Henry Tang and Fred Ma

Regina Ip -a December 27 at 10:32pm

Jeff, As you may have noted from my recent letter to Dr. Raymond Ho, Chairman of LegCo's investigating committee on the Lehman-related issues, judging from the testimony of Martin Wheatley, Executive Director of the Securities and Futures Commission, the relevant officials in the HKSAR Government might have overlooked the need to implement the recommendations of the SFC's Consultation in 2006. Their delay in making he necessary legislative amendments might have left loopholes in the selling of Lehman-related products, especially those sold through private placement, like ELN. I have asked the Chairman Dr. Ho to summon the former Financial Secretary Mr. Henry Tang and the former Secretary for Financial and Treasury Services, Mr. Fred Ma. Bu the government might put pressure on Dr. Ho behind-the -scene to discourage him from doing so. If you support my proposal, would you like to write to Dr. Ho to request these former financial officials to be summonsed?

On the meeting with the Alliance of Lehman Brothers' Victims, the representives have agreed to support Regina Ip proposal on Henry Tang and Fred Ma on their roles in Minibonds issues and are drafting letter to Legco to support Regina Ip and also on issue to summon SFC Mr. Ko.

爆煲前兩年悉漏洞 雷曼小組倡召唐英年解畫

(明報)2009年12月26日 星期六 05:10

【明報專訊】立法會 調查雷曼事件的小組委員會已完成對財政司 長曾俊華 的聆訊，但小組成員葉劉淑儀 將矛頭指向前任財金官員。她稱，證監會 早在2006年已經發現衍生產品的資產資料披露不足，然而政府及證監會一直未有堵塞漏洞。她指小組或有需要傳召時任財政司長唐英年 和財經事務及庫務局 長馬時亨 作出解釋。

資產資料披露不足

葉太周一去信小組委員會主席何鍾泰 ， 提出3項書面提問，要求政府回答。葉太在信中指，曾俊華提出的書面答覆，顯示證監會在06年的「香港衍生權證市場——未來路向」諮詢結果，提及衍生產品的 發行商對衍生工具掛鈎的資產所作出的資料披露，不會像那些資產的發行商在集資時一樣高。但她指證監會並沒有做任何堵塞漏洞的工作。

她提出3項問題，包括有何阻力令證監會不能即時行動改正系統漏洞；財政司長和財經事務及庫務局長對證監會一直沒改正這漏洞一事有什麼意見；如果當年恰當處理這個漏洞，會否令購買了雷曼產品如迷債等的香港市民減少等。

葉太對本報表示，有關問題反映了證監會早在06年已經發現迷債、股票掛鈎票據等衍生產品，在資料披露上出現系統性漏洞，特別是證監會是以披露為本的方式進行監管，令到問題更嚴重，但證監會和時任財政司長、財經事務及庫務局長一直沒有處理。

她指，就這個問題，政府有需要解釋，她認為應考慮傳召前任財政司長和前任財經事務及庫務局長作供，交代為何收到證監會的報告後，沒有做過任何堵塞漏洞的事情。她透露，小組委員會的閉門會議上，已有委員提出傳召前官員。

湯家驊 ﹕政府證監反應太慢

委員會主席何鍾泰則表示，傳召財金官員的部分已到尾聲，稍後會開會研究是否傳召之前的財金官員，農曆新年後則會討論傳召銀行、銀行前線人員和事主。

公民黨 立法會議員湯家驊亦指事件反映政府和證監會的反應太慢，但他指再傳召前任財金官員的意義不大，因為真正的問題應在證監會身上。小組委員會在下月8日將再傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮作供。

雷曼聆訊 曾俊華玩卸膊本文重點

雷曼聆訊 曾俊華玩卸膊
本文重點
縱容違規銀行逃離法網
【本報訊】立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會昨日第二次聆訊財政司司長曾俊華，有議員批評金管局和證監會「自己查自己」欠公信力，兩個監管機構與銷售銀行提出的迷債回購協議更容許違規銷售的銀行「逃離法網」。
金管局前總裁任志剛於去年初已建議銀行調高零售信貸掛鈎產品的風險評級，曾俊華表示他在事後才知悉，辯稱這是監管機構的日常監管工作，港府不會干預。他又推說銀行公會主席和廣北，在去年雷曼倒閉前與金管局的會議上也認為雷曼財困對本地銀行體系影響不大。

雷曼苦主向證監會遞交請願信，要求會方盡快調查銀行在事件中有否違規。 （李西全攝）
縱容違規銀行逃離法網
議員劉慧卿質疑，雷曼事件後金管局和證監會只是「自己查自己」，欠公信力亦不符國際標準。議員甘乃威批評，監管機構不對已接受回購協議的個案採取執法行動，是容許違規銀行「逃離法網」。余若薇質疑金管局和證監會，在監管銀行和證券商的標準上「有嚴有寬」。
曾俊華指，雷曼事件後兩監管機構已應港府要求認真地進行調查，港府亦會配合和尊重小組的調查和結論，若有個案涉及刑事罪行，當局會繼續跟進，又否認兩監管機構的標準不同，強調兩個機構不時開會使標準一致化。
小組主席何鍾泰稱，向曾俊華取證的工作已暫告一段落。下月八日及十二日再傳召證監會行政總裁韋奕禮，而前證監會非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠至昨日仍未回覆小組，但小組已預留一月下旬聆訊高秉忠。他又預計最快農曆新年後、約二月中展開第二階段的取證工作，傳召銀行代表、銀行前線員工及雷曼苦主作供。
另外，約三十名非迷債苦主昨日到證監會及警察總部抗議，指苦主於去年底已向當局提交投資文件，但當局至今仍未展開調查，批評警方拖延時間。警方指，有關文件已交律政司處理，如有進展會作出通知。

非迷債銷售複雜 調查需時

雷曼迷債的和解協議獲近99%合資格客戶接納，但雷曼相關非迷債產品的違規銷售調查仍路途漫漫。接近監管機構的消息指出，由於非迷債產品的分銷安排、產品特質相對迷債複雜，因此或需要較長時間才能完成調查及紀律程序。
部分無抵押品 銀行勢抗辯
　　消息並稱，由於部分非迷債產品並無任何抵押品，意味銀行一旦同意回購產品和解，便須承擔全部損失，不排除分銷銀行因而更激烈抗辯。
　　「迷債是16家分銷銀行，銷售同一投資產品，而在商討和解過程時，16家銀行亦有一些共同利益；相反，非迷債產品涉及不同結構及特質的產品，每隻產品有不同分銷銀行，需要逐一調查及磋商（和解），因此程序較複雜，需時亦可能較長。」消息人士不願估計首宗非迷債產品和解可於何時完成。
證監來年監管 「抓大放小」
　　該名消息人士指出，證監會在非迷債產品調查及紀律程序上，會繼續「由上而下」（top-down approach）檢視分銷銀行有否系統性缺失，並以達致和解協議令客戶獲賠償為首要原則。
　　據了解，證監會調查雷曼迷債時，是先向涉及最多投資者的分銷銀行，即中銀香港（02388）埋手。被問及在非迷債產品調查上會否採用同一原則，消息人士則指，為最多客戶爭取賠償確是考慮因素之一，但亦須視乎對相關銀行違規調查的結果。
　　資料顯示，在非迷債產品中，以星展銀行發售的Constellation所涉及的金額最多，達85億元；其中與雷曼掛的系列金額達20億至30億元，客戶達3,000人。
　　至於證監會來年監管取向則定調為「抓大放小」。消息人士指，對中介機構的監管重點，不再是「風險為本」，監察小經紀的操守事宜。證監會正考慮跟從國際組織建議，包括將信貸評級機構納入發牌監管，加強對對基金的監管，以及檢討對保薦人的監管等安排。
內幕交易 盼更高級法院審
　　另外，證監會亦致力尋求在檢控及懲處過程中「擴大戰果」，例如就內幕交易等刑事檢控，爭取律政司交由更高級法院審理，以向市場發出更清楚的信息。「以最近一宗涉及操縱期指市場的個案為例，交由裁判署審理，並不足以反映事件嚴重性。」
　　按《證券及期貨條例》規定，違法的最高刑罰是10年監禁及罰款1,000萬元，但裁判處的最高判刑只是3年、地方法院最高判刑7年，只有高等法院才能判處法例下所列明的最高刑罰。此外，證監會亦認為現時違規個案轉介「市場失當行為審裁處」的過程太慢，希望爭取由證監會直接轉介個案。
15 Dec 2009

曾俊華

曾俊華誇監管顛倒黑白

財政司司長曾俊華昨日首次出席立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會聆訊時指，截至上月有近九成九合資格的雷曼迷債苦主接受了回購協議，「正正彰顯了監管機構的監管能力」。多名議員隨即炮轟曾俊華「顛倒黑白」，強調迷債苦主只是被迫接受回購協議，又指從雷曼迷債一役中，顯示銀行銷售結構性產品已到「無法無天」，反問曾俊華如何彰顯監管機構的監管能力。
曾俊華昨日出席聆訊時，多番強調金融海嘯是「百年一遇」，「世界上無一個完美制度」，當局已要求監管機構從速處理苦主的投訴，他又揚言截至上月，二萬四千六百多名合資格迷債苦主中，有百分之九十八點九接受了和解協議，正是「彰顯了監管機構的監管能力」。
承認調查迷債緩慢
議員余若薇炮轟，迷債苦主只是被迫接受回購協議，加上雷曼倒閉至今，只有一宗非迷債個案進行了紀律處分，質疑當局根本沒有從速處理。
甘乃威則直斥曾俊華「將事實顛倒黑白」，因至今仍有六千多宗非迷債投訴未獲賠償，再者從證監會調查銀行的結果顯示，銀行銷售結構性產品的情況已「無法無天」，反問曾俊華如何彰顯監管機構的監管能力。
曾俊華回應時承認調查過程緩慢，但力稱金管局已密鑼緊鼓進行調查，由於個案眾多且涉及法律程序，指本港是法治社會，須有公平的處理過程，而現時金管局已集中資源處理非迷債個案，預料明年三月可完成大部分個案。
曾俊華又指，暫時未見有非迷債回購協議，他解釋說港府在迷債回購協議中的角色有限，金管局、證監會與銀行達成回購協議亦不用其同意，但監管機構不時會通知他商討進度，不過兩個監管機構至昨日仍未有知會過他有關非迷債回購協議的事宜。
小組主席何鍾泰於會後稱，曾俊華將於下周五繼續出席小組聆訊。此外，小組擬於下月傳召前證監會非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠，但高至昨日仍未向小組提供聯絡地址，希望高於本月十六日前回覆。何鍾泰又否認小組工作緩慢，解釋因雷曼事件仍在發展中，加上涉及人士眾多和法律程序，而且小組委員人數多，強調他滿意小組工作進度。
約五十名雷曼迷債苦主昨於立法會外示威，並向出席立法會雷曼迷債聆訊的財政司司長曾俊華喝倒采，其後一眾苦主展開名為「遍地開花」行動，各自向其推銷雷曼迷債所屬銀行門外示威。

迷債風波曾俊華顛倒黑白

【本報訊】立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會昨日首次傳召財政司司長曾俊華出席作供。但他砌詞當局監管得當引來多名議員炮轟「顛倒黑白」。曾俊華昨日供稱，截至上月，已有近九成九合資格雷曼迷債苦主接受了回購協議，這「正正彰顯了監管機構的監管能力」。多名議員隨即強烈批評他，指出迷債苦主只是被迫接受回購協議，而雷曼迷債一役顯示銀行銷售結構性產品已到「無法無天」地步，反問曾俊華監管機構在事件中顯示了甚麼監管能力。
苦主被迫接受回購
曾俊華昨日出席聆訊時多番強調金融海嘯是「百年一遇」，「世界上無一個完美制度」，當局已要求監管機構從速處理苦主的投訴。他又揚言截至上月，二萬四千六百多名合資格迷債苦主中，有百分之九十八點九接受了和解協議，正正「彰顯了監管機構的監管能力」。
議員余若薇炮轟，迷債苦主只是被迫接受回購協議，加上雷曼倒閉至今，只有一宗非迷債個案進行了紀律處分，質疑當局根本沒有從速處理。甘乃威則直斥曾俊華「將事實顛倒黑白」，因至今仍有六千多宗非迷債投訴未獲賠償，再者從證監會調查銀行的結果顯示，銀行銷售結構性產品的情況已「無法無天」，反問曾俊華如何彰顯監管機構的監管能力。
非迷債協議未有影
曾俊華回應時承認調查過程緩慢，但力稱金管局已密鑼緊鼓進行調查，由於個案眾多且涉及法律程序，指本港是法治社會，須有公平的處理過程，而現時金管局已集中資源處理非迷債個案，預料明年三月可完成大部分個案。
曾俊華又指暫時未見有非迷債回購協議，他解釋，港府在迷債回購協議中的角色分量有限，金管局、證監會與銀行達成回購協議亦不用其同意，但監管機構不時會通知他商討進度，不過兩個監管機構至昨日仍未有知會過他有關非迷債回購協議的事宜。
小組主席何鍾泰於會後稱，曾俊華將於下周五繼續出席小組聆訊。此外，小組擬於下月傳召前證監會非上市投資產品高級經理高秉忠，但高至昨日仍未向小組提供聯絡地址，希望高於本月十六日前回覆。何鍾泰又否認小組工作緩慢，強調滿意小組工作進度。

巧言令色鮮矣仁 錯而不認必成災
孔子說：「巧言令色，鮮矣仁！」財政司司長曾俊華昨日首次出席立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會聆訊，便親身演繹了何謂巧言令色，令人眼界大開。
眾所周知，在雷曼事件中，政府事前監管不力、事後處理不當，負有不可推卸的責任。但曾俊華不但不肯承認過失，反而砌詞狡辯，文過飾非，聲稱世界上沒有一套完美的監管制度，可以確保金融市場不出事，而金融海嘯是百年一遇，雷曼迷債事件亦在許多人意料之外，所以他不認為本港的金融監管機構在事件中警覺性不足。
這就奇怪了，如果本港的金融監管沒有問題、監管機構保持警覺，為何一種在歐美地區只賣給機構及專業投資者的高風險金融產品，在香港竟然被包裝成低風險的「債券」，向包括長者及傷殘人士在內的普羅大眾大銷特銷？正如有議員指出，證監會調查銀行的結果顯示，銀行銷售結構性產品的情況已是「無法無天」。金融監管漏洞多多，曾俊華無法提出任何針對性的改善措施，反以「無完美制度」為由替監管機構開脫，可謂恬不知恥。
更加荒謬的是，曾俊華強調，銀行提出的和解方案可減輕投資者的困擾，銀行亦可恢復正常運作，可以兼顧各方利益。他甚至為近九成九合資格雷曼迷債苦主接受回購協議而沾沾自喜，聲稱這「正正彰顯了監管機構的監管能力」。但實際上，雷曼爆煲已逾一年，苦主接受回購協議，是迫不得已，是無辦法中的辦法，是無選擇中的選擇，對此，曾俊華不以為恥，反而還在大講風涼話，不啻在苦主們的傷口上灑鹽，這不是太涼薄了嗎？難怪此語一出，即被多名議員炮轟「顛倒黑白」。
事實上，即使當局推出回購方案，雷曼事件並未因而解決。正如有議員指出，至今仍有六千多宗非迷債投訴未獲賠償。而金管局亦公布，截至十二月，局方合共收到近二萬二千宗涉及雷曼兄弟相關產品的投訴，但調查中的個案只有三千一百多宗，另有二千多宗投訴因表面證據不足等理由終止調查。有議員質疑，當局根本沒有從速處理雷曼事件，曾俊華也不得不承認，調查過程過於緩慢。
除了調查緩慢外，對於當局的處理，人們也不無疑問。時至今日，當局僅對一名銀行前線職員施以不痛不癢的停牌三個月處分，相對於雷曼事件的嚴重性，完全不成比例，甚至被譏為一場避重就輕的大戲，拿前線小卒做替死鬼。必須指出的是，雷曼事件影響巨大，苦主數以萬計，反映的絕非個別員工、個別銀行的問題，而是牽涉整個行業運作及監管的大問題，當局不去追究銀行的責任，以及政府監管人員的失職，怎能防止同類事件再次發生？
古羅馬領袖西塞羅有一句名言：「每個人都會犯錯，但只有愚人才會執過不改。」在雷曼迷債事件中，當局錯而不認、執過不改，正正是愚人的表現。不懂吸取教訓，不知亡羊補牢，必然會重蹈覆轍。曾俊華可以推卸責任，可以文過飾非，但他無法掩住天下人的悠悠之口。

Investor Wins Lehman Note Arbitration

By JESSICA PAPINI

In what will likely be a closely studied ruling, a small investor was awarded $200,000 after an arbitration panel decided her UBS AG broker inappropriately sold her risky Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. principal-protected notes.

The case is one of the first involving the Lehman notes to be heard by a Financial Industry Regulation Authority arbitration panel. While the arbitration ruling won't set a precedent, it could indicate how rulings on similar cases will play out.

There are "many pending similar cases," said Jacob Zamansky of Zamansky & Associates, who represented the investor, Patricia Flanagan of South Carolina, in the arbitration case. Mr. Zamansky said he is representing a dozen clients in similar situations around the country.

As in most arbitration awards, the three-person arbitration panel didn't give reasons for its findings. Other panels don't have to follow precedent, so they could rule in different ways on nearly identical cases. Still, the case will likely be cited by other plaintiff lawyers.

The case, submitted for arbitration a year ago, was brought against UBS Financial Services, a unit of UBS, which also is being investigated by numerous regulators for alleged issues around its selling of these notes. Mr. Zamansky's client was seeking $300,000 in compensatory damages because the broker recommended structured products. Mr. Zamansky argued that the notes were "speculative derivative securities" and were "unsuitable" for unsophisticated investors, according to the Finra claim statement.

The broker bought two notes for his client: a $225,000 guaranteed principal protection note and a $75,000 return optimization note. The panel ruled the client should be compensated $150,000 plus interest and attorney fees on the principal protected note; there was no compensation for the $75,000 note.

UBS said it "is disappointed the arbitration panel in this case awarded the claimant any damages, even if it was only half the compensatory losses she was seeking. UBS maintains that any client losses were the direct result of the unexpected and unprecedented failure of Lehman Brothers, which affected all Lehman bondholders."
Steven Caruso, attorney with Maddox, Hargett & Caruso, said that there are hundreds or thousands more arbitration cases that are expected to be filed in connection with Lehman principal protected notes. Mr. Caruso said his firm alone will represent roughly 100.

Write to Jessica Papini at jessica.papini@dowjones.com

UBS-Lehman Note Case a Potential Bellwether for All Banks

CMS notes sold by Shanghai Commercial Bank were the same as those sold by UBS.

by: Jake Zamansky December 08, 2009 Jake Zamansky

One of the accomplishments I’m most proud of is the 2001 settlement I negotiated for a client who trusted the bogus research of former Merrill Lynch analyst Henry Blodget. That award caught the attention of then New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer and ultimately resulted in the $1.4 billion settlement where nearly a dozen Wall Street firms were required to pay for issuing conflicted research. Sadly, Spitzer allowed firms to settle without admitting any wrongdoing, which limited the arbitration recoveries of other investors who mistakenly trusted Blodget.

I’m now optimistic that the arbitration award I won on behalf of a client of mine in South Carolina will prove to be another significant case with similar far-reaching consequences for Wall Street as my Blodget settlement. The case was covered in Saturday’s Wall Street Journal.

The award relates to Lehman Brothers “100 Percent Principal Protected Notes” that UBS (UBS) sold to my client. UBS sold more than $1 billion of these notes to retail investors, my client’s award is the first arbitration ruling relating to them in the country. In addition to ordering UBS to reimburse my client for a significant portion of her principal, the panel also required UBS to pay interest, plus all related expenses, including attorneys’ fees.

The potential implications of the arbitration panel’s findings are significant. If the South Carolina ruling proves to be a bellwether, UBS’s ultimate liability could be staggering, particularly given that the firm was forced to take a $900 million writedown relating to its sale of auction rate securities. Though UBS was by far the biggest peddler of the Lehman notes, countless other Wall Street firms sold them as well as other structured notes, and they, too, may face significant liability.

UBS’s sale of Lehman notes has caught the attention of New Hampshire securities regulators. New Hampshire alleged in a June filing that UBS engaged in “dishonest and unethical” business practices selling the Lehman notes, causing New Hampshire investors to lose $2.5 million. The North American Securities Administrators Association (NAASA) has said it was considering convening a task force on the Lehman notes, and I have strong reason to suspect the SEC also is looking into the matter.

Contrary to what common sense would suggest, the Lehman “100 Percent Principal Protected Notes” were anything but “principal protected.” They were essentially high-risk unsecured bonds that were entirely dependent on Lehman’s ability to make good on them. When the UBS broker sold my client her Lehman notes in April 2008, there already was good reason to be concerned about Lehman’s creditworthiness. Bear Stearns had failed a month earlier because of its exposure to subprime loans and speculation was rife that Lehman would fail for the same reason.

But my client’s UBS broker assured her that her notes had virtually “no risk” of losing principal and had the potential upside of earning a whopping 20.66 percent return in 18 months if the stock market performed within certain parameters. As Lehman’s demise increasingly became more likely in the summer of 2008, my client’s UBS broker repeatedly assured her that her notes were safe and dissuaded her from selling them at a loss as she wanted to do.

My South Carolina client is a hard-working individual who lost a sizeable portion of her net worth when the tech bubble burst. She made it clear to her UBS broker that she wanted only the most conservative investments and she had good reason to believe that in buying the Lehman notes the protection of her principal was a “sure thing.” Fortunately, the South Carolina arbitration panel understood that UBS deceived her and acted accordingly. The finding of fraud will be extremely helpful in other related cases.

Complaint to OMD (The cover up of HK gov. in Minibonds)

Complaint to OMD (2nd version)
期:
2009 12 3
Since Legco will start equiry of Lehman Brother case involving HKMA ,SFC and HK government, so I include my copy of complaints to Ombudsman on HKMA for your information. I had U. of Minnesota alumnus with Ph.D. that used to work for HKMA and later quit to work for 信報 as chief editor. These people had inside information about HKMA, SFC and most news from these newspapers should be true :

"《信報》雷曼苦主應獲百分百賠償 By 王岸然

雷曼苦主已經漸漸無人願意理會，但他們的堅持一直延續，因為身受其苦的人深知或方知社會如何不公平。這些有餘錢投資的人本屬小資產者、傳統上支持建制社會的人，是誰奪去了他們一半的財富？這是誰人的責任？一年前大家有為這個問題一同想，一年後見他們已獲六成賠償就當是投資失誤個案，就讓事件不了了之。只是幾個月前立法會的政客見民氣可用，高調成立了特權小組調查，到今天因為民氣不再就愛理不理，立法會的工作只要沒有傳媒注視，就事事旦旦。
冷待證人原因可疑
若不特別留意細段的新聞，一般人不會留意到一位前證監會的投資產品部高級經理，名叫高秉忠的人物，在八月辭去年薪過兩百萬元的高職，提早六年退休，要求到立法會雷曼特權小組作證，受到小組的冷淡對待。小組主席何鍾泰以小組成員意見之名，先要求高先生提供希望作供的內容詳情，然後始決定是否傳召。

雷曼苦主為高先生開了記者招待會，他自己亦發出公開信，小組還是愛理不理。小組的特權原來不是查真相，而是幫政府掩蓋真相！高先生明言，由於雷曼苦主要進行司法覆核的行動，若到時法庭傳召，他會到庭作供，將所有知道的內幕公開，因為法庭同樣是有言論自由特權的地方，他不會被刑事追究。
高秉忠之所以要求被傳召到特權小組，是因為《證券及期貨條例》中有類似《官方保密法》的惡法條文，而沒有公眾利益（public interest）的辯解理由。高秉忠只有到特權小組或是法庭才有講出內情的機會。
講出內情對雷曼苦主多重要，可能連他們也不知道。筆者只是從法理上分析，並不是知道內情。現在公眾不同情苦主的一點是，被誤導以為這是一次投資的失誤，但若然雷曼事件的出現是因為政府的決策過程失誤，政府或是決策過程中下令的政府高層可以有個人民事上的疏忽責任！
一如一間公司的決策出現問題，公司可以起訴董事疏忽，要求他個人賠償。一般政府高官可能無錢可賠，苦也無用，但當年（二○○三年）雷曼引入香港的決策過程，涉及特首董建華及財政司司長梁錦松、金融專員任志剛，這數人有億元計身家，若有個人疏忽之處，起訴他們，有可能得到苦主餘下的四成損失的賠償。特別是董建華有數十億元身家，他不肯賠，法庭下令他破產，相信會大快人心。
筆者一年之前已經在本欄介紹有關的法律問題，這裏再簡介一次，所有投資產品若要發出任何廣告，皆要先得到證監會投資產品部一群專家的研究與審批，證監會與全世界的證監會皆會互通這類投資產品的資訊。雷曼產品在美國是不准出售給小投資者，箇中理由如何，香港的證監會在審批的過程中必然要先行查問美國證監會有關的資料，亦必然早就掌握專業的判斷，就是雷曼產品不能在銀行的櫃位出售給小投資者！為何結果可以，就是最大的謎團所在。
高秉忠的證供有助解開謎團，是不言而喻的，因為正是他負責類似產品的研究調查。政府不想謎團被解開，並不出奇，為何連在雷曼事件中撿盡政治便宜的民主黨也似乎在幫忙？小組又不願傳召，又不願公開聆訊，要黑箱作業，是否有不可告人內情！ "

1st copy:2008年12月18日 星期四 上午9:14

The following was my complaint against HKMA and now includs HK gov. and SFC as you received on 12/12/08" and now revised:

1. From the start, HK Monetary Authority is only giving details about Lehman Brother related Minibonds which is different from what I heard from the banks. So HKMA is still trying for more than a year to mislead HK people about all Minibonds products that they belong to Lehman Brothers as bonds which may face totally loss in Lehman bankrupt case. In fact, up to now all others Lehman structures products including ELN, CMS and Notes are still not Lehman bonds but derivatives. So from the internet in discuss.com.hk, there were many confusing about Lehman Brother bonds and PIFL minibonds until some people and I point out that minibonds are PIFL products and never do HK Monetary Authority mentions about PIFL products in the news and even now are covering these information up together with SFC using the 60% buy-back scheme on some of these products. There is also one charge and investigation of PIFL, Constellation and Octave companies that their Minibonds are sold as bonds in HK banks up to now after more than a year of investigations by SFC, HKMA.

2. There is also no mention of HSBC as trustee of Minibonds until I give the information on discuss.com.hk on the night of 20th and only do HKMA has a few hints about trustee after 21st demonstration by holders of Minibonds. There are no actions against HSBC which allows Lehman Brothers to switch their securities one months before Lehman Brothers went to bankrupt protection in US but only to investigate HK distributors - i.e. banks that sells these structured products. Also during meetings with HKMA of me HKMA still refuses to investigate Singapore DBS Constellations Notes from pressure of Singapore government as told by Regina Ip. So HKMA , SFC actions seem only to put the blames to these HK banks that only act as distributor but not to trustee that supposing protect HK people savings as Minibonds are sold in HK.

3. There are also many discussions in the radio since SARS and HK government were promoting bonds to HK citizens about Minibonds and bonds from HK finance institute and HK gov. and HK Monetary Authority never warned against the minibonds are not bonds and also allow banks to sell them. Even today news (東方日報)are reporting these:

"迷債抵港遇上二巧合
立法會調查雷曼迷債小組委員會運作已一年，雖然絕大多數投資者都已經接受賠償，但這種「美國製造，香港傾銷」的結構性產品，當初為何會得到證監會批准，銷售予零售投資者，卻仍未水落石出。有熟悉《證券及期貨條例》的老友告訴老紀，證監名義上是獨立法定機構，但執董和非執董都是由特首委託財爺委任，怎樣能夠不去好好「配合」政府的政策呢？
老紀側聞，證監亦非毫無疑問便批准迷債上市，問題在於官員與證監高層職員沒可能全無「溝通」。老紀翻查當初的報道，便發現雷曼迷債推出市場的時間為2002年5月；而之前雷曼迷債抵港，向證監申請審批之日，亦巧合地是政府有意大力推動債券市場發展（雖然曾蔭權說迷債並非債券）之時，同時各銀行更巧合地因01年中取消利率協議而收入大減。
當時主管金融市場的兩名特區要員，分別是財政司司長梁錦松和財經事務局局長葉澍。雖然兩人都已離開政府，但老紀始終不明白，調查小組何以不傳召他們，以及當年在證監主理投資產品審批的執董作證？
證監處境不禁令老紀想起香港電台被「陰乾」，以至忍不住要問，現在的政府究竟是否懂得尊重arm's length bodies的權限，而不作干預呢？ "

And I read in the internet there are recordings found in Radio HK about the selling of Minibonds products as bonds and later on proved to be from directors of PIFL. And also from Legistrators after they received my complaint letters about HKMA, I heard that HKMA had promised Legistrators years ago during issueing of HK government related bonds (similar to structured products as these bonds can be later sold in stock market) in the Legistrators meetings that HKMA was very careful to look after these products sold in banks. And also during Legistrators meeting HKMA has told the legistrators that they did actually warned against the banks about Minibonds (includingConstellation series sold by DBS) that they include CDOs which are very high risks products that could not be sold to HK investors but only to institutional investment such as private bankings and goverments such as most Constellation series do include these CDOs. I also read about these CDOs in Yahoo.com in last two years these are very high risks products. But no warning of these products are given to me by banks and HKMA that they have missold me very high risk products. So there is a possible of COVER UP involved by HKMA and HK banks and these are a series crime.

4. For DBS Constellation series, these are poison milk sent to us by Singapore government and banking in last two years to rip off HK people for DBS use their worthless CDO lost to US banks. They just use notes to get all our money back to Singapore and I believe none of money still stay in HK. During the buyback of Constellation series by DBS bank, the Lehman Brothers went bankrupt protection but is still functioning. Also SCB manager of my bank has doubt about the calculating method of DBS and he thinks a large part of the money remaining in the CDO lost to depreciation of the collateral and costs and expenses are huge and unbelievable. Though these accounting method was also approved by HKMA, HKMA never investigates about these cases as Constellation series are all high risk products that cannot be sold in HK banks:

"Letter to Legco :

KPMG - Accounting firm for DBS constellation notes that also adapt inaccurate accounting method for Siemen and LHSP in Europe that I bought the stocks before under law suit in fruads of accounting methods.Right now KPMG is also involved in HK banks frauds of DBS Constellation Notes for their dubious accounting methods as charged even by Shanghai Commercial bank manager that involved in bank frauds and sold their Constellation Notes to me and I had sent the complaint letters to Legco last year for Legco to investigate.

Criticisms of KPMG
Rite AidIn 2003, KPMG agreed to pay $125 million to settle a lawsuit stemming from the firm's audits of the drug chain Rite Aid.[25]
Lernout & HauspieIn 2004, KPMG agreed to pay $115 million to settle lawsuits stemming from the collapse of software company Lernout & Hauspie Speech Products NV.[26]- I bought this company stock before-

Tax shelter fraud

Main article: KPMG tax shelter fraud

In early 2005, the United States member firm, KPMG LLP, was accused by the United States Department of Justice of fraud in marketing abusive tax shelters. KPMG LLP admitted criminal wrongdoing in creating fraudulent tax shelters to help wealthy clients avoid $2.5 billion in taxes and agreed to pay $456 million in penalties in exchange for a deferred prosecution agreement. KPMG LLP would not face criminal prosecution if it complied with the terms of its agreement with the government. On January 3, 2007, the criminal conspiracy charges against KPMG were dropped.[27] However, Federal Attorney Michael J. Garcia stated that the charges could be reinstated if KPMG does not continue to submit to continued monitorship through September 2008.[28]Before the settlement, the firm, on the advice of its counsel Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, removed several tax partners and admitted "unlawful conduct" by those partners. The firm agreed to cooperate with DOJ's investigation and help prosecute former partners who had devised and sold the tax shelters. Additionally, the firm hired former U.S. district judge Sven Erik Holmes to monitor its legal and regulatory affairs.

Siemens

In February 2007 KPMG Germany was investigated for ignoring questionable payments in the Siemens bribery case.[29] (Siemens agreed to pay a record $1.34 billion in fines to settle the case in December, 2008.) In November 2008 the Siemens Supervisory Board recommended changing auditors from KPMG to Ernst & Young.[30]-I also owned this stocks

Others

In 2006, Fannie Mae sued KPMG for malpractice for approving years of erroneous financial statements.[31]In March 2008 KPMG was accused of enabling “improper and imprudent practices” at New Century Financial, a failed mortgage company[32] and KPMG agreed to pay $80 million to settle suits from Xerox shareholders over manipulated earnings reports.[33]

Sponsorship
In February 2008, Phil Mickelson, ranked one of the best golfers in the world, signed a three-year global sponsorship deal with KPMG. As part of the agreement, Mickelson will wear the KPMG logo on his headwear during all golf related appearances.[34]

06 Oct 2009"

But HKMA does cover these facts up from HK citizens as we are never warned as HKMA only asks HK people be careful in their investments. Everybody knows that buying bonds is still the safest way to invest. This is a great fault of HKMA to allow Singapore bank owned partly by Singapore government to sell these high risk products in HK. HKMA is responsible to protect HK monetary system and they are experts in bonds market. This is a very great fault of HKMA to allow Singapore bank to steal money from HK people.

5. Even after HK government asks HK banks to buy back the PIFL products, the HK government with advise from HKMA still lied to HK people that PIFL products are Lehman bonds that covered by US laws and allow HK banks to stop buy back of these Minibonds and allow international financial institutions to steal our money away from us held by HSBC .

6. During investigating of HKMA relating to HK banks selling of these products, HKMA mainly start with Minibonds holders age over 65 while the other age group will be started later. And this break the rules that the banks have to answer the HKMA in 60 days of the complaints. Under that conditions, the work in process of HKMA will take 20 years to complete in relationship to their requirement of 60 days. This is a delaying tactics of HKMA to help HK banks to steal money from us. Even now HKMA has stopped the investigation of HK banks frauds related to Minibonds. And now most banks will not repay to all others non-Minibonds victims with their internal investigations with the help of HKMA delaying tactics, we are unable to locate evidences frombanks for legal actions. and your action to investigate HKMA delaying actions is urgently required. However, new informations were found about PIFL in the news:

"21st Century Business Herald 16 亞洲市場 By 譚璐 2008-12-18

擬在美集體起訴匯豐香港雷曼迷你債投資者"一致行動" 12月17日，CoughlinS t o i a G e l l e r R u d m a n& R o b b i n s L L P 的代表律師PatrickW.Daniels在香港接受記者採訪時表示，起訴美國匯豐的理據，是因為在香港負責雷曼迷你債券發行的公司 P a c i f i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c e L t d ，是由美國匯豐1 0 0 % 控股的公司。本報記者譚璐香港報道在香港擾攘多時的雷曼迷你債券回購事件仍然呈現膠著狀態，對駁公堂是否成為最後的解決之道?美國律師事務所CoughlinStoiaGellerRudman&RobbinsLLP早在11月底已經向香港雷曼苦主大聯盟提出建議，可以安排香港的迷債持有人在美國進行集體訴訟，要求美國匯豐賠償損失。12月17日，CoughlinStoiaGellerRudman&RobbinsLLP的代表律師PatrickW.Daniels在香港接受記者採訪時表示，起訴美國匯豐(HSBCBankUSA)的理據，是因為在香港負責雷曼迷你債券發行的公司PacificInternationalFinanceLtd，是由美國匯豐100%控股的公司。"香港的投資者不是從雷曼兄弟那裡買到這些債券的，是PacificInternationalFinanceLtd發行的，這個公司是獨立于雷曼兄弟運作的。"PatrickW.Daniels說，關於PacificInternationalFinanceLtd這個公司的資料可以從香港證監會那裡找得到。按照PatrickW.Daniels的說法，美國匯豐控制的公司發行了雷曼迷你債券，這些債券由雷曼兄弟負責擔保，同時匯豐又是這些迷你債券的信托人，負責保護抵押品。因此，PatrickW.Daniels認為，"匯豐不是受害者，實質上是雷曼迷你債的擁有者、發行者。 "

Here are some further misdeed of HKMA that need further investigations:

For complaint No. 1, HKMA,SFC should know that PIFL is 100% owned by HSBC since HKMA monitors all banks and financial institute in HK. Will there be any cover up of these facts by HKMA that need investigate.

For complaint No. 2, HKMA, SFC should know that HSBC issues the Minibonds, and why should HKMA.SFC not to investigate about the issuer but only the distributors. Same is true for DBS Constellation Notes as no investigations of DBS banks.

For complaint No. 3, after I put complaint letter to the discussion board, somebody is saying HKMA only warn the investment banks about the CDO that are bad milk and these CDO should not be sold to low risk investors. But no investment banks and private banks in HK sell Minibonds, only public banks sell Minibonds in HK. And this means all public banks in HK may not know they are selling high risk products such as Minibonds because HKMA never warn them. And all these banks that bought Minibonds become victim themselves and HKMA is responsible. Even thru now some facts are know to us that all HK based banks knew about CDO's, but not Bank of China as the directors told Lehman victims that in fact they did not know about Minibonds and these CDO's. See the following :


"揭示了銀行對於迷債真實風險之理解 -- 筆者: JL
銀行主動停止銷售雷曼迷你債券之决定：
揭示了銀行對於迷債真實風險之理解
2003-2008: 銀行一直以跟 7個著名公司信貸掛鈎作為銷售迷債的風險介紹。 銀行眾多職員們對於迷債的重大風險的瞭解似乎僅限於跟7個著名公司信貸掛鈎之風險. 此處暫且不談銀行職員對於“如果出現一個破産事件之後的迷債價值的理解和介紹 ”。
從2007年下半年起， 諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行開始陸續停止銷售迷債 。為甚麼? 發生了甚麽變故？是甚麼令銀行改變主意， 開始對雷曼迷債說‘不’？相同期間，星展 DBS 和大摩也不再繼續發行 Constellation 和 精明債券系列了。
信貸破產掉期 CDS 等信貸掛鈎產品的目的之一是為銀行界服務. 有著理解並且買賣 CDO / 合成 CDO / CDS / 信貸掛鈎票據 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗的銀行界, 是 出于對于系列 34/35/36 的 7 個著名挂鈎主體有可能出現破産事件之擔心， 還是其它不可公開的因數和憂慮而使銀行决定停止銷售迷債的呢 ？ 銀行掌握了些甚麽信息？銀行之决定是否揭示了銀行從未告知客戶 的關于雷曼迷債之真實特徵和相關風險？！
- 系列 34　信貸掛鈎主體 ：　中國，匯豐，太古， 新地， 和黃，星展，置地；
- 系列 35　信貸掛鈎主體 ：　中國，匯豐，太古,　新地， 和黃，港鐵，渣打；
- 系列 36　信貸掛鈎主體 ：　中電, 匯豐，中海油，星展，和黃，港鐵，渣打。　
系列 34/35/36 抵押品: 3A 評級 實質為信貸掛鈎產品 之 合成 CDO,合成 CDO之主要風險是一籃子掛鈎主體之信貸事件風險;
(a) 永亨銀行
永亨銀行是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列 5 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售， 直至2007年中的系列33。
自2007年10月起，是甚麽發生了變化？ 是甚麽原因促使永亨銀行决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 34／35／ 36？ 銀行是出于甚麽考慮而决定停止銷售“中風險”評級的迷債？（注：永亨銀行對於迷債的風險評級一直是“中風險”）。
(b) 富邦銀行
從 2005 的 系列21 開始銷售迷債。在銷售了迷債2年之後，
自2007年10月起， 是甚麽原因促使富邦銀行不再參與銷售迷債系列 34／35／36 ？
(c) 上海商業銀行，工商銀行亞洲
二者都是最早參與迷債銷售的銀行之一。從2003年的迷債系列5 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售， 直至2007年底的系列34。
自2007年12月起， 是甚麼原因促使上海商業銀行和工商銀行亞洲 决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35／36 ？
(d) 中信嘉華銀行
從2004年8月起的迷債系列12 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售， 直至2007年底的系列34。
自 2007年12月起， 是甚麽原因促使中信嘉華决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 35／36？
(e) 中國銀行
中銀作為迷債銷售量最大的分銷商，叢2004年2月的迷債系列 8 開始，一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售， 直至2008年1月的系列35。
自2008年3月起, 是甚麽發生了變化？ 是甚麽原因促使中銀决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？
(f) 集友銀行，南洋商業銀行
二者一直是迷債的長期忠實分銷商。
自2008年3月起， 是甚麽原因促使二者决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？
(g) 荷蘭銀行
自2008年3月起， 是甚麽原因促使荷蘭銀行决定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ？
對信貸掛鈎産品有豐富經驗的銀行，陸續停止銷售傭金慷慨的迷債，是否揭示了銀行對于迷債真相之真實理解程度? 等於把銀行從未告知公眾的真話公佈與世？
1. 銀行是根據甚麽因數和考慮而决定對迷債說”不” ？是甚麽發生了變化而使銀行改變了對于銷售迷債的態度？
2. 銀行是否出于擔心迷債抵押品出現爆煲而决定停止銷售 ？
對CDS/CDO/ 信貸挂鈎産品有著豐富知識和經驗的銀行應該完全明白抵押品爲信貸掛鈎產品而非傳統債券， 應該完全明白抵押品的掛鈎主體數目很可能是跟100多個主體信貸掛鈎。換言之，盡管給客戶的風險介紹和銷售章程均是大肆介紹 ７個著名掛鈎主體信貸風險， 隻字不講抵押品有著跟100多個主體信貸挂鈎之特徵和風險。銀行 心知抵押品內的信貸掛鈎主體出事的可能性是遠遠高于那大肆宣揚的 7 個掛鈎主體的。
至今， 銀行以及金管局公開堅持聲稱沒有必要對客戶介紹迷債的抵押品.
- 聲稱因爲抵押品是 3A 評級，可卻從不解釋：既然抵押品和迷債的實質均爲信貸掛鈎， 爲甚麽以跟一籃子主體信貸掛鈎爲主要特徵的抵押品之信貸挂鈎風險無須給客戶任何介紹和解釋, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹?
- 同時又聲稱： 由于每一個系列的迷債的抵押品在銷售期間之間還沒有買入， 在每一迷債系列的銷售期間銀行也不知道該系列抵押品的詳情。 可卻從不敢公開說明：銀行方面是否認爲(實為信貸掛鈎票據之) 抵押品的相關信息 是 '信貸掛鈎票據:雷曼迷你債券'的相關重大風險和重大信息?
- 中國銀行給迷債的風險評級是“高風險”, 給與客戶的解釋是 ：所有信貸掛鈎產品評級都是高風險。 依此類推， 實為信貸掛鈎產品 之 抵押品應該是當仁不讓地也同屬于“高風險“類別了！
可中國銀行卻從不敢公開說明：同屬於信貸掛鈎產品，“高風險” 類別的抵押品之重大風險和信息是否屬于迷債相關的重大風險和信息 ? 為甚麼無須給客戶介紹和解釋？
3. 儘管銀行聲稱在銷售迷債的時候不瞭解該迷債系列抵押品之詳 情， 銀行的産品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層看來對于抵押品實 爲信貸掛鈎之主要特徵和相關風險是一直有所瞭解而且一直關注相關的市場變化。 這就解釋了爲甚麽諸多迷債的長期經驗分銷銀行從2007年下半年 開始陸續停止銷售迷債 。因爲他們知道迷債抵押品實爲（第二層） 隱藏的信貸挂鈎産品，而表面的7個著名公司只是招牌。真正帶來利息（收入）和重大風險的都是藏於 實爲信貸挂鈎産品的抵押品（合成CDO）之中。一旦市場變差， 抵押品中的質素參差不齊的100多家公司破産爆煲的機會就會快速大大增加，迷債的真實風險被原形畢露的機會大大增加， 迷債的謊言被戳穿的機會也大大增加。
4. 以迷債系列 34 爲例，銷售系列 34 的時候，銀行或許不知道系列 34 的抵押品之詳情。但是， 銀行的産品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層對于比系列34 早的那些系列 5 － 33 的抵押品之主要特徵和相關風險等看來却是有相當程度的瞭解的， 因而對于系列 34 抵押品很可能又是“跟100-150多個公司信貸掛鈎” 之相關重大風險和特徵也是有著清晰的理解的。 這就解釋了隨著市場變差，銀行開始逐漸停止銷售迷債。 因爲銀行擔心從未跟客戶解釋的迷債抵押品之謎會容易原形畢露。
　［附註－１］：　迷債系列銷售商
• 系列 33：一共 16 個 分銷商。 銷售期間：2007年 7月；
• 系列 34：一共 14 個 分銷商。 銷售期間：2007年11月；
• 系列 35：一共 11 個 分銷商。 銷售期間：2008年 1月；
• 系列 36：一共 7 個 分銷商。 銷售期間：2008年 4 月；
［附註－２］：無獨有偶，2007年底， 當諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行們開始逐漸對銷售雷曼迷債說“不”的時候，
• 星展DBS 於 2007年8月發行了　Constellation　系列82－86， 隨後就徹底停止發行Constellation，　而且幷沒有再推出跟Constellation類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸掛鈎票據了。　
• 而大摩 於2007年9月發行了的精明債券系列21－22 之後，　隨後就徹底停止發行精明債券，　而且幷沒有再推出跟精明債券類似的跟幾個著名公司信貸掛鈎票據了。　
2007年底, 是甚麼原因促使星展和大摩決定停止發行 Constellation 和 精明債券 ？
(i) 是由於經濟環境變差,而不易找到 7－8著名公司來掛鈎了呢？
(ii) 還是由于經濟環境變差，擔心包藏于抵押品內的真實風險容易爆煲， 有著漂亮外表的騙局極有可能被原形畢露？
----------------------------
相關文章："從 迷債系列 6 看 迷債騙局手段之 完美完善過程"
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/09/6_4956.html"


For complaint No. 5, even all HK banks involved in the buyback of Minibonds are hiring lawyers to protect the bonds hold by HSBC as trustee, but there are no actions from HK government and HKMA, SFC.

Regards,

"2nd copy2008年12月19日 星期五 下午4:11complaints@omb.gov.T

he following was my complaint against HKMA you received on> 12/12/08>3.

There are also many discussions in the radio since SARS and HK government were promoting bonds to HK citizens about Minibonds and bonds from HK finance institute and HK gov. and HK Monetary Authority never warned against the minibonds are not bonds and also allow banks to sell them. And I read in the internet there are recordings found in Radio HK about the selling of Minibonds products as bonds and later onproved to be from directors of PIFL. And also from Legistrators after they received my complaint letters about HKMA,SFC, I heard that HKMA had promised Legistrators years ago during issueing of HK government related bonds (similar tostructured products as these bonds can be later sold instock market) in the Legistrators meetings that HKMA was very careful to look after these products sold in banks.And also during Legistrators meeting HKMA has told the legistrators that they did actually warned against the banks about Minibonds (including Constellation series sold by DBS) that they include CDOs which are very high risks products that could not be sold to HK investors but only to institutional investment such as private bankings and goverments such as most Constellation series do include these CDOs. I also read about these CDOs in Yahoo.com in last two years these are very high risks products. But no warning of these products are given to me by banks and HKMA that they have missold me very high risk products. So there is a possible of COVER UP involved by HKMA,SFC, HK gov. and HK banks and these are a series crime. Pls see the following in the news:

"16 Dec 2008 [香港經濟日報]

港星金融爭霸 種迷債禍根雷曼兄弟爆煲剛好三個月，財政司司長曾俊華要求證監會及金管局，三個月內提交檢討報告的限制亦將於下周屆滿，據知兩監管機構最快於本周稍後提交報告。在檢討報告揭示制度缺失，並提改善建議前，本報綜合市場各界剖析，重組構成雷曼迷債風暴的來龍去脈。　
　
「有沒有想過，為何香港及新加坡，是全球少數面對大量雷曼迷債零售個案的市場？」有資深市場人士在分析雷曼迷債風暴的來龍去脈時，提出這項發人深省的反問。
　　
市場上確有不少分析認為，要準確了解包括雷曼迷債在內的總值835億元（證監會統計）零售結構產品，如何得以通過重重監管關卡，在過去數年向數以萬計的散戶傾銷的局面，不得不由2002、2003年間，香港與新加坡的「雙城故事」開始。董施政報告 定調便利產品開發 　　
當時，港府極力探索在金融風暴及科網泡沫爆破後，帶領本港經濟走出谷底的路向，並定調大力促進金融業為首的四大支柱行業，作為本港經濟的出路；適逢當時新加坡政府亦大力推動當地作為亞洲金融中心，迫使星、港兩地在金融領域上「短兵相接」
。　　
港府推動金融發展的決心，可見於前特首董建華在2003年1月發表的施政報告中，有關金融的部分一改往年加強監管、改善市場質素的主調，除提出推動債券市場發展外，更特別提及「讓金融新產品特別是衍生產品，可以較方便開發」（見附表）。 監管轉寬鬆 產品蜂擁而出　
　
「在我（2002年年間）上任初期時，傳媒每次見面都追問新加坡都推甚麼措施，吸引到多少對�藁�金開業……但最近已沒有多少記者提這方面問題。」一名前任財金官員，2006年間私下對記者說，本港當時在與新加坡競逐金融中心上已「跑出」，反映2002、2003年正處於「雙城」競逐的關鍵時刻。
　　
在這種國際競爭的大氣候下，證監會於2003年2月發表指引，為非上市零售債券及結構產品推售大開方便之門。據新指引，零售債券及結構產品發行商只須在同一系列首隻產品時印備長達數百頁的詳盡基礎文件後，每次印製長約數十頁的簡化版銷售文件。　　
雷曼迷你債券正如在簡化措施的基礎上，於2003年3月推出首隻信貸掛產品後，在其後的5年半（截至2008年9月），不斷推出迷債新系列至共36個，平均每年推出6至7個系列。 撤利率協議 銀行急闢新財路 　　

監管關卡闖過後，市場人士分析指出，雷曼迷債等推陳出新的投資產品，正好為急欲開拓新財源的銀行提供出路。自2001年撤銷利率協議後，銀行之間的競爭大增，一向是銀行主要盈利來源的按揭業務，其利率由1998年的最優惠利率加2厘，降至去年低點的最優惠利率減3厘，嚴重蠶食銀行的利息收入。　　
傳統貸存業務轉差，非利息業務乘時而起，成為了過去幾年銀行主力發展的業務，配合監管機構的推動，加上利息持續低企，在2003、2004年香港更出現「零利率」，一眾存戶紛紛找尋其他的投資工具，各項理財產品愈來愈普及。但結果在這個百年一遇的金融風暴中，面對血本無歸的苦果。 "

Pls check if HKMA, SFC, HK gov. are responsible for their negligent in controlling the Minibonds issuing and their cover up of their responsibility in the controlling of HK banking system.

Regards

Hong Kong's SFC seeks to impose tighter investment regulations

Hong Kong's SFC seeks to impose tighter investment regulationsBy Channel NewsAsia's Hong Kong Correspondent Leslie Tang Posted: 30 November 2009 2308 hrs


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> ">Martin Wheatley



HONG KONG:

Hong Kong's securities regulator said on Monday that its responsibilities do not include taking risk out of the system, in the aftermath of the Lehman Minibond scandal. But to avoid a repeat of last year's fiasco, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has proposed new investment regulations which are up for public consultation until end-December.
The Lehman Minibond saga rocked Hong Kong's status as an international financial centre. Many blamed the city's financial regulators for failing to prevent the fiasco.
A year later, the SFC is still on the defensive. Martin Wheatley, CEO of SFC, said: "If it's imposed on us, the burden of accessing risk for all of you and your clients and the man on the street, then you can assure yourselves that the product range that's available in Hong Kong will disappear, completely disappear. "It's not our job to take risk out of the system.
It's our job to make sure that features are properly disclosed and that intermediaries act according to a set of good principles, which are about acting in the interest of the investor." More than 30,000 Hong Kong investors bought about US$1.5 billion worth of the structured products, which became virtually worthless when Lehman went bust last September.
This sparked protests by mostly elderly investors who said they did not understand what they were buying and had lost their life savings in the process. To avoid a repeat of the debacle, the SFC is seeking to impose tightened investment guidelines. It is proposing clearer documentation on products, so investors are better informed.
The regulator has also suggested redefining categories of investors and banning the selling of complicated products with derivatives to regular "retail" investors.
Another proposal is a "cooling off" period during which investors can back out of their investments, but they must pay a penalty fee. Members of the public have up to the end of December to give their feedback on the SFC's proposals. If the market endorses the consultation paper, the new rules could be implemented next year.
- CNA/so