2010年12月31日星期五

Lehman, bank dismiss claims

Lehman, bank dismiss claims

NEW YORK — Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and a trustee services unit of Bank of New York Mellon Corp. dismissed all claims against each other after settling a dispute over swap agreements in which Lehman claimed it was owed $70 million, according to a court filing today.

Terms of the settlement approved earlier this month weren't disclosed. A ruling in Lehman's favor might have allowed the defunct firm to recover billions of dollars from similar contracts at the expense of noteholders, a judge in U.S. District Court in Manhattan said in September.

Top 10 business news of 2010

中國日報香港版

After the global financial crisis, 2010 was a year in which the world climbed out of the economic trough. Hong Kong rode the recovery wave, despite facing continuing challenges of its own – including a looming property bubble. But the city had its triumphs too, most notably moving a step forward to becoming a yuan businesss hub. China Daily looks back at the stories that shaped the past year.

Fighting against the property bubble

If you take 1997 property price levels as the benchmark, some may also recall Alan Greenspan’s famous phrase, “irrational exuberance” – implying that these halcyon days are numbered. Indeed, prices in the luxury sector have already passed their historical peak and the mass market is hot on its heels.

But with a lot of brainpower at its disposal, the government has been doing its best to come up with a solution. The Urban Renewal Authority, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority – they have all been trying to come up with something to stop a trend that has seen home prices surge 50 percent since the beginning of 2009. Seven whole rounds of measures have been taken this year including initiatives to smoke out speculators and increase housing supply.

But on November 19, the government finally delivered a knockout punch to speculators. It announced punitive stamp duties of up to 15 percent on those buyers who resell within two years, as well as declaring much tighter mortgage restrictions. The red hot property market has cooled since then, but the question remains – for how long? We’re not sure what will happen, but we can safely predict that property will remain a big story in 2011.

Offshore yuan center takes a leap forward

Throughout the year, bankers in the city got excited every time when there was news that Hong Kong is moving closer and closer to becoming an offshore yuan center for the yuan business. And as it takes quite a lot to get a banker excited, you know that this was a big story in 2010.

After the People’s Bank of China and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority signed supplementary and revised agreements on the yuan business in the city on July 19, a flurry of yuan bonds issued by both banks and private companies hit the market.

By the end of November, yuan deposits in Hong Kong reached 279.6 billion yuan, double that of a year ago. In early December, the People’s Bank of China announced a list of newly approved export companies that are qualified to participate in the yuan settlement pilot scheme for cross-border trade. The number skyrocketed to 67,359 from 365, boosting demand for Hong Kong’s established yuan settlement platform. The latest boost has come from the city’s richest tycoon, Li Ka-shing, who is reportedly considering launching the first yuan-denominated initial public offering in the city. 2011 is poised to welcome more breakthroughs in the offshore yuan business.

HKEx to extend

trading hours

Fearing that long lunches are more of a threat than Singapore to Hong Kong’s status as an international financial center, Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing (HKEx) sought to keep in line with other markets in the region by announcing in November that it is extending its trading hours.

Starting from March 7, 2011, the current four-hour daily trading session will be extended to five hours and an extra half hour will be added from March 5, 2012. HKEx, the operator of Asia’s third-largest stock market, will certainly see trading volume increase while its competitiveness as a trading platform should be given a boost. Or at least that is what some analysts believe. Stock brokers generally applauded the change, despite having less time for lunch. Is nothing sacred anymore?

Soap opera in the HSBC boardroom

We don’t know how many hissy fits were staged or if any tears or blood was shed, but the drama in the HSBC Holdings Plc boardroom showed us that bankers might really be human after all.

Douglas Flint, HSBC’s former finance director, took over as chairman of the bank on December 3, replacing Stephen Green whose unanticipated resignation in September to become the UK government’s trade minister triggered off one unholy bun fight in the boardroom.

After all the upheaval, HSBC Chief Executive Michael Geoghegan announced that he would be stepping down in early 2011 once it was clear that Flint would become chairman.

Geoghegan, who joined the bank at 19, might have believed the position should rightfully have been his. And given that was the tradition for most of the previous 150 years, no doubt this put his nose out of joint. Anyway, once the cigar smoke cleared, it was announced that Geoghegan would be succeeded by Investment Bank Head Stuart Gulliver in March 2011.

Reverse mortgage scheme for the elderly

Hong Kong’s elderly can expect another monthly income stream for the rest of their lives if they sign up for the so-called reverse mortgage scheme.

The government-sponsored Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation (HKMC) announced on December 16 that it is to launch a reverse mortgage pilot scheme by the middle of 2011.

Under the scheme, home owners aged 60 or above can apply for a reverse mortgage loan with approved banks and receive monthly payments for the rest of their lives.

The elderly can expect steady cash flows to improve their standard of living while staying in their own homes. However, a HKMC survey shows that only 44 percent support the idea and less than 25 percent of respondents would actually consider taking out such a loan. Reverse mortgages have also drawn criticism elsewhere with the agreements being hard to understand. Some also worry that the elderly may be preyed upon by brokers or lenders. And it has been pointed out that in Hong Kong those most typically drawn to the scheme would be the very poor, who would draw very little in return.

SFC chairman to step down in June

Preventing PCCW Ltd from going private due to alleged manipulation of shareholder votes, securing jail sentences for insider trading, boosting protection for retail investors after the Lehman Brothers mini-bonds fiasco, the city’s financial market watchdog was not shy of making bold moves in the pursuit of better corporate governance for Hong Kong.

However, the news that Martin Wheatley, the chief executive officer of the Securities and Futures Commission, will leave before his contract expires, prompted people to ask questions about the future of corporate governance in the city after his departure. Wheatley said on December 11 that he will leave his post in June 2011, three months before his contract expires. Wheatley’s successor has not been named yet, but investors are sure to keep a close eye on who gets the post and whether he or she will protect their interests.

Regulators tighten derivatives rules

Financial derivatives products, obscure and risky by nature, helped ignite the global financial crisis in 2008. But to keep in line with global commitments agreed by the G20 on better regulation and supervision of the products, Hong Kong’s regulators got in on the act. Though small compared with other markets, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority said December 10 that it will set up a central registry, requiring financial institutions to report their OTC (over-the-counter) derivatives transactions and keep their records on an electronic database. Meanwhile, HKEx will operate a central counterpart clearing facility. The initiatives are designed to improve transparency.

Hontex IPO funds frozen by court

The Securities and Futures Commission made an unprecedented move earlier in the year as it cracked down on one firm that just wouldn’t play by the rules. The SFC filed a complaint on March 30 saying that Hontex International, a Taiwanese-controlled mainland fabric maker, had violated the rules by providing misleading information during the firm’s IPO at the end of 2009. Later in April, the Court of First Instance granted an order which stopped the company from moving its HK$1 billion IPO funds out of the city. This was the first time that the regulator had sought a court order to freeze the IPO cash of a newly-listed firm, and the toughest move it had ever made against a newly-listed company.

City tops world IPO market rankings

The local bourse was crowned the world’s top IPO market in 2010 for the second consecutive year and many market watchers believe the momentum will continue in 2011. The local IPO market raised HK$450 billion in aggregate new capital and was shored up by several heavyweight bourse listings.

Agricultural Bank of China raised HK$98.2 billion of capital in June, while American International Insurance raised HK$138.3 billion of funds in October. Meanwhile, HKEx did its best to attract new companies and diversify its constituents. United Company Rusal, the city’s first-ever primary offering from a company based outside of Asia, raised HK$17.3 billion in Janurary. L’occitane, a French beauty products maker, raised HK$5.49 billion in April. And in December, Vale completed its secondary listing in the form of Hong Kong depositary receipts (HDR).

Mainland accounting standards get nod

HKEx said on December 10 that it will allow locally-listed mainland firms to file financial statements compiled based on mainland accounting standards and audited by accredited mainland auditors. Meanwhile, mainland regulators will also recognize financial statements of Hong Kong-based companies, compiled and audited based on the city’s accounting standards when they list on the mainland.

Following this mutual recognition, the 64 A+H share companies and 100 H-share-only firms, representing 11.5 percent of overall listed companies on the local bourse, need now prepare only one set of financial statements based on mainland accounting rules, rather than two sets of reports as currently practiced. This new arrangement will reduce compliance costs of mainland-incorporated companies that list here, potentially inviting more IPOs in the future.

曾特首,又一年,你是否把我們遺忘了!

曾特首,又一年,你是否把我們遺忘了!

2010年12月29日星期三

金融海嘯餘波猶在

金融海嘯餘波猶在


2010年 12月 28日 00:00 中國窗

2008年雷曼倒閉,一些購入雷曼迷債的投資者損失慘重,結果港府出面安排銀行賠償60%本金,但散戶仍不滿意,一直在中環各銀行門前示威,最近示威者從銀行移師至遮打大廈的證監處,一班長者天天在街外鑼鼓喧天,控訴證監監管不力。這些行動對香港的銀行只是噪音及出入不方便而已。

美檢察官開始起訴核數師

不過在地球的另一邊,紐約州檢察官亦開始對雷曼的核數師采取法律行動。按《華爾街日報》報道,紐約檢察當局,準備從民事途徑,控告會計師樓,指其在雷曼破產前,就其財務狀况隱瞞投資者及監管當局,屬專業失當。這將是金融海嘯發生以來,問責下首個訴訟,預計其他專業機構,將會受波及。

雷曼人為移走五百億資產

現紐約州檢察官審查的,是調查部分銀行及投資銀行有否在業績公布前夕,透過回購方式,把負債從資產負債表中移除,令銀行表面上負債比實際情况低,而誤導投資者及監管當局。雷曼兄弟所涉及的動作稱為回購105(Repo 105),調查人員發現在2008年公布業績前夕,雷曼將高達500億元的短期負債,出售給友好機構,等業績日期過后又從友好機構購回,這樣就人為地把500億元的資產移走,讓雷曼的槓桿比率大幅下調至合理水平。

事實上美國自2000年安隆(Enron)破產后,核數師監察已經大幅收緊,以防止核數師為了幫客戶做出不道德的事。按美國當時法例,雷曼要做回購來降低槓桿比例除需要核數師批准外,還需要律師事務所發出法律意見,同意回購動作沒有違法。不過當時核數師在美國找不到律師樓肯發出同意的法律意見,便越洋去英國找到友善的律師事務所發表同意法律意見。檢察官認為核數師越洋去找友善律師事務所有違專業道德,準備從民事途徑索償。

在雷曼事件中,涉及的所有專業團體都有問題,包括律師及評級機構。兩間美國評級機構都給雷曼債券A的評級,但雷曼在倒閉前夕,槓桿比率已高達66倍,只要資產減值3%,公司就資不抵債。當然雷曼兄弟已經破產,成了歷史上一個句號,但須要負責的專業團體要面對長期的訴訟

雷曼核數師尋求和解

傳聞核數師已經準備和檢察官談判,尋求庭外和解,以免和涉及安隆的安達信會計師樓一樣命運──被迫清盤。自安達信會計師樓倒閉后,大型核數師樓只剩下四間,美國政府不想核數師樓再減少,會變成沒有競爭及選擇,所以,數年前畢馬域(KPMG)因協助富豪逃稅被起訴,美國政府刻意只重罰負責人,而放過核數師樓。10年前安隆破產揭發專業人士缺乏道德操守,到2008年雷曼事件揭發專業道德仍是可以用費用來解決。

部分上市公司帳目好到難置信

2009年12月上市的洪良(946)被揭發造假帳,慶幸證監處及時凍結10億元集資款項,今年有130間公司在香港上市,集資4100億元,其中有些帳目好到不可想像,到底有多少是水分,無人有確實答案。

富昌證券總經理藺常念(作者為證監會持牌人) 逢星期二刊出

HK SFC Sums up Major Plans to Refine Financial Regulatory System

HK SFC Sums up Major Plans to Refine Financial Regulatory System

In its Quarterly Report for July to Sept 2010 released today, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) highlighted major plans to refine Hong Kong’s financial regulatory system.

Noting overall support from consultation respondents, the SFC announced its decision to establish a regulatory regime for credit rating agencies. The regime is expected to be implemented in mid 2011, upon completion of the relevant code and legislative amendments.

Jointly with Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd, the SFC unveiled in September an agreed operation model to introduce a scripless securities market in Hong Kong. Separately, the SFC launched a consultation on proposals to extend the scope of the present requirements governing conflicts of interest to pre-deal research reports as well as analysts preparing research reports on real estate investment trusts, be they listed or applying for listing.

In August, the SFC authorized the first renminbi-denominated fund for retail investors in Hong Kong. In view of Hong Kong’s unique position to play a role in the internationalisation of the Mainland currency, the SFC urged industry participants to get prepared for handling listed renminbi-denominated products.

As the SFC Handbook, the new codes for investment products, went into effect in June, the SFC held meetings with the industry to offer guidance on how to apply the principles.

The report notes that the SFC made further progress in resolving Lehman Brothers (LB)-related issues. It reached an agreement with a bank to offer a refund on principal – with interest – to over 2,000 holders of LB-related Constellation Notes.

In September, InvestEd Intelligence was launched as a bimonthly newsletter to cover more topics of interest to investors. Regularly featured are articles on current market issues, popular investment products, common misconceptions and recent regulatory developments.

The Quarterly Report is available under “Speeches, Publications & Consultations” – “Publications” of the SFC website at www.sfc.hk.

2010年12月26日雷曼苦主參加城市論壇

2010年12月26日雷曼苦主參加城市論壇

方正坦言難找行政總裁人選

方正坦言難找行政總裁人選

加強保障投資冷靜期周六生效

加強保障投資冷靜期周六生效

韋奕禮請辭揭監管危機

By 王岸然 2010-12-29

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮於本月9 日突然請辭,此事反映政府在金融危機與雷曼事件爆發之後,並無認真正視危機及汲取教訓,進而要迫走韋奕禮這一類國際級的行政專才,令香港的金融監管變得更加虛假和人治。

一個人的去留,本來不應與一個制度的存廢掛,但若然將這幾年間發生的重要財經事件與韋奕禮的突然離任串在一起,便看到香港的深層次危機再次顯現,政府已經為財團操控,獨立的監管制度已名存實亡。

人才離職庸才到位

香港只有一個證監會,證券監管工作予人與其他獨立非政府機關,如申訴專員或私隱專員屬同樣的東西,主管其事者不過是一名首長級人物而已,其位置可以隨便更換。不同的是,韋奕禮年薪900 多萬,比特首高出幾倍,比負責監管他的財經事務局局長陳家強及財政司司長曾俊華高出更大比數;為何他值那樣的高薪?

韋奕禮不是那些一生在本地官僚系統內打滾的人物,而是國際證監集團人才的一員,有沒有工作一回事,身價與個人名譽是國際級別,毋庸置疑。證監是一門國際化的專業,國際證監會有一百八十多個會員,全世界的證券業九成以上受到同一類別的證監制度所監管(英、美、澳、加的證監為先進的代表模式);世上比香港先進的監管制度其實不多,香港能夠付出比先進地區更為優厚的薪酬,卻不能留住人才,高薪位置由本地或是來自國內的人治庸才所佔據,這就是金融災難及失誤連番出現的原因。

苦主不忿抗爭至今
韋奕禮「劈炮」之後,政府透過自己的媒體放出消息,指韋是另有高就,會返回倫敦交易所任職云云。事實上,韋當年正是失意於倫敦交易所的人事鬥爭,已經回到鄉下準備搞點小生意終老,適逢香港證監會總裁有空缺,所以到來搵食。當然,此一時、彼一時,今天韋奕禮衣錦還鄉,有更高成就,是完全可能的事。不過,高級任命不可能不會多等三個月、到韋9 月合約期滿為止;今天韋奕禮主動辭職,繼任無人,並不是好來好去的安排。
眾所周知,韋奕禮在雷曼事件的立場,一直是投資產品持牌者若有違規銷售的問題(mis-selling),會依國際證監的慣例,要銷售者負起全責,亦因而證監成功迫令包括新鴻基在內的三家雷曼產品分銷商要百分百賠償。這是去年初的事。
問題在於,經銀行監管出售同一類產品之時,監管之責與權全在銀行,而銀行的監管者任志剛卻站到銀行一邊,於是出現同一雷曼事件,卻出現不同賠償的六成方案;亦所以被迫接受六成賠償的苦主心存不忿,抗爭到今天,依然堅持事件尚未解決。
韋奕禮與任志剛的分別在哪裏?不是誰更有能力,而是一個是過江龍,以國際證監的監管標準為念;一個則是一生在香港的官僚與商界銀行之間打滾為生的地頭蟲。大家同樣面對特區政府可在適當時候另請高明的局面,韋堅持保護投資者為優先的國際證監專業,另一人則盤算要與業界打好關係,準備退休之時還可有再上層樓的空間。香港的官僚莫不如是。
自11 月底,雷曼苦主不停向證監會施壓,要求證監依〈證券及期貨條例〉第一百零七條檢控銀行從業員;這一擊中銀行的死穴,因為執行證券大法的權力還在證監之手,不須得到金管局的同意,因為不是業界監管而是刑事檢控。
問題是政府在最初就經由陳家強與曾俊華提議銀行先支付六成的所謂和解方案,作為政府不再追究的交換條件,而曾政府一直以官僚應付刁民的思維看問題,以為一人讓一步是最好的方案,只是這個六成和解方案本質是「不平等條約」,迷債苦主固然從不順氣,迷債以外的雷曼苦主只能私下與銀行和解,賠償有多有少,但亦無一人順氣,雷曼問題從無解決。

轉向國際提出申訴

過去兩個月的中環,雷曼苦主的示威威力比法輪功更強大,證監會不肯接受苦主報案的笑話,連外國金融報章亦已開始報道;這本是金融中心的天大笑話,只是香港人面對曾政府多樣的施政荒謬,已經麻木不覺。
這就是韋奕禮提早盡快離職的主要原因。去年政府拋出六成方案之時,是趁韋奕禮放假不在港,要證監會董事會通過決議接受;韋奕禮揹了黑鍋,卻受制於保密法例不能多言,今天面對苦主的天天示威,為保一己的清譽,只好提早離任。
可以預見,面對這樣一個官商橫行、不講法治的政府,證監會之內的國際人才專家會紛紛離去,國際的證監專才亦望而卻步,不肯來港,香港的監管制度名存實亡。
還有年半時間的曾蔭權不會拆彈,這是官僚習性,人人只會在任內自保。能藉第一百零七條迫銀行合理賠償的,只有政府及證監會,政府不動,苦主豈非無望?
筆者以為,苦主應將事件帶到國際層面,苦主可以直接向各國的證監會提交事件的報告,也可以直接向國際證監會組織(International Organization of Secu rities Commissions)提出申訴,給全球一百八十多個證監會評評道理,讓拒絕依法保護投資者的香港證監與香港政府在國際上名譽掃地。

王岸然

2010年12月23日星期四

逾百雷曼兄弟個案仍在調查

逾百雷曼兄弟個案仍在調查

回覆: 致財經事務局局長陳家強先生惠鑑 --- 雷曼苦主大聯盟2010年12月24日

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7570
From: Webmaster
Date: 2010/12/24
Subject: Re: 回覆: 致財經事務局局長陳家強先生惠鑑 --- 雷曼苦主大聯盟2010年12月24日
To: enq@fstb.gov.hk


致財經事務局局長 陳家強先生大鑑:

閣下於2010年十二曰二十二日的回信(岑俊楷代行) 得悉,

閣下或閣下的能幹官爺,若曾審閱苦主大聯盟與證監會近來的書信往還,理當清楚知道我們對證監會拒絕我們投案的所謂理由,早就一清二楚,無需經閣下的 "得悉" 加以轉述,實多此一舉。

若我們的理解沒有問題,局長閣下是以證監的立場為立場,以證監的意見為意見,政府的立場是與證監一致,所以表明"政府不宜對有關事宜作出干預"。我們認為閣下並未履行作為局長所負有的監管、溝通、協調與支援『證券及期貨事務監察委員會』之責,我們對此極為不滿。

我們無論是依賴常理或是法律意見,報案正常的過程必須有:

1. 正式落口供的過程。
2. 獨立的檔案編號。
3. 負責跟進的聯絡人。

我們在十二月十三日的信件,請局長閣下盡快安排時間與苦主代表作一次正式的會面,讓我們可以直接對閣下解釋被證監無理拒之於門外的詳情。 閣下作為問責局長,有責任會見市民,了解民情,而非以耳代目,充當證監會的留聲機。

若在未來數天得不到與閣下會面的適當安排,我們視閣下欠缺誠意,會採取我們認為合適同時符合香港法律的抗爭抗議行動,不再另行通知。

雷曼苦主大聯盟
2010年12月24日

聯絡人:
xxxxx xxxxxxxx
xxxxx xxxxxxxx

抄送:所有香港傳媒



2010/12/22


雷曼苦主大聯盟聯絡人 :

收到你們於十二月十三日致財政司司長及財經事務及庫務局局長的電郵,內容備悉。

對於貴組織指證監會拒絕投訴人向該會作刑事報案,我們得悉證監會沒有將任何人拒諸門外。根據證監會的統計,自二零零八年九月雷曼兄弟倒閉以來,已處理約8 900宗投訴,當中大部分投訴人已因為監管機構的工作而獲得賠償。

證監會表示會致力解決雷曼兄弟事件,聽取有理據的投訴,並樂意與貴組織保持溝通。然而,證監會不會把舉報或投訴分類為所謂的「刑事報案」。證監會呼籲投訴人可採用常設的投訴途徑,如郵寄投訴信、填妥網上投訴表格或致電該會,使該會能夠更有效率跟進投訴。

我們得悉警方亦已調查有關事宜一段時間,最近並根據《證券及期貨條例》第107條展開檢控行動,故在作出投訴時,亦請表明曾否就相同事件向警方投訴,以避免不必要的重覆,及/或妨礙警方正進行的工作。

若貴組織希望就有人涉嫌違反《證券及期貨條例》第107條的規定作出投訴一事,貴組織可透過上述常設的投訴途徑作出投訴,政府不宜對有關事宜作出干預。

財經事務及庫務局局長
(岑俊楷 代行)

Webmaster
13/12/2010 07:57 To財經事務局局長陳家強
Subject致財經事務局局長陳家強先生惠鑑 --- 雷曼苦主大聯盟2010年12月13日


財經事務局局長陳家強先生惠鑑,

閣下作為財經事務局的問責局長,負有監管、溝通、協調與支援『證券及期貨事務監察委員會』之責。雷曼事件當初亦是閣下負責代表政府解釋有關政策及政府立場,這是眾所周知的。

雷曼事件尚未解決,閣下理應清楚明白。近月以來,雷曼苦主曾多次要求約見閣下,閣下拒絕見面,我們感到失望與不滿,並認為閣下並未認真履行政策局長應有之責。

最近的事態發展,是苦主們欲到證監會履行公民責任,就銀行在雷曼產品銷售過程之中的欺詐或罔顧實情的失實陳述 (違反證券及期貨條例第107條)行為,作刑事報案,竟被拒之於門外。

作為問責局局長,閣下有責任介入事件,現苦主們要求閣下儘快安排與我們會面,以便我們向閣下當面解釋情況,並討論閣下作為問責局長可以擔當的角式。

現請 局長閣下盡快安排時間與苦主代表作一次正式的會面。

雷曼苦主大聯盟
2010年12月13日

聯絡人:
xxxxx xxxxxxxx
xxxxx xxxxxxxx

調解中心無牙虎 港府卸責騙市民

雷曼迷債事件爆發後,港府曾派人到歐洲考察金融監管制度,財經事務及庫務局局長陳家強於去年初宣稱,港府正研究設立金融申訴專員,負責處理有關金融業的投訴、調解及仲裁,預期年底前諮詢公眾。言猶在耳,陳家強昨日公布諮詢方案,建議設立金融糾紛調解中心,協助處理個人客戶與金融機構之間的金錢糾紛,同時建議設立投資者教育局,提高公眾的金融知識水平。
金融申訴專員計劃胎死腹中,由金融糾紛調解中心取而代之,這不僅是機構名稱的改變,實質亦大有不同,申訴專員有調查權力,而調解中心則沒有,只能扮演和事老角色。按當局的設計,如果投資者與金融機構之間發生金錢糾紛,而金融機構內部的投訴機制失效,則有義務將糾紛提交調解中心,並徵得投資者同意下,由一名獨立的中立調解員協助雙方調解,以期達成彼此皆可接受的和解方案。由此可知,調解中心只能調解,和解方案亦無約束力,如果投資者拒絕協調,調解中心更是「無用武之地」。

為甚麼港府建議設立一個有職無權的調解中心呢?其實,當初港府的確有意模仿英國設立金融申訴專員,但遭到金融機構的反對,擔心投資者濫用此機制,並將由金融機構承擔所有相關的費用,會導致營運成本上升。而金管局及證監會同樣不滿有關構想,擔心設立申訴專員會與自己爭權。港府於是打起退堂鼓,去年十月,曾蔭權在施政報告中談到金融監管問題時,放棄使用金融申訴專員的字眼,而用上「金融糾紛調解機制」,已現端倪。顯然,這個擬議中的金融糾紛調解中心並非為保護小投資者利益而設,而是向大機構屈服、敷衍市民的產物。

早有專家指出,在西方發達國家禁止向普通投資者銷售的迷你債券,在本港卻可以公然銷售,根源在於當局監管有漏洞,這也是金融海嘯帶給本港的最大教訓。但令人失望的是,港府好了傷疤忘了痛,不是從監管缺失的源頭上着手改革,不是加強官員問責及堵塞監管漏洞,反而捨本逐末,足證港府始終不承認自己失職,始終將迷債事件視為一場天災。吃一塹而不能長一智,甚至連亡羊補牢的工夫都不做,這才是港府的悲哀。

俗話說三個和尚沒水喝。金管局及證監會兩個法定監管機構尚且未能妥善處理有關金融糾紛,再設立一個效果成疑的調解中心,疊床架屋,極易造成互相扯皮、推諉責任的問題,投資者很可能會被當成「球」踢來踢去。更何況,調解中心處理的糾紛以最高申索額五十萬元為限,當局還有意將調解中心的工作外判,三年之後,調解中心的經費也要全部由金融機構分擔。今後再發生金融糾紛,調解中心就會被推上前台應付,財經官員固然可以置身事外,連金管局及證監會亦可金蟬脫殼。所以,與其說這是調解中心,不如說是卸責中心。

人們不難發現,港府危機處理已有固定的程式:發生一個問題,就成立一間新機構,或者將有關工作及責任一起外判。譬如,樹木因管理不善而倒塌殺人,當局就成立專門管理樹木的機構;公共屋邨的清潔及保安工作非常棘手,就將之外判給私人公司;還有,衞生署抽驗問題藥物態度懶散,效率低下,食物及衞生局局長周一嶽便藉口政府化驗所人手不足,計劃將部分恒常化驗工作外判予私人機構。

政府的職責本來就是為市民排難解憂,無論是解決金融糾紛,還是化驗藥物,這些都是分內工作,責無旁貸,但本港高官熱衷隱身,甚麼責任都不願負,甚麼麻煩都想往外推,請問,他們憑甚麼享受高薪厚祿?市民交稅所為何來?

Watch out

Watch out




The Hong Kong Monetary Authority has asked institutions to comply with regulatory requirements while selling accumulators - a high-risk financial product which caused losses worth billions of dollars two years ago.

``Authorized institutions should adopt a cautious selling approach and ensure that accumulators are only sold to customers who can fully understand the structure and risks,'' said Meena Datwani, executive director of the de facto central bank.

``The HKMA should ensure that the suitability of the recommendation or solicitation for the customer is reasonable in all the circumstances.''

The authority requested institutions to take into account the financial impact on customers as well as credit risks of sellers.

HKMA expects the products to be sold only to professional investors.

The regulator is concerned over signs of renewed accumulator selling activities, triggered by a buoyant market.

Many investors lost huge amounts of money after investing in accumulators back in 2008.

CITIC Pacific (0267) lost HK$15.5 billion from unauthorized accumulator trading on future contracts of the Australian dollar and the euro. TONY LIAW

Role of Auditors in Crisis Gets Look

Role of Auditors in Crisis Gets Look
By MICHAEL RAPOPORT

Until this week when civil-fraud charges were brought against Ernst & Young LLP for its role in the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., auditors had largely side-stepped blame for the financial crisis.

Yet auditors had to pass judgment on some of the practices that caused the big losses that led to government bailouts. The case against Ernst highlights the roles accounting firms played and raises questions about whether reforms enacted after the last financial crisis went far enough.

Auditors weren't involved in a lot of the primary causes of the crisis: bad lending and investing decisions; a lack of understanding of risk; and flaws in the credit-rating system. Auditing isn't meant to stop companies from making dumb business moves—just to make sure those moves are properly disclosed.

Accounting firms were at the center of the last financial crisis, when companies such as Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. collapsed amid scandals. New accounting rules focused on the abuses of the time, but touched on some of the issues in the Ernst case, including the relationship between companies and their auditors, the processes companies have in place to prevent fraud or errors in their financial statements, and the way companies value their assets.

Ernst has denied the allegations in the civil-fraud suit filed against it Tuesday by New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo. The firm declined to comment further beyond its statement Tuesday in which is said there was "no legal or factual basis" to bring a claim against it.

Every big auditing firm had clients that blew up or required huge government bailouts or engaged in questionable practices leading up to the crisis. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP is the auditor for American International Group Inc. and Goldman Sachs Group Inc., for example. KPMG LLP audits Citigroup Inc. Deloitte & Touche LLP was the auditor for Bear Stearns Cos. and audits Fannie Mae.

Several investigations are currently underway into some of these companies and their auditors, though none are expected to yield charges in the immediate future.

"We have to take this as a very serious red flag that there really may be something that has changed in the audit industry," said Lynn Stout, a professor of corporate and securities law at the University of California, Los Angeles.

That's particularly the case with the valuation methods for companies' assets, she said. "Companies rely on auditors to bless their valuation methods and there's so much subjectivity," Ms. Stout said. "There's a real problem if we can't rely on the valuations."

Lynn Turner, a former Securities and Exchange Commission chief accountant, said auditors did perform better after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which took effect in 2002. But around 2006, faced with a slowing economy, they "stepped back from that, reversing course, heading back down the same old road they've been on before the corporate scandals."

In addition, a series of court rulings in recent years have made it tougher to hold auditors accountable when their work is flawed. In 2008, for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court restricted the ability of shareholders defrauded by a company to sue third parties such as the company's accountants.

Others believe auditors have performed well recently. Michael Young, a lawyer at Willkie Farr & Gallagher specializing in cases involving accounting irregularities, said auditors have actually been pretty tough during the crisis in forcing companies to justify their valuation methods, a move which has resulted in many banks having to write down the value of their assets.

"By and large, the accountants rose to the occasion," Mr. Young said.

Michael J. Gallagher, head of PricewaterhouseCoopers' U.S. national office, said, "This was fundamentally an economic crisis, but all parties in the financial reporting chain should use the lessons learned to continue improving financial reporting going forward to better serve investors and the capital markets."

A spokesman for KPMG declined to comment. A spokesman for Deloitte couldn't be reached for comment.

Some see parallels in the role played by the credit-ratings firms in the current crisis and the one played by the auditors. In both cases, the firms are paid by the companies they are supposed to evaluate independently. "When the people being watched get to choose their watchdog, they're not going to choose the toughest animal around," Ms. Stout said. Lehman paid Ernst $185 million in fees in the decade before the investment bank collapsed.

Asset valuation is one area in which investors and regulators might question accountants. Banks still carry huge amounts of potentially questionable assets like mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations on their balance sheets, often valued using nothing but the bank's own estimates. As of Sept. 30, the four biggest U.S. commercial banks alone had a total of $332 billion in "Level 3" securities—those valued using the bank's models instead of market prices.

Valuing assets became particularly tough during the crisis when many markets froze and more firms had to rely on their own models to price their holdings. Even then, though, there were questions about accountants' role. For a time during the crisis, AIG and Goldman were on either end of credit-default-swap transactions that produced big losses for the insurer. Each was valuing the swap differently, even though they were both audited by PricewaterhouseCoopers. The auditing firm did find a material weakness in AIG's internal controls in 2008 related to asset valuation, and under accounting rules, there can be a range of proper valuations for some assets.

Auditors' responsibility for overseeing a company's internal controls —the processes it has in place to prevent misstatements or fraud—might also draw inquiries, especially in light of the recent foreclosure scandal and the securitization of mortgages.

Recent court cases have shown that in at least some securitizations, banks didn't properly transfer mortgages being sold to investors, possibly because of a lack of controls. If auditors didn't make sure companies had sufficient internal controls related to those sales, that might mean they improperly signed off on sales transferring hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgages from banks to investors.

Auditors, however, note that what they're supposed to vet are companies' internal controls over financial reporting, —making sure a company has working procedures to insure that what goes on the financial statements is accurate—and not necessarily the controls related to business transactions like securitizations.

Another potential trouble area, companies holding assets and debt off their balance sheets, was addressed earlier this year when new accounting rules forced banks and other companies to bring more of their holdings back onto the books.

Write to Michael Rapoport at Michael.Rapoport@dowjones.com

雷曼聆訊爆銀行講大話




多家雷曼分銷銀行早前出席立法會聆訊時,堅稱已為前線銷售職員做足培訓、有嚴格監察員工有否違規銷售,以及有為客戶做足風險評估等。不過,立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會早前向銀行前線職員閉門取證時,踢爆部分銀行「講大話」,在培訓及銷售過程中犯上「三宗罪」,包括僅以產品章程摘要而非全文來培訓職員、分區經理只是片面地監察員工銷售情況、部分職員對不同風險承受能力的客戶來者不拒,多年來從未向有意買入雷曼產品的投資者說不。


雷曼小組本月上旬進行了多場閉門聆訊,傳召來自多間雷曼分銷銀行的十多名前線職員作供,了解他們的銷售及監察過程,銀行有否給予足夠培訓等。據悉,有前線職員在聆訊期間表現激動,揚言自己循正當途徑售賣雷曼產品,而雷曼事件令其備受壓力,反責小組「抽秤」他們。

職員銷售靠「打天才波」
不過,有前線職員作供時直言,銀行培訓員工時,未有使用整份逾百頁紙的雷曼產品章程作為教材,僅以經簡化的章程摘要進行講解,有職員更因而在從未閱讀章程的情況下,便「打天才波」向投資者進行銷售;有職員在質問下更承認,連雷曼產品發行人的註冊地點也不知道,反映職員對產品了解極為不足。

對於銀行被指向風險承受能力較低的長者、退休人士,以至家庭主婦售賣雷曼產品。有銀行職員在作供時被揭,多年來完成了逾百宗雷曼產品交易,但都從未因投資者不適宜購買而拒售。


何鍾泰表示,小組最終會邀請約二十名雷曼苦主作供。

雷曼小組閉門聆訊銀行前線職員,揭露雷曼銷售銀行「三宗罪」。


分區經理從無完整監察
除了培訓和銷售有問題,據悉有負責五間銀行分行的分區經理,在聆訊中自稱有透過觀察職員銷售,確保銷售程序無誤,不過在委員追問下,最後卻承認由於負責多家分行的工作,未有任何一宗交易是完整地跟進監察整個銷售過程。

另外,本報早前揭發有銀行由同一名律師,分別陪同銀行高層及前線職員出席聆訊,令人質疑藉此嚴防員工在閉門聆訊中爆料。有前線職員在聆訊下表示,知悉與高層使用同一律師,但聲稱不擔心會有角色衝突,甚至不介意將其書面證供轉交銀行高層過目,令人質疑其供詞是否百分百可信。

小組委員會預計於明年一月完成向前線職員取證,明年農曆新年後傳召雷曼苦主作供。小組委員會主席何鍾泰表示,現正進行挑選應訊苦主的工作,預計最終會邀請約二十名苦主作供。

■記者呂浩然

2010年12月20日星期一

http://dailycaller.com/2010/12/20/ernst-young-faces-lawsuit-over-lehman/

http://dailycaller.com/2010/12/20/ernst-young-faces-lawsuit-over-lehman/


More than two years after Lehman Brothers was at the epicenter of a financial crisis that nearly brought the global economy to its knees, regulators are preparing to file the first major legal action stemming from the collapse of the investment bank.

The charges, however, are not expected to be filed against senior executives at Lehman, but rather against the accountants who audited the firm’s financial statements.

A civil fraud case could be brought by the New York attorney general against the accounting firm Ernst & Young as soon as this week, according to a person briefed on the matter. Ernest & Young certified the financial statements of Lehman from 2001 until the firm’s collapse in September 2008.

The move by the New York attorney general, Andrew M. Cuomo — coming just days before he is to be sworn in as New York’s governor — could spur other regulators to act. Both the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange Commission have been investigating the collapse of Lehman.

Those investigations commenced not long after the firm’s bankruptcy filing. Several Wall Street firms were subpoened in 2008, seeking information about whether their analysts were misled by Lehman about its financial health, according to people familiar with the matter. Yet no executive or officer of Lehman — including Richard S. Fuld Jr., its longtime chief executive — have faced charges connected to the collapse.


Read more: http://dailycaller.com/2010/12/20/ernst-young-faces-lawsuit-over-lehman/#ixzz1Df7nsMhm

2010年12月19日星期日

當局研擴法援範圍 涵蓋衍生工具申索

當局研擴法援範圍 涵蓋衍生工具申索


【明報專訊】雷曼迷債事件揭露目前法律援助對衍生工具相關的索償個案存在真空,不幸因投資衍生工具而遭受損失的市民,即使能證明銷售機構要為損失負責,亦不能透過法援追討。法律援助局最近完成檢討有關法律援助計劃,建議擴大法援涵蓋範圍,包括納入衍生工具的申索。法援局主席陳茂波承認,經歷雷曼事件,認為有需要擴大法援。

政府早前預留1 億元,注資「法律援助輔助計劃」基金,以擴展有關計劃的涵蓋範圍,擬納入專業疏忽案件類別、向多層大廈法團就財物損提出的申索,以及有關衍生工具的申索(見表),建議若得到當局接納,部分預計可於明年中前實施。

研究納入何種衍生工具

法律援助局主席陳茂波接受訪問時表示,由於現時的法援計劃未有涵蓋衍生工具的買賣,如雷曼迷債一類事件,市民即使購買涉違規的產品,仍無法申請法援,因此建議將法援涵蓋衍生工具。至於何種衍生工具納入計劃,則要由法援處研究。

議員倡涉違規即可申請

資深大律師湯家驊不認同有需要區別不同衍生工具,他說: 「要爭論哪些衍生工具納入法援計劃,要花很多時間……倘若拒絕市民申請法援,對方將會提出上訴,而上訴又浪費不少時間及法庭的資源。」他認為,倘若衍生工具買賣涉及違規、疏忽等令市民蒙受損失,市民應獲得法援。他相信,若要求申索人證明有關衍生工具買賣涉及違規,便不會遭人濫用法援。

除了擬將衍生工具納入法援計劃,法援局亦有兩項建議,包括建議納入向多層大廈的業主立案法團就財物損提出的申索,陳茂波表示,現時計劃已涵蓋人身傷害的申索,認為有需要擴充至應納入財物損。至於現時只有涉及醫療、牙科及法律專業疏忽的範圍納入為法援計劃,法援局建議將會計師、建築師、工程師及測師的疏忽申索納入計劃之內。

Ernst & Young Face Fraud Charges

Ernst & Young Face Fraud Charges Over Lehman Collapse, WSJ Says
By Chris Peterson - Dec 20, 2010 1:54 PM GMT+0800

Ernst & Young LLP face being charged with civil fraud by New York prosecutors over their role as auditors for Lehman Brothers, the Wall Street Journal reported, citing people familiar with the matter.

State Attorney General Andrew Cuomo is ready to file the charges, which are based on alleged transactions by Lehman aimed at making the bank’s liabilities look less, the newspaper said.

Ernst & Young earned about $100 million in fees from Lehman between 2001 and 2008; the charges may be laid as early as this week, the WSJ said.


To contact the editor responsible for this story: Chris Peterson at cpeterson@bloomberg.net
.

唐英年

唐英年(早誓?)去年2009年4月9日接受傳媒訪問時表示以下的一番話嗎?
他說:“香港要維持國際金融 (是海盜?) 中心的地位,允許市場 (如賭場?) 存在金融衍(險)生工具(賭具五花八門,有:百家樂《迷債》、番灘《星債》,牌九《ELN》等品牌)是理所當然的事,只要分銷商在推銷時能提供風險透明度(例如:莊家開圍骰時通殺等風險聲明),至於銷售甚麼產品 (不管有毒或無毐?),政府是不會過問的(註:有人解說是政府便坐視不理,不會去管了,你死你賤喔!)”。

證監玩弄的“風險披露為本” 政策只是證監/金融官僚用來推卸責任及整色整水瞞天過海渾飯食的呃神騙鬼奸技而矣! 既然官僚奉行 “金融糖衣毒藥和險(衍)生工具有充分披露風險(知有風險都買你死你事)便可濫售的政策, 咁, 若賣K仔, 搖頭丸, 白粉可卡恩毒品的賣家拆家有向市民充分披露了該毒品的可能風險, 便可合法公然向平民濫售了嗎?若在車頭車尾掛了 ”喝了酒的風險披露驚告牌” 便可合法公然喝多多酒駕車嗎? 香港還有真理可言嗎?

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/04/blog-post.html

有線寬頻電訊有限公司

有線寬頻電訊有限公司
董事 吳天海, 主席兼行政總裁
關則豪, 董事兼財務總裁
徐耀祥, 非執行董事
何定鈞, 獨立非執行董事
陸觀豪 (BBS, JP), 獨立非執行董事
楊國琦, (JP)獨立非執行董事

高級管理
吳天海, 主席兼行政總裁
關則豪, 董事兼財務總裁
曾展章, 執行董事兼總經理 - 香港有線電視企業有限公司
張志成, 高級副總裁, 香港有線電視
于家啟, 高級副總裁 – i-CABLE Network Operations Limited
盧德衡, 副總裁 - 外事部

*********************** 信內容 ***********************

致 : 有線電視廣播有限公司

謝先生啟

內容: 有關在資訊財經節中胡孟清女仕的不負責任報導及對
雷曼苦主的影響作出真正澄清和誠懇的道歉。

關於日前胡孟青小姐於貴台的財經頻道內對雷曼苦主的不實報道, 以訛傳訛及加上其個人不負責任的評論, 對苦主們做成了傷害.

在這裏,我們提出幾點意見:-

1) 為何胡小姐聽聞在外面傳出對苦主的誤解而不作深入了解便深信不疑地去報道? 為何我們說出事實的真相但胡小姐却不肖一顧,没有加以澄清和作出誠懇的道歉?

2) 作為一位公衆人物,在電台討論前是否應該要確實儘量做到真正了解每件事實的真相才加以評論,只是道聽途說,並不是一貫的正確態度.

3) 胡小姐在節目內有一段是提到她經過遮打大廈,親睇看見一位職業FANS打鼓停下來在發呆,便說人家收了錢在偷懶. 但她有否想到苦主天天到證監門前示威,實在也身心疲累,只是在休息,為何她的心能把一件事情想得那麽髒?

請知道,我們大多數苦主也是年老且退休, 只是依頼本金收利息渡日, 而且文化水平不高. 在一生儲蓄被銀行騙光後,且投訴無門下,政府,銀行,也置諸不理會下,如不跑上街來控訴,還可以干什麽? 很多人也以為所有雷曼苦主也已收了錢, 但真實是股票掛鈎的老人家一分錢也未收.

有些人總是說苦主們輸打贏要,願賭服輸,但真實是苦主們並没有賭錢,並不會輸打贏要. 就如我們去藥房買葯,但藥房却把假藥貼成真葯賣. 苦主們買迷你債劵,是被銀行職員告知是保本定期收利息等如定期存款,並没有告知其真正的產品性貭,而且原來迷你債劵並不是債劵,而是複雜的衍生工具,CDO,那不等於買真葯變了買假葯? 股票掛鈎產品也是一樣,銀行職員從没有告知没有股票,但最後又變成了無抵押債劵,連名稱也可以作假,苦主們何時買股票產品變成買無抵押債劵? 這些都是銀行在銷售的過程中,犯上了瞞騙重要資料而達到銷售目的.

我們走上街來,是希望證監還苦主們公道,要求用證劵法107條調查及控告銀行,這是社會公義. 為了我們香港這個家,為了我們的下一代,我們不能埋没了公義,我們要求證監執法, 實在香港現在到處也見不平之事.

現在我們衷心希望貴台能真正澄清對苦主們的誤解,要求貴台讓我們有2分鐘時間作出一個申訴的平台去解譯這個誤會,並願意讓貴台訪問,您們可以在遮打大廈門口找幾個苦主了解一下他們的內心.事實勝於雄辯. 又或找胡小姐那天在門口看見那位在打鼓停下手去休息的苦主,問一下他/她是否收了錢?

作為一間公衆媒體,是否要報道真正公義之事? 就如國內負責任的傳媒也敢冒上得罪中央去支持趙連海, 劉曉波.那我們香港的傳媒害怕什麽? 或仍樂於棄善揚惡?

衷心等待貴公司的回覆! 請儘快將這事件完滿解決及結束。

此致

雷曼苦主大聯盟暨
證券及期貨條例107關注小組
www.lbv.org.hk

2010年12月18日

2010年12月17日星期五

為何證監不執法?


為何證監不執法?
網誌分類:Toxic Bonds | 圖片 網誌日期:2010-11-26 13:22
昨天,2010年11月25日「證監會萬人報案 」大行動 己進入了第四天,但證監會仍不接受我們苦主報案,更召來大批警員及保安員駐守,令情況混亂。

報案是香港市民應有的公民權利,而證監和警方竟阻攔及不接受苦主報案,這是什的天理喔!!這証明證監會在對雷曼事件不盡不實,始作俑者,證監不監, 有法不依。我們抗議證監多重標準,為何處理證券行苦主和銀行苦主的投訴有如此天壤之別?難道銀行參與證券業務,是比證券公司更為穩健、更能保障客戶權益嗎?雖知道,從銀行職員的角度去看,他們的專業是銀行業務,而非金融產品,由外行人去推銷這些專業的產品,相比起專業於此的證券專才,其出錯的機會理所當然也是較高的。這個顯淺的道理,難道你班九官是不知道嗎?若你們真的是「先知先覺」,老早該把這些高風險金融產品禁止由銀行去銷售。你們不僅如此,還對銀行經營證券業務大開綠燈,任由銀行存心欺詐,把複雜的衍生工具,包裝成為低或無風險的「債券」出售,禍害市民。你們犯了如此嚴重錯誤,卻不知悔改,還堅持銀行無錯,把錯歸於銀行客戶。噢!別把我們銀行苦主當“羊牯”,白白地為你們犧牲,讓你們無恥地成為維護香作為國際金融中心的功臣,向「亞爺」領功啊。你們這樣做,不覺得可恥可悲嗎?

名位高官(高薪超低能的官員)大老爺,你們要是有良知,做事有責任,請不要再向大財團傾斜、向商賈土豪及老千銀行獻媚送大禮,這才對得住香的老百性,也對得住你自己啊!!

MARK , CONVERT, TELL THE TRUTH

MARTIN, CONFESS, FACE THE MAGIC


請掏出良心來, 將真相說出來

請告訴我們有那個董事局內的執行董事或非執行董事施壓阻撓調查! 哪個阻止公義彰顯? 哪個不顧人民含冤?

證監會董事 請按: 名字 (履歷)

主席 方正博士,GBS,JP

香港证券及期货事务监察委员会 香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會 主席
(任期由2006年10月20日起) (目前任期至2011年10月19日止) (

方正博士于2006年10月获香港特区行政长官委任为证券及期货事务监察委员会(证监会)非执行主席,他自2005年1月起担任非执行董事。方正博士於2006年10月獲香港特區行政長官委任為證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)非執行主席,他自2005年1月起擔任非執行董事。

方博士兼任谘询委员会主席、薪酬委员会、提名委员会、证监会(香港交易所上市)上诉委员会及证监会程序覆检委员会委员。方博士兼任諮詢委員會主席、薪酬委員會、提名委員會、證監會(香港交易所上市)上訴委員會及證監會程序覆檢委員會委員。

方博士为执业会计师,曾任国际会计师行罗兵咸永道会计师事务所的高级合伙人。方博士為執業會計師,曾任國際會計師行羅兵咸永道會計師事務所的高級合夥人。 方博士在香港及英国接受教育,于1972年取得特许会计师资格,并于1997年7月获英国肯特大学颁授民法学荣誉博士。方博士在香港及英國接受教育,於1972年取得特許會計師資格,並於1997年7月獲英國肯特大學頒授民法學榮譽博士。

方博士现任香港按揭证券有限公司非执行董事、香港金融管理局银行业务谘询委员会委员及香港公开大学校董会主席。方博士現任香港按揭證券有限公司非執行董事、香港金融管理局銀行業務諮詢委員會委員及香港公開大學校董會主席。 方博士于1996年获委任为太平绅士,并于2008年获香港特别行政区政府颁授金紫荆星章。

方正就證監會工作範疇,監管對象、監管方式等作了深入演講,他指自雷曼事件后,政府關注公眾對金融投資產品的了解,未來會加強這方面的教育工作。

證監會是負責監管香港的證券期貨市場運作的一個機構,在香港這個國際金融中心的大舞台上扮演着極其重要的角色,它不單止讓香港的證券期貨市場循着健康的軌道發展,亦為香港的金融體系注入更為全面的元素。

方正介紹說,證監會的日常工作主要分為三個範疇,包括市場監管、促進香港作為金融中心能夠繼續取得成功
并向前邁進以及投資教育。他說,雷曼事件后,證監會認為在工作上有好多需改善的地方,其中產品監管及披露方面可以再做多一些工作。投資教育方面,他認為要灌輸基層金融投資知識,有見現時香港金融市場流入的資金不少來自內地同胞,而內地同胞接觸金融產品都是近5 年至10 年時間,指自己經常呼吁業界向持有金融產品的同胞提供保障,教育他們相關的金融產品知識。

方正強調,監管市場不能單單依賴監管機構做到無失當,監管一個金融市場需要三隻腳,首先證監會建立穩健
基礎,完善監管工作;二是市場參與者、發行商也有責任,不要誤導市民,就像金融風波令許多投資者對高風險投資產品卻步,創新高風險衍生工具生意少了許多,投資者大多買保守債券產品,最終發行商也有損失;最后一隻腳是投資者本身,對一些聽極都不明的金融投資產品就不要投資,記住錢是你們的,要親力親為。

他透露,為了加強公眾對金融市場的認識,證監會與港台合作拍攝一系列「『証』義搜查線」劇集在電視台播放,希望透過劇集內容令普羅市民對金融市場有更多認識。

執行董事
韋奕禮 (Martin Wheatley),JP , 香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會
行政總裁
(任期由2006年6日23日起)
(目前任期至2011年9月30日止)

韋奕禮先生於2006年6月23日成為證券及期貨事務監察委員會 (證監會) 行政總裁。

韋奕禮先生現為金融穩定委員會準則執行小組委員會委員,以及國際證監會組織技術委員會委員。他目前亦擔任國際證監會組織技術委員會賣空專責小組主席。
在加入證監會前,韋奕禮先生在倫敦證券交易所擔任副行政總裁。
韋奕禮先生亦曾任富時國際有限公司主席及英國金融服務管理局轄下的上市監管機構諮詢委員會委員。

證監會總監韋奕禮惹火 「無人只看名字投資」
(明報)2008年10月14日 星期二 05:05
【明報專訊】昨日在立法會 會議上,除了任志剛 ,證監會 行政總監韋奕禮成為「第二個箭靶」。議員批評「迷你債券」名稱有誤導成分,韋奕禮強調只屬品牌名稱,直言投資者不應單以名字決定購買投資產品;證監會企業融資部執行董事何賢通坦言,迷你債在美國 的確無零售市場,因為「美國(對迷你債)有戒心,意識比香港強,所以在美國好難批准!」
下屬:美國好難批迷債
民主黨 李永達 提到「迷你債券」命名是否有特定意義,並質疑有誤導成分。韋奕禮說,迷你債與公司票據均屬於債權證,迷你債只是品牌名字,「沒有人會根據它的名字購買,應根據其特色決定是否購買」。他強調購買者應該問清楚,「當銀行職員提供6厘利息,而非半厘時,購買者便要問為什麼可以有6厘?職員也要解釋風險較高。」
金管局總裁任志剛卻與韋奕禮有不同意見,他認為可研究名稱可能引起的聯想,又提到金管局不容許其他機構隨便使用「銀行」這稱號。
對於香港成為雷曼迷你債券重災區,韋奕禮稱並非只有香港銷售,與CDO(債務抵押證券)相關的投資產品,歐美也有售;其在香港及新加坡較受歡迎,是因為銀行存款利息低,令較高息的產品受到追捧。
議員梁美芬質疑香港監管制度不足。韋奕禮表示,「每個地方有不同水平,美國規定結構產品只可銷售給有衍生工具戶口、期權戶口的投資者,但香港沒有這樣的規定。」不過,何賢通說,迷你債在美國的確無零售市場,因為「美國(對迷你債)有戒心,意識比香港強,所以在美國好難批准!」

張灼華

香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會
執行董事及副行政總裁
政策、中國事務及投資產品部
(任期由2001年12日1日起)
(目前任期至2011年2月28日止)

張灼華女士現任證券及期貨事務監察委員會 (證監會)副行政總裁及政策、中國事務及投資產品部的執行董事。張女士的主要職責包括為證監會制訂以內地及香港市場發展為重點的整體政策,以及監管香港的零售投資產品市場。

由張女士領導推行的主要舉措包括:

制訂《證券及期貨條例》。
改革保證金融資規則和業界常規。
積極發展香港作為國際資產管理中心,包括推出零售對沖基金、發展香港成為亞洲第二大的的交易所買賣基金(ETF)交易市場,以及實現了香港與台灣ETF的相互跨境上市。

在內地政策方面,張女士代表證監會一直與內地政府、監管機構及商界領袖定期研討有關宏觀經濟、市場發展及監管事宜。張女士並一直致力推動內地與香港金融策略的合作,包括參與制定《內地與香港關於建立更緊密經貿關系的安排》(CEPA)及出任中國證監會的合格境內機構投資者計劃(QDII)專家委員會成員。此外,在張女士的領導下,證監會分別與中國銀行業監督管理委員會(中國銀監會)以及中國保險監督管理委員會(中國保監會)簽訂了監管合作協議,加強內地與香港的監管合作。

在國際工作方面,張女士是國際證券事務監察委員會組織(國際證監會組織)第5號常務委員會委員。在加入證監會前,張女士在紐約和香港累積了超過20年的企業及商業法執業經驗,並曾為多家跨國企業提供有關直接投資於內地的法律意見。

除證監會外,張女士履行的公職包括香港大學法律學院亞洲國際金融法研究院專業顧問委員會成員、香港貿易發展局金融服務業諮詢委員會委員及亞洲金融論壇2009及2010年策劃委員會成員。

何賢通 , 香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會
企業融資部執行董事
(任期由2006年8月28日起)
(目前任期至2012年8月27日止)

何賢通先生是證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)委員,並且是掌管企業融資部的執行董事。該部門負責監察收購及合併活動、公司建議及披露,以及有關上市公司及證券上市的事宜,包括雙重存檔職能。

何先生已服務證監會超過12年,以往曾在多家主要的律師事務所執業,在企業融資界擁有豐富的監管經驗及湛深的知識。

何先生兼任公眾股東權益小組主席、提名委員會及執行委員會委員。

何賢通指雷曼事件後規管仍一致
2009-07-21 (14:00)

立法會雷曼迷債小組研訊,證監會企業融資部執行董事何賢通繼續被傳召作供。

何賢通作供時表示,抵押品的破產或然率只有0.09%,因此於債券單張及章程所提及編幅較小,但其詳細資料已放於其他可供客戶的文件當中。
他稱,雷曼事件前後,證監會審批準則仍然一致,惟要求發行人加強披露風險,令到投資者對投資更加明白。
他指出,結構性產品對一般市民而言較為複雜,並補充雷曼事件前,曾與上司表示對此關注及曾考慮其他外國市場對監管結構性產品做法。

雷祺光 ,
雷祺光先生
香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會
市場監察部執行董事
(任期由2006年8日28日起)
(目前任期至2012年8月27日止)

雷祺光先生是證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會) 委員,並且是掌管市場監察部的執行董事。該部門負責監督香港交易及結算所有限公司的交易及結算活動、自動交易系統的授權、管理投資者賠償基金,以及促進證券及期貨市場的發展。

雷先生服務證監會已超過15年,他在監督證券及期貨市場方面擁有豐富知識及經驗。在加入證監會前,他曾在美國任職於金融機構。

雷先生兼任香港交易及結算所有限公司風險管理委員會委員、證券賠償基金委員會主席、投資者賠償基金委員會主席、證監會(香港交易所上市)委員會委員、財政預算委員會委員及執行委員會委員。他亦是投資者賠償有限公司的董事之一。

施衛民 (Mark Steward)香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會
法規執行部執行董事
(任期由2006年9月25日起)
(目前任期至2012年9月24日止)

施衛民先生是證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會) 委員,並且是掌管法規執行部的執行董事。該部門負責監察證券期貨市場的不適當行為、就法定罪行及違反證監會有關法例的事宜作出調查,以及在適當情況下對持牌人採取紀律處分和提出檢控。

施衛民先生兼任證監會(香港交易所上市)委員會委員及執行委員會委員。

在加入證監會前,施衛民先生(Mr Steward)曾於澳大利亞證券及投資事務監察委員會(Australian Securities and Investments Commission)先後擔任數項要職,最後任職該委員會法規執行部副執行董事。施衛民先生自1987年起已在澳洲及英國參與企業及證券的監管事務,尤其專注於調查工作及繼後的訴訟程序。施衛民先生於1989年在墨爾本大學(University of Melbourne)取得法律學學士學位,並擁有在澳洲的法院執業的廣泛經驗。


非執行董事
陳鑑林議員,SBS,JP ,
郭慶偉,BBS,SC,JP .
李王佩玲,JP ,
李金鴻,JP
廖柏偉教授,SBS,JP ,
章晟曼 ,
黃啟民,BBS,JP

! 我 們 心 裡 有 數了!

商業罪案調查科用107告銀行職員案例:

商業罪案調查科用107告銀行職員案例:
審銀行職員張瑰瑰的案件已到最後控方盤問的時候,雖然是中銀銷售迷債和星債,但以107失實陳述來告其中的內容(有無看過銷售章程)與非迷債的相同,所以ELN苦主應多出席去聽,對自已日後怎樣準備證據很有益處。如果這次成功,將會牽起一連串的成功案件。

Meeting with Legco member

約見議員解釋107報案:

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7458

葉劉淑儀議員:

雷曼事件拖延已兩年三個月,事件已不再引起議員和社會的關注。而事實上雷曼事件是一件不折不扣的社會公義事件。不但苦主受到銀行的失實陳述,誤導和欺騙,加上政府對銀行之偏袒,而所謂一切的和解方案,苦主在根皮力盡下無奈地接受。現今本會祈望各議員能幫助苦主彰顯公義,維護社會安定繁榮。

1. 本會堅持証監會有必要就證監法571章107條為苦主進行調查。
2. 由於107條屬刑事法例,證監會必需接納筆錄取口供,本會就此事件向證監會查詢,但都遭到拒絕,證監會身為執法機構,拒絕錄取口供,非但有法不依,更有包庇銀行之嫌。
3. 雖然部份苦主已向警方報案,但由於警方對其產品並不熟識,調查進度緩慢,現今祇有3宗起訴個案。由於部份苦主年紀老邁,記憶力衰退,實不應再作拖延。
4. 由於警方向各苦主取証時,大部份未了解107條所賦予的保障,及未有充份認識107條之重要性,以致在舉証時資料有所遺漏。加強苦主之証供,乃市民之權利。
5. 報案乃市民應有之權利,證監會拒苦主於千里之外,而沒有對苦主解釋,對市民交代責任,拒絕接受報案合理嗎?
6. 由於107條屬刑事法例,證監會必需依過往設立了的報案程序行事,豈能拒絕(錄取口供)作為報案的先決條件。
7. 其實苦主已於2年前經各政黨投訴證監會,現今才通知苦主投訴機制,兩年前的投訴,一直迴避,一直擱置,這是一個執法機構應有的態度嗎?
8. 本會諒解證監人力資源有限,曾績極地配合要求每天由5人開始,待證監會聘請足夠人手,再作調配和加速進度,但仍未得到回應。
9. 如證監會仍以人力資源支源短缺而拒絕苦主報案,莫非證監不能如警方和金管加聘人士,任由香港成為罪惡溫牀?或讓公義不能彰顯?
10. 證監會有賴證監法生存,證監理念是保護小投資者,保持市場交易公正,公平,公開。沒有任何部門比証監熟悉證監法之立法原意,事件拖拉兩年,年紀老邁之苦主已身心疲慮,證監會再拖拉,令市民和苦主對社會公義,弱勢社羣之保障感到憂慮。
11. 對於證監會拒絕筆錄取証,大感不惑,是否祇是敷衍苦主,增加苦主疑慮。對於年紀老邁者,必需視乎其身體狀況而作適當恊助,而在醫院或不良於行者,必需從速向苦主取証,而確保証供全面及加速處理。
12. 身為執法機構,有義不容遲之責任。包括取証,搜証和檢控等工作,由於證監會已採取由上而下之調查,已掌握各銀行職員的培訓、盡職審查之記錄,這些對調查107都有莫大幫助。

苦主祈望各議員能明白香港能保持其司法獨立性尤為重要,並祈望能討回公道。亦希望社會各界能從雷曼事件汲取教訓,將犯法者繩之於法,保持香港國際金融中心地位。

雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人

陳浩偉
2010年12月21日

Professor K C Chan

Professor K C Chan
Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury

K C Chan, JP
Chair Professor (on leave)
kcchan@ust.hk

PhD, 1985, University of Chicago, Finance
MBA, 1981, University of Chicago
BA (with Honors), 1979, Wesleyan University, Economics

Professor K.C. Chan was born in 1957. Before assuming the post of Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Professor Chan was Dean of Business and Management of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST). Prior to joining the HKUST Business School in 1993, Professor Chan had spent nine years teaching at Ohio State University in the USA.

Professor Chan received his bachelor's degree in economics from Wesleyan University and both his M.B.A. and Ph.D. in finance from the University of Chicago. He is specialised in assets pricing, evaluation of trading strategies and market efficiency and has published numerous articles on these topics.

Before joining the Government, Professor Chan held a number of public service positions including Chairman of the Consumer Council; director of the Hong Kong Futures Exchange; member of the Commission on Strategic Development, Commission on Poverty, the Exchange Fund Advisory Committee, the Hang Seng Index Advisory Committee, and the Hong Kong Council for Academic Accreditation. Professor Chan is also former President of the Asian Finance Association and former President of Association of Asia Pacific Business Schools.

PUBLICATIONS:

"An Exploratory Investigation of the Firm Size Effect," with Nai-fu Chen and David Hsieh, Journal of Financial Economics 14 (3), (1985).

"Can Tax-Loss Selling Explain the January Seasonal in Stock Returns?" Journal of Finance 41(5), (1986).

"Risk and the Economy: A Finance Perspective," with René Stulz, in Financial Risk: Theory, Evidence and Implications, C.C. Stone, ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, Norwell, M.A., (1988)

"On the Contrarian Investment Strategy," Journal of Business 61: 147-64, (1988).(Reprinted in Market Efficiency: Stock Market Behaviour in Theory and Practice, Andrew Lo, ed., Edward Elgar Publishers.)

"An Unconditional Test of Asset Pricing and the Role of Firm Size as an Instrumental Variable for Risk," with Nai-fu Chen, Journal of Finance 63: 309-325, (1988).

"Risk and Return from Real Estate: Evidence from Equity REITs," with Patric Hendershott and Anthony Sanders, AREUEA Journal , (Winter 1990), 431-452.

"Structural and Return Characteristics of Small and Large Firms," with Nai-fu Chen, Journal of Finance 46, (1991).

"Intraday Volatility in the Stock Index and Stock Index Futures Markets," with Kalok Chan and Andrew Karolyi, Review of Financial Studies 4: 657-684, (1991).

"The Volatility of the Japanese Stock Market: Evidence from 1977 to 1990," with G. Andrew Karolyi, in Japanese Financial Market Research , W. Ziemba, W. Bailey and Y. Hamao, (eds.,), North-Holland Publishers, (1991).

"The Volatility of Short-Term Interest Rates: An Empirical Comparison of Alternative Models of the Term Structure of Interest Rates," with G. Andrew Karolyi, Francis A. Longstaff and Anthony B. Sanders, Journal of Finance 68 (1992), 1209-1227.

"The Volatility of Japanese Interest Rates: A Comparison of Alternative Term Structure Models," with G. Andrew Karolyi, Francis A. Longstaff and Anthony B. Sanders, in Rhee and Chang (eds), Pacific Basin Financial Market Research , Vol. 3, (1992).

"Global Financial Markets and the Risk Premium on the U.S. Equity" with Andrew Karolyi and René Stulz, Journal of Financial Economics 32 (2) (1992), 137-168

"Economic Forces and Commodity Futures Prices: Further Evidence on Time-Varying Risk Premia," with Warren Bailey, Journal of Finance 48 (3) (1993).

"Market Structure and the Intraday Pattern of Bid-Ask Spreads for NASDAQ Securities," with William G. Christie and Paul H. Schultz, Journal of Business 68 (1) (1995), 35-60.

"Information, Trading and Stock Returns: Lessons from dually-listed securities", with Wai-Ming Fong and René Stulz, Journal of Banking and Finance, (1996).

"Does Money Explain Asset Returns? Theory and Empirical Analysis" with Silverio Foresi and Larry Lang, Journal of Finance 51(1), (1996).

"The Performance of Japanese Mutual Funds", Review of Financial Studies, (with Jun Cai and Takeshi Yamada), (1997) 10: 237-274

金管局仍調查135宗雷曼個案 - Yahoo! 新聞

金管局仍調查135宗雷曼個案 - Yahoo! 新聞: "金管局仍調查135宗雷曼個案
(星島)2010年12月17日 星期五 16:50
金管局 今日宣布,就收到的21,740宗雷曼兄弟相關投訴個案當中,超過99%已完成調查工作,餘下的135宗個案仍在調查中。"

In-Depth Look - Casualties of the Lehman Collapse - Bloomberg



In the year 2010, bloomberg news still cover HK Minibonds misselling frauds in HK in the court where HKMA, HK police CCB are now charging BOCHK bank staffs.

2010年12月16日星期四

Europe job beckons as SFC chief calls it quits

Tony Liaw

Thursday, December 09, 2010

Securities and Futures Commission chief executive Martin Wheatley will resign in the summer, three months before his contract expires in September.
The regulator will seek his successor through open recruitment.

"Six years is long enough," said Wheatley, 51, saying he is resigning for personal reasons and that his first priority will be to go back to his hometown for a holiday.

But sources said that will only be a break before Wheatley takes up a position with an European-based securities watchdog.

The new job takes Wheatley back to his roots.

Before joining the SFC, he was deputy chief executive of the London Stock Exchange.

Wheatley sits on the Financial Stability Board's standing committee for standards implementation and is a member of the International Organisation of Securities Commissions' technical committee. He chairs the committee's task force on short selling.

He was appointed SFC chief in June 2006, one year after joining the regulator.

Wheatley will earn HK$9.09 million this year. His compensation package includes HK$7.2 million in basic salary, HK$1.35 million in discretionary pay and HK$540,000 in retirement scheme contributions.

Wheatley said the commission has taken in its stride the many challenges that confronted the financial markets and regulators, including the Lehman Brothers minibond crisis. "The Hong Kong system and the regulatory structure are still better than any other system in the world," he said.

Wheatley also succeeded in cracking down on a number of inappropriate deals. The SFC went to court to block the privatization of PCCW (0008) triggered by chairman Richard Li Tzar-kai.

It also strengthened protection for retail investors of structured products after the Lehman minibonds saga.

The involvement by the SFC led to a settlement between lenders and investors, in which 16 banks compensated minibond investors, in some instances in full.

2010年12月15日星期三

金管會新規範 理專亂賣商品 最重撤照3年

理財專員不當銷售金融產品給民眾,未來最重3年不能再賣商品。

為了防止銀行理專亂賣金融商品,讓投資人受到「重大損失」,金管會昨天宣布新規範,理專將比照保險業務員,未來必須採用登錄制;一旦違規,金管會可撤銷登錄資格、停止執行業務,最長達3年。

金管會也列舉理財專員可能遭禁賣商品的「八大罪狀」,包括:

1、對客戶做不實的說明。2、為獲取佣金,不當勸誘客戶以「異常頻率」,轉換投資標的。3、讓客戶誤以為是本金可獲保證的商品。4、把金融商品和銀行存款等作誇大不實的比較。5、擅自為客戶交易。6、侵占或不當處分資產。7、推薦客戶投資特定商品,以取得特定利益。8、向業務有往來的客戶,直間接收取金錢或利益。

官員說,這次規範的範圍,是以透過銀行特定金錢信託的業務為主,包括了境外基金、境內基金,以及結構型商品。保險商品雖然未納入,官員說,「若理專賣基金出了事,銀行還敢讓他賣保險商品?」

至於「重大損失」的認定,金管會沒有明訂,主要是根據個案情況而定。官員表示,每名投資人所能承受的損失不同,金額損失一、兩萬元,「應不屬於重大損失」。

2010年12月14日星期二

Minibond Protesters: Are They Right?

Minibond Protesters: Are They Right?Article Comments (5) Exchange HOME PAGE »There are 5 Comment(s)
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http://blogs.wsj.com/exchange/2010/12/10/minibond-protesters-are-they-right/
10:18 am December 13, 2010
Standard Chartered - wrote:
1100 victims complained about the mis-selling of Standard Chartered Bank, and 702 cases were confirmed by HKMA with enough evidence proving such, but these victims got nothing, and the only reason being Standard Chartered Bank was the foreign bank in the terrritory and they do not care what HKMA or SFC. The other banks who compensated were mostly Chinese banks. There is a difference between the Chinese and British banks. In future don’t trust the British banks or American banks. Better trust the Chinese banks.


10:22 am December 13, 2010
Standard Chartered - Citi wrote:
The report was not accurate. Only seventeen banks agreed to compensate 60% to minibond holders. Standard Chartered Bank paid none, even 70% of the complaints showed evidence that there was mis-selling, and these were the so called equity linked deposits related to HK Stocks, which are worth more than 100% of the principal amount. Standard Chartered Bank sold these as fixed deposits and never mentioned the name of the issuer as Lehman. Now the bank is saying they were only acting as agents for Lehman, and they do not have the stocks which are now even worth more than the principal. Isn’t this a FRAUD?


11:34 am December 13, 2010
Alice wrote:
Dah Sing Bank sold principal protected Note to the depositors just before Lehman collapsed. The Notes was under two year ago ( Aug 2006 ) prospectus. Even though the rumour of financial crisis of Lehman throughout the market. Dah Sing Bank still pushed to sell the Lehman Note. Dah Sing Bank transfered their risk to the depositors. Shame of Dah Sing Bank.


12:21 am December 14, 2010
Jimmy wrote:
I think a lot of people, and the worse is the media, misled by the HK governement and banks saying they have helped the victims getting back 60-70% of their money. The banks only repurchased minibond issued by PFIL but there are other similiar minibonds issued by other entities are not repurchased or even discussed how to solve it. The poeple protected on street are those being ignored. The question is why SFC and bank agreed on the repurchase of some kind of minibonds but not other kind of minibonds which they have very similiar in nature. These people on street are claimed being cheated by bank staffs, but it seems that no one in government offices, SFC, HKMA and even media pay a little attention to them. Please look into the matter more deeply before you raise this subject.

2010年12月12日星期日

城市論壇 Corruption Hong Kong

城市論壇:
兩次出鏡,初步有成效,想出個新名稱:”雷曼苦主大聯盟暨證券及期貨條例107關注小組”,日後可用。



城市論壇
舉行地點:九龍城賈炳達道公園涼亭 Venue: Carpenter Road Park, Kowloon City 李永達調查有關梁展文先生離職後從事工作的事宜專責委員會副主席 LEE Wing-tat Deputy Chairman


2010-12-05
論題 : 退休官員轉職審批 寬緊得宜嚴防出軌 Discussion on: Post-service Work of Mr LEUNG Chin-man
舉行地點:九龍城賈炳達道公園涼亭
Venue: Carpenter Road Park, Kowloon City

李永達
調查有關梁展文先生離職後從事工作的事宜專責委員會副主席
LEE Wing-tat
Deputy Chairman, Select Committee to Inquire into Matters Relating to the Post-service Work of Mr LEUNG Chin-man

黃偉豪
中文大學政治與行政學系副教授
WONG, Wilson Wai Ho
Associate Professor, Department of Government & Public Administration, CUHK
“Corruption and Accountability in the Globalized World: A Comparative Study of Japan, Hong Kong and China.” In Stephen Osborne and Amanda Ball, eds., (forthcoming) Social Accounting and Public Management: Accountability for the Public Good. UK: Routledge Critical Studies in Public Management Series.


蘇平治
香港高級公務員協會主席
SO Ping-chi
Chairman, Hong Kong Senior Government Officers Association

Dr. Wilcon Wong is talking today about ranking system for retiring high level officials of HK, I also talked with Dr. Stan Wong Department of Government & Public Administration, CUHK about "Political Connections and Firm Performance: The Case of Hong Kong" by Stan Hok-Wui Wong using ranking system about Political connections early this year.

2010年12月8日星期三

FT.com / FT Trading Room / Markets Regulation - Wheatley to step down from HK securities regulator

FT.com / FT Trading Room / Markets Regulation - Wheatley to step down from HK securities regulator: "Wheatley to step down from HK securities regulator"


By Robert Cookson in Hong Kong

Published: December 8 2010 13:32 | Last updated: December 8 2010 13:32

Martin Wheatley, chief executive of Hong Kong’s securities regulator, will step down in the summer after six years cracking down on market misconduct in the Chinese territory.

Mr Wheatley has become one of the world’s most influential regulators since joining the Securities and Futures Commission in 2005, gaining a reputation for tough but measured enforcement in the Asian financial hub.

Mr Wheatley, 51, announced on Wednesday that he would leave just before his contract with the SFC expires in September 2011. He said he had decided not to run for another term because “six years feels like a good point to return to the UK”.

A former deputy chief executive of the London Stock Exchange, Mr Wheatley is expected to have little trouble finding a new job at another regulator or a big exchange. He was in the running to be the chief executive of the LSE in 2001 but was passed over in favour of Clara Furse.

His exit comes as Hong Kong’s role in global finance continues to expand and as financial institutions beef up their presence in the city to access the rapid economic growth of Asia and in particular China.

“Martin Wheatley’s departure from the SFC will be a crossroads in Hong Kong regulatory reform,” said Alan Ewins, a partner at Allen & Overy. “The Hong Kong regime has started along the process of significant regulatory change under his stewardship.”

The SFC has gained a reputation as a force to be reckoned with in recent years.

In the last three years alone, the SFC has notched up 171 criminal convictions for market manipulation – representing 70 per cent of the total number of convictions since 1989.

In one of the most high-profile cases, Du Jun, a former managing director at Morgan Stanley Asia, was sentenced to seven years behind bars for insider trading.

In tandem with his role at the SFC, Mr Wheatley chairs a taskforce on short selling for the International Organisation of Securities Commissions.

Hong Kong won international recognition for being one of the few markets that did not ban short selling or impose other emergency restrictions during the financial crisis.

“[Mr Wheatley] has been a very steady hand,” said Martin Rogers of Clifford Chance in Hong Kong.

But Mr Wheatley has drawn criticism as well as praise. The SFC attracted public anger for failing to prevent the misselling of complex financial products that collapsed during the financial crisis. It has also been criticised for sometimes being too aggressive in its enforcement actions and for failing to work closely with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

This year the SFC has started investigating whether investment banks have failed to perform adequate due diligence on companies selling shares to investors in Hong Kong.

For the second year running, Hong Kong is on track to become the world’s biggest centre for initial public offerings, with more than $44bn raised on the city’s stock exchange so far in 2010.


.Copyright The Financial Times

.

Wheatley: Was It His Choice?


By Peter Stein

"Did he jump, or was he pushed? Martin Wheatley’s departure as chief executive of Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission is bound to prompt the question, given the feathers he’s ruffled in his tenure.

Bloomberg News
Martin Wheatley speaks at a conference in September 2009 Mr. Wheatley, who first joined the market regulator in 2005 and took over as its head in 2006, was unequivocal in his comments Wednesday. No, he wasn’t pushed, he said. He was leaving for personal reasons. Six years was enough, and it was time to return to the U.K.

Probably not all will be sad to see him leave. Mr. Wheatley took on some big fish during his time. In 2009, Richard Li, son of Hong Kong multibillionaire Li Ka-shing, for instance, saw his plan to privatize his telecommunications company PCCW Ltd. dashed when the SFC alleged that a shareholder vote approving the deal was rigged. An appeals court found in the SFC’s favor.

The SFC took an aggressive stance against insider trading and other securities violations. Earlier this year, the SFC scored a big notch in its belt when a court sentenced former Morgan Stanley banker Du Jun to seven years in prison and fined him 23.3 million Hong Kong dollars (about US$3 million) for insider dealings during his time with the Wall Street bank.

Some holders of so-called Lehman minibonds had a much less favorable view of Mr. Wheatley. Many small investors lost money when the complex derivatives issued by Lehman Brothers and sold by banks locally collapsed in value. A settlement with banks brokered by the SFC ended up returning a portion of money lost to the securities holders, but institutional and sophisticated investors were excluded.

Since then, many individuals who weren’t included in the settlement have waged noisy protests outside the offices of banks in Hong Kong in an effort to force them to return some of their lost money. They’ve also protested in recent days outside the SFC’s offices in Hong Kong’s central district, holding signs with a circle around Mr. Wheatley’s face and a line drawn through it.

There’s been speculation in the past that Mr. Wheatley’s tenure might be cut short. His contract was last renewed in September 2008, but only just before its expiration – a reminder that he held his job only at the government’s pleasure.

That said, Mr. Wheatley, a former deputy chief executive of the London Stock Exchange who’s been involved in setting international regulatory standards for the securities industry, has privately let it be known in the past that six years at the SFC was likely going to be enough for him. While he’s become an important fixture of the Hong Kong financial scene, he was no lifer. It’s more likely he’d decided to move on by himself, without any new clashes or incidents precipitating the decision.

The big question really will be: who takes his place? Based on past practice, a panel of advisers would recommend a successor to the government. For Hong Kong to maintain the confidence of global investors, it will need to find a new regulator of comparable stature, but one with a thick enough skin to take on the rich and powerful when it’s called for. Now that Mr. Wheatley has given everyone a six months’ heads up, the government will do well to use the time to conduct a thorough search.
"

Legco member Ms Ip had commented that Mr. Wheatley is the only reliable and trustworthy person left in HK govenment. It is well known to HK people that others HK high level officials were power corrupt (and now simply corrupt) and privately covering up misconduct deals of government secret acts with the bankers. Ex-SFC official Ko's view is that Martin must have great disagreement with the government over how to handle our case and had to throw up his job at the end. I would say such as Tsang brothers and others with relatives in banking industries (Morgan Stanley) to help out in cover up of HK banks misselling frauds.

2010年12月7日苦主到YMCA向特首贈興

無代表訴訟《競爭法》打折扣

無代表訴訟《競爭法》打折扣

本文可能略為學術,但對本報其中一類「目標讀者」的商界中人而言,應在常識之內,理應提出質疑,卻又長期為大家忽略的問題,就是在我們的商業法律系統之內欠缺代表訴訟的制度(representative action)。由於這一欠缺,小投資者長期遭受欺凌,而本來在《競爭條例》立法之內包括代表訴訟的制度,作為對中小企的有效保障,卻在草案之中無聲無息地失去影蹤(美國稱為「集體訴訟」﹝Class Action﹞,採取訴訟更為容易)。

證監會漠視責任

在商務及經濟發展於2008 年5 月出版的《競爭法詳細建議──公眾諮詢文件》中的第40 項建議,正是提議《競爭法》中容許引入較直接的代表訴訟制度。情況是如獲競爭事務委員會轄下的審裁處批准,應容許消費者或代表中小企的代表訴訟。審裁處只要認為代表組織能公平且充分代表有關方面的利益,即可以批准進行代表訴訟。
這一個明顯有利中小企而針對大企業的訴訟制度,諮詢文件有詳細介紹其好處及各國的經驗。在其他的司法地區經驗顯示,受反競爭行為影響的消費者與中小企皆不願自行向法院提出訴訟,他們憂慮個別的訴訟費用太大;容許代表訴訟作為私人訴訟的一環,能令中小企可在涉及最少時間和金錢的情況下提出訴訟,以保障其權益。
當然,理論上競委會在接受中小企針對大企業的投訴情況下,可以代為調查起訴;但競委會的訴訟一來不能直接為所有受損害的中小企爭取賠償,二來正是由於大家對政府或政府所延申依法成立的獨立機構,同樣欠缺信心,恐其受一時的政府政策立場影響,不能公正執行法律。
現成不過的事例,正是證監會(已經是獨立於政府之外)可以完全不理會法例之內清楚規定的責任,拒絕雷曼苦主的報案要求;這是上星期本欄直接指出的。這一指控十分嚴重,卻完全於法有據,證監會還是可以不聞不問不理會。陳家強作為負責財經的官員,只要事件沒有社會新聞的關注,一樣可以不理,一直拒絕會見苦主。

議員不提質疑

更奇怪的是,苦主到另一法定機構申訴專員公署投訴證監會要求安排仲裁,雖已經過了申訴專員的十天內有初步行動的服務承諾,卻還是可以對苦主的訴求全不理會。這事件只說明一點,香港的法治制度已經在不經不覺之間變得十分人治,決定政府是否公正處事,是政治壓力,而不是道理。
試想,若然香港有集體訴訟的制度,又或是政府肯協助苦主進行代表訴訟,苦主何用接受六成賠償的「不平等條約」?最可怕的是政客與政府一樣,只要新聞不再受到關注,便同樣對事件作淡化處理,任由小投資者、消費者與中小企受盡大財團的欺凌。
再說《競爭條例》之中本來曾經提議有簡易的代表訴訟機制,但到草案出籠之時,這一項本來提議賦予審裁處的批准權力竟無聲無息地消失了,政府沒有任何解說取消該諮詢文件中建議的理由;一直關注競爭法立法的民主黨政客李華明與公民黨湯家驊,同樣沒有提出質疑,就當事情沒有發生過一樣!
奇怪嗎?當然不是,筆者兩星期前的文章,已經指出建制派、官府與反對派的政客可能已經達成共識,會拉倒《競爭法》的立法或令其變成無牙老虎,延續大資本家在香港的霸權利益。民主政治亦不能避免政客出賣人民,何況香港現時只有半民選制度?

資本家操控政客
政府在去年底曾經有法律改革委員會的諮詢文件,建議為集體訴訟進行立法,但發表完文件就無聲無息,討論文章也沒有幾篇;此建議曾經為雷曼苦主帶來希望,但亦可能因有雷曼的因素,政府要保護銀行的利益,若干年內都不會真的立法。
一般人皆有錯覺,以為香港並無代表訴訟的制度,其實只是沒有案例而已,制度一直因為英國普通法的關係而存在。現有的制度,授權可以進行訴訟者是在高等法院原訟庭,寫於《高等法院規則》第15 號命令第12 條規則,法院保留了批准與否的酌情權。
據英國的案例,代表訴訟必須符合三項標準:即為代表與被代表者有相同的權益(common interest) 、共同的冤情(commongrievance)及所謀求的濟助(rel ief),必須有益於所有當事人。代表訴訟的好處,是一件案例會對被告代表的類別所有成員有約束力(binding)。
實行的困難,是批准這類訴訟的審批準則,就連英國的經驗也不易掌握。競爭法的原本建議,是審裁處(級別相等於高等法院)只須認為代表組織能公平且充分代表有關方面的利益,就可以批准有關的私人訴訟(private action),大大降低了門檻,亦令到中小企可實在地利用競爭法抗衡大財團。但現在這一項建議無聲無息地取消,而各方關注立法的持份者則視而不見,大家可以想像這一項立法的誠意如何有限。至於資本家的邪惡力量,年來一直有增無減,而且明顯地在幕後開始操控道德水平本來就很低的泛民政客。

王岸然

2010年12月6日星期一

Prospectus of Minibonds

Prospectus of Minibonds
寄件人﹕ abraham Razack
收件人﹕ jeff wang


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Thanks for your email which I would take note for our hearings . Regards Abraham Shek

Sent from my iPad

On Sep 16, 2010, at 12:48 AM, jeff wang wrote:


HKMA complaint no : R057 NLTE0011
主題: Complaint regarding the sale of investment products related to Lehman Brothers by banks

Legco Ref : CP/C 635/2008

Dear Sir,

I got Prospectus of Minibond series 32 from email in 2007 from Shanghai Commercial Bank , these documents are now these propectus information are avaliable in SFC.

I only bought Minibond series 20,21 from Shanghai Commercial Bank with verbal explainations inside the bank during 2005, and Minibonds series 34A later 2007 by telephone even thru I did not want to buy series 34A at that time, but the bank told me the collaterals were General Electric bonds and every banks were fighting to get this series to sell to their customers.

I never remember that I heard any mentioning of CDOs during the sales of Minibonds series 20,21 inside Shanghai Commercial Bank in 2005 and later around 2006 in telephone on Octave Notes 6, and I just used the search engine and found out that only starting in Minibonds series 22 that CDOs were mentioned in prospectus. I read about CDOs in 2006,2007 and the news were mostly negetive news for CDOs were related to US housing mortgage being packaged into CDOs, and I alway believed CDOs were very high risk products.

Shanghai Commercial Bank never changed their risk form, and now they still rated Minibonds, Constellation Notes and Octave Notes as low risk in their documents since 2004,2005 and that time no CDOs were mentioned in the Minibond prospectus. But Bank of China did rated every structure products including Octave Notes 15 and they sold as High Risk products started in end of year 2006 but not early in 2006 and hide their sales documents from me and some of their customers that bought these structure products at that time. So I suspected Bank of China did know that these structure products were high risk with CDOs involved in end of year 2006 while many other banks that sold these structure products before Bank of China started to sell structure products did not look very closely on these changes.

7th, Dec 2010

Simon Lee Lecturer in Chinese University as witness in court against BOCHK staffs with statement stated that :

1. Minibond 21, there was no mentioning of priciple protected in the prospectus

2. CDO was not mentioned in series 21.

3. Collaterals might not pay back the priciple amount and in many early Minibonds, Principle not protected were not mentioned but in my case of Octave Notes, these were mentioned in propectus but never explained as high risk by the bank but being cover up in the sales.

4. CDOs were related to US housing markets such as the collaterals in Minibonds 34 Tranche A .

5. Default on lower Tranche (C or D) on notes might not lead to default on better Tranche (A or B). ( For my case, Default on Octave Notes 15C and 15D leads to buyback of Octaves Notes 15A and 15B but in fact Octave Notes 15A, 15B still had not defaults but Morgan Stanley get nearly all the money away from investors)

6. Credit events consists of three type : bankrupt, restructuring and spin off, no interest payment and these were never mentioned in all bank misselling cases.

7. During credit events of the reference entity mainly blue chip companies, the investors should cover the obligations of the reference entity which were listed as AAA but these notes are linked with mostly subordinated bonds around 5% interest but these subordinated bonds would be worth close to nothing. So during the sales of these notes, the bank staffs in facts were telling lies that these Minibonds were link to AAA/AA rated companies but in fact to these subordinated bonds.
In finance, subordinated debt (also known as subordinated loan, subordinated bond, subordinated debenture or junior debt) is debt which ranks after other debts should a company fall into receivership or be closed.

8.During credit events of the Swap CDS, which were intended for protection of the reference entities and higher yield to pay interests to the investors. But only some Minibonds series had these protection and some series had not. But it is also possible for loss all the amount of CDS, much larger than the values of investors invested to the Swap counterparties involved, if duty of care and Banks’ due diligence was at faulty for not checking these CDS during and after the sales of these structure products.

9.More facts on CDOs rating from Simon Lee saying that credit rating varies according to time : Insured CDOs May Have AAA Ratings Cut Four Levels, Fitch Says Posted on Thursday, November 8th, 2007 at 1:47 pm by Lars Toomre Business Intelligence Credit Derivatives Enterprise Risk Management Market RiskSecuritizationStructured Products.On Thursday November 8th 2007 at 12:40 EST, Bloomberg News ran this little story by Cecile Gutscher: Insured CDOs May Have AAA Ratings Cut Four Levels, Fitch Says. Toomre Capital Markets LLC just three hours earlier posted a note entitled Incestuous Mix: Structured Credit, Financial Guarantors and Rating Agencies that was focusing on what might happen if the financial guarantors were downgraded.

Apparently, if you were an investor in collateralized debt obligations that were rated AAA because of guarantees issued by bond insurers including MBIA Inc. and Ambac Financial Group, Fitch Ratings has now decided that the credit ratings may be cut in one swell swoop by as much as four rating levels. According to this Bloomberg article, Fitch rating analyst Thomas Abruzzo said in an interview today that "We expect there could be situations that could lead to downgrades of three to four notches on insured structured-finance CDO transactions."

New York-based Fitch said Nov. 5 it may lower the top ratings of bond insurers after a review that takes into account the CDOs they guarantee. Any bond insurer that fails the new test may be downgraded within a month unless the company is able to raise more capital. ``The bond insurers themselves remain AAA but there is the potential that companies could fall short of capital and also be downgraded, but we don't expect below the AA category,'' Abruzzo said. AA is the third-highest investment grade.

Oh well… There goes another linchpin under the high-grade bond market. No longer can one buy an insured bond and assume that the bond will remain in its original rating category throughout its life cycle. Perhaps someone can now suggest what credit enhanced bonds are really worth??? Does a AAA credit rating really mean anything??? Shouldn't AAA-rated structured finance transactions trade more cheaply than AA-rated corporate debt, or maybe even A-rated corporate debt? Or maybe it really is worth JUNK???

After all, one has to use one of those modern computers to calculate the value of the structured finance security? There is no absolutely transparency like there is in whether a company might be able to pay back its debts! The structured finance market used to have some degree of trust. With these dramatic ratings downgrades in portfolios that traditionally have seen small changes in principal value, is there any question about why there is a complete breakdown in reputation and trust? Widows and orphans bought high-grade bonds because of their high quality and predictable cash flows. What is a rating worth if it can go from AAA to BB on one Friday afternoon? What the heck good is bond insurance if a rating agency can suddenly bring down the rating of the insurer and all of the insured bonds that it backs? In short, What good is a credit rating?

10. More facts about CDO, CDS inside Minibonds such as those collaterals inside Minibonds series 15A, 15B, 18A, 18B MBIA was related to US housing market (HSBC USA, dated 21 Nov. 2008) as Simon Lee quoted about MBIA is related to US housing market :

Dec. 20, 2007, 7:11 p.m. EST

MBIA slumps on concern about CDO exposures
Bond insurer has $8.14 billion of CDO-squared exposures; analyst
Alert By Alistair Barr, MarketWatch
SAN FRANCISCO (MarketWatch) -- MBIA Inc. shares fell more than 26% Thursday after the bond insurer disclosed $8.14 billion of exposure to complex credit products known as CDO squareds.

Also on Thursday, Fitch warned that it may cut MBIA's AAA rating to AA+ if the company can't boost its capital during the next four to six weeks.

About 85% of the collateralized debt obligations in question are other CDOs, with most of the rest being residential mortgage-backed securities, MBIA reported on its Web site.


/quotes/comstock/13*!mbi/quotes/nls/mbi
MBI 10.01, -0.04, -0.40%

/quotes/comstock/11i!abkfq
ABKFQ 0.15, +0.01, +6.52%


MBI
200%100%0%-100%JJASON
More than half of the underlying loans in the vehicles were originated in 2006 and 2007, the insurer also noted. Those are years of particularly lax underwriting standards in the mortgage industry.

"We are shocked that management withheld this information for as long as it did," Ken Zerbe, an analyst at Morgan Stanley, wrote in a note Thursday. "MBIA simply did not disclose arguably the riskiest parts of its CDO portfolio to investors."

MBIA shares fell 26% to close at $19.95 on Thursday. The stock hit $18.84 earlier in the day, its lowest level for at least a decade, according to FactSet data.

Bond insurers agree to pay principal and interest when due in a timely manner in the event of a default. It's a $2.3 trillion business that offers a credit-rating boost to municipalities and other issuers that don't have AAA ratings.

Shares of bond insurers such as Ambac Financial /quotes/comstock/11i!abkfq (ABKFQ 0.15, +0.01, +6.52%) and MBIA /quotes/comstock/13*!mbi/quotes/nls/mbi (MBI 10.01, -0.04, -0.40%) have slumped in recent months on concern they could suffer losses from guaranteeing complex securities such as CDOs, which are partly backed by subprime mortgages.

CDOs are made up of bits of asset-backed securities with underlying collateral such as mortgages and auto loans. CDO-squared vehicles take that slicing and dicing one step further by investing in parts of other CDOs.

Ambac insured $2.4 billion of these CDOs of CDOs in 2007. After the company disclosed these exposures on its Web site on Aug. 10, its shares slumped almost 20% during the following four trading days.

Partly because of this exposure, Ambac has been considered more risky than MBIA. But that's changed now, according to Morgan Stanley's Zerbe.

"This new disclosure completely changes our view of MBIA being a 'more conservative underwriter' relative to Ambac," the analyst said.

The CDO-squared deals guaranteed by MBIA are higher quality than Ambac's, but Zerbe said that probably won't matter much as subprime-mortgage losses continue to mount.

Rating agency Standard & Poor's recently estimated that MBIA's CDO losses could be 61% higher than Ambac's in a stressed housing market scenario, Zerbe said.

Warburg questions
Most bond insurers are now trying to boost capital to avoid losing crucial AAA ratings. Without such ratings, their business models may be imperiled. See full story.

MBIA unveiled an investment of up to $1 billion from private-equity firm Warburg Pincus on Dec. 10. See full story.

Late Thursday, MBIA said that its CDO-squared disclosures won't affect the deal because it told Warburg about the exposures before the agreement was signed.

The CDO-squared information was disclosed late Wednesday to provide investors with more detail on MBIA's multisector CDO portfolio. It doesn't disclose any additional CDO exposure.

The company said it hadn't disclosed this earlier because many of these transactions contain less than 25% direct U.S. residential mortgage-backed security collateral. MBIA shares gained 10 cents to $20.05 during after-hours trading Thursday.

Fitch warning
Fitch put the AAA ratings of MBIA's bond insurance units on Ratings Watch Negative, suggesting the agency may downgrade to AA+ within the next four to six weeks.

Fitch said it finished a review of MBIA's exposures recently and concluded that losses from its guarantees of CDOs, CDO-squared deals and mortgage-backed securities -- plus downgrades of some of those securities -- leave the company roughly $1 billion short of the excess capital needed to keep an AAA rating, under a stressed housing-market scenario.

MBIA needs to raise more capital or boost its capital cushion in other ways, in addition to the $1 billion commitment the insurer recently got from Warburg Pincus, Fitch explained.

"The $1 billion capital commitment from Warburg Pincus will likely increase MBIA's flexibility to engage in other capital enhancement measures in the weeks ahead," the rating agency said.

Alistair Barr is a reporter for MarketWatch in San Francisco.

2010年12月5日星期日

陳家強,雷曼迷債事件發生至今,只有屬證監會監管的新鴻基投資服務有限公司和解外,金管局監管的銀行卻一間都不見受處分,迷債持有人圈圈轉

用107法到政監報案行動:
經過個多星期的開花行動,證監不得不從避而不談這議題,到要正視尋找解決辦法。現在我們收到證監的白紙黑字回覆話,接受我們報案;從以前 ”你們書面投訴等本會答覆” 到現在接受我們落口供,這是一個大突破,值得鼓舞。
據了解,證監是整個雷曼事件從頭到尾最清楚不過的部門,亦可以說是始作俑者,他們手上掌握著銀行的罪證;並且負有政府決策部門,銀行,苦主三方的中界角式。現在他們被我們從暗處挖了出來,要他們面對 ”香港的執法部門是否可以不執法” 這個難題之同時並且會引起市民會問 ”你們的從上至下系統性調查” 承諾到那裡去?是陳家強強迫證監停止調查銀行。
‎20 FEB 2009 立法會雷曼小組首次公開聆訊,傳召財經事務及庫務局局長陳家強作供。余若薇向他指出,07年11月,國際貨幣基金組織提出了預警,敦促香港特區政府監察結構性產品的風險問題;翌年5月,陳家強在紐約演說中,亦詳細解釋次按產生的問題,顯示他熟悉次按危機及衍生工具的問題。余若薇質問陳家強,發表演說前,是否已察覺有關產品在香港市場廣泛銷售予普羅大眾?有否在9月迷債「爆煲」前向小投資者提出預警?有否有在任何階段提醒小投資者,雷曼迷債是信貸掛勾票據,並非一般人理解像「五隧一橋」的債券?陳家強說上述演辭只是論述次按危機的成因。

另外,湯家驊質問陳家強,政府對金融市場應該有宏觀的監管責任,除了賦予金融監管機構議會及金融市場穩定委員會資源和權力外,官方有否監管渠道?陳家強說官方與該兩個機構有不少日常接觸。

23 FEB 2009 立法會財經事務委員會特別會議,討論金管局和證監會調查雷曼事件報告。余若薇問金管局總裁任志剛,為何雷曼迷債在香港廣泛銷售,但在美國卻沒有?任志剛、金管局副總裁蔡耀君及證監會行政總裁韋奕禮均表示,其他地區都有類似但可能名稱不同的投資產品。
24 FEB 2009
立法會雷曼小組第2次公開聆訊,繼續傳召陳家強作供。余若薇問他,身為財經事務及庫務局局長,他的職責之一是監督轄下執行部門,若然金管局和證監會辦事不力,他是否要負上政治責任?陳家強說,例如公司註冊處,才是其轄下執行部門,金管局和證監會不是。

另外,余若薇問他,他既然明知有些銀行本身也不明白結構性產品的投資風險,他豈能期望散戶明白呢?陳家強說,這正正是監管機構調查的問題。

27 FEB 2009 立法會雷曼小組第3次公開聆訊,繼續傳召陳家強作供。余若薇問他,為何迷債在香港的銷售層面比其他地區大很多,是否香港監管比較寬鬆?陳家強重申香港的「披露為本」和「合適性評估」政策與其他地區無異,分別在於投資習慣和行業結構。金管局和證監會的調查報告已表述可改善之處。

余若薇追問他,他認為銀行需要花多少時間才能向客戶充分「披露」如此高風險的投資產品?陳說,不能以時間度量,視乎表達方式。

湯家驊問陳家強,07年8月金融監管機構議會和金融市場穩定委員會兩個會議中,他可有提出關注雷曼兄弟正遇上經濟困難?他說,有討論次按的全球影響,無印象曾否討論個別金融機構。

05 MAR 2009 公民黨公布一項民意調查結果,逾千名受訪市民中,高達72%認為,監管機構至今未能交代銀行違犯銷售雷曼迷債個案的調查結果,實屬失職。 民調結果
20 MAR 2009 立法會雷曼小組第4次公開聆訊,陳家強第4次作供。湯家驊問陳家強08年9月前可有主動了解雷曼有沒有在港出售金融產品。陳家強說,這是監管機構的工作。

余若薇問陳家強,雷曼迷債事件發生至今半年,只有屬證監會監管的新鴻基投資服務有限公司和解外,金管局監管的銀行卻一間都不見受處分,迷債持有人圈圈轉,一業兩管是否浪費資源?陳家強說,一業兩管有效地減少監管重疊,是恰當的做法。

City forum, Victory Park

http://www.facebook.com/album.php?aid=308656&id=754557663&l=8123e16365

City forum on retirement plans and mismanagement of MPFA REGULATORS:
Mandatory Provident Fund Schemes Authority (MPFA) Regulates retirement savings scheme.

(8/10/2008)王冠一教授及何保繼續評論『雷曼迷你債券事件』

2010年12月4日星期六

12月2日遮打道證監會門前現場



突狗刷鞋,刷出真功夫!
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/iam-marclee/article?mid=1669

2010年12月3日星期五

致證券及期貨事務監察委員會,證監會在對雷曼事件不盡不實

今天的證監和警方居然阻攔香港市民報案之應有公民權利。這樣祇証明證監會在對雷曼事件不盡不實,始作俑者,證監不監。今日的香港,祇能稱得上國際金融詐騙中心!

致證券及期貨事務監察委員會,

貴會2010年12月02日的來函得悉:

貴會的來函只重覆貴會早前的觀點,我們認為於事件的解決,並無實質的幫助。我們重申不接受書面申訴這類官樣文章。貴會必須派員面見個別苦主,接受苦主的報案,開備個別檔案,並加以實質的跟進調查工作。這都是法例之內貴會必須履行的責任。

我們的苦主從一開始就準備充足資料、口供及文件以協助貴會依據《證券及期貨條例》第107條展開調查,亦樂意簽署任何有助貴署調查工作的同意書,但前題理所當然是貴署依法接受報案 (再重申苦主是依107條報案,並非一般的申訴)。依據第107條作刑事報案是所有苦主從未做過的合法行動,盼望貴會以社會公義及和諧為念,勿再延誤事件。

再次重申,我們早就清楚明白有系統地報案,以免貴會應接不遐的重要性,故早於一個月前已致函貴會,要求貴會作出安排,(例如每天接見10名苦主) 這樣安排我們看不到有任何不合情理,故意為難貴會的地方。

我們現在進一步具體提議,我們的代表可邀請一位或以上關注事件的立法會議員作中間人,與貴會的代表坐下來商討一套如何能最符合貴會調查工作及苦主報案權利的安排,令事件可以從束解決。這一建議請貴會儘快接納為盼。

我們亦再重申,在妥善安排作出之前,苦主不會停止我們和平示威集會抗議的公民權利。

雷曼苦主大聯盟第107 條關注小組

聯絡人:

Lee Daisy Esther Yip

CC. 申訴專員公署
所有立法會議員

Belgian court fines Citibank over Lehman sales, that is exactly the kind of justice the citizens at large in Hong Kong wants.

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7426

Letter to CEO of HK regarding Belgian gov. action and bank frauds cover up of Donald Tsang, CEO of HK by Citibank Lehman ELN victims :

We copy below a news coverage on “Belgian court fines Citibank over Lehman sales” by AFP on 2 Dec 2010 for your reference. Belgium’s Federal Economy Minister Vincent Van Quickenborne said the verdict was an “unequivocal condemnation”.

That is exactly the kind of justice the citizens at large in Hong Kong wants. Yet, since 22 Nov 2010, Lehman victims of 19 banks have been barred from entering the SFC office to report the crime of banks under the Securities and Futures Ordinance Section 107. We want you to take prosecution action against the criminals. It is your official responsibility and it is our rights to see that justice is done. We will persist and see that your inaction is made known to the world.

Mr. Donald Tsang Chief Executive, and Mr. John Tsang Financial Secretary, if you stand up and say what the Belgium Federal Economy Minister said about the conviction of the 19 banks, then you can claim Hong Kong is a world financial centre.


Regards,

A group of Citibank victims of Lehman-related notes

反訴雷曼‧馬多夫信託人求償‧摩根大通官司纏身

(美國‧紐約3日訊)摩根大通最近官司纏身,除了反訴雷曼拖欠逾250億美元貸款不還,也面對“世紀大騙局”主謀、納斯達克前主席馬多夫的信託人索賠64億美元的官非。

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7447

2010年12月2日星期四

HKSFC protection of HK banks against Minibonds misselling frauds

Pls look at my link on actions of HKSFC against Banks to show HKSFC did discriminate against Minibonds victims for not taking action on HK banks on Minibonds frauds.

Former bank employee banned five years for forging signatures
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?new=1&mid=7436

Former Merrill MD Banned For Life by HK SFC For Manipulating Options
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7435
Hong Kong regulators have fined U.S. investment bank Merrill Lynch

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=7434