2010年9月30日星期四

過去文章關於 107 條法例 在大聯盟特稿 -

12 Apr 2010 [107條法例] 意圖詐騙與罔顧實情的誤導 ─ 再析第107條 -- 作者:老馬

就此而言,銀行前線職員的憂慮與不安是有事實根據的,事實也應令社會震驚,雷曼事件也決不僅僅是有數萬人損失了金錢,而是大規模地對道德、法律的違反,大規模的反社會行為。雷曼事件的解決必須要有人出來承認錯誤,承擔責任,有責任者必須提出大和解的解決方案。否則,就算政府與銀行利用自己的強大勢力將事件壓下去,社會並沒有吸取教訓 ......

10 Apr 2010 [107條法例] 警方動用107條告銀行 -- 王岸然

作為銀行前線,現時要做的是將決策過程儘量向公眾及警方提供。用市井的說法,是盡量「拉高層落水」,這樣做自己固然安全,也符合公義。


03 Apr 2010 [107條法例] 《信報》商罪科何時查捕賓架? by 紀曉風

結果,果然出事了,銀行可以賠錢同絕大部分客戶和解,免除責任,但其員工被刑事拘捕,可能要坐7年監,令人想起莊子金句「竊鉤者誅,竊國者諸侯」(譯成廣東話,可以是「偷針判死刑,偷金攞大紫荊」)。

01 Apr 2010 [107條法例] 遲來的正義 -- 作者: 老馬

政府應該改弦更張,與利益各方商討平復社會創傷的方案,使受害者與銀行在公平的基礎上達到合理的和解,而不是單方面具強迫性的6至7成之迷債方案,才是一個人民的政府,而不是少數財閥寡頭的代理,才不會被歷史所唾棄。

31 Mar 2010 [107條法例] 《信報》苦主應發動萬人報案行動 by 王岸然

證監會在二○○四年起設立了一個「投資者賠償基金」,足以賠償給所有雷曼苦主。若政府當局肯藉刑事檢控銀行高層,立法會雷曼特權小組再加把勁對證監會施壓,證監會與銀行聯合出資全數賠償給雷曼苦主,包括已被迫接受六成賠償作和解的苦主,是完全可能,亦是合情合理的結果。

13 Mar 2010 [107條法例] 剖析《證券及期貨條例》第107條 -- 老馬

"任何人為誘使另一人作出以下作為而作出任何欺詐的 失實陳述或 罔顧實情的 失實陳述, 即屬犯罪"。按照法例,任何人被法庭裁決干犯此條例,則須負上刑事責任。

12 Mar 2010 [107條法例] 香港條例: 證券及期貨條例 - SECT 107
http://www.hklii.org/hk/legis/en/ord/571/s107.html

2010年9月27日星期一

銷售衍生品新例 規則實施未釋疑

銷售衍生品新例 規則實施未釋疑




證監會明年六月實施新的投資產品銷售準則,有關規定對涉及窩輪、牛熊證、A股ETF、期指等衍生產品,傳統的交易模式會引發根本改變。業界關注實施細節,以免由於一知半解,誤觸「紅線」,導致惹事上身。事實上,作為雷曼迷債後遺,投資產品銷售不論是監管機構或銷售中介,都有驚弓之鳥的餘悸。為保護投資者匡正監管,減少出現糾紛拗撬,建立一套機制固然必不可少,但規則易訂,現實中對應的事態千差萬別,難怪業界有誤觸「紅線」之憂。

在銷售層面,新規則震動兩個方面:一是中介人對客戶甄別的困難。當中涉及要依循的程序及中介人須作出判斷,就程序確有化繁為簡,以提高效率的需要,否則也為客戶所厭棄;至於中介人的判斷,沒有硬性可量化準則,無疑希望指引的細則清晰,而不致易生誤判。二是網上銷售要改變來加以配合。因為網上交易的模式,沒有體現「嚴格」的甄別程序,為符合規定須化簡為繁,以甚麼形式達致合規,有待作出規範。

此外,在銷售設下冷靜期後,客戶得到了退買的保障後,有關費用及損耗的計算,以及記錄或保存,涉及到系統的修改需時。畢竟是可能引發拗撬、需要仲裁所在,經過雷曼迷債事件後,這個環節備受重視,業界緊張這一條可以諒解。況且有關方面的事態,亦非一、兩個例子可以涵蓋,某些情況恐怕監管機構都難以援引例子說清道明。

監管與中介人就如何合規尚需磨合,歸根究柢是效率和問責這兩大犯難。依新例規定的運作,與過往相比無疑是以犧牲效率為代價的,如果說有關的犧牲實屬必要,監管機構要做的是,應尋求減少犧牲效率與達到監管效果的平衡,想方設法將繁複的程序盡可能簡化,並使之易於執行,做到這一條才能體現監管是促成更佳的交易成效,而非製造交易障礙,這是中介人及客戶的共同需要。

至於有關問責,很難想像可以拿出一套包羅萬有的細則,可以做的是設立原則性的追究或豁免。跟手尾的工夫在後面,需要適用的仲裁機制,或者設立過渡期,摸清發生糾紛的種類及影響。這方面雷曼迷債的事態提供了借鏡,但新形勢會有新情況出現,也難以「一本通書讀到老」,這是需要監管者持續跟進的。好在新例推行還有時間,容許監管機構了解反應和需要,為推新例作更多準備。

實際上,對於就買賣衍生產品的風險,須向客戶作出書面解釋,不論是以電子或其他形式(包括內容錄音)是合乎規定的,關鍵是要取得客戶的確認,這為業界開啟了借助電子手段,減省面晤的耗時低效,當中涉及的又是新例實施後,業界所面對的成本問題。電子手段可減輕成本,然而,一般應用電子手段,對中青年人來說不是問題,但對老年投資者來說就可能成為「盲區」,要對老年投資者甄別,無疑是較麻煩的事,恐怕要費事耗時,尤其一些耳不聰、目不明的老年投資者,會讓中介人感到難以應酬,因而也要防止引發銷售為求成效,惹出年齡歧視的不公平。

2010年9月17日星期五

Octave Notes a leap into the unknown for investors

Octave Notes a leap into the unknown for investors

Once again, bank clients had no idea of risks they took on

Last October, Wang Wu, a 58-year-old Hong Kong housewife, had a stroke. A few weeks earlier, US investment bank Lehman Brothers had collapsed, taking US$90,000 of the Wang family's life savings down with it. The irony was that the Wangs never invested in Lehman Brothers, not even in the bank's now-infamous minibonds.

Instead, in 2006 they bought Octave Notes, fiendishly complex structured products designed by another US investment bank, Morgan Stanley, and marketed as a high-income product to retail investors by 17 local banks.

Mr Wang claims he and his wife had no idea the future of the couple's retirement income had anything to do with Lehman Brothers. But lurking under the bonnet of the Octave Note the Wangs bought from Citic Ka Wah Bank was a complicated credit derivative that effectively ruled that if Lehman Brothers went bust, investors' money would disappear. Mr Wang says he found out in late September that all the money was gone.

"I cannot say [the stroke] was totally due to this incident," he said of his wife's condition, which has left her unable to speak. "But she was worrying about the money [she lost] all the time."

A Citic Ka Wah spokesman said the bank could not comment on individual cases.

Mr Wang is one of 400 outraged retail investors who have lodged grievances with the Hong Kong Monetary Authority about Octave Notes. Investors poured more than HK$2 billion into the products. Most have lost almost all their investment.

Advertisements for the note the Wangs bought promised annual interest of up to 7.5 per cent. According to Mr Wang, what they did not see within the highly structured investment was a bundle of derivatives with the potential to turn into a ticking time bomb.

There are multiple series of Octave Notes. In most cases, that bomb has already gone off, or is about to. Three series of the notes have already collapsed. Ten of the remaining 15 have lost 90 per cent or more of their value.

Bank of China (Hong Kong) was the biggest seller of Octave Notes, according to the Allied Victims of Lehman Products campaign group. A bank spokeswoman would not comment on this data. She said the bank complied with the law when selling Octave products and prospectuses contained clear risk disclosures.

But Mr Wang and others claim they never realised how Octave Notes worked. Two senior structured- finance lawyers said people without a background in finance could probably not read the prospectuses.

When they bought Octave Notes, investors really took out high-stakes wagers with Morgan Stanley on the future financial performance of a range of companies, some of which were to become very troubled. The notes contained two very conceptually advanced mechanisms known as credit default swaps and synthetic collateralised debt obligations.

Octave Notes' advertising brochures stated very clearly that they were not principal-protected and that they were "linked to the credits" of companies including Lehman Brothers. Campaigners question whether investors understood what this meant.

Last Sunday, just under 100 Octave investors attended a campaign meeting organised by the Democratic Party in Hong Kong.

"At the meeting, all those present said they had never heard anything from bank staff about credit derivatives or CDOs," said Democratic Party chairman Albert Ho Chun-yan.

"When people were asked to show hands if they had not heard about CDOs, the show of hands was unanimous."

Each Octave Note is structured slightly differently. But series 10, which the Wangs bought and has since been liquidated, is typical in its complexity.

When customers bought Octave 10, their money flowed into a shelf company called Victoria Peak, which Morgan Stanley headquartered in the Cayman Islands tax haven. As soon as Victoria Peak obtained retail investors' funds, it essentially placed a few bets, all perfectly legally and well documented in product prospectuses, of course. These gambles employed credit default swaps.

In Note 10, one of Victoria Peak's swaps wagered that a group of companies, including the now-bankrupt Lehman Brothers, would not default on loan payments. Under the terms of that bet, if any one of these supposedly safe companies defaulted, Victoria Peak would lose all its money. So when Lehman Brothers went bankrupt, investor money was gone.

Just like gambling in Macau, Octave 10's investors were betting against the house. Victoria Peak did the credit derivative swap with an entity named Morgan Stanley Capital Services, owned by the investment bank. So when Lehman Brothers collapsed, Morgan Stanley collected retail investors' cash. Note 10, as well as Notes 11 and 12, which were also credit-linked to Lehman Brothers, went into liquidation in this way.

She spent US$60,000 buying Octave Notes series 17 from Citic Ka Wah Bank. Note 17 was not credit-linked to Lehman Brothers. But it is currently priced at a valuation of only 4 cents on the dollar. Ms Chan's would realise just US$2,400 if she sold now.

She also lost US$35,000 on Lehman Brothers minibonds and a further HK$500,000 on equity-linked notes issued by Lehman Brothers.

Ms Chan says she is too busy to analyse investments, and claims she always relied on the staff at Citic Ka Wah, with whom she has banked for a decade. Ms Chan claims the bank's staff sold her the investment in a five-minute phone call. She was under the impression it was "like a time deposit".

Most of the Octave Notes are structured similarly to Note 17, so this product is worth a deeper look. It took Your Money three days of poring over hundreds of pages of documents and questioning bankers and lawyers to find out where May Chan's and other investors' money had gone.

When retail investors paid US$28 million into Octave Note 17, the cash also went to Victoria Peak, the zombie company set up by Morgan Stanley in the Cayman Islands. Victoria Peak has only US$250 of its own money, however, so Octave 17 investors hunting for their cash will not find it here. After Victoria Peak collected the money, it went gambling again (all perfectly legally and detailed in the prospectus). It placed a high-stakes bet on the future financial performance of 100 global companies, which retail investors are perilously close to losing.

The bet basically said this:

If all companies in the group of 100 remain healthy, Morgan Stanley will pay Victoria Peak, and therefore Octave 17's investors, a certain amount of income per year. But if a certain number of companies in the reference pool miss loan payments - probably eight to 10 - Victoria Peak must give everything it owns to Morgan Stanley Capital Services.

So far six of the companies in the betting pool have missed loan payments, including Icelandic bank Landsbanki and US mortgage guarantors Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. According to structured-finance experts, as soon between four and seven more names default, retail investors lose their cash.

The bank's structured-finance whizz kids built a "synthetic CDO" for Victoria Peak's wager. Synthetic CDOs exist only conceptually. They do not own anything. Instead, they are like a term sheet from the Jockey Club, detailing the agreement gamblers have made.

The way the CDO was structured means retail investors cannot be sure how many defaults need to happen in the pool of 100 firms before Note 17 is wound up.

The synthetic CDO in Note 17 is a pretend pot of money. Retail investors lose their cash as soon as this pretend money runs out.

The CDO started life with US$1billion of fake money. It has US$328 million of fake money left. Each company in the structure is "worth" a pretend US$100 million. So four more defaults could wipe the CDO out completely.

But companies' bonds often have some value after they miss loan payments. The value of pretend money in the CDO would reflect this. There may be enough money for another seven or eight further defaults before the betting vehicle expires.

If the CDO expires, Morgan Stanley cashes in. But this probably will not enrich the bank. According to informed sources, Morgan Stanley Capital Services (MSCS) has made hundreds of further bets on Octave 17 with other banks. It will have to pay all these counterparties something if Octave 17 fails. So as soon as MSCS gets the money retail investors put into Victoria Peak, it all may fly off somewhere into the complex, interconnected web of derivatives agreements between financial institutions.

If this all sounds mind-bogglingly complex, that could be the main point. Hong Kong's financial regulators, banks who sold Octave Notes and Morgan Stanley, their architect, must ask themselves if such products can ever be suitable for financially unsophisticated retail investors.

A Morgan Stanley spokesman said the investment bank was working with Octave Notes distributors to help them keep customers fully informed. It has also set up a website containing relevant issue documentation and a section on frequently asked questions.

A spokeswoman for the Bank of China (Hong Kong), which apart from Citic Ka Wah was the only distributor to answer questions, said: "The bank, as one of the distributors of the Octave Series, complies strictly with the relevant laws and regulatory requirements and internal rules and guidelines."

Regulators and lawmakers will have to decide whether this is enough.

Investors who feel bamboozled by Octave Notes want only compensation. Who they will pursue remains to be seen.

Quoted: 2009-6-7(Sun) South China Morning Post P.16

2010年9月13日星期一

BBC:朱镕基女儿升任中银香港助理总裁

BBC:朱镕基女儿升任中银香港助理总裁

前总理朱镕基的女儿朱燕来被中银香港任命为助理总裁,协助总裁负责银行整体战略、业务方向和可持续发展的规划与实施。

惠譽強調中國銀行隱藏信貸壞賬風險貸款

惠譽強調中國銀行隱藏信貸壞賬風險貸款再打包或打擊城巿商銀

2010年06月23日13:02
匯港通訊 惠誉金融机构高级董事朱夏莲在该行活动上表示,中国银行业隐藏信贷风险,当中强劲的贷款增长、贷款分类方法及将贷款再打包为金融产品的活动均令不良贷款的数字,在短期难以体现实质情况,她亦预计今年中国银行业的不良贷款亦难见有关趋势。惠譽金融機構高級董事朱夏蓮在該行活動上表示,中國銀行業隱藏信貸風險,當中強勁的貸款增長、貸款分類方法及將貸款再打包為金融產品的活動均令不良貸款的數字,在短期難以體現實質情況,她亦預計今年中國銀行業的不良貸款亦難見有關趨勢。

朱夏莲表示,关注银行将贷款再打包成为金融理财产品,再出售予投资者的做法,她指,有关做法与雷曼迷债产品相似,认为内地银行通过有关做法少报两成的贷款,她又表示,有关产品曾经出现违约个案,但获银行介入解决而已。朱夏蓮表示,關注銀行將貸款再打包成為金融理財產品,再出售予投資者的做法,她指,有關做法與雷曼迷債產品相似,認為內地銀行通過有關做法少報兩成的貸款,她又表示,有關產品曾經出現違約個案,但獲銀行介入解決而已。

朱夏莲相信,内地银行最终或需要为部份投资者的损失负上责任,如果有关违约强化,城市商业银行的资金可能会出现问题,然而大型银行由于有额外现金在手,问题或不大,但该行非常关注有关隐藏风险。朱夏蓮相信,內地銀行最終或需要為部份投資者的損失負上責任,如果有關違約強化,城市商業銀行的資金可能會出現問題,然而大型銀行由於有額外現金在手,問題或不大,但該行非常關注有關隱藏風險。

理财师的罪与罚:中银香港两员被捕无争议

理财师的罪与罚:中银香港两员被捕无争议

来源:和讯网  时间:2010-06-17  www.jinluck.com




  连续进行欺诈诱导的理财服务,共诱导8名客户购买雷曼产品,涉及总金额约350万元,由这些事实可见,中银香港两名雇员被捕毫无争议

  理财师的“罪与罚”

  日前,中银香港雇员被拘事件引起轩然大波。4月8日,银行" style="color:blue;text-decoration:none;font-weight:normal;">中国银行(601988,股吧)(香港)有限公司(以下简称中银香港)两名雇员因代表中银香港分销雷曼相关结构性产品而被香港警务处商业罪案调查科控告违反香港相关法例。这两名雇员被指在2005年至2008年间,涉嫌故意隐瞒投资产品的潜在风险,欺诈或罔顾实情地诱使8名客户购买结构性银行产品,涉及总金额约350万港元。

  理财师们都听说过著名的庞氏骗局,麦道夫顶着金融大师的光环,设计了金融骗局获取钱财,受到处罚。但很少有人想到,销售产品不提示风险而造成客户损失,也可能遭到法律的惩罚,这是近在身边的真实案例。

  何谓欺诈

  案情回顾:

  据香港媒体报道,早在去年11月,已有一名33岁前银行女职员,涉嫌在销售结构性产品期间伪冒客户签署,被警方拘捕,今年1月,被香港警方引用《刑事罪行条例》检控。而今年4月的拘捕行动是引用《证券及期货条例》,针对的则是“误导及诱使”客户的不良销售手法。事后,警方主动发出新闻稿,透露拘捕两名分别38岁及51岁的银行女职员,指她们涉嫌违反《证券及期货条例》第571章第107条,以“欺诈地或罔顾实情地诱使他人”投资金钱。

  误导客户、造成客户的财产损失,严重者会触犯法律。但触犯的边界在哪里,大多数理财师并不清楚。事实上,不仅香港有《证券及期货条例》,中国大陆在民法领域及刑法领域对理财师不当诱导客户的责任问题均有涉及。

  在民法领域,《商业银行个人理财业务管理暂行办法办法》(以下简称《办法》)及《商业银行个人理财业务风险管理指引》(以下简称《指引》)对理财师们在进行个人理财服务时的操守均作出明确规定。《办法》第37条规定,“商业银行利用理财顾问服务向客户推介投资产品时,应了解客户的风险偏好、风险认知能力和承受能力,评估客户的财务状况,提供合适的投资产品由客户自主选择,并应向客户解释相关投资工具的运作市场及方式,揭示相关风险。”《指引》第29条规定:“商业银行向客户提供的所有可能影响客户投资决策的材料,商业银行销售的各类投资产品介绍,以及商业银行对客户投资情况的评估和分析等,都应包含相应的风险揭示内容。风险揭示应当充分、清晰、准确,确保客户能够正确理解风险揭示的内容。”

  通过这些规定我们可以看出,向客户提示产品风险是理财师们在进行个人理财服务时的法定义务,违反了此项义务,向客户隐瞒产品风险,给客户造成重大财产损失的,将承担法律责任。

  香港警方拘捕中银员工时,提到“故意隐瞒投资产品的潜在风险,欺诈或罔顾实情”,它的判断标准又是什么呢?

  欺诈可以理解为欺骗,包括虚构事实和隐瞒真相。虚构事实即便早某种根本不存在或者不可能发生的,足以使他人受蒙蔽的事实欺骗他人;隐瞒真相即隐瞒上客观上实际存在的客观情况,既可以是全部隐瞒,也可以是部分隐瞒。就中银香港雇员推销雷曼产品而言,则是隐瞒了投资雷曼产品次级债券所存在的高度风险这一真相,罔顾实情,未将这一实情告知潜在投资者,因而使的客户对风险问题茫然不知,盲目选择投资雷曼产品。

  中国的相关法律规定,如果理财师隐瞒产品风险诱导客户的行为情节严重,那么法律责任将延伸至刑法领域——诈骗罪。诈骗罪,是指以非法占有为目的,用虚构事实或者隐瞒真相的方法,骗取数额较大的公私财物的行为。

  主观上,如果理财师具有故意的心理状态,明知产品存在风险而仍故意隐瞒,就构成诈骗罪。客观上,以下隐瞒风险、诱导投资的行为也满足诈骗罪的构成要件:

  (1)欺骗行为。欺骗行为包括虚构事实和隐瞒真相两种形态。隐瞒风险诱导投资的行为采用的正是隐瞒真相这种欺骗行为,掩盖客观上存在的产品风险,避开不谈。

  (2)使被害人陷入错误。理财师们在提供个人理财服务时,仅提供产品收益,避开风险不谈,必然会使得客户陷入错误认识,高估产品带来的收益率,对产品的信心盲目大增。

  (3)被害人因错误而交付财物,行为人获得财物。基于对产品的盲目信任,客户将资金交付金融机构由其代为投资,金融机构由此获得客户交付的数额较大的投资款。

  涉案金额大

  销售雷曼产品的理财师很多,为什么是这几个人最先被捕?原因之一,在于涉案金额大。此次案件中,香港警方相信,两名被捕者涉及总金额估计约350万元。依据刑法原理,诈骗罪属于数额犯,即诈骗取得的财务数额较大时才构成犯罪。因而就诈骗罪而言,罪与非罪的界限在于获得财物数额是否较大。

  何为“数额较大”,法律没有明确规定,司法实践中一般参照最高人民法院1996年 2月6日颁发的《关于审理诈骗案件具体应用法律的若干问题的解释》的规定。根据该司法解释,个人诈骗公私财物2000至4000元的为数额较大;单位直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员以单位名义实施诈骗行为,诈骗所得归单位所有的,以5万元至10万元以上的为数额较大。具体到理财师隐瞒风险诱导投资的行为,一般是以单位的名义实施,所得归入单位经营运作,因而应当适用上述第二档——以“5万元至10万元”为数额较大的起点,具体数额由各省、自治区、直辖市高级人民法院根据本地区的经济发展状况确定。

  在中国大陆法下,理财师隐瞒风险诱导投资的法律责任依据情节轻重可分为民事责任和刑事责任。在香港法例中,根据第571章《证券及期货条例》第107条的规定,任何人为诱使另一人作出以下作为而作出任何欺诈的失实陈述或罔顾实情的失实陈述,即属犯罪。只有在触犯刑法,构成诈骗罪的情形下,才存在刑拘问题。在理财师的行为尚未构成犯罪的情况下,由银监会予以处罚。因而,并不是所有销售雷曼的人都被捕。

  具体到中银香港雇员销售雷曼被拘的案件,其行为特征满足“欺诈的或罔顾实情的诱使他人投资金钱的罪行”之规定,因而被拘无疑。倘若将此案置于中国大陆法律环境中,中银香港的雇员同样满足被拘条件。就涉案金额来看,350万港币的数额远远超过诈骗罪的起刑点,数额特别巨大。就犯罪情节来看,两名雇员在2005年至2008年间连续进行欺诈诱导的理财服务,共诱导8名客户购买雷曼产品,情节也属特别严重。因而,综合犯罪情节及涉案金额,此案责任人员被拘毫无争议。

  不排除更多被罚者

  中银员工被拘之后,据香港媒体报道,金管局及证监会正在调查连串雷曼结构产品投诉个案,警方亦收到近6000个事主的投诉。金管局指出,该局已完成调查99%有关雷曼迷债的投诉,可能或已进入纪律处分程序的个案共2842宗,意味着将有大批银行从业员面临处分,业内人心惶惶。

  现实情况中,理财师们在销售业绩的压力下,往往以夸大产品收益率,避开产品内在风险,诱导客户投资。在银行营业网点随处可见的理财产品宣传册上,其显著位置通常都会标明“预期收益率高达多少”、“上不封顶”等诱人字眼。此类做法司空见惯,蒙蔽了理财师们的法律意识和职业操守,同时也掩盖了销售过程中隐瞒产品风险的非法性。正因为如此,中银香港雇员被拘事件引发了极大的社会争议。不少理财师们认为隐瞒风险是使销售利益最大化的合理手段,如果将风险提供给客户,谁还会购买产品呢?因此而被拘是一件不可思议的事情。笔者认为,这是道德意识与法律意识淡薄的表现。

  首先,理财产品往往横跨银行、信托、证券、保险等多个行业,一般投资者无法对理财产品有一个全面的了解。在尚未完全具备风险识别和判断能力的情况下,投资者购买银行理财产品很大程度上依赖于理财师的信任。如此一来,理财师的建议和引导对投资者的财产安全起着十分重要的作用。如果理财师在提供服务时不将复杂的交易结构和风险水平告诉投资者,影响投资者自身的判断力,那么风险一旦出现,便会给投资者带来重大财产损失。因而,隐瞒风险诱导投资的行为超越了理财师的道德底限及最基本的职业操守。

  其次,在法律领域,为了保护投资者的合法权益,《办法》和《指引》分别规定了商业银行在开展个人理财顾问服务和综合理财服务时必须履行相应的风险揭示和信息披露义务,否则将可能会遭到客户的索赔请求并受到银监会的处罚。(详述见问题一)既然法有明文规定,理财师的行为便应当遵循法律规定,履行法定义务。

  因此,中银香港雇员被拘一案应当引起金融界的重视,隐瞒风险诱导投资并不是将销售利益最大化的合法手段,理财师们应时时刻刻将客户们的利益放在第一位。在个人理财服务活动中,理财师们承担着将复杂的交易结构和风险水平告诉投资者的法定义务,让投资者在购买产品时清晰地了解收益与风险的对等性。这种信息的透明性是维护投资者利益的必然要求,同时也是理财师道德价值及职业操守的体现。

中银香港利润大涨310% 雷曼迷债支出32.78亿

中银香港利润大涨310% 雷曼迷债支出32.78亿

http://www.17ok.com 2010-03-24 10:38:20 来源:



【09上市公司三季报一览】 【财富密码独家首次曝光】 【股指期货权威数据发布】
【基金三季度重仓股汇总】 【主力机构权威策略发布】 【沪深股市一周交易备忘】



  3月23日,中银香港(02388.HK)公布其2009年全年业绩,股东应占溢利比2008年大增310.6%,达137.25亿港元。

  09年的业绩如此之高,皆因金融海啸肆虐的2008年业绩太不尽如人意。不过2008年的阴影已逐步褪去,在2009年,中银香港的总经营支出增加38.4%为121.41亿港元,其中,与迷你债券回购计划相关的费用为32.78亿港元。

  中银香港副董事长兼总裁和广北表示,去年7月22日香港16家分销银行与相关监管机构达成协议,其后大家理性处理有关回购雷曼迷你债券的事情。至于完成回购后,今后是否需要继续作出拨备,则要看个案而定,暂时无法估算。

  对于备受关注的人民币业务问题,和广北在记者会上始终保持神秘感,不愿透露具体发展计划。和广北说,中银在香港的人民币存款市场,占38%的份额,有领先优势。至于此前有关容许金融中介机构开设人民币债券账户,以及限定红筹公司在内地所得的人民币必须经由中行和中银汇回香港的传闻,和广北就表示不清楚。

  业绩增长三大动力

  中银香港在去年表现亮眼,主要由于净服务费及佣金收入的增长,保险业务的显著增长,以及证券投资减值拨备的拨回。

  和广北表示,2009年中银香港的净服务费及佣金收入增长25.7%至65.08亿港元。一方面是来自代理股票业务的服务费收入增加52.9%达36.38亿港元。另一方面,是贷款业务佣金收入大幅增加79.7%至9.22亿港元。

  其二,是中银的投资和保险业务在2009年大幅增长。代理股票业务交易量及服务费收入分别增长45.0%及52.9%。中银香港也担任了去年香港22项新股上市活动的收票行,使新股上市相关业务有所增长。此外,中银香港的保险业务的净经营收入大幅增加143.5%至4.71亿港元。去年,中银人寿共推出23项新产品,主要针对客户对退休及财富管理的需要。期缴保险产品的保费收入较上年同期大幅增加141.8%。

  其三,和广北表示,去年中银香港把握市场机会,出售大量美国非机构住宅按揭抵押证券38亿港元,减幅80.4%,占总投资比例由5.8%降至1.1%。中银香港去年积极减持风险较高的证券,因此录得证券投资减值准备净拨回13.02亿港元。而在2008年,则因全球金融风暴爆发的负面影响,中银香港的证券投资需作净拨备119.00亿港元。

  和广北说,去年录得的13.02亿港元证券投资回拨,很大比例是来自上述住宅按揭抵押证券,但由于目前比例已大幅缩减,今后再录回拨的影响有限。同时,信贷环境回稳也使中银香港的贷款减值准备净拨备大幅下降84.4%至1.03亿港元。

  无意提早赎回欧元次级债

  今年2月初,中银香港发行16亿美元的10年期后偿票据,所得款项已用于偿还由母公司中国银行于2008年12月提供的部分后偿贷款。至2009年底,中银香港的综合资本充足比率上升0.68个百分点而为16.85%,核心资本比率维持在11.64%。

  和广北表示,目前无意提早赎回发行给中国银行的欧元次级债,因为这批次级债的利率对中银香港的资金成本相当有利,所以会尽量保留。

  去年,中银香港成为中央政府财政部委任为首宗在港发行的人民币国债的联席牵头行、入账行及配售银行。并在去年7月份,率先办理首笔跨境贸易人民币结算业务。和广北表示,未来会加强与中行合作发展人民币业务。

  此外,中银的业绩报告也显示,其内地业务中,贷款稳健增长,客户贷款总额较去年增加14.9%,其中人民币贷款上升5.1%。客户存款增加48.8%,其中人民币存款增加58.7%。
(责任编辑:陈娟娟)

2010年9月12日星期日

Hong Kong goes ETF active but caution remains

Hong Kong goes ETF active but caution remains
By Mark Konyn

Published: September 12 2010 12:28 | Last updated: September 12 2010 12:28

T he mutual fund industry across Asia continues to rebuild confidence following the global financial crisis. The flow of new products in many markets has slowed significantly as investors have remained cautious and fund managers have adapted to more volatile investment conditions and a regulatory environment demanding more disclosure and greater transparency.

The so-called Lehman’s mini-bond scandal that saw individual investors lose money in Singapore and Hong Kong remains a concern for financial product distributors. These distributors, mainly retail banks, need to ensure their frontline staff are well trained on the products they are offering, and put more emphasis on understanding how such products match their clients’ needs.

There was some hope that mutual funds would emerge from the crisis with a competitive advantage over other financial products that are more complex and opaque, but this has not yet been the case as market conditions and investor caution have reduced opportunities.

Keen to establish an advantage over other stock exchanges in Asia, the Hong Kong exchange is looking to encourage the listing of so-called active exchange traded funds, dubbed actively managed listed open-ended funds, or Alofs.

The exchange has amended ETF rules and exempted Alofs from stamp duty when investing outside Hong Kong. The issue of disclosing holdings is another that needs to be negotiated ahead of any Alof launch.

It requires agreement on the approach with the Securities and Futures Commission. Fund managers are hopeful of a compromise requiring them to disclose names but not portfolio weights.

Judging by international reaction to active ETFs, Asia will have an uphill struggle to promote such investment funds. In the US there have been some 14 active ETF launches in the past year and double this number are trading actively, although the amount of money attracted to these funds has been disappointing. The 11 active equity ETFs in the US account for only $100m of assets.

Passively managed ETFs that seek to replicate the performance of a particular index have been available to Asian investors for some time. One of the most successful in the region is the Hong Kong Tracker Fund.

This was launched in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis and was used to facilitate the disposal of some of the HK$120bn ($15.5bn) worth of stocks acquired by the Hong Kong government during the crisis as it successfully defended the currency peg.

The initial launch size of the Tracker Fund was HK$33bn and the fund’s tap facility allowed the government to return large parts of its stock portfolio to the market. The circumstances surrounding the launch were unique and favourable. Investors were offered both a discount and bonus shares if they held their shares for a specified time.

The stock market at that time was trading well below its peak but had already staged a meaningful recovery from the crisis lows, and the government was able to promote the introduction with a community-wide marketing campaign. Such conditions are unlikely to be repeated for a fund launched by the private sector alone.

Despite the availability of ETFs, private banks and wealth managers have made little use of them. This is more indicative of the way private banks work than of the merits of ETFs, which offer a convenient and low-cost means of investing in international markets.

Wealth managers and private banks typically earn their fees as a charge on transactions rather than in respect of advisory services. As such, a buy-and-hold strategy for an ETF represents a low revenue allocation for the private banker since ETFs do not pay the trail commissions offered by many mutual funds.

The other potential source of new business for ETFs is the region’s retail stockbrokers. Stockbrokers have not proven to be a good source of business for any form of funds in the past in many markets in Asia, in contrast to the situation in Japan or the US.

When the Chinese fund management industry was liberalised in the last decade it was hoped stockbrokers would be influential in helping to channel domestic savings to the stock market. However, as has been the pattern across Asia outside of Japan, retail banks became dominant mutual fund distributors.

Even where ETFs have proven popular in China, they have been repackaged inside mutual funds to allow banks to participate easily rather than provide convenience for clients.

There has been much discussion in the wealth management industry in Asia concerning a shift towards an advisory fee model. Until this becomes a reality it is unlikely ETFs, whether active or passive, will represent a large allocation for the region’s wealthy investors. Mark Konyn is chief executive of RCM Asia Pacific

中國銀行 .

中國銀行 .
中銀作為迷債銷售量最大的分銷商,叢2004年2月的迷債系列 8 開始,一直忠實的參與了每一個迷債系列的銷售,直至2008年1月的系列35。
自2008年3月起, 是甚麼發生了變化?是甚麼原因促使中銀決定不再參與銷售迷債系列 36 ?



從2007年下半年起,諸多雷曼迷你債券的長期忠實的經驗分銷銀行開始陸續停止銷售迷債。為甚麼? 發生了甚麼變故?是甚麼令銀行改變主意,開始對雷曼迷債說‘不’?

信貸破產掉期 CDS 等信貸掛鈎產品的目的之一是為銀行界服務. 有著理解並且買賣 CDO / 合成 CDO / CDS / 信貸掛鈎票據 的專業知識和多年豐富投資經驗的銀行界, 是 出于对于系列 34/35/36 的 7 個著名掛鈎主體有可能出現破產事件之担心,还是其它不可公开的因数和忧虑而使银行決定停止銷售迷債的呢 ? 銀行掌握了些甚麼信息? 银行之决定是否揭示了銀行從未告知客戶的關於雷曼迷債之真實特征和相關風險?!

对信贷挂钩产品有丰富经验的银行,陸續停止銷售佣金慷慨的迷債,是否揭示了銀行對於迷債真相之真實理解程度? 等於把銀行從未告知公眾的真話公佈與世?

1. 銀行是根據甚麼因數和考慮而决定对迷債说”不” ?是甚麼发生了變化而使銀行改變了對於銷售迷債的態度?

2. 銀行是否出於擔心迷債抵押品出現爆煲而決定停止銷售 ?
對CDS/CDO/信貸挂鉤產品有著豐富知識和經驗的銀行應該完全明白抵押品為信貸掛鈎產品而非傳統債券,應該完全明白抵押品的挂鉤主體數目很可能是跟100多個主體信貸掛鈎。換言之,盡管給客戶的風險介紹和銷售章程均是大肆介紹 7個 著名掛鈎主體信貸風險, 只字不講抵押品有著跟100多個主體信貸挂鉤之特徵和風險。銀行心知抵押品內的信貸掛鈎主體出事的可能性是遠遠高於那大肆宣揚的 7 個掛鈎主體的。

至今, 銀行以及金管局公開堅持聲稱沒有必要對客戶介紹迷債的抵押品.
- 聲稱因為抵押品是 3A 評級,可卻從不解釋:既然抵押品和迷債的實質均為信貸掛鈎,為甚麼以跟一籃子主體信貸掛鈎為主要特徵的抵押品之信貸掛鈎風險無須給客戶任何介紹和解釋, 跟7個公司信貸掛鈎的特徵和風險卻要用諸多篇幅去介紹?

- 同時又聲稱:由於每一個系列的迷債的抵押品在銷售期間之間還沒有買入,在每一迷債系列的銷售期間銀行也不知道該系列抵押品的詳情。可卻從不敢公開說明:銀行方面是否認為(實為信貸掛鈎票據之)抵押品的相關信息 是 '信貸掛鈎票據:雷曼迷你債券'的相關重大風險和重大信息?

- 中國銀行給迷債的風險評級是“高風險”, 給與客戶的解釋是:所有信貸掛鈎產品評級都是高風險。 依此類推, 實為信貸掛鈎產品 之 抵押品應該是當仁不讓地也同屬於“高風險“類別了!
可中國銀行卻從不敢公開說明:同屬於信貸掛鈎產品,“高風險”類別的抵押品之重大風險和信息是否屬於迷債相關的重大風險和信息? 為甚麼無須給客戶介紹和解釋?

3. 儘管銀行聲稱在銷售迷債的時候不瞭解該迷債系列抵押品之詳情, 銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層看來對於抵押品實為信貸掛鈎之主要特徵和相關風險是一直有所瞭解而且一直關注相關的市場變化。這就解釋了為甚麼諸多迷債的長期經驗分銷銀行從2007年下半年開始陸續停止銷售迷債 。因為他們知道迷債抵押品實為(第二層)隱藏的信貸掛鈎產品,而表面的7個著名公司只是招牌。真正帶來利息(收入)和重大風險的都是藏於 實為信貸掛鈎產品的抵押品(合成CDO)之中。一旦市場變差,抵押品中的質素參差不齊的100多家公司破產爆煲的機會就會快速大大增加,迷債的真實風險被原形畢露的機會大大增加,迷債的謊言被戳穿的機會也大大增加。

4. 以迷債系列 34 為例,銷售系列 34 的時候,銀行或許不知道系列 34 的抵押品之詳情。但是,銀行的產品相關部門和銀行主要相關管理層對於比系列34 早的那些系列 5 - 33 的抵押品之主要特徵和相關風險等看來卻是有相當程度的瞭解的, 因而對於系列 34 抵押品很可能又是“跟100-150多個公司信貸掛鈎”之相關重大風險和特徵也是有著清晰的理解的。這就解釋了隨著市場變差,銀行開始逐漸停止銷售迷債。因為銀行擔心從未跟客戶解釋的迷債抵押品之謎會容易原形畢露。


全文請參見:
“銀行主动停止銷售雷曼迷你債券之決定:揭示了銀行對於迷債真實風險之理解”
http://minibondvictim.blogspot.com/2009/10/2007.html

2010年9月11日星期六

逾萬雷曼苦主恐血本無歸

逾萬雷曼苦主恐血本無歸 27/08/08


星展下周率先公布投資餘額

【明報專訊】經過連日示威、抗議,部分雷曼迷你債券等產品的投資者,下周開始要陸續面對投資化為烏有的事實。據了解,星展銀行下周將率先公布「噩耗」,分批通知6901名手持Constellation雷曼信貸掛鈎產品的客戶,無望取回一分一毫。其他手持雷曼信貸掛鈎票據、雷曼擔保掛鈎票據,以及迷債系列5、6、7及9的投資者,也要做定心理準備,投資餘額只剩下一個「0」。換言之,近4萬名雷曼結構產品的投資者中,逾1萬人恐怕會血本無歸。

包括迷債系列5、6、7及9

由於29個雷曼迷債系列的估值及銀行回購工作需時,3萬多名迷債投資者在短期內未必有望知道其投資本金最終「所餘有幾」。然而,消息透露,雷曼迷你債券系列5、6、7及9的投資者,或可先行獲悉「結果」,因為這4個系列的抵押品為雷曼票據,早已全無價值。銀行公會近日已取得港府同意,將不會向上述4個系列的投資者提出回購安排。

雷曼票據作抵押變無價值綜合迷你債券信託人匯豐向銀行提供的資料,迷債系列5、6、7及9的投資者是「最不幸」的一群,無望取回分毫本金,系列15至18的投資者亦要有「輸掉一半」的心理準備。然而,這兩類系列實際涉及的投資金額僅約20億元(相對總額約兩成),以此推斷,受影響人數未必太多。至於其他迷你債券系列的投資者,估計有望取回最多六至七成本金餘款。

大部分迷你債券投資者不至於血本無歸,但手持雷曼信貸掛鈎票據的投資者,則沒有這麼好彩。據了解,有份發行Constellation雷曼信貸掛鈎票據的星展銀行,下周將陸續通知客戶票據估值結果,如無意外,投資者無望取回一分一毫。有熟知結構產品的人指出,另外兩類由瑞銀及摩根士丹利發行的票據(SPARC及Victoria系列),產品結構與Constellation同出一轍,同樣是與雷曼信貸掛鈎,所以如今雷曼破產,有關票據便完全沒有價值。

另一方面,手持由雷曼發行的Atlantic及Pyxis系列的股票或基金掛鈎票據產品,由於產品的擔保人及所持抵押品同樣與雷曼有關,一般相信,投資者可取回的餘款同樣是「0」。對於這批「捧蛋」的投資者來說,只有寄望分銷銀行為其不當銷售行為作出補償或和解。

12/9/10

中銀至今還不會向Constellation, Octave Notes 的客戶 回購

中銀3400迷債戶接受回購

中銀3400迷債戶接受回購
(星島)2009年8月20日 星期四 05:30
(綜合報道)

(星島日報 報道)銀行提出的回購雷曼迷債方案,反應良好,接納數字不斷上升。以最大分銷銀行中銀香港 為例,銀行界消息指出,截至昨天為止,大約有近三千四百名客戶表示接納回購,較周一的一千七百名大增約一倍。另有消息傳出,透過東亞銀行 買入迷債的投資者,有約三成已表示接納回購,顯示回購方案獲得投資者支持。

  全港符合回購方案資格的迷債投資者,大約有二萬九千名,市場估計當中約六成是中銀香港客戶,即大約有一萬七千名,以三千四百名中銀香港客戶接納回購來說,差不多是該行總數的二成。由於客戶有六十天時間考慮,故相信稍後陸續有客戶回應,接納人數會不斷上升。

  東亞約三成客戶接納方案

  另一方面,消息傳出東亞銀行亦已收到三成的迷債客戶回覆,幾乎大部分都接受回購建議,該行已向所有迷債客戶發出信函,涉及數目少於一千個,即已收到大約三百封回覆。東亞發言人稱,迷債客戶的反應十分良好,但拒評具體數字。另外,迷債第二大銷售銀行大新及豐明,其發言人稱,正陸續收到迷債客戶的回覆,但未有數據可披露。

  十六家迷債分銷銀行與證監會 達成回購協議後,銀行隨即向客戶以掛號形式寄出回購計畫文件,以中銀香港來說,是在本月七日寄出,換言之不少客戶收到文件只是考慮了幾天的時間便接納。客戶收到文件後有六十天時間考慮是否接納回購,如果提出合理原因,客戶可以取得額外的三十天再考慮。換言之,現時仍屬回購計畫的初步階段,但已有二成至三成的迷債投資者接納,顯示回購方案反應理想。

  交回文件後30天可取款

  此外,在公布回購方案之前,銀行已經與個別投資者商討和解,中銀香港截至今年七月中,已經與接近二千六百名持有迷債的客戶達成和解。根據今次回購計畫,投資者最少可以取回相當於本金六成的款項,年齡在六十五歲或以上的投資者,更可以取得最少七成的本金。接納回購的迷債投資者,在交回文件後,可以在三十天之內取回款項。

  雖然迷債問題已有解決方案,但部分苦主的抗議行動尚未結束,雷曼苦主大聯盟在其網站呼籲,苦主在本周日(八月二十三日)舉行遊行,由銅鑼灣 集合,經灣仔往中環 政府合署示威。由於接納回購者不斷增加,故反對抗議的聲勢料會逐步減低,而苦主控告迷債抵押品信託人美國 滙豐一事,大聯盟亦承認,因部分苦主接受回購,可能要另找苦主作官司的原告。本報財經組

12/9/10 中銀期權保的苦主被作為經驗投資者而不會有回購

中銀迷債客申索千一萬

中銀迷債客申索千一萬
一名退休人士○六年斥資一千一百萬元購買了雷曼迷你債券,他由資深大律師清洪撰寫入稟狀,昨入稟高院控告中國銀行(香港)(下稱中銀),指中銀向他銷售迷債時陳述失實及有疏忽,資料有誤導性,他現要求中銀賠償損失一千一百萬元。
原訴投資者為Lam Yuk Pang Jackie,他○六年所購入的是「迷你債券系列廿八——二○○九年到期可贖回信貸相聯美元/港元定息債券」,發行人為Pacific International Finance Ltd.,並由雷曼作掉期對手。
原訴稱未獲悉風險原訴人指他當時表明自己已年過六十五歲,只有一至五年投資經驗,投資用作退休,只求保本,而中銀當時亦在投資意向問卷中把原訴列為「保守」類。中銀向他銷售該產品時,指產品有如銀行存款,適合退休人士的原訴。
原訴現指摘中銀當時並無如實指出產品根本並非「債券」,而是與信貸相聯的票據,且屬複雜兼高風險的衍生產品。至去年十一月原訴獲知會該批迷債的發行人已無法如期支付到期利息,原訴的投資有可能全軍覆沒,故現向中銀追究責任。

12/9/10 中銀知雷曼迷你債券屬複雜兼高風險的衍生產品而問卷中把很大部份列為「保守」類客戶銷售該產品,陳述失實及有疏忽,商業調查科也在跟進非雷曼非迷你債券,可作中銀詐騙處理。

民建联同时要求,有关单位应公布有关调查的全面结果,包括公开银行内部的销售守则是否存在系统性的问题,以释公众疑虑。

  另外,对于跟进事件的工作,民建联建议特区政府及金融监管机构就此事件汲取教训,从速针对监管上的不足,作出政策上的修改。特区政府应积极研究海外市场对衍生投资产品作出的监管法例和做法,制定一套因时制宜及与时并进的监管措施。

中銀香港兩年內為迷債事故共撥備39.17億元。

【明報專訊】2009 3/24 雷曼迷債最大分銷行中銀香港(2388)公布第三季未經審計的經營表現,期內為迷債提撥了30.08億元支出準備,首三季支出金額共32.42億元,連同去年撥備的6.75億元,兩年內為迷債事故共撥備39.17億元。中銀香港第三季提取減值準備前經營溢利,因迷債撥備按季大跌63.79%至17.5億元,首9個月這項經營溢利按年跌兩成至132.78億元。但分析員認為,中銀此舉有助驅散迷債對中銀股價帶來之陰霾。
分析員:舉動為股價掃陰霾此外,07年次按風暴起一直困擾中銀香港的美國住宅按揭抵押證券(RMBS)問題,於第三季初現光,該行首度為RMBS減值準備作出大幅的淨撥回。該行期內的減值準備撥回及已減值證券的已實現淨收益,合共為10.61億元,主要受惠於RMBS持續還款及減持。
中銀聯同其他分銷行於7月公布迷債回購計劃,中銀香港發言人表示,已有98%至99%迷債客戶作出回覆,已回覆的客戶中約99%表示接受回購方案。中銀香港公布,基於回購計劃,第三季的經營支出中撥備了30.08億元,其中28.48億元為回購相關金額,另有1.6億元用作支付受託人支出。據中銀7月公布估計,回購所需金額最高為36.26億元,連同支付予受託人的支出,合共為37.86億元。
撇除迷債因素,中銀香港業務首9個月提取減值準備前的淨經營收入輕微增長1.4%至198.34億元,主要受惠於股市暢旺及集團放款增長,以致淨服務費及佣金收入上升,加上保險業務扭虧為盈,但部分遭淨利息收入下跌抵銷。至於單計第三季,提取減值準備前的淨經營收入實微跌3.69%至68.06億元,期內淨息差持續收窄,但淨利息收入正按季溫和上升。

Chapter 11

Chapter 11

LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS INC., et

Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)

This is a matter arising out of a complex financial structure that includes an added layer of complexity due to the pendency of parallel and potentially conflicting legal proceedings in this Court and the United Kingdom. The litigation in England (the “English Litigation”) was first commenced in the High Court of Justice,Chancery Division (the “High Court”) followed by an appeal to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division (the “Court of Appeal” and, together with the High Court,the “English Courts”). At issue both here and in the English Courts is the priority of payment to beneficiaries (one a noteholder and the other a swap counterparty) that hold competing interests in collateral securing certain credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes. The swap counterparty is Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (“LBSF”), one of the Lehman entities whose chapter 11 case is before this Court.

The English Litigation was filed in the High Court by Perpetual Trustee Company Limited (“Perpetual”), as holder of various credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes, against BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited (“BNY”) seeking priority payment pursuant to so-called “Noteholder Priority” (as defined below) under the terms of certain swap agreements (each a “Swap Agreement”)1 among LBSF and Dante Finance Public Limited Company (“Dante”).

LBSF intervened in the English Litigation and has participated both in the English Litigation and in this adversary proceeding.2 After a trial, the High Court issued a judgment in which it held, inter alia, that LBSF’s interest in the collateral securing the Swap Agreements (the “Collateral”) was “always limited and conditional,” and, therefore, payment pursuant to Noteholder Priority did not violate the so-called “anti-deprivation principle” under English law.
(Venditto Aff. Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 45, 49-55). The High Court also noted that Noteholder Priority became effective on September 15, 2008, the date on which Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
(“LBHI”), credit support provider for LBSF’s payment obligations under each Swap Agreement, filed its petition in this Court for protection under chapter 11 of title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”). (Venditto Aff. Ex. 7 at ¶¶ 24, 49).

1 Each Swap Agreement consists of an ISDA Master Agreement, appurtenant schedules and written confirmation.
2 Perpetual is not a party to the adversary proceeding, and it is unclear whether Perpetual is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court.


During the pendency of the English Litigation in the High Court, on May 20, 2009, LBSF (collectively with LBHI and its affiliated debtors, the “Debtors”) commenced this action by filing a two-count complaint (the “Complaint”) against BNY. Count I of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the provisions in the Swap Agreements that modify LBSF’s payment priority upon an event of default constitute unenforceable ipso facto clauses that violate Bankruptcy Code sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B), thereby enabling LBSF to retain its right to receive a priority payment under the Swap Agreements (“Swap Counterparty Priority”). Count II seeks a declaratory judgment from this Court that any action to enforce the provisions purportedly modifying LBSF’s right to priority of payments as a result of its bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay under Bankruptcy Code section 362(a).
The interplay between this litigation and the English Litigation has been obvious from the start, and both this Court and the English Courts have been aware of the potential for conflicting rulings due to differences in the law being applied by each tribunal to the underlying dispute.

With this trans-Atlantic aspect of the cases in mind, LBSF requested and received permission to file its motion for summary judgment prior to the deadline for BNY to file a responsive pleading so that it could be used in the English Litigation. (06/03/09 Tr. 110: 1-6). LBSF filed its motion for summary judgment on June 10, 2009. On June 22, 2009, BNY filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, arguing that Perpetual, as the real party-in-interest in this matter, is an “indispensable party” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, made applicable to this proceeding by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7019. LBSF opposed the motion to dismiss.

At a hearing held on August 11, 2009, the Court found that BNY had the capacity to adequately represent Perpetual’s interests in this litigation3 and denied the motion to dismiss. (08/11/09 Tr. 68:11-25, 69:24-70:3). Thereafter, pursuant to a briefing schedule ordered by the Court, BNY filed a cross motion for summary judgment. In addition, the official committee of unsecured creditors appointed in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases requested and received permission to intervene in this matter and has filed various statements in support of LBSF’s pleadings.

LBSF filed a notice of appeal of the High Court’s judgment on August 17, 2009.
(Venditto Aff. Ex. 8). On November 6, 2009, the Court of Appeal issued a unanimous judgment in which it affirmed the holding of the High Court. (Venditto Supp. Aff. Ex. A). Specifically, the Court of Appeal determined that (i) the LBHI bankruptcy filing on September 15, 2008 gave rise to the application of Noteholder Priority and triggered the calculation of a subordinated Early Termination Payment (as defined below) to LBSF under Condition 44 of the Terms and Conditions of the Notes (“Condition 44”), and (ii) this was independent of the early termination of the Swap Agreements effected by Saphir Finance Public Limited Company (“Saphir”), as issuer of the credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes at issue. (Venditto Supp. Aff. Ex. A at ¶ 21).

The Court of Appeal also determined that LBSF lost no property right or interest as a result of the shift to Noteholder Priority and the subordinated Early Termination Payment, because LBSF’s interest in the Collateral always had been contingent. (Venditto Supp. Aff. Ex. A at ¶ 62). Stated differently, LSBF was not deprived of any right by virtue of the fact that the

3 At the time of this hearing, BNY was a party to another adversary proceeding involving similar issues relating to the application of the ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, and so the Court considered BNY to be particularly well positioned to make the same arguments in this case in Perpetual’s absence. That other case was settled prior to a hearing on dispositive motions.

applicable payment priority had shifted to Noteholder Priority because it “had always been an agreed feature of that right, as a result of [an event of default on its part], LBSF had to rank behind, rather than ahead of, [Perpetual].” (Venditto Supp. Aff. Ex. A at ¶ 63). On November 13, 2009, the Court of Appeal issued an order denying LBSF’s motion for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of England and Wales. (Venditto 2d Supp. Aff. Ex. A).

Throughout these proceedings, the parties have kept the Court apprised of the progress of the English Litigation. In addition, the Court has exchanged various communications with the High Court regarding coordination of and cooperation with respect to the litigation here and in London. Most recently, this Court received a letter from the High Court (i) explaining that “[t]he English court has confined itself to making a declaration that the relevant contractual provisions are ‘valid, effective and enforceable as a matter of English law as the proper law of such contracts, so as to give effect to Noteholder Priority,’” and (ii) requesting that if this Court concludes that “the relevant provisions are void or otherwise unenforceable under U.S. bankruptcy law” it “go no further at that stage than to make a declaratory judgment to that effect.” At a hearing on the cross motions for summary judgment on November 19, 2009, the parties agreed that it is appropriate for this Court to determine at this time only whether declaratory relief is appropriate in this matter and to further coordinate with the High Court should it become necessary after a decision is rendered. (11/19/2009 Tr. 64: 1-3, 65: 5-11).

It is in this context that the Court has evaluated the motions for summary judgment and has decided to grant LBSF’s motion for summary judgment and to deny the cross motion of BNY. This Court concludes that the relevant provisions purporting to reverse the priority of payment on account of the occurrence of a default due to commencement of a case under the Bankruptcy Code are unenforceable and violate the ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate where there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” so that the moving party is entitled to “judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences against the moving party. Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 1991). In determining whether to grant a motion for summary judgment, the court is not to “weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 at 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505. The parties acknowledge that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the questions presented purely involve the application of relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to undisputed facts.

Background

On October 10, 2002, BNY’s predecessor entered into a Principal Trust Deed (the “Principal Trust Deed”) with Dante, pursuant to which a multi-issuer secured obligation program (the “Dante Program”) was established. BNY currently serves as Trustee under the Dante Program.

Under the Dante Program, Saphir, a special purpose entity created by Lehman Brothers International (Europe), issued various series of credit-linked synthetic portfolio notes. At issue for purposes of this litigation are two series of such notes held by Perpetual: (i) Series 2004-11 AUD 75,000,000 Synthetic Portfolio Notes Due 2011, and (ii) Series 2006-5 AUD 50,000,000 Synthetic Portfolio Notes due 2011 and Extendable Up to 2016 (collectively, the “Notes”).

The Notes are secured by the Collateral, which BNY holds in trust for the benefit of creditors of Saphir, including Perpetual (as holder of the Notes) and LBSF (as swap counterparty). The Collateral comprises various assets and secured obligations. Each series of Notes is governed by a Supplemental Trust Deed (each, a “Supplemental Trust Deed” and collectively with all agreements underlying the Notes, the “Transaction Documents”). Each Supplemental Trust Deed, in turn, references a Swap Agreement. The events of default under each of the Swap Agreements include the bankruptcy filing of any party.

Pursuant to the terms of the Transaction Documents, the rights of LBSF in the Collateral ordinarily take priority (“Swap Counterparty Priority”) over those of Perpetual. However, if an event of default occurs on the part of LBSF under a Swap Agreement, the Transaction Documents call for a reversal of priorities so that Perpetual would then be entitled to priority over amounts otherwise payable to LBSF (“Noteholder Priority”). In addition, Condition 44 modifies the calculation of the Early Redemption Amount (i.e., the amount payable upon the early redemption of a Note) in the event that LBSF defaults under the related Swap Agreement.

LBHI commenced a voluntary case under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on September 15, 2008. LBSF commenced its own voluntary case under the Bankruptcy Code on October 3, 2008 (the “LBSF Petition Date”). On November 25, 2008, counsel to the Debtors sent a letter to Bank of New York Mellon Trust Company, National Association, and Bank of New York Mellon stating that (i) any action with respect to transactions in which BNY serves as trustee may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, and (ii) any provisions purporting to subordinate any amounts payable to LBSF would be unenforceable and unlawful. (LBSF Br. Supp. Ex. G). On December 1, 2008, Saphir sent notices to LBSF terminating the Swap Agreements designating (i) the filing by LBSF of a chapter 11 petition as the relevant event of default and (ii) December 1, 2008 as the Early Termination Date under section 6(a) of each ISDA Master Agreement. (LBSF Br. Supp. Exs. H, I). Under the terms of the Principal Trust Deed, such termination obligated Saphir to redeem the Notes.

Motions for Summary Judgment

In its motion for summary judgment, LBSF argues that the contractual provisions in the Transaction Documents that modify the scheme for payment priority are unenforceable ipso facto clauses that inappropriately modify a debtor’s interest in a contract solely because of a bankruptcy filing in violation of Bankruptcy Code sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B). LBSF also maintains that any attempt to modify its payment priority violates the automatic stay, in violation of Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)(3), because it improperly seeks to exercise control over the property of LBSF’s estate. Finally, LBSF argues that the so-called “safe harbor” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code do not protect the purported modification of the payment priority.4

In its motion, BNY argues that because the Transaction Documents are to be governed by and construed in accordance with English law, this Court must defer to the determination by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal that Noteholder Priority and subordinated payment under Condition 44 became effective automatically on September 15, 2008. If the Court defers to such finding, LBSF’s interests already were governed by Noteholder Priority and subordinated to the interests of Perpetual under Condition 44 as of the date it filed its chapter 11 petition.

Under this theory, LBSF never had the right to claim Swap Counterparty Priority or its preferred method of calculation of the Early Redemption Amount under Condition 44. BNY maintains

4 The scope of the safe harbor provisions is discussed later in this opinion.

that LBSF cannot use its status as a bankruptcy debtor to attempt to garner any greater rights with respect to the Collateral than it possessed prepetition.
BNY also argues that even if the payment modification provisions at issue constitute unenforceable ipso facto clauses, inasmuch as they are the agreed mechanisms pursuant to which the parties’ transactions are liquidated, the provisions fall within the scope of the protections provided by the safe harbor provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Finally, BNY asserts that Noteholder Priority and Condition 44 constitute subordination agreements, which agreements have been found by the English Courts to be enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

Given that subordination agreements are enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code “to the same extent that such agreement[s] [are] enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,” BNY submits that Noteholder Priority and Condition 44 are enforceable against LBSF. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).

The Court will examine in turn each of these issues – ipso facto, automatic stay, safe harbor and Bankruptcy Code section 510.

Ipso Facto/Automatic Stay

The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 effected a change in the treatment of contract or lease clauses that would seek to modify the relationships of contracting parties due to the filing of a bankruptcy petition – so-called ipso facto clauses. See Reloeb Co. v. LTV Corp. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6130, *14 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). It is now axiomatic that ipso facto clauses are, as a general matter, unenforceable. See, e.g., Id. at *15-*16 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that Bankruptcy Code section 365 “abrogates the power of ipso facto clauses” and, therefore, “[n]o default may occur pursuant to an ipso facto clause”). Under Bankruptcy Code section 365(e) an executory contract … may not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract … may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of the case solely because of a provision in such contract … that is conditioned on … the commencement of a case under this title … .

11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1).

Bankruptcy Code section 541, in addition to describing what constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate, also invalidates ipso facto clauses, providing that a debtor’s interest in property becomes property of the estate … notwithstanding any provision in an agreement, transfer instrument, or applicable nonbankruptcy law … that is conditioned on … the commencement of a case under this title … and that effects or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or termination of the debtor’s interest in property.

U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B).

The intriguing question presented is whether it is the bankruptcy filing of LBHI or the later filing of LBSF that is the relevant commencement of a case for purposes of invalidating the shifting of priorities under the Transaction Documents. Before reaching that question, the Court needs to determine whether the Transaction Documents constitute executory contracts and, therefore, whether LBSF is entitled to the protections provided by Bankruptcy Code section 365. BNY, in its papers, baldly states that “the only performance due [under the Transaction Documents] – if any – is payment” and, therefore, the Transaction Documents are not executory contracts. (Br. Opp’n at 7) (citing cases that found contracts were not executory where the only performance remaining was payment). BNY does not offer any additional analysis or make any further argument on the issue, relying on the assertion that Noteholder Priority and subordination under Condition 44 took effect prior to the date on which LBSF filed its bankruptcy petition.
(Id).

Regardless of whether and when Noteholder Priority and subordination under Condition 44 took effect, there is no question that the parties’ obligations under the Transaction Documents are continuing, that performance remains outstanding and that the Transaction Documents satisfy the functional definition of executory contracts.

The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term “executory contract. ” The Second Circuit has characterized an executory contract as one “on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides,” Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa. (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 85 F.3d 992, 998-99 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). In COR Route 5 Co., LLC v. Penn Traffic Co. (In re Penn Traffic Co.), 524 F.3d 373, the Second Circuit addressed the question of the extent to which performance must remain due on both sides for a contract to be treated as executory under section 365. The Penn Traffic court adopted the so called “Countryman”5 approach to its determination; that is, “an executory contract is one ‘under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing performance of the other.’” Id. at 379-80.
The language and structure of the ISDA Master Agreement that forms a central part of the Swap Agreement demonstrate that these contracts are executory. Paragraph 9(c) of each ISDA Master agreement expressly provides that the obligations of the parties under the relevant Swap Agreement shall survive the termination of any transaction. (LBSF Br. Supp. Ex. E § 9(c); Ex. F § 9(c)). Given that all obligations of the parties under the ISDA Master Agreement remain outstanding, the failure of either party to complete performance would constitute a material 5

See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973).

breach excusing the performance of the other. In addition, each of LBSF and BNY has unsatisfied contractual obligations to make various payments. (See, e.g., LBSF Br. Supp. Ex. C Sched. 2 Annex 3 § 3(c); Ex. D Sched. 2 Annex 3 § 3(b)). These outstanding obligations to make payments pursuant to the Swap Agreement constitute sufficient grounds to find that the contract in question is executory. See Penn Traffic, 524 F.3d 379-80 (holding that a contract was executory based upon unsatisfied contractual obligation to pay). Given the foregoing, the Transaction Documents are executory contracts and the provisions of section 365 are applicable
to the Swap Agreement.

This leads to an examination of how to apply the ipso facto prohibitions of section 365 to the unusual challenges presented by the current facts and circumstances. In particular, the Court must consider the shifting priorities under the Transaction Documents caused by the separate defaults that occurred when LBHI and LBSF filed for bankruptcy, the distribution priorities that were in effect as of the LBSF Petition Date and any impact of the ipso facto provisions on the legal rights of the parties to enforce those priorities. The cross-border procedural posture further complicates this already challenging question of statutory interpretation.

In its motion, BNY argues that because the Transaction Documents are to be governed by and construed in accordance with English law, under the principles of comity and res judicata, this Court must defer to the determination by both the High Court and the Court of Appeal that September 15, 2008 should be viewed as the operative date with respect to the reversal in payment priorities under the Transaction Documents.
The English Courts authoritatively have interpreted the Transaction Documents in accordance with applicable English law. The Court, while respecting that determination as valid and binding between the parties, is not obliged to recognize a judgment rendered by a foreign 14 court, but instead may choose to give res judicata effect on the basis of comity. See Gordon and Breach Sci. Publishers S.A. v. Am. Inst. of Physics 905 F. Supp. 169, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).

In deciding whether to recognize the decision of the English Courts in relation to the determination that Perpetual is entitled to a distribution based on Noteholder Priority, this Court will evaluate whether the English Courts, in rendering their respective decisions, sufficiently considered the applicability and impact of section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code. It appears that the English Courts did not take into account principles of United States bankruptcy law and understood, as did the parties themselves, that the outcome of the dispute might well be different
in this Court. Indeed, BNY has been concerned from the very outset of this litigation about the prospect of being caught in the middle between conflicting decisions as to the rights of Perpetual and LBSF to the Collateral. From BNY’s perspective, consistent guidance from courts of competent jurisdiction on both sides of the Atlantic would be highly desirable and would avoid the unwanted result of conflicting judgments as to which party is entitled to the Collateral.

As a general matter, “courts will not extend comity to foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies or prejudicial to the interests of the United States.” Pravin Banker Assoc., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d Cir. 1997). It is relevant that in adjudicating this dispute the English Courts addressed only (i) the breadth of the English common-law anti-deprivation principle in the context of the shift in payment priorities under the Transaction Documents based on LBSF’s bankruptcy filing; (ii) if such shift is invalid under the
anti-deprivation principle, whether it still is applicable if LBSF is not in insolvency proceedings in England; and (iii) if such shift is invalidated under the anti-deprivation principle, whether it still is applicable if the shift in payment priorities operates on account of an event other than the bankruptcy of LBSF. (Venditto Aff. Ex. 7 at ¶ 28). Upon considering the identified issues, the
High Court (as confirmed by the Court of Appeal) determined that the relevant provisions of the Transaction Documents are valid and enforceable under English law and do not violate the antideprivation principle. The English Courts did not consider any provisions of the Bankruptcy Code in connection with their decisions. Importantly, neither of the English Courts purported to bind this Court in any respect, and the High Court explicitly declined to “preclude any request or
other application made by the … US Bankruptcy Court.” (Venditto Aff. Ex. 7 at ¶ 63).

Therefore, the English Courts have been most gracious in allowing room for this Court to express itself independently on matters of importance to the administration of the LBHI and LBSF bankruptcy cases. In applying the Bankruptcy Code to these facts, this Court recognizes that it is interpreting applicable law in a manner that will yield an outcome directly at odds with the judgment of the English Courts.

Despite the resulting cross-border conflict, the United States has a strong interest in having a United States bankruptcy court resolve issues of bankruptcy law, particularly in a circumstance such as this where the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provide far greater protections than are available under applicable provisions of foreign law. See, e.g., Bank of N.Y. v. Alison J. Treco (In re Treco), 240 F.3d 148, 159-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (declining to extend comity to foreign proceeding where “special protected status that secured creditors enjoy under
United States law” was lacking under applicable foreign law). Given the responsibility of the Court to interpret and apply the Bankruptcy Code, the thoughtful and otherwise binding decisions of the English Courts do not prevent this Court from examining relevant provisions of the Transaction Documents under the broad protections afforded to debtors by the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the Court declines to give preclusive effect to the respective judgments rendered by the High Court and the Court of Appeal and will apply relevant provisions of the 16
Bankruptcy Code to determine the questions presented in the pending motions for summary judgment.

Under section 541, the bankruptcy estate is comprised of, inter alia, “all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Second Circuit has recognized that “[t]his definition is broad and includes even strictly contingent interests.” Mid-Island Hosp., Inc. v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield (In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc.) 276 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir. 2002). When determining whether a debtor has a property interest in an executory contract as of the commencement of a bankruptcy case so that the contract constitutes property of the estate, courts examine whether “termination requires the non-debtor party to undertake some post-petition affirmative act.” In
re Margulis, 323 B.R. 130, 135 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citations omitted); accord In re St.Casimir Dev. Corp., 358 B.R. 24, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (allowing assumption of contract as executory because removal of debtor as general partner of partnership required post-petition affirmative act of non-debtor party, which act was prohibited by automatic stay). BNY’s position is that Noteholder Priority replaced Swap Counterparty Priority as of the date of LBHI’s bankruptcy, such that the property right claimed by LBSF already was lost before the date of commencement of its own bankruptcy case. That interpretation is inconsistent with the structure of the Transaction Documents.

As of the LBSF Petition Date, the Transaction Documents required certain affirmative
acts be to taken prior to the effectiveness of any modification of payment priority or method of calculation of the Early Termination Payment. No provision in any of the Transaction Documents automatically causes a change in legal rights immediately upon an event of default.

Pursuant to the terms of the Principal Trust Deeds, Noteholder Priority becomes effective only when there are amounts to be paid “in connection with the realisation or enforcement of the [Collateral].” (LBSF Br. Opp’n Ex. C § 5.5; Ex. D § 5.5). Similarly, Condition 44 requires certain payments to be made, which payments may be made only after the “sale or realisation of the Collateral.” (LBSF Br. Opp’n Ex. C; Ex. D, Sched. 2). It is undisputed that the Collateral had not been sold as of October 3, 2008, nor has it been sold to date. Indeed, Perpetual commenced the English Litigation on the grounds that BNY had failed to enforce rights in the
Collateral. (LBSF Mot. Sum. J. Ex. 7).

Certain other payments required by Condition 44 cannot be calculated until after
termination of the relevant Swap Agreement. (Id). The relevant termination events took place after commencement of the LBSF case. Saphir sent termination notices to LBSF on December 1, 2008 and such notices designated the filing of LBSF’s chapter 11 petition as the triggering event of default. (LBSF Br. Supp. Exs. H, I). Given these undisputed facts, LBSF held a valuable property interest in the Transaction Documents as of the LBSF Petition Date and, therefore, such interest is entitled to protection as part of the bankruptcy estate.

This sequence of events supports the conclusion that the relevant date for purposes of testing whether any shifting of priorities occurred under the Transaction Documents is the LBSF Petition Date, and not the commencement of the LBHI case on September 15, 2008. However, even if LBHI’s petition date were to be considered as the operative date for a claimed reversal of the payment priority under the Transaction Documents, the ipso facto protections provided by sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code would bar the efficacy of such a change in distribution rights. Each of these sections of the Bankruptcy Code prohibits modification of a debtor’s right solely because of a provision in an agreement conditioned upon “the commencement of a case under this title.” 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(e)(1), 541(c)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Notably, the language used is not limited to the commencement of a case by or against the debtor. Given the legislative history, the absence of such precise limiting language is significant.

The legislative history of section 365(e)(1) and section 541(c)(1)(B) provides helpful guidance in understanding the meaning of these sections and in analyzing how to interpret the words “a case” as used in these sections. An early version of what eventually became section 365(e)(1) referred to “the commencement of a case under this Act by or against the debtor.”

Pub. L. No. 91-354, § 4-602(b) (emphasis added). Similarly, a draft of the language that became section 541(c)(1) at one time referred to “the commencement of a case under this title concerning the debtor.” H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 541(c). This initial use and later rejection of limiting language demonstrates that Congress considered, but ultimately rejected, drafting sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) in a manner that would have expressly restricted their application to the bankruptcy case of the debtor counterparty.

The language used – “commencement of a case under this title” – appears simple enough
at first reading, but what has been left out raises a number of questions. The plain meaning of the words applies to the commencement of a case (presumably any case that is related in some appropriate manner to the contracting parties). If the words are not tied to the case filed by the particular debtor that is party to a specified executory contract, under what circumstances is the bankruptcy case of another debtor sufficiently related to rights of the parties to such an executory contract that it is reasonable to trigger the ipso facto protections of these sections? Opening up the subject to cases filed by debtors other than the counterparty itself has the potential of opening up a proverbial “can of worms” that may lead to speculation as to the nature and degree of the relationship between debtors that is needed in order to properly apply the provision.6

The Court recognizes the potential for future disputes over the interpretation of this language but declines here to make any broad pronouncements, interpret the language in the abstract or to expand on the various relationships between or among debtor entities that would make it appropriate for one debtor to invoke ipso facto protection due to the filing of another affiliated member of a corporate family. The description of the kind of relationship that is sufficient to trigger such protections affecting the rights of contracting parties is best left to a case-by-case determination. With this principle of restraint in mind, the Court will apply the language of these sections of the Bankruptcy Code to the situation presented by the sequential filings of the LBHI and LBSF bankruptcy cases and confine its conclusions to the Debtors’ business structure and circumstances.

This Court has been presiding over the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases for just over 16
months. During the multiple hearings and status conferences that have taken place during this period, the Court has learned that the Debtors are perhaps the most complex and multi-faceted business ventures ever to seek the protection of chapter 11. Their various corporate entities comprise an “integrated enterprise” and, as a general matter, “the financial condition of one affiliate affects the others.” See JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Charter Communications Operating, LLC (In re Charter Communications) 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 3609 *67-*68 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). The LBHI chapter 11 petition was filed without adequate advance planning as 6

For example, one possible interpretation is that multiple subsidiaries under common control are sufficiently related to permit application of the ipso facto protections. Another possibility, in the context of swap agreements, might treat counterparties and their credit support providers as sufficiently related to impose ipso facto protections if either the principal or the guarantor were to file for bankruptcy relief. This opinion identifies these possibilities, but makes no ruling as to whether any of these relationships is sufficiently close to mandate that the bankruptcy of one debtor entity necessarily would lead to the protection of property interests of any other entity

the first of multiple related filings, each of which necessarily impacted the Lehman corporate family. Everyone knows that together these filings constitute the largest business bankruptcy in history.

Due to the sheer size of the corporate family7 and to the emergency, unplanned nature of the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases,8 the impact of each bankruptcy case in the Lehman chain on nondebtor affiliates has yet to be fully determined. The Debtors continue to discover that certain non-debtor affiliates need to seek the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. For example, two LBHI affiliates filed chapter 11 petitions as recently as December 21, 2009. (See Case Nos. 09- 17503, 09-17505). Under these circumstances, the first filing at the holding company level of the corporate structure has significance, especially in the context of the ipso facto provisions that speak in terms of the commencement of “a” case under this title. Regardless of how this language may be interpreted in other settings, the Court is convinced that the chapter 11 cases of LBHI and its affiliates is a singular event for purposes of interpreting this ipso facto language.

Nothing in this decision is intended to impact issues of substantive consolidation, the importance of each of the separate petition dates for purposes of allowing claims against each of the debtors or any other legal determination that may relate to the date of commencement of a case.

However, for purposes of applying the ipso facto provisions of 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B), what happened on September 15, 2008 was a bankruptcy filing that precipitated subsequent related events. LBHI commenced a case that entitled LBSF, consistent with the statutory language, fairly read, to claim the protections of the ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code because

7 The Debtors, together with their non-debtor affiliates, once ranked as the fourth largest investment bank in the United States.

8 The Court is convinced the 18-day delay in filing a bankruptcy petition for LBSF never would have occurred if the markets had been more forgiving and the Debtors had enough time to devote to a coordinated process of bankruptcy planning.
its ultimate corporate parent and credit support provider, at a time of extraordinary panic in the global markets, had filed a case under the Bankruptcy Code.

The Court finds that the provisions in the Transaction Documents purporting to modify
LBSF’s right to a priority distribution solely as a result of a chapter 11 filing constitute unenforceable ipso facto clauses. Moreover, any attempt to enforce such provisions would violate the automatic stay. The stay is triggered upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, and it operates to prevent “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). Thus, any attempt by any party to enforce Noteholder Priority or subordinated payment under Condition 44 would violate the automatic stay because it would deprive LBSF and its creditors of a valuable property interest.

Safe Harbor

BNY argues that if Noteholder Priority and subordination under Condition 44 are deemed not to have taken effect prior to the LBSF Petition Date, they nonetheless are enforceable as part of an integrated “swap agreement” that qualifies for the safe harbor protections set forth in section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The safe harbor provisions of Section 560 of the Bankruptcy Code protect a nondefaulting swap participant’s contractual rights to (i) liquidate, terminate or accelerate “one or more swap agreements because of condition of the kind specified in section 365(e)(1)” or (ii) “offset or net out any termination values or payment amounts arising under or in connection with the termination, liquidation, or acceleration of one or more swap agreements.” 11 U.S.C. § 560. These provisions specifically permit termination solely “because of a condition of the kind specified in section 365 (e)(1)” – that is, the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor and the commencement of a bankruptcy case. 11 U.S.C. §§ 560, 561.

BNY maintains that the Noteholder Priority provision and Condition 44 comprise part of the Swap Agreements as “terms and conditions incorporated by reference and all documents that the market deems part of the parties’ transaction” in accordance with Bankruptcy Code section 101(53B)(A). (BNY Br. Supp. at 29). A review of the components of each Swap Agreement – the ISDA Master Agreement, schedules and written confirmation – reveals that there is no reference at all to the Supplemental Trust Deeds, the Noteholder Priority provision or Condition 44. The provisions at issue dictate the means by which the proceeds of each Swap Agreement will be distributed, but do not comprise part of the Swap Agreements themselves. Because the provisions of section 560 deal expressly with liquidation, termination or acceleration (not the alteration of rights as they then exist) and refer specifically to “swap agreements,” it follows that the Noteholder Priority provision and Condition 44 do not fall under the protections set forth therein.

11 U.S.C. § 510

BNY argues that Noteholder Priority and Condition 44 constitute subordination agreements, which agreements have been found by the English Courts to be enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy law. Given that subordination agreements are enforceable under the Bankruptcy Code “to the same extent that such agreement[s] [are] enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law,” then, according to BNY, Noteholder Priority and Condition 44 are enforceable against LBSF. See 11 U.S.C. § 510(a).

Although not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, a subordination agreement is an “agreement by which one who holds an otherwise senior interest agrees to subordinate that interest to a normally lesser interest … .” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). The Noteholder Priority provision and Condition 44 may be construed as subordination agreements – that is, LBSF agreed that upon the occurrence of certain conditions precedent, its interest in the Collateral and in the Early Termination Payment would be subordinated to the interest of Perpetual. Nonetheless, BNY cannot overcome the shifting nature of the subordination that is being activated by reason of a bankruptcy filing. This subordination agreement differs, as result,
from those enforceable agreements that establish lien or payment priorities that are permanently fixed without regard to the unenforceable future contingency of a bankruptcy filing.

Were it not for the bankruptcy filings of LBHI and LBSF, the provisions at issue in the Transaction Documents would be enforceable as expressions of the intent of the parties to allocate the priority for distributing the Collateral between them.9 However, the shift in payment priority upon the commencement of a bankruptcy case renders unenforceable this aspect of the subordination agreement. BNY has cited no case law or provision of the Bankruptcy Code that would allow a contract that is otherwise valid under Bankruptcy Code section 510(a) to escape application of the disabling ipso facto provisions of sections 365 and 541.

Conclusion

The Court finds that there is no material undisputed fact with respect to unenforceability of Noteholder Priority and subordination under Condition 44 and that LBSF is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court will enter a declaratory judgment that (i) the 9

The Court recognizes that there is an element of commercial expectation that underlies the subordination argument. LBSF was instrumental in the development and marketing of the complex financial structures that are now being reviewed from a bankruptcy perspective. The Court assumes that a bankruptcy affecting any of the Lehman entities was viewed as a highly remote contingency at the time that the Transaction Documents were being prepared. At that time, LBSF agreed to a subordination of its Swap Counterparty Priority in the hard-to-imagine event that it should be in default at some time in the future. Capital was committed with this concept embedded in the transaction. But the ipso facto protections of sections 365 and 541 of the Bankruptcy Code apply uniformly, regardless of prepetition market expectations. They exist and should be enforced to preserve property interests for the benefit of all creditor constituencies.

provisions in the Swap Agreements that seek to modify LBSF’s payment priority upon an event of default constitute unenforceable ipso facto clauses that violate Bankruptcy Code sections 365(e)(1) and 541(c)(1)(B) and (ii) any action to enforce such provisions as a result of LBSF’s bankruptcy filing violates the automatic stay under Bankruptcy Code section 362(a). LBSF is directed to submit a draft order consistent with this decision for the Court’s consideration.

The issues presented in this litigation are, as far as the Court can tell, unique to the Lehman bankruptcy cases and unprecedented. The Court is not aware of any other case that has construed the ipso facto provisions of the Bankruptcy Code under circumstances comparable to those presented here. No case has ever declared that the operative bankruptcy filing is not limited to the commencement of a bankruptcy case by the debtor-counterparty itself but may be a case filed by a related entity -- in this instance the counterparty's parent corporation as credit support provider. Because this is the first such interpretation of the ipso facto language, the
Court anticipates that the current ruling may be a controversial one, especially due to the resulting conflict with the decisions of the English Courts.

One of the distinguishing characteristics of the Lehman bankruptcy cases is the
complexity of the underlying financial structures many of which are being analyzed for the first time from a real world bankruptcy perspective. It is to be expected, as a result, that the cases of LBHI and LBSF on occasion would break new ground as to unsettled subject matter. This is one such occasion.

This decision places BNY in a difficult position in light of the contrary determination of the English Courts confirming that Noteholder Priority applies to claims made against it in England by Perpetual. This is a situation that calls for the parties, this Court and the English Courts to work in a coordinated and cooperative way to identify means to reconcile the conflicting judgments. The Court directs that the parties attend a status conference to be held on the next available omnibus hearing date in the Debtors’ cases for purposes of exploring means to harmonize the decisions of this Court and the English Courts.

2010年9月10日星期五

Corporate bankruptcy: Costly and often worthless

Corporate bankruptcy: Costly and often worthless
by Kit R. Roane, contributorSeptember 9, 2010: 5:55 AM ET


FORTUNE -- Unsecured creditors of Lehman Brothers may have choked last week when Harvey Miller, the lead attorney on the bank's bankruptcy, told Congress that the final bill to unwind its sprawling claims would likely hit $2 billion and take two more years to settle. He also said some of those creditors might only collect twenty cents on the dollar for approved claims.

To some, Lehman is an example of bankruptcy costs run amuck, driven higher by $1000-an-hour lawyers and pricey consultants out to line their pockets at creditors' expense. Such costs have also come under scrutiny during the mega-bankruptcies being unwound at General Motors, Chrysler and Washington Mutual -- the latter a hobbled bank that just passed the $100 million mark in reorganization fees.

History is replete with similarly expensive tales of woe. The tab for parsing Enron topped $750 million, while WorldCom's hit $657 million and Pacific Gas & Electric's (PCG, Fortune 500) was $462.5 million. In comparison, UAL's (UAUA, Fortune 500) more recent three-year slog through bankruptcy -- at $330 million -- seems almost too cheap to compare.

But some bankruptcy experts argue that those eye-popping figures aren't really that large, given the complexities involved in unwinding institutions such as Enron or Lehman Brothers, or when the sums are compared with the assets held by such bankrupt concerns. In fact, the most egregious and most costly problem with the bankruptcy system may be something else entirely -- that too many companies emerge from bankruptcy only to find themselves distressed again.

Good times for turnaround specialists

That's not to say that bankruptcy costs couldn't come down. Bankruptcy rules make it easier for companies to obtain financing and sweat out their creditors while restructuring, say critics, adding that the executives running the companies are unfazed by the fees because the creditors will end up eating the cost. They also argue that fee applications are generally too voluminous and too difficult to truly challenge, and that judges and creditors' lawyers are generally too timid to question them anyway.

Stephen French, whose company, Legalbill, helps businesses manage the costs of outside counsel, says companies in bankruptcy can see a 15% to 20% reduction in legal costs when they put oversight controls in place. But UCLA Law professors Lynn LoPucki and Joseph Doherty recently wrote that "meaningful objections to fee requests are few, and judges are shirking the duty to review fees absent objection." The professors added that their data indicates only about 1% of all fee requests are cut down and that such fees increased at a rate greater than 10% per year between 1998 and 2007 -- more than twice the rate of inflation.

However, it can often be hard to say which bankruptcy fees are truly excessive. As Professor Stephen J. Lubben, a bankruptcy expert at Seton Hall University's School of Law, noted in one of his own studies, "the idea of professionals receiving millions from a company that is ostensibly 'broke' strikes more than a few as peculiar, or worse," but deciding "exactly how much it should cost to reorganize a corporate entity is a matter of surprising elusiveness."

In the end, he says, the excessive Chapter 11 cost, "like pornography, is recognized by whatever shocks a particular commentator."

The depth of the most recent recession focused attention on those fees again, as a string of high-profile bankruptcies has again fattened the wallets of bankruptcy lawyers and their consultants. Nine of the 20 largest corporate bankruptcies to occur in the last three decades were filed in 2008 and 2009. Last year marked the highest number of billion-dollar bankruptcies ever recorded. And corporate bankruptcies have continued at an elevated clip, with about twice the number of businesses filing for bankruptcy protection in the 12 months ending June 2010, as they did during the same span of time in 2008, 2007 or 2006.

But despite the headline-grabbing string of expenses emanating from the Lehman case and others -- $500 a day limo fees, a few hundred for dry cleaning, or a few million a month in billable hours -- experts say that such costs are not only hard to judge, but relatively small.

Lawyers aren't paid a dime in about 35% of all Chapter 11 bankruptcies, generally because the cases are dismissed or the firm is liquidated. And with the average time spent in bankruptcy in decline, the higher billable hour may be a wash, say some experts.

Bankruptcy's hidden costs

Far more important than a bankruptcy's legal and consultant fees are its indirect costs -- lost sales and profits due to the firm's uncertainty and its financial distress. These can add up to between 10% and 15% of a firm's value; in contrast, lawyer and consultant fees generally amount to only about 1% or 2% of a large company's asset value, or 4% to 5% of the asset value of the smallest firms.

In the end, the cost of lawyers and consultants on a bankruptcy is "trivial," says Professor Edward Altman, an expert on bankruptcy at NYU's Stern School of Business who believes the focus on legal fees in bankruptcy masks a greater and more debilitating danger within the system, one that affects about one-third of all public companies seeking bankruptcy reorganization. The problem? Within four or five years, they find themselves back in a distressed restructuring again.

Despite the bankruptcy code's order that judges independently confirm that a reorganization plan "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation or the need for further financial reorganization of the debtor," these companies are routinely allowed to leave bankruptcy with the same operating issues and over-leveraged balance sheets that caused their original death rattle. Among the recent repeat offenders are Polaroid, Sun Country Airlines, Spiegel/Eddie Bauer Holdings, Filene's Basement, and Firstplus Financial Group.

Some of these companies probably should have never been allowed to reorganize, and been liquidated instead. Others, Altman argues, could have survived with more nurturing. Instead, they were pushed through the reorganization process too quickly and left with too much leverage by investment bankers wanting to collect fees and equity-averse senior creditors wanting to cash out. If the creditors are on board, he says, the courts too often refuse to look at the efficacy of the reorganization plan and refuse to judge the likelihood that financial stress will bow the company gain.

Too many firms come out of bankruptcy but they are not really cured, says Altman, adding that he's much more concerned with the fact that companies can't stay out of bankruptcy than that reorganization costs may seem a little high here or there.

After all, what's more expensive than a corporate bankruptcy? A second one.

Lehman Investigation Said to Be Closing In

September 10, 2010, 5:58 am

In the Securities and Exchange Commission’s investigation into the fall of Lehman Brothers, scrutiny has turned to an accounting maneuver that artificially lowered the bank’s debt levels, The Wall Street Journal reported.

The investigation is also looking into the accuracy and consistency with which executives noted the cost of the real-estate portfolio acquired when Lehman took over the apartment developer Archstone-Smith Trust, and the extent to which investors were made aware of the losses that resulted, The Journal said.
As the investigation gets more specific, so the threat of the S.E.C.’s bringing civil charges pertaining to the investment bank’s collapse increases. However, The Journal noted, it doesn’t look like a decision is going to be made just yet.

“Bottom line, the S.E.C. wants a scalp out of Lehman,” Lawrence G. McDonald, a former vice president at the bank, told DealBook. “So does the White House.”

2010年9月7日星期二

Channel NewsAsia - Less sophisticated structured products expected in future - channelnewsasia.com

Channel NewsAsia - Less sophisticated structured products expected in future - channelnewsasia.com

Yuan bonds an easier sell as curbs eased

Yuan bonds an easier sell as curbs eased

Tuesday, September 07, 2010

Sales procedures have been simplified for yuan-denominated bonds, just in time for a launch by Bank of China (3988) tomorrow.
Banks were notified of the streamlined sales procedure, pushed as a pilot scheme by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority, yesterday.

The relaxation only applies to "non-sovereign plain vanilla bonds" - which are products that are not leveraged or come with embedded derivatives - issued by those with a track record.

Investors will not have to undergo audio recording sessions - which were put in place in wake of the Lehman Brothers minibonds saga - as long as their risk assessments matches that for the bond products.

Distributing banks will make a standardized risk disclosure statement to facilitate the procedure. The bonds can also be sold at designated counters inside the "green zone"- within which normally no transaction of investment products can be conducted.

BOC will launch two tranches of the yuan bond with maturities of two and three years for a bond yield of 2.65 percent and 2.9 percent per annum, seeking to raise up to five billion yuan (HK$5.72 billion) from retail investors.

The minimum that investors will have to cough up to buy into the product is about 10,000 yuan, sources said.

More than 10 local banks will help distribute the product. DBS Hong Kong rates its risk level at three in a range of one to five, while Fubon Bank and Bank of Communications (HK) give it a rating of just two.

Demand is expected to be hot amid the current low interest rate environment and the potential strengthening of the yuan, despite the yield offered being low, market observers and fund managers said.

"Given the current interest rate level, market demand for a new yuan bond is likely to be high," said Wesley Kong, director of fixed income investment at Hai Tong Asset Management (HK).

Meanwhile, Russian aluminum giant UC Rusal (0486) is also seeking to launch yuan corporate bonds, following the fast-food chain McDonald's. But Rusal's yield may be higher than the 3 percent McDonald's offered as it has no credit rating yet.

The yield of Rusal's yuan bond may be 5.5 percentage points above McDonald's and it may sell at least US$100 million (HK$780 million) worth of bonds to attract international investors, a fund manager at Union investment, Surgey Dergachev, told Bloomberg.

China Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of China have also received the green light to issue yuan bonds of up to five billion yuan each in Hong Kong this year.

MANDY LO and BETH YE

2010年9月3日星期五

Fed chairman testifying to crisis inquiry panel

Fed chairman testifying to crisis inquiry panel


Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke is set to appear before a panel investigating the financial crisis to give his take on the meltdown and his views on potential systemwide risks posed by large financial institutions.Bernanke led the economy through the tumultuous months of the most severe recession since the 1930s, as the Federal Reserve took extraordinary measures to inject hundreds of billions into the battered financial system.And he said last week the central bank is prepared to make a major new investment in government debt or mortgage securities if the economy worsened significantly or if the Fed detected deflation - a prolonged drop in prices of wages, goods and assets like homes and stocks.

Bernanke's scheduled appearance yesterday at a hearing by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission comes as the congressionally appointed panel approaches the end of its yearlong investigation of the roots of the economic disaster. Sheila Bair, the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., also is testifying before the panel.At a session Wednesday the commission examined the danger of having banks deemed "too big to fail" and their potential to topple the financial system.

The former chief of Lehman Brothers, Richard S. Fuld Jr., testified that the Wall Street titan could have been rescued in the fall of 2008, but federal regulators refused to help - even though they later bailed out other big banks.Panel chairman Phil Angelides said there appeared to be "a conscious policy decision" by the regulators not to rescue Lehman.Under the landmark financial overhaul law enacted in July, regulators are empowered to shut down financial institutions whose collapse could threaten the system.Bernanke has said that a key lesson learned from the crisis is that the Fed can't focus solely on the soundness of individual banks, and must cast a watchful eye on the health of the financial system as a whole.

The central bank already has moved to conduct bank examinations that take a broader-picture approach, he says.Bernanke could be asked by panel members about the Fed's handling of the Lehman Brothers episode and Fuld's accusations. Thomas Baxter, general counsel of the New York Fed, insisted at Wednesday's hearing that the Fed lacked the legal authority to provide a government guarantee of Lehman's obligations to its trading partners or other aid the firm sought.

Hundreds of billions worth of collateral would have been needed to secure a guarantee of that magnitude, and Lehman didn't have it, Baxter said.Bair, the FDIC chief, has been one of the most vocal critics of the "too big to fail" approach that brought the government rushing in to bail out big banks in the crisis."Never again should taxpayers be asked to bail out a failing financial firm," Bair told community bankers in a speech in March. "It's time that the big players understand that they sink or swim on their own."Bair took on a high profile and gained popularity outside Washington early in the crisis, as she pressed for more government intervention to help struggling homeowners.

That opened a rift with then-President George W. Bush's treasury secretary, Henry Paulson.

2010年9月1日星期三

Lehman ex-chief hits at regulators

Lehman ex-chief hits at regulators


Richard Fuld, former chief executive of Lehman Brothers, has hit out at regulators for helping his competitors but letting his investment bank collapse at the height of the financial crisis.

"Other firms were hurt by their plummeting stock prices," Fuld (pictured) said in prepared remarks submitted to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) for a hearing in Washington. "Lehman was the only firm that was mandated by government regulators to file for bankruptcy. The government was then forced to intervene to protect those other firms and the entire financial system." Lehman, the biggest underwriter of mortgage-backed securities at the top of the US real estate market, filed the largest bankruptcy in the country's history in September 2008, with US$639 billion in assets, roiling markets and exacerbating the global credit crisis.

The firm succumbed to the subprime mortgage crisis it helped create after surviving railroad failures of the 19th century and the Great Depression in the 1930s. "Lehman was forced into bankruptcy not because it neglected to act responsibly or seek solutions to the crisis, but because of a decision, based on flawed information, not to provide Lehman with the support given to each of its competitors and other non-financial firms in the ensuing days," Fuld said.

The collapse of Lehman and the bailout the same week of insurer American International Group contributed to the biggest rewrite of financial rules since the Depression.

Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke said in October 2008 that regulators were unable to prop up Lehman because the firm did not have enough collateral and "there was no mechanism, there was no option, there was no set of rules, there was no funding to allow us to address that situation". The rescue of AIG, which was unable to obtain private-sector funding as Lehman faltered, swelled to US$182.3 billion after regulators determined that allowing the insurer to fail would further hobble the financial system.

The FCIC's hearing is called "Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of Systemic Risk in the Financial Crisis".

The bipartisan FCIC was created by Congress to study the causes of the worst economic slump since the 1930s. The commission is scheduled to report its findings to Congress and President Barack Obama by December.

銀行用蠢招吸傻客

銀行用蠢招吸傻客


上星期,我接到銀行的電話,說要同我做一份問卷,如果是優惠餽贈,我通常都會馬上拒絕,因為我喜歡的東西都是愈貴愈好,免費的東西幾乎是不可能符合我的心意。但是本助人為快樂之本,我又是銀行的客戶,所以做問卷是義不容辭的。

風險回報比例理應不相等

那位問卷調查員問了好幾條問題,我都回答了。然後他說: 「世上有高風險高回報的投資,也有低風險低回報的投資,你會選擇那一樣?」我的回答是: 「這條問題的前提不通,所以我無法回答。」於是,問卷告吹。

我想,銀行的人設計出這條問題出來,證明金融界的人的金融知識是何等貧乏,怪不得居然會有人設計出害人不淺的雷曼迷債了。

要知道,在投資世界,每一種產品的風險和回報率都不同,假如在數學上,所有投資產品的風險和回報都是相等的,例如說,99%的安全度,回報率就是1%,一半的total loss 風險,回報率就是1 倍……那我們隨便挑一隻去購買就可以了,何必精挑細選投資產品?

尋找低風險高回報投資

我們去尋找優良的股票,正是因為世上有低風險、高回報的產品,所以才值得我們花時間去找尋。高風險往往代表了低回報,舉例說明,股市在32000 點時,風險肯定比在11000 點時為高,潛在回報則肯定是較低(11000 點反彈回32000 點的2/3, 就是升1 倍, 而恒指是不可能跌至零的)。

我不明白,這麼簡單的道理,應該是豬囉也能明白的,為什麼銀行高層居然還用這種方法去Sell 客?這證明在投資界,玩的是「dumber anddumber」的遊戲,中文應譯作「扑傻瓜」,盲毛打出亂棍,總會扑中一人。