永遠被禁止」。

　　事實Baschi事件並非冰山一角，根據意大利核數署及央行的數字，單是01至08年期間，該國有525個地方政府或機構，簽訂共1,000宗利率掉期合約，涉及總金額高達350億歐元，等同該國地方債務三分一。

　　究竟是市場後知後覺，還是大家被21世紀的景氣蒙蔽雙眼，才對結構複雜得只有少數專家明白的衍生工具掉以輕心？


10 Mar 2010

Fury over Lehman Bros minibonds remains in season

Fury over Lehman Bros minibonds remains in season


The annual spring open day at Government House is supposed to be a dream come true for young volunteer tour guides.

But their training couldn't possibly have included saying: on your left are blossoming azaleas, and on your right, fuming Lehman Brothers protesters.

Around 30 demonstrators protested at Government House yesterday, demanding that the government resolve their grievances.

Throughout their protest security guards warned them to cease their action. Police later said no one was arrested.A housewife said she lost HK$1.3 million on Constellation notes purchased from DBS in 2006 but "there was no follow- up action from the bank."

Another protester said their action was not planned, even though a few of them had zipped open their windbreakers to reveal Chinese characters that, in sequence, said Donald Tsang Yam-kuen should step down.

Other visitors said the protest was inappropriate. "I think all demonstrations have to go through official applications," she said.

"What they are doing is disrespecting Government House. It is not the right place to protest."

There were 12,021 visitors for the whole day, most of them to enjoy the various flowers in bloom and soak up the history of Government House.

But we're sure yesterday's action won't merit a mention in any guided history tour in the years to come.


08 Mar 2010

Progress of the HKMA's investigations in Lehman-Brothers-related cases

Progress of the HKMA's investigations in Lehman-Brothers-related cases


The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) announced today (March 5) that up to March 4, 2010, there were 12,993 complaint cases concerning Lehman-Brothers-related investment products which have been resolved by a settlement agreement reached under section 201 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (Notes 1 & 2) and 1,212 cases through the enhanced complaint-handling procedures required by the settlement agreement. Together with the 2,833 cases closed because insufficient prima facie evidence of misconduct was found after assessment or no sufficient grounds and evidence were found after investigation, the handling of 17,038 complaints received have now been completed.

Currently, 1,056 Lehman-Brothers-related complaint cases (including minibond cases) are under disciplinary consideration after detailed investigation by the HKMA. Proposed disciplinary notices are being prepared in respect of 757 such cases and proposed disciplinary notices or decision notices have been issued in respect of another 299 cases (Note 3). Adding these 1,056 cases to those the handling of which has already been completed, investigation work has finished for 84% of complaint cases received.

(A table summarising the progress of the disciplinary and complaint-resolution work in respect of Lehman-Brothers-related complaints is attached.)

For further enquiries, please contact:

Alice Lo, Communications Chief, at 2878 1480 or

Peggy Lo, Manager (Communications), at 2878 1687

Notes:

1. On July 22, 2009, the SFC, the HKMA and 16 distributing banks reached an agreement under section 201 of the SFO in relation to the repurchase of Lehman Brothers Minibonds from eligible customers and the HKMA has informed the banks that, since the agreement contains detailed arrangements for settlement of claims and the implementation of robust systems for selling unlisted structured investment products and dealing with related customer complaints in future, it is not the intention of the HKMA to take any enforcement action in relation to Minibond cases that involve eligible customers who accept the repurchase offer.

2. Since August 7, 2009, 16 minibond distributing banks have begun issuing repurchase offer letters to eligible customers (about 25,000 customers) under the Lehman-Brothers Minibonds Repurchase Scheme (the Scheme) announced on July 22, 2009. Up to February 27, 2010, 24,744 customers have responded to the repurchase offers, of whom 24,482 customers or 98.9% have accepted the offers. As of February 27, 2010, for customers who had accepted the offer, 99.99% of them already received payment from the banks concerned, while the remaining payments will be settled soon (in any case no later than 30 days after having received the duly completed acceptance forms from these customers). Separately, about 4,800 customers who had reached settlements with the banks prior to the introduction of the Scheme are eligible for the voluntary offer made by the banks, with a view to bringing them in line with the eligible customers who accept the repurchase offer under the Scheme. For customers whose previous settlement amount was less than 60% (for customers aged below 65) or 70% (for customers aged 65 or above) of the principal invested, 99.5% had already received top-up payments from the banks concerned on February 27, 2010.

3. These are cases in respect of which (a) proposed disciplinary notices have been issued and representations were pending, (b) representations have been received and are being reviewed, or (c) disciplinary decision notices have been issued and the persons concerned have been given 21 days to consider whether to appeal to the Securities and Futures Appeals Tribunal.

Ends/Friday, March 5, 2010

Issued at HKT 19:26