法庭消息：中銀女經理被控誤導客戶購迷債

法庭消息：中銀女經理被控誤導客戶購迷債
【12:30】2011年03月01日
【on.cc 東方互動 專訊】 中國銀行高級經理戴晶，被控2項欺詐誘使他人投資的罪名，案件今日在區域法院開審。控方指，戴晶於2008年誤導2名客戶分別以逾30萬元及100萬元，購買雷曼迷你債券。戴晶對2名客戶作出虛假陳述，包括向客戶表示雷曼迷你債券是保本的低風險投資。

歐智華慳家 早餐食雞粥

歐智華接受與《金融時報》訪問，選擇於中環匯豐銀行頂樓共晉早餐，記者預先點了傳統西式早餐，歐智華有廣東人的口味，點了碎雞肉粥。或許，歐智華的「節儉」作風，與其出身不無關係。

出身牛津攻讀法律

今天掌管匯控的歐智華並非生於大富大貴之家，父親是法律行政人員，母親則是工程師的個人助理。英國本土精英大多數就讀名牌公學，歐智華卻是出身於一般文法學校（Grammar School）。

他在牛津大學攻讀法律，初衷是當大律師。歐智華說，由於當時家庭環境不容許繼續進修，暫且打消念頭。機緣巧合之下，在派對遇到一位匯豐派駐印度的行政人員， 建議他申請匯豐培訓計劃。「派駐海外」這一點，吸引了熱愛旅遊的歐智華。他坦言原本只想打兩年工，儲夠錢後回去進修法律。

歐智華1980 年加入匯豐，先後調派阿聯酋的沙迦及香港當交易員，他形容在投資界打滾經歷極之興奮（real buzz）， 「你要為自己的決定負責，判斷要快」。歐智華其後扶搖直上，1998 年掌管匯控亞州資本市場業務時，由於當時正值亞洲金融風暴，一眾銀行、對基金等投資者，皆認為亞洲貨幣價值被高估，紛紛衝擊亞洲貨幣。歐智華卻放棄這個短期獲利機會，反而幫助亞洲央行重建金融體系；危機過後，聲名大噪。

兩大金融風暴突顯才能

《金融時報》的報道說，歐智華從不熱中短炒，也認為以此獲利並非良好生意模式。他憶述在亞洲金融風暴時，有些美國銀行確能借亞洲貨幣大跌獲利， 「它們很多客戶也無法償還債務，結果導致銀行出現龐大壞帳」。

10 年後的金融海嘯，令歐智華在集團內的聲名更上一層樓，由於他先知先覺，在雷曼兄弟倒閉前，他已減少華爾街大行的證券投資，成為其後董事會甄選行政總裁過程獲得垂青的有利條件。

Notice From the Securities Arbitration Law Firm of Klayman & Toskes to All UBS ...

Notice From the Securities Arbitration Law Firm of Klayman & Toskes to All UBS ...

UBS AG LONDON BRHUBS | 2/25/2011 4:37:44 PMNEW YORK, Feb 25, 2011 (GlobeNewswire via COMTEX News Network) --
The Securities Arbitration Law Firm of Klayman & Toskes, www.nasd-law.com, announced today that it is continuing to pursue securities arbitration claims against UBS Financial Services (NYSE:UBS) with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority's ("FINRA") Office of Dispute Resolution, on behalf of investors who sustained losses in Lehman Brothers 100% Principal Protection Notes ("Lehman Notes"). Many investors of the Lehman Notes have received paperwork from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceeding, and are hoping to recover their losses in the Notes through that process instead of filing an individual securities arbitration claim against UBS. However, it is unclear how long that process will take, or whether investors will recover more than a nominal amount. Accordingly, investors should avail themselves of all remedies in attempting to recover their losses, including filing a securities arbitration claim against UBS. Further, investors should determine if they have to contend with any statute of limitations issues.

Additionally, while a class action lawsuit has been filed relating to the Lehman Notes, Klayman & Toskes reminds investors of the benefits of filing an individual arbitration claim, as opposed to participating in a class action lawsuit. According to Lawrence L. Klayman of Klayman & Toskes, "We have consistently said that investors who lost more than $100,000 in their brokerage account should pursue an individual arbitration claim rather than participate in a class action. The Awards coming out in these Lehman Note cases confirm our position."

To date, investors who filed claims against UBS in the FINRA arbitration forum have won seven of eight cases. The sole case which did not prevail was filed by a pro se investor. Collectively, the eight cases sought damages of $3,642,688, with Panels handing out 95% of that amount, or $3,461,438. Five of the seven successful cases won 100% of the damages sought. The other two cases won an average of 67% of the damages. The high win rate in these cases stands in stark contrast with the results obtained by investors from 2006 to 2010. During this time frame, investors won about 43% of the time.

By participating in a class action lawsuit, an investor may only recover a nominal amount. However, if one has experienced significant investment losses, it may be more beneficial for them to file an individual securities arbitration claim. In 2003, Klayman & Toskes conducted a detailed study of securities arbitration versus class action. The study concluded that investors who file a securities arbitration claim traditionally obtain an overall higher rate of recovery as opposed to participating in a class action lawsuit. To view the full results of the comparison, please visit our web-site: http://www.nasd-law.com/documents/classvr.pdf

Investors who have sustained losses in the Lehman Notes can contact Klayman & Toskes to explore their legal rights and options. The attorneys at Klayman & Toskes are dedicated to pursuing claims on behalf of investors who have suffered investment losses. Klayman & Toskes, an experienced, qualified and nationally recognized securities litigation law firm, practices exclusively in the field of securities arbitration and litigation. It continues its representation of investors throughout the world in securities arbitration and litigation matters against major Wall Street brokerage firms.

If you wish to discuss this announcement or have investment losses of $100,000 or more in the Lehman Notes, please contact Steven D. Toskes, Esquire or Jahan K. Manasseh, Esquire of Klayman & Toskes, P.A., at 888-997-9956 or visit us on the web at http://www.nasd-law.com.

This news release was distributed by GlobeNewswire, www.globenewswire.com

SOURCE: Klayman & Toskes P.A.

CONTACT: Klayman & Toskes, P.A. 888-997-9956

(C) Copyright 2010 GlobeNewswire, Inc. All rights reserv

Minibond investors hadn't heard of Lehman

And Jeffrey Lam, the Legco member whose company has business with BOC, dare to lie in Legco that the bankers had told the victims that they were buying Lehman Minibonds inside the Bank of China at those time during Legco question period and was stopped by other members of Legco.

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/05/legislator-jeffrey-lam-dear-citizens-of.html

Investors in Lehman Brothers minibonds told a Legislative Council subcommittee yesterday they had never heard of the bank before its collapse in 2008 and had not realised their savings were lost when told of its failure.

The investors were testifying at the subcommittee's first hearing on the Lehman Brothers collapse and the loss of millions of dollars in savings of Hong Kong investors, many of them pensioners.

The first three to testify - Ip Chun, Ng Joong-yee and Ho Lai-yuet - all bought Lehman minibonds from the Bank of China (Hong Kong) and said they had not been given any prospectuses and were not aware of the risks when buying derivatives.

Ho, 70, said she did not immediately realise she had lost her HK$480,000 investment, half of her total savings, when Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008. She said she had bought the minibonds from a Bank of China staff member whom she had known for two years.

I was doing fixed deposits at the bank. The staff member told me she had a better offer for me. She said it was a three-year plan with a better interest rate, Ho said. News of Lehman Brothers' collapse did not concern her at first, as she had not realised she was exposed to any of its products.

Then the staff member called me one day and told me the three-year plan I bought was not operating anymore. I was very puzzled.

She said she had not been given any documents or receipts until she asked the bank to send these to her after Lehman Brothers collapsed.

Ng, 75, told the subcommittee that Bank of China staff who advised him to buy the minibonds had not even mentioned Lehman Brothers, and he was unaware of the consequences for him when the US bank collapsed.

I had bought MTR and government bonds in the past and I thought minibonds were just the same.

He said he was told to sign two documents when he invested HK$1.26 million: one was the contract, the other was blank. He said staff had not explained the risks.

I got back the blank document from them after Lehman Brothers collapsed. It was the risk assessment, and the information on it was totally wrong. They even mixed up the ages of my wife and I, Ng said.

When subcommittee member Chan Kin-por asked Ng why he had signed a blank document, he replied: I believed in the bank, and thought I needed to sign two documents to buy the products, so I signed.

Ip invested HK$1 million in minibonds, one-third of her total savings. She said she was only shown a leaflet and told it was a safe investment. When I asked about the risks they only told me to be confident. I trusted the staff there because they represented the bank and I thought it had a very strict policy on the promotion of products, Ip said.

Subcommittee chairman Raymond Ho Chung-tai said more investors from other banks would testify in March and April. Copyright (c) 2011. South China Morning Post Publishers Ltd. All rights reserved.

檢控銀行才是司法公義

檢控銀行才是司法公義


上星期本欄介紹了一件有線電視被電訊管理局罰款之後上訴去上訴庭的案件，非常巧合，同一天區域法院為第一件雷曼事件之下的銀行僱員被控以欺詐或魯莽（Reckless）的事實陳述引誘他人投資行為事件，結果是僱員因為疑點得益而獲判無罪，此案有甚多疑問，特別是控方準備證供之時未盡全力，有「放水」之嫌。


但本文只討論一個與上星期所介紹有線電視案相同的法律觀點，就是筆者認為在同類事件之中，檢控僱主（銀行）較檢控僱員更為合理。


在有線電視一案，辯方的主要抗辯理由之一，是公司有明文禁止僱員對顧客作出欺詐性陳述，在這情況下公司應不用承擔僱員犯事的所謂「轉承法律責任」（Vicarious Liability）。我們皆明白，大公司的官僚作風與政府無異，必然有一套表面上和合法合情的工作指引，但私下的機構商業文化，必然是壓迫員工爭取最多的生意額，指引其實就只屬官樣文章，用以逃避責任。


在上述案件的第13段開始，法官解釋有關一個機構是否不必為僱員在受僱期間所犯的責任負責之時，答案原則上必然是不是（question must be answered in the negative）。由於持牌人的工作，必然是經由僱員所進行，如果僱員是受僱進行某一類行為，在此案中是與準顧客進行交易行為，持牌人必須為僱員的行為負上責任。


唯一的例外，是僱員胡亂行事（a frolic of his own），置僱主的指示於不顧。僱主可在已經採取完全有效防止措施（completely effective preventive measure）。


由誰人證明，或是提出證據，說是已經採取了完全有效的防止措施，防範前線員工有不正常的銷售手法？很明顯，在僱員有犯法的初步證據之時，法人的僱主有責任向法庭提供資料，以證明已經採取非常小心及有效的措施，不許員工違規銷售。


回到雷曼事件本身，所有銀行一定有官樣文章與文件，說明會要求員工合法地推銷雷曼的產品，但實情當然不應是同一回事，而違規銷售肯定是系統性的現象，不是單一事件。大家可以翻查08年尾證監會的一份提交給財政司「就雷曼迷你債券危機引起的事項」的報告，其中第17段說明，近8千宗投訴銀行的指控，皆有共同的情況，包括：前線人員主動遊說投訴人將到期的定期存款轉為購買迷債；前線人員在銷售產品時沒有考慮投訴人的承受風險能力和個人情況，特別是退休、年長、教育水平較低及對投資不熟悉，以及不願承擔風險的客戶；沒有提供條款表及章程等產品資料，也沒有說明產品特點和風險，部份前線職員更作出失實陳述，指有關產品與定期一樣，並無風險。


很明顯，既然是結構性事件，銀行作為法人，中層與高層不會不知道事件的普遍性，為求業績，銀行的中高層促銷心態明顯，壓迫前線員工促銷的動機亦十分明顯，犯法的元兇是銀行作為法人而不是前線員工。前線員工充其量是充當串謀者，但主要責任是在銀行本身。在直接檢控銀行的情況下，銀行就有責任交出推銷雷曼產品的計劃詳情，職員對產品的培訓及銷售的指引等等，事件的發生經過才能夠有一個全面的圖像，才能還司法公義的真面目。◇

雷曼小組下月及4月將再傳召苦主作供

雷曼小組下月及4月將再傳召苦主作供
【13:43】2011年02月25日
【on.cc 東方互動 專訊】 立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會，今日傳召多名雷曼苦主出席聆訊作供。小組主席何鍾泰表示，下月及4月將再度傳召雷曼苦主作供，作供完畢後，委員會將開始撰寫報告，期望明年初完成。

早前區域法院裁決1名前中國銀行(香港)員工被控誤導苦主，罪名不成立，何鍾泰表示，相信有關裁決不會影響雷曼事件調查工作。

立法會雷曼小組傳召苦主出席聆訊作供

立法會雷曼小組傳召苦主出席聆訊作供
【11:52】2011年02月25日
【on.cc 東方互動 專訊】 立法會研究雷曼事宜小組委員會，傳召多名雷曼苦主出席聆訊作供。其中一名向中銀購買雷曼產品的投資者葉珍表示，向她銷售產品的職員沒有向她提及風險評估，只強調產品涉及6間知名企業及內地，即使有任何風險亦只會損失本金的7份之1，銷售期間職員只替她填寫一份問卷，再由她簽名作實。

另1名向中銀購買迷債的投資者吳中兒表示，職員向他銷售時強調，迷債與定期存款相若並無風險，職員並要求他簽署一份合約及一份空白文件，吳中兒其後才知那是風險評估書，更發現職員將他的個人資料及投資經驗等填寫錯誤。

NY suit against Ernst over Lehman takes detour

NY suit against Ernst over Lehman takes detour

(Reuters) - New York state regulators face their first test soon in their accounting fraud lawsuit against Ernst & Young LLP over its role as auditor for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

The first major government legal action stemming from Lehman's 2008 bankruptcy filing, the lawsuit first brought by then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo accused Ernst of helping the Wall Street investment bank engage in a massive accounting fraud in the years before its collapse.

Ernst, the world's third biggest auditor, has said it acted properly and that Lehman's accounting complied with national standards.

The firm has moved the case to federal court from state court, saying it involves questions of federal auditing standards. But Cuomo's successor, Eric Schneiderman, wants to move the case back.

Some lawyers said Ernst's move could be an attempt to streamline defenses, as the auditor is already fighting a similar lawsuit in federal court.

But the move could also benefit Ernst by throttling a "home court" advantage that Schneiderman could have in state court, according to Anthony Sabino, a law professor at St. John's University in New York.

The biggest benefit from a change in court is that cases move faster in federal court.

While defendants often want to slow cases down, he said "the accountants clearly are confident in their ability to win" and want to dispose of the case quickly.

"Bringing the action to the federal courthouse levels the field," he added.

Miles Ruthberg, a Latham & Watkins LLP partner representing Ernst, declined comment.

"We believe this civil lawsuit by the New York Attorney General presents important questions of federal law that should be decided by a federal judge," a spokesman for Ernst said in a statement.

Moving the case would allow it to be heard by the same judge who is already overseeing other Lehman civil lawsuits and understands the issues, Ernst said.

Ernst has asked that its case be moved to U.S. District Judge Lewis Kaplan, who is hearing another case involving Lehman in which Ernst is a defendant.

That lawsuit, led by several pension funds that invested in Lehman securities, also accused the auditor of signing off on misleading accounting.

This included a so-called "Repo 105" device that Lehman used to lower its reported leverage and make its balance sheet look less risky

Kaplan, however, may decide not to take the New York state case, according to Jake Zamansky, a securities fraud lawyer and founder of Zamansky & Associates.

When he sued Ernst in December, Cuomo cited violations of the Martin Act, a 90-year-old law giving New York state regulators broad enforcement powers over securities fraud.

Zamansky said that because of the Martin Act, previous attempts to move cases brought by New York attorneys general have been allowed to proceed in state courts, even if they appeared to involve federal matters.

"The attorney general's choice of forum will govern here," Zamansky said.

Ernst should probably settle because of its potential liability for the Repo 105 accounting, which was apparently meant to deceive investors, Zamansky said.

"If Ernst & Young knowingly allowed it, they could be complicit," he said.

Schneiderman has until March 4 to respond to Ernst's attempt to move the case, a court filing shows. Cuomo is now New York's governor. A spokesman for Schneiderman declined comment.

The attorney general's case is New York v. Ernst & Young LLP, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York No. 11-00384. The earlier Ernst & Young case is In Re: Lehman Brothers Securities and ERISA Litigation in the same court, No. 09-md-02017.

(Reporting by Dena Aubin; editing by Andre Grenon)

政府要趕絕苦主, 未免做得太著跡了--作者:旁觀人

政府要趕絕苦主, 未免做得太著跡了--作者:旁觀人

中銀出動「的近律師行」數位大律師為張瑰瑰出庭, 在上庭前又與她討論和訓練證供問題, 全部動作都是為中銀脫罪. 銀行為張瑰瑰聘請了數個保鑣, 又準備了一輛豪華的七人房車, 陣容之盛, 不能言喻......

反觀雷曼苦主證人, 既沒有律政署的律師為他們作出任何安排, 警方的檢控官又在法官面前結結巴巴, 讓年老的證人苦主在庭上說話, 令法官對證人留下壞的印象. 簡直強弱懸殊, 目不忍睹.

商罪科和律政署攜手同心, 泡製出如此一齣鬧劇, 令ELN, 精債或其他苦主陷於不利的位置, 真多謝政府各部門的苦心.

他們「眼不見為乾淨」, 就這樣把事情壓下去, 並不是對香港的金融中心地位有幫助, 而是親手把他摧毀. 因為再一次印證「官商勾結」 ,「政府怕財團」的事實.

要求證監公開調查16家售買精明債券銀行報告

要求證監公開調查16家售買精明債券銀行報告


證監聲稱, 有關雷曼及非雷曼的各類金融產品的投訴個案, 99%巳完成了調查工作. 各有關銀行也聲稱巳啟用了加強版投訴機制處理精明債券的投訴. 但至今只有一小部份人獲得低成數賠償，更多的人并沒有得到賠償。這是因為銀行對自己當年銷售精債的違規行為，死不認帳， 意圖逃避罪責，不了了之，而苦主們都是些普通市民， 當時又太相信銀行， 輕易被哄上當， 就算有銀行犯規證據， 也未必懂得保存下來， 現在也未必懂得如何去準確指控銀行，只能通過向證監和金管機構投訴， 希望討回公道， 但金管和證監卻當了啞巴裁判， 光聽不說， 使銀行可以繼續撒謊抵賴,苦主依然徬徨無助， 也使事件拖了二年末能解決，每天中環有苦主還在納喊示威。 因此， 我們強烈要求證監公開對16家銷售精明債券的調查報告，讓事件在陽光下、在大眾的目光下，作公平審判，平息苦主與銀行間的爭拗， 還受害人一個清白，何況金管及證監在調查工作上花費了大量人力、物力及納稅人的金錢，只有公開證監的調查報告，對公眾，納稅人才有交待。

The key issue with Minibond is not about if it declared “principal protected” or not. The key issue is about misrepresentation and omission of the true nature and risk of the so-called “Minibond”. Lehman bankruptcy only triggered an awakening call. It made the public and minibond holders realize that the true nature and risk of minibond was not being disclosed in the past few years.


http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/07/sfc-lehman-brothers-minibonds-incident.html

要求證監全面調查精明債券摩根士丹利

要求證監全面調查精明債券摩根士丹利

證監經常在電視上宣傳教育投資者，高回報產品必定是高風險，投資時必定要小心，量力而為。精明債券是高風險但是低回報產品，高風險不是第一層掛的機構，而是隱藏著的第二層掛勾的120間各類高、中、低風險公司，很多是持有劇毒的次按資產，此120間公司只要大約10間公司出事，債券就被強制贖回，在漫長的4至7年期間，就算沒有金融風暴，出事的機會也很大。它是低回報產品，因為利息只高當時定期一至二厘，但本金被鎖4至7年，不算是高回報，只算是穩定。如此劣質的產品，狡猾的設計者想到，如放在證券行之類的金融機構，一來裹面多為有經驗投資者，不會上當，二來投資者不多，想過辦法，把它包裝成像債券的模樣及冠以精明債券，掛頭牌是中華人民共和國，錯覺是買了中國國債，夠穩陣，肯定吸引警覺性低及貪穩定收息的一眾。剛好這時證監吹著快嬴風氣，精債獲批在16間銀行發售，結果大買。達到大摩設計的目的。以大摩資深國際投行的老謀深算，或許可以把他們的罪責掩飾到天衣無縫，但是利用自己的專業知識，設計風險與回報的不對稱產品，來騙取零售市場中一些初級小投資者的金錢，就是不誠實行為，就是專業的不道德行為。

證監對不誠實的毒債設計者的處理也有不公平，迷債設計者新鴻基證券早巳被罰全數賠償，星債設計者新架坡星展，因不在香港，沒有辦法。精明債券設計者大摩，現時還在香港，但在精債事件上好像被忽略，不須付任何責任。我們要求證監徹查大摩，從設計概念到分銷到16間銀行的整個過程，公開調查報告，及懲處大摩的不誠實行為。

雷曼判決有公義嗎？

雷曼判決有公義嗎？ [信報財經新聞]


中銀前線職員張瑰瑰被商業罪案調查科控以欺詐或魯莽（reckless）的失實陳述，引誘他人投資，違反《證券及期貨條例》第107 條的案件審結，結果是六項指控皆不成立，中銀和被告當然歡迎判決，說是還以清白。筆者不會形容這是中銀的勝利，這是玩弄和出賣香港司法公義、以求登上特首之位的律政司司長黃仁龍的勝利。


一般市民，包括筆者，基本上還是信任司法制度，還是信任 99％的判決是公正的，誰知餘下的1％空間，會給奸詐的人、有權勢的人和不義的政府加以利用。按證監會於2008 年12 月向財政司就「雷曼事件」提交的報告中的第17.2 段所言，證監會接受了近八千宗針對銀行職員的投訴，包括主動游說，職員完全沒有考慮顧客的風險承受能力，指產品與定期存款一樣安全，職員只重點介紹迷你債券掛的知名機構，沒有提及雷曼控股的角色。


簡單而言，這正是法例所針對的魯莽銷售和失實陳述，「張瑰瑰案」的案情一般而言屬典型情況，但為何本案卻慘敗收場，令公眾這類案件會有「告不入」的錯覺？這是因為黃仁龍的聰明與本案法官鄧立泰的愚蠢，聯手為司法不公義作出惡例。


甲組砌丙組輸贏早有數

在證監會提交報告整整兩年後，政府才提出第一宗檢控，本身已說明問題所在，就是政府背後受到銀行業、特別是中資中銀的壓力，根本不準備認真追究事件；銀行亦不肯承認錯誤，從而作出合理補償。由於完全不檢控似乎說不過去，想上位的黃仁龍於是利用精準的法律專業知識，弄幾件告不入的案件，蒙騙公眾，為不再作刑事檢控製造輿論聲勢。


公眾也不上當。港大法律教授張達明指證人記憶力不一樣，不可以因為本案而影響其他案件的進行。湯家驊的說法更是精準，一分不差，道出問題中的問題所在， 「對警方以證據鬆散的案件進行檢控，感到奇怪」。湯認為本案控方證據不到入罪水平，就根本不應檢控。這間接說出黃仁龍是故意安排了一場必輸的「中銀檢控案」。


筆者兩星期前特意到法庭旁聽本案的結案陳詞，本欲在法理上研究一下，結果嚇了一跳。中銀職員由「的近律師行」一隊精英律師作代表，輔以大律師和資深大律師；而控方呢？是一位英文口音差、說話口窒窒和沒有戴假髮的普通律師，這根本就是一場甲組對丙組的比賽。黃仁龍的安排，過於苦心了，令人一看就明。


這類情況，很依賴法官的明察秋毫，主動研究案情。在普通法的制度下，法官沒有這個責任，法官只依據控辯雙方提供的資料斷案。作為一部審判機器，本案的鄧立泰法官只按預定程式工作，已令人慨嘆；更差的是，為了保護自己的裁決免受上訴庭推翻，判詞中竟然照搬辯方的政治性指控，足見其司法裁斷的質素，何等低下。


辯方資深大狀指「雷曼苦主是受政客、特別是民主黨所煽動，所以才會誤會自己被騙，然後報案」，鄧立泰基本上接受了這個論述，在判詞中苛刻批評苦主，認為他們說謊，其中一些說法近乎荒謬。他批評李姓菜販曾經作出衝擊銀行的激烈行為，有以不擇手段取回資產的傾向。衝擊銀行有多激進？最大問題是這與她曾否受騙完全無關，法官明顯具有偏見。


此外，鄧立泰指另一個四十歲的貿易公司東主是年輕的成功生意人，被告根本不可能向他作出失實陳述。然而，史上有無數專業精英或成功人士遭受欺騙的案例；其實用常識想想，就明白精英人物由於自負，更容易受人欺騙。


政府玩手段抗爭沒了斷


筆者再舉一個簡單不過的理由，大家就明白黃仁龍利用司法程序協助中銀脫罪，是如何用心良苦——為何本案只檢控前線職員，而非銀行身為法人【註】，與職員串謀犯法？更公平的做法是，只檢控銀行犯法，職員只須充當證人。鄧立泰指職員只按一貫銷售手法，沒有特別的獎金，所以沒有犯法的意圖；這就算是事實，也不等同銀行本身沒有「魯莽」誘人投資的犯法意圖。正好相反的是，在商業社會這類意圖十分明顯。


筆者舉一個上訴庭的案例（CACV 329/2008），大家比較一下，便會明白——電訊管理局判罰有線電視（不是僱員），因為有兩名前線職員游說顧客購買合約時作出失實陳述，聲稱有線將肯定提供英超聯的足球節目（游說時有線未有轉播權，最終也沒有）；有線電視以內部指引不准職員作出類似失實陳述作為抗辯理由，但上訴庭不接受，並指職員犯事，是法人的代理人（agent）犯事，即等同法人犯事。


「張瑰瑰案」或是同類案件的檢控目標，首要是法人銀行本身，在這樣的檢控情況之下，中銀就要將所有內部培訓資料、政策指引等呈堂，中層負責設計推銷雷曼產品的主管亦要出庭解釋一切，事件的圖像就會十分清楚，第一責任本來不在前線人員。


現時的審理，是中銀內部所有有關銀行促銷迷債的資料均沒有呈堂，黃仁龍是巧妙地利用了法官對前線職員按指示工作、沒有犯罪理由的同情心，故意提供不足夠的資料，旨為中銀開脫；而公眾就只會簡單地以為中銀沒有犯法，事件只是苦主貪心與胡鬧（連法官也遭誤導，一般人焉會不受騙？）。


利用大多數人的無知，拉一派、打一派，以欺壓少數人，本來是殖民地時代的統治手段，回歸後政府官員與建制勢力反而將這一套製造社會不公義、埋下社會仇恨種子的做法發揚光大。十多年來對付爭居權人士的權益、對付法輪功就是用這種方法。


中共對待「六四事件」也是同一手段，也是沒有從根本上解決問題，因為少數人遭受不公平對待，必然堅持抗爭；社會上總有少數不值這類可鄙行為的人協助他們，這就令到事件沒完沒了。


黃仁龍與特區政府再玩弄手段，只會激化矛盾， 「雷曼事件」將一如「居港權事件」，不會完結。

【註】法人犯法不會坐牢，但據107條可被罰款百萬，更重要的是判罪有利苦主民事索償。黃仁龍協助中銀逃避責任，保護其權益，機心算盡，有利爭取中資的歡心與支持，日後謀取特首之位。

JPMorgan Says It Was Tricked Into Keeping Lehman's `Goat Poo' Collateral

JPMorgan Says It Was Tricked Into Keeping Lehman's `Goat Poo' Collateral
By David McLaughlin - Feb 19, 2011 6:26 AM GMT+0800

Lehman accuses JPMorgan of siphoning billions of dollars from Lehman, leading to it collapse in September 2008. Photographer: Tomohiro Ohsumi/Bloomberg
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. tricked JPMorgan Chase & Co. into holding onto collateral that the bankrupt investment firm internally described as “goat poo,” according to a court filing by JPMorgan.

JPMorgan was stuck with Lehman’s worst securities backing $25 billion of loans as Lehman was sold to Barclays Plc in September 2008, JPMorgan said in its filing yesterday in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. Lehman described the collateral as “toxic crap” and “goat poo” to be scattered “in other people’s backyards,” JPMorgan said.

“Only later was JPMorgan able to determine that the position in which it unexpectedly found itself was the result of collusion and deception” by Lehman and Barclays, JPMorgan said.

The accusations appeared in amended counterclaims against Lehman in its lawsuit against JPMorgan. Both companies are based in New York.

Lehman accuses JPMorgan of siphoning billions of dollars from Lehman, leading to it collapse in September 2008. London- based Barclays bought Lehman’s broker-dealer unit after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing.

Kimberly Macleod, a spokeswoman for Lehman, and Mark Lane, a spokesman for Barclays, both declined to comment.

The case is Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 10-03266, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

To contact the reporter on this story: David McLaughlin in New York at dmclaughlin9@bloomberg.net

"渣打馬拉松"雷曼苦主到維園踩場

聯盟斥官不熟雷曼架構

聯盟斥官不熟雷曼架構


雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳浩偉（圓圖）對裁決結果表示失望，他認為法官根本不熟悉雷曼結構，又不滿意法官質疑案中年老事主的記憶能力。

陳浩偉在庭外表示，警方商業罪案調查科這次檢控表現欠佳，他對裁決結果感失望，又不滿法官指年老事主的記憶不可靠：「就係老人家，先至記得幾年前事呀。」陳又質疑法官不熟悉雷曼架構，指法官連「保本」的意義亦不清楚。

否認受政黨影響

不過，陳浩偉表示今次只屬個別事件，雖然裁決結果未能伸張正義，相信不會增加追討上的困難，雷曼苦主今後仍可透過法律討回公道。他強調，苦主大聯盟行動是針對銀行管理層，並非針對前線員工。

一名雷曼苦主大聯盟成員王先生則表示，他不滿法官指有事主參加了民主黨舉辦的雷曼苦主集會，受到政黨影響：「唔覺得政黨會影響到喎，邊個黨幫到手咪去邊度囉。以前我去民主黨會，家去新民黨。」 被告張瑰瑰脫罪後，並沒有由法院正門離開，而是由多名相信是保安人員的男子及家人護送，通過停車場路徑登上一部七人車離去。期間護送她的男子曾以手揮舞阻止記者拍攝，張瑰瑰似亦感不妥，表示：「由得佢啦。」顯示並不抗拒採訪，但護送的男子們並沒有停下，將她半推半送帶上七人車。

新報記者

政府招聘證監會行政總裁[11:08]

政府招聘證監會行政總裁[11:08]

政府今日宣布就證券及期貨事務監察委員會行政總裁一職展開全球招聘。
當局已成立由財政司長曾俊華擔任主席的遴選委員會，負責物色最合適的人選，然後向行政長官作出建議。委員會成員包括陳鑑林、鄭慕智、方正、李金鴻、唐家成和財經事務及庫務局長陳家強。


政府發言人說，招聘工作將全面在本港及海外進行，以物色最具資格擔任該職位的人選，接替將於2011年6月離任的韋奕禮。


(即時新聞)

aTV 亞視新聞 雷曼事件

BOC Hong Kong Manager Cleared of Lehman Products Fraud

BOC Hong Kong Manager Cleared of Lehman Products Fraud
By Debra Mao and Stephanie Tong - Feb 18, 2011 5:42 PM GMT+0800
inShare.0More
Business ExchangeBuzz up!DiggPrint Email .A BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. manager was found not guilty of fraudulently or recklessly inducing her retail banking customers to buy structured products linked to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

Judge Garry Tallentire said in his verdict delivered in Hong Kong’s District Court today that he found the banker Cheung Kwai-kwai honest and some of the witnesses for the prosecution unreliable.

The Hong Kong case underscores how the fallout from the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history continues to ripple around the world, three years after Lehman collapsed with $613 billion in liabilities. About 43,000 investors in Hong Kong bought an estimated $1.8 billion of equity-linked notes known as minibonds that were connected to Lehman and sold by commercial banks.

“Despite the (political heat?) and emotion of the Lehman minibonds, the court has adopted a rigorous and objective approach to determining very serious questions of potential criminal liability,” said Martin Rogers, head of litigation and dispute resolution in Asia at Clifford Chance LLP.

The law firm, which advised Cheung during regulatory investigations into the products, didn’t act in the criminal proceedings.

Lehman’s collapse angered many members of the public, Tallentire said. The prosecution failed to prove its case against Cheung, he said.

Customers Warned
Cheung, 48, warned customers that they risked losing their investments in the custom-made securities, which lost their value after Lehman’s bankruptcy in 2008, her lawyer Peter Duncan had told the court.

She burst into tears on hearing the verdict, which was read out over several hours today.

Jonathan Man for the prosecution declined to comment on whether the government would appeal.

The Hong Kong unit of Bank of China Ltd. was the biggest seller of the notes and was among 16 institutions that agreed to buy them back for at least 60 cents on the dollar in a settlement brokered by regulators.

BOC Hong Kong spokeswoman Angel Yip said last month Cheung is still employed by the bank. Another employee charged for the same offence, Tai Ching, is scheduled to be tried next month.

Street Protests
Lehman’s collapse wiped out the value of investments in the notes, sparking a public outcry, street protests and allegations of misselling. The heads of the city’s central bank and securities watchdog were called to testify before lawmakers and scolded in public.

“We are disappointed,” said Chan Ho-wai of a group called the Alliance of Lehman Brothers Victims after the verdict. They will continue to seek to recover their money, he said.

Securities and Futures Commission spokesman Jonathan Li said yesterday the participating banks have paid about HK$5.5 billion ($706 million) to 98 percent of the almost 30,000 eligible investors who bought minibonds from them.

The Hong Kong Monetary Authority said today that more than 99 percent of the 21,747 complaints it has received on Lehman- related products have been resolved, closed or acted upon.

Investigation work is underway on the remaining 91 cases, it said.

The case is Hong Kong SAR v. Cheung Kwai Kwai, DCCC526/2010, in Hong Kong District Court.

To contact the reporters on this story: Debra Mao in Hong Kong dmao5@bloomberg.net; Stephanie Tong in Hong Kong at stong17@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Douglas Wong in Hong Kong at dwong19@bloomberg.net
.

證監張灼華續約 唐家成任非執董

證監張灼華續約 唐家成任非執董

證監新CEO 要照顧本地細行

證監新CEO 要照顧本地細行

梁定邦在法律、金融和學術三棲發展，多年來於中港廣立人脈，他自言「日日都收到獵頭公司電話、電郵」，請他推薦金融管理人才。那可有人請他推薦證監會新行政總裁人選呢？他就支吾數秒，似是有難言之忍：「那天碰到方正（證監會主席），說請獵頭公司招聘嘛。」

膚色不重要 須是有心人

　　他謂，新行政總裁必須是個「有心人」，更要平衡本地業界利益。

　　現任證監會行政總裁韋奕禮去年12月初宣布於本年6月離任，月初時英國官方正式公布，委任其為新成立的消費者保障和巿場管理局（CPMA）主管，有意見指，繼任人將揭起華洋爭奪戰，梁定邦不同意。

　　「綠色黃色黑色（人種）均不重要，但一定要是有心人。要照顧大行之餘，亦不可忽略本地業界。」

　　他謂，業界一直都感到證監對外國大行特別照顧，雖然有可能是錯覺，但現時監管要求愈來愈嚴格，本地經紀行要跟隨亦感吃力。

　　「中國人做個人服務已累積長時間的經驗，是個優勢，相對銀行服務就較疏離。」研究金融監管歷史的他，希望證監繼任人重視本地經紀訴求。

人性貪婪 雷曼事件勢重演

梁定邦於監管機構工作多年，經歷過股市高低起跌，他處理過98年百富勤證券清盤，10年後雷曼迷債遺禍人間，他披甲上陣為消費者爭取，又代表法改委發表集體訴訟諮詢文件。他不諱言，雷曼事件令他搖頭歎息，但歷史循環不息，將來人民幣產品發展至一個地步，亦劫數難逃。

昔成功替事主 取全額賠償

　　「我與律師David Wright（合作），他用一星期時間畫了個圖，才看到整個產品的來龍去脈，最大問題是迷債持有人買swap（指CDS，即信貸違約掉期），即是賣保險，根本無人知道自己做了保險公司。」雷曼事件令梁定邦感受很深，當時其客戶是退休教授夫婦事主：「我問他：『你是教授、又拿PhD（博士），這些事怎會不懂？』他答我：『更高深數學我都識，但我只識計數。』」該夫婦最終獲星展銀行全數賠償約983萬元。

　　梁認為證監會在迷債後推新措施，證明監管不力。「如監管得好，何須出新政策？當時為何不推這些較激烈的新政策？因為當時社會風氣是要求開放，監管機構更加要收緊，人家就會說你阻住地球轉。」

　　「歸咎於誰沒意思，（迷債）太複雜，是監管制度無法捕捉的漏網之魚，遺害投資者，甚至從業員。」

監管倘收緊 「阻住地球轉」

　　經過教訓，監管制度將改善，梁定邦認為，隨歐美制度收緊，亞洲將會跟隨，金管局去年提出的投資者教育局概念，他一直渴望出現，亦樂意協助。

　　百富勤清盤後又有迷債，他只能搖頭歎息，研究金融歷史的他知道，貪婪是人性：「（經濟）收縮了就會好警惕，再過一段時間就會發現，有錢搵喎，就有新產品出台，忘記風險。金融機構、監管機構、投資者，將一窩蜂去做一些以後會後悔的事，這是人類一個不能避免的劫數。」他說來臉上盡是笑意，似看穿了歷史循環。

梁定邦向花旗索償 揭炒15份Accumulator.

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4428

工商東亞 精明債券系列21及22

工商東亞 精明債券系列21及22

---------------
http://paper.wenweipo.com [2007-09-21]
　該港元零售債券為不保本產品，與中國之信貸及人民幣的表現相聯，而投資者毋須兌換或開設人民幣戶口。系列21債券為期4年(可延期至7年)，首4年的年息率為4.05%，其後3年的年息率為8.1%；系列22的投資期為5年，年息率為5%。利息會每半年派息一次，按人民幣名義金額及固定息率計算利息回報，並以當時港元兌人民幣匯率折算為港元支付，而發行人可選擇於票據發行半年後或之後任何時候贖回。債券面額均為4萬元，認購期至10月12日。

Victoria Peak International Finance Limited精明債券系列15及16

Victoria Peak International Finance Limited精明債券系列15及16

-------------------------http://paper.wenweipo.com [2006-12-07]
　為不保本產品，債券與中國及6間著名機構之信貸表現相聯，包括匯豐、渣打、星展、國家開發銀行、華僑銀行及太古。債券分為兩個組別，系列15可由4年投資期延長至7年，美元及港元系列首4年分別派發6%及5.3%，第5年至第7年分別派發7.2%及6.3%；系列16投資期為5.5年，美元及港元系列首4年分別派發5.5%及4.8%，第5年至第5.5年分別為6.5%及5.8%。最低投資額為5000美元或4萬港元，認購期至12月28日

【香港經濟法律】「精明債券」的合約法律問題

【香港經濟法律】「精明債券」的合約法律問題

作者﹕黃覺岸

【大紀元6月23日訊】首先不要期望筆者在本文可以為大家介紹一眾什麼：「違約信貸掉期」、「債務抵押證券」、「結構性票據」以及accumulator等等投資工具的法律問題，因為其結構本身複雜，非一般人包括一般的律師所能理解，合約出了問題之時，永遠對合約不理解的一方不利。

於是引申出來的問題是，投資者不能依賴這些衍生工具合約的條文本身保護自己的權益，而要設法在合約訂定的過程之中尋找漏洞，希望法庭接納，從而宣告合約無效，這樣一來，法律就假設合約從來沒有存在，大家要退回到合約履行之前的狀況，即銀行退還款項給投資者，投資者退回產品。這與現時一般雷曼迷債苦主的情況不同，現時的所謂回購或其他協議，苦主多數也要分擔責任。

摩根士丹利發行的「精明債券」，據知亦是爆煲在即，不單因為用作債券內容的抵押債項價值已經大幅貶值到九成五以上，更是由於合約的調款寫明：當有更多的信貸相關聯公司倒閉之時，例如美國大通汽車(GM)，過了一定程度投資者要強制以市值贖回債券，亦即是馬上血本無歸。這一條款保障了作為發行商的大摩沒有進一步的風險，但買了「精明債券」的人就要承擔所有損失，翻身無望，合理嗎？公平嗎？

別小看筆者兩個簡單的問題，如果以常人的常識看，一份合約的條款若是不合情理，不公平，法庭有權宣告其無效，亦即是合約會無效。於是，能否成功爭辯一合約條款本身是不合理就變得重要了。我們亦須明白，合理與否，是公說公有理，婆說婆有理的事情，並不是一方指控不合理就是不合理。法庭要審視全面的情況，只在個別案件上考慮。

另一說得最多，也是筆者認為最有力的論據，就是合約一方被誤導。Misrepresentation能夠證明被誤導的情況存在，合約就會無效。由於這類投資的性質複雜，風險亦高，出售產品的銀行代表（一般是前線職員召客，再由一個有牌的代理人解說）是否有全面透徹解說合約的內容？更重要的是小投資者是否明白理解有關的風險，並且同意？

以常理而論，「精明債券」的回報只是7厘年息，這比全無風險放在保險公司作長期存款的5厘息回報只屬略高。「精債」與百多間歐美的公司的信貸情況掛鉤，一般的投資者不可能對這些境外的公司有認識，就只信其中多間主要公司，如匯控、中銀的信譽，結果出事。在解說過程中，誤導的情況幾乎一定存在，只在乎多少，因為常理已經告訴我們，負責售賣的銀行小職員對這些境外公司也沒有太認識，小職員又怎樣可以解釋得清？

據知小投資者會收到一本三百頁的說明書。這些說明書的用詞技術性很高，而風險警告的字句有非常細少，這其實是一般典型不合情理合約的情況，免責條款細小到你幾乎看不到之類，也是經常被判無效的原因。筆者認為，有心協助「精債」的立法會議員不應等待事件「曝煲」再行動，應先發制人，找出明顯的案情，主動現在就入稟法庭要求宣告其無效。◇(http://www.dajiyuan.com)


本文只代表作者的觀點和陳述

上商被客索償

上商被客索償


上海商業銀行昨遭一名63歲客戶Tam Kar Chuen控告，Tam○八年三月以100萬美元（約780萬港元），向上商認購了一批雷曼十年期票據，隨雷曼倒閉，該批票據價值化為烏有。Tam指上商銷售該批票據時誤導及塞責等，現要求撤銷交易及要上商賠償損失。

Hong Kong’s International Financial Centre: Retrospect and Prospect

excrept concerning Minibonds :

Louis W. PaulyReport for the Savantas Policy Institute
(founded by Regina Ip)
5 February 2011

7. Relative to the recent experience of the United States and much of Europe, and to its own experience ten years earlier during the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, in 2008 Hong Kong’s crisis management system proved reasonably robust. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,however, and widespread allegations that the risks and fees associated with so-called minibonds bearing the Lehman name had been misrepresented by many Hong Kong intermediaries, revealed serious flaws in governance at a number of levels.

8. Across the advanced economies of the world, including Hong Kong’s, the crisis of 2008 suggested the need for more pro-active and less reactive government. But balancing the competitive impulses required for continuing prosperity in financial markets and durable expectations of overall stability and safety requires subtlety. For Hong Kong it also requires the maintenance of relative autonomy both internationally and inside greater China.

9. At the global and regional levels, Hong Kong’s government has already proven its ability to think strategically and act constructively as financial regulatory and supervisory policies are adjusted. The joint work of FSTB and the HKMA during and after the crisis of 2008 suggests that to strengthen today’s IFC in Hong Kong a single entity ‘above the fray’ needs to be in a position to think strategically about healthy financial markets in Hong Kong and their relationship with the broader economy. It should be a permanent secretariat and longterm think-tank for the Council of Financial Regulators.

10. Closer to the markets, a version of the UK’s planned Prudential Regulatory Authority, as a distinct and distinctly mandated subsidiary of the HKMA, should be considered. Under its stability mandate, the HKMA should remain in a position continually to re-assess and guide macro-prudential policies, especially as they apply to systemically significant banks and the migration of systemic risks, arising, for example, from institutional scale, crossborder links, and interconnectedness, ostensibly outside the banking system. International
comparators should also inform continuing reconsideration of the relationship between the SFC and the HKEx. Similarly, comparative analysis should influence continuing debate on moving beyond arbitration procedures to the establishment of a separate, cross-sectoral agency for consumer protection.

11. There is no reason to tamper with the HKMA’s primary responsibility for managing the Exchange Fund. But the current scale of reserves and the expansion of cooperative
facilities with China and regional partners call for reconsideration of very conservative investment practices. A sovereign wealth fund may not need to be explicitly carved out, but the return on a serious portion of existing and future reserves could reasonably be benchmarked against the performance of SWFs in comparable jurisdictions.

...................................................................................

Derivatives and synthetic securities

Although the global crisis of 2008 prompted many market observers to question the difference between investing and gambling, the investment vehicles that caused the most trouble were not really new. Rather, the risks they represented, the scale of those risks, and the essential implications of contagion from a systemic crisis of confidence were all misunderstood and mismanaged. In the wake of the crisis, Hong Kong is collaborating with other jurisdictions around the world to improve the basic infrastructure through which various kinds of financial derivatives and synthetic securities, like synthetic exchange-traded funds, are handled.

For derivatives, the HKEx is establishing a clearing house for over-the-counter derivatives.
This complements recently announced plans of the HKMA to maintain a central registry and database of OTC activity. With the latter improving market transparency and the former reducing clearing risks, since the clearing house serves as counterparty for both sides a trade, the aim is to make Hong Kong a relatively more attractive centre than its regional competitors.

Interest-rate derivatives will open the market, and equity derivatives are expected to follow. Eventually, dealers expect to be able to offer variations on such products denominated in RMB. The main securities market regulator, the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), is consulting market participants on appropriate supervisory structures.45 Similar issues regarding appropriate disclosure of risks and data on pricing confront instruments like synthetic exchangetraded funds. Parallel work programs are therefore underway within the HKEx and the SFC.

More on this below, but it is obvious that regulators want to keep Hong Kong markets abreast with regional and global competitors without also repeating transparency-related problems like those encountered with Lehman mini-bonds in 2008.


.............................................................................

Wealth management

At the intersection of commercial and investment banking as traditionally defined are
rapidly expanding financial services organized under the banner of asset or wealth management.

At the most sophisticated end of the retail market for such services are high net-worth individuals and firms open to new strategies for investing in stocks, bonds and other fixed-income instruments, foreign-currency instruments, real estate, private equity funds, hedge funds and other types of managed funds. This clientele is obviously growing in Hong Kong itself, and many of their counterparts technically still resident on the Mainland are becoming more prominent participants in Hong Kong’s market for asset-management services. A range of similar kinds of services also exists for non-profit and for-profit institutions, as well as for financial intermediaries operating at least in part out of Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s low-tax system attracts wealth holders, and the market for high-end advisory services develops in train.

Nevertheless, given conservative banking habits, and controversial episodes associated with alternative investment vehicles like ‘mini-bonds’ issued by the ill-fated local subsidiary of Lehman Brothers, innovation in the field of wealth management in Hong Kong has not been straightforward. Real estate investment trusts, for example, were only authorized in 2005, and they attracted controversy from inception. REITs are essentially mutual funds for real estate driven partly by corporate tax advantages deriving from the requirement that 90% of associated income be distributed to investors. The Hong Kong Housing Authority launched the first one as soon as the SFC gave it permission to do so. Although it was substantially oversubscribed, groups fearful of the implications for the future availability and pricing of public housing objected. Later issues were modest and the financial performance of the trusts has been disappointing.

Despite the challenges, wealth management looks set to become a much more important
source of activity for Hong Kong’s IFC. The seeds have already been sown. Private equity pools, hedge funds of various kinds, and alternative investment vehicles comprise a fast-growing sector. Bolstering their growth have been recent regulatory moves in the United States and Europe aimed at pushing riskier and more speculative activities out of banks and bank holding companies. At base, however, it is the search for yield that simultaneously seems to be pushing them out of developed markets and toward perceived new opportunities, not least in greater China. Hong Kong’s strategic position in this context is obvious. Less obvious are associated
risks.

Net capital flows from the Mainland are expected to contribute significantly to the demand for asset-management services, but of those flows the HKMA estimates that Hong Kong will retain around 10%. The liberalization of the RMB will increase flows both ways, but the HKMA recently announced that RMB deposits in Hong Kong-based banks totaled RMB 279.6 billion (US$42 billion) as of November 30, 2010, an increase of 29% from the previous month and 246% from a year earlier.52 By the end of 2010, 67,000 Mainland firms had been authorized to settle cross-border trade accounts in Hong Kong, facilitated by an expanding currency swap arrangement between the HKMA and the PBOC. Since this growth also increased the risk that unauthorized transactions would take place, Hong Kong’s banks were directed especially to
monitor transactions in large amounts by new customers or between firms known to be related to one another. In any event, even as Hong Kong-based firms continue to invest heavily on the Mainland in anticipation of continuing rapid growth and currency appreciation, the amount of Mainland wealth invested in and through Hong Kong will surely grow as well. Capital controls have typically had a portfolio diversification effect elsewhere, and, even when flows are perfectly legitimate, differences in tax rates can be expected to reinforce such an effect.

.............................................................................

Market participants routinely suggest that much work remains to be done to build the infrastructure of Hong Kong’ stock and bond markets, so the business of local investment bankers and financial advisors is likely to remain robust. While no one complains about the opportunities presented by IPOs and offshore RMB instruments, pressures are mounting both for further diversification and for more competitive pricing. It is worth noting here that the monopoly of the Hong Kong Exchange is frequently questioned in this regard. But so too is the sustainability of the profits of intermediaries that depend upon sales of investment products to retail investors. The Lehman Brothers mini-bond incident of 2008 shed much light on the regulatory and supervisory underpinnings of changing investment and commercial banking markets in Hong Kong, and we examine it in more detail later in this study.


.................................................................................


Consumer protection

The fundamental challenge is hardly novel or unique. In a world of free and more open
financial markets, does the responsibility of governmental authorities extend beyond the most basic matters of licensing, establishing and adjudicating property rights, and otherwise ensuring that competition in those markets takes place on a level playing field? The current answer everywhere in the world where capital flows relatively freely is ‘yes.’ That, however, is where full agreement stops. The follow-up question has necessarily normative cast. Where should we draw the line between governmental responsibility and the responsibility of individual market participants? Answers vary, both across national borders and within them.

Certainly before the handover in 1997, the traditional answer in Hong Kong was that the role of government should be as limited as possible. As long as the society in which a relatively free and unrestricted financial market is embedded is flexible and capable itself of adjusting quickly to internal or exogenous economic shocks transmitted through those markets, then financial openness and minimal official interference should produce prosperity. As noted above, several decades ago something like such an expectation might have guided official decision-makers in Hong Kong. Nevertheless, the actions taken by their successors during each major financial crisis since 1973, and certainly the actions taken during the crisis of 2008, strongly suggest quite another expectation and quite another understanding of Hong Kong’s society.

The saga of the Lehman Brothers mini-bonds in Hong Kong well illustrates the point. Its observable conclusion is an evident social and political consensus to support a more interventionist set of financial regulatory policies, including policies designed to protect the consumers of financial services (from unclear risks and excessive fees) and to impose fiduciary legal obligations on intermediaries selling such services. The surrounding events also suggest a new understanding that such obligations rest not simply on the shoulders of private intermediaries but also on government. In short, it repudiates traditional notions of caveat emptor. Together with the evolution of such practices as mandatory insurance coverage for bank deposits, governments in Hong Kong will in the future likely find it more difficult not to respond to social demands for protection from sudden or widespread financial losses, even when such losses do not threaten overall market stability. Again, to some observers and participants who valued the freedom they once found in Hong Kong, this is a matter of some regret. For present purposes, the main point is that Hong Kong has joined most other advanced economies in this regard.

Lehman mini-bonds and similar instruments were sold in many countries, but their
unwinding cast a particularly harsh light on the limits of Hong Kong’s rules governing the selling of financial products to retail investors. The same lesson had been learned elsewhere during earlier crises. Transparency, or full disclosure, in the selling especially of complex products by banks is not enough. Light-touch regulation to discourage mis-selling by institutions the public typically sees as insured or at least closely watched by government is not enough.

Traditional understandings of the fiduciary obligations of banks to their customers are now reinforced with the threat of penalties or enforcement efforts designed to elicit ‘voluntary’ compensation. In a new era of structured financial products with tempting returns and vague risks, especially to investors hardly qualified as ‘professionals,’ the idea of ‘self-regulation’ rang hollow.

The fact that Lehman Brothers itself was ultimately at risk in the event of a default on the mini-bonds sold by Hong Kong institutions with permission of the SFC was not entirely clear at the point of sale. Even if it had been, investors may well have imagined that the Lehman name was undoubted. The truth is that no one expected the firm to be permitted to go into bankruptcy in 2008, and even if they had, certainly no one should have expected its American overseers to be so cavalier in their consideration of liabilities not domiciled in the United States. When that
bankruptcy nevertheless did occur, contagion spread across borders like wildfire in a dry forest.

Under British law, for example the London subsidiary of Lehman ceased business immediately.
The holders of Lehman Brothers mini-bonds in Hong Kong suddenly found themselves facing staggering losses. Having authorized their sale, under the Securities and Futures Ordinance and the Companies Ordinance, the SFC in turn found itself the target of intense political reaction. As the main regulator and supervisor of banks selling the Lehman instruments, the HKMA was drawn into the ensuing controversy as well.

In short, some 44,000 investors bought nearly HK$16 billion in mini-bonds guaranteed by Lehman Brothers. They might well have turned out to be low-risk, high-yield investments. With the unexpected collapse of the firm, however, they in fact turned into under-valued claims at the tail-end of a long and complicated unwinding process. With the HKMA and SFC awash in complaints from the holders of those claims, and the government under mounting pressure from the LegCo, the sixteen banks that had distributed the mini-bonds eventually agreed to repurchase them. They ‘voluntarily’ bought most of them back at prices varying between 60 and 70% of
their nominal value, depending on the age of the bond-holder, plus an additional payment reflective of any recoveries the banks themselves were eventually able to make in the Lehman bankruptcy process. For the time being, at least, the cause of diversifying the financial holdings of most Hong Kong citizens was set back. The local development of wealth management services promised long to be marked by the experience.

At the same time, a precedent had been set to extend outward the implicit safety net under banks licensed to do business in Hong Kong. Public consultations during 2010 on the idea of establishing an insurance authority at arm’s length from the government covered some of the same terrain Turning the clock back to the days of non-interventionism--positive or not-- seemed entirely unrealistic. Likewise, future reliance on the ad hoc management of markets during crises seemed imprudent. As has happened elsewhere, therefore, following in train from the crisis of 2008 was a fully justified debate on a new and more effective system of financial oversight. The questions that inevitably followed focused on the modali ties of that system.

要求: 公開金管局對星展香港銷售Constellation債券的投訴的調查報告

要求: 公開金管局對星展香港銷售Constellation債券的投訴的調查報告

致 香港證監會/金管局 及 星展銀行(香港)
要求: 公開金管局對星展香港銷售Constellation債券的投訴的調查報告.

公 開 信

2010年7月14日, 證監會及金管局與星展香港就雷曼相關Constellation債券達成的協議 (下稱協議)中, 有兩點:
1) “星展香港另一部門曾將同一產品評為較高風險級別的產品。”
2) “即使證監會成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分,亦不能達到此協議取得的結果;”

先說第一點, 一種投資產品有兩個風險評級, 必定有一個合理/一個不合理, 一個對/一個錯。星展香港賠100%本金予第1,2,3級風險客戶的情況就已經告訴大家, 星展香港印在<<債券認購表格>>上的“產品風險程度2”(即:中低風險級別), 是錯的。

銀行內部對同一產品持不同評級意見, 必定會有討論, 星展雇用的都應是些財經專家, 怎麼會偏偏選擇一個錯誤評級呢 ? 是誰最後拍板的 ? 理據是什麼 ? 同樣銷售Constellation債券, 別家銀行把它定在高風險級別產品, 星展香港會不知道嗎 ? 星展香港標榜自己的銷售團隊有著豐富專業知識和經驗, 其中就沒有一個人能看出問題, 提出反對 ? 星展香港從來沒檢討過? 還是這本來就是預設的陷阱 ! 再說第二點, 這句話已清楚表明: 證監會及金管局有足夠證據, 可以 “成功對星展香港及/或其主管人員及僱員採取紀律處分.”(只不過證監自以為: 採取紀律處分效果不及 “協議”而已) 。

關於這點, 我們從星展香港向立法會雷曼相關債券調查小組提交的陳述文件, 我們從前星展香港總裁葉約德等人在該調查小組聆訊時的供詞, 我們從大量Constellation債券受害人向金管局提供的投訴資料及金管局對這些投訴的調查的回餽資料的分析, 也充分印證了在銷售 Constellation債券過程中, 星展香港銀行: 沒有足夠的產品盡職審查和透徹分析, 沒有分析到產品風險特性和結構, 就把產品賣出給客戶。沒有披露足夠的產品資料給予他們的銷售職員, 包括有關產品的風險的資料, 及沒有提供適當的培訓和產品知識, 可讓他們的銷售職員向顧客提供合適的產品建議。

沒有確保他們的銷售職員完全明白及在向客戶銷售時披露有關產品的資料, 產品的風險及產品風險評估的方法。也就是說:
1) 星展香港把Constellation債券當作中低風險產品銷售, 就是欺騙了所有購買這些產品的客戶, 當然包括被評估為高風險級別的客戶。
2) 星展香港及其主管人員和僱員, 銷售Constellation債券產品過程中, 系統性的違反證監條例。

本來, 星展香港觸犯香港證監條例, 經過調查, 証據確鑿, 當局只須按例執法就是. 香港是法制社會, 只要你判得星展入罪, 受害者懂得循法例去取回損失,大可不必有人自充嫁孃. 當局當然也可以選擇與星展談判來解決問題, 那就得秉持公道, 盡量把一碗水端平, 惠及各方, 不可或缺. 但是, 現在這個“協議”, 卻完全背離了基本公平原則, 准許星展只賠償予低至中級風險類別客戶.

既出賣了被星展評為4,5級風險客戶利益, 又 “在不承認任何責任下”, 放生了銀行. 証監會也毫無理據就大膽假設: “客戶若有較高的風險承受能力, 且具備衍生工具交易的經驗及知識, Constellation債券 可能 本應是適合他們的投資產品.”

憑什麼說“可能…適合”? 這是在強加於人! 證監會還一廂情願地作樂觀估計: “「星展香港加強投訴處理程序」應足以處理星展香港將雷曼相關Constellation債券分銷予這批客戶(指4或5級風險類別客戶)的過程中, 可能出現的其他不規範情況。” “產品風險程度2”, 明明是星展香港有意錯定的產品風險級別, 將之印在<<認購表格>>上, 是用來騙人買貨的謊言, 職員也是拿銀行編制的同一套銷售稿, 向所有客人撒同樣的謊, 怎麼對1,2,3級風險客戶就是騙, 對4,5級風險客戶就不是騙?!

難道“謊言”這東西, 懂得隨受眾不同而自動變異? 根本不合邏輯, “協議”用被動方的風險高低來為理賠劃界根本不合理. 若看作是監管當局的一種階段性策略, 也就罷了. 但是, 半年時間過去了, 我們這批被 “協議”犧牲的所謂 “較高風險級別客戶”, 其實正是弱勢無助的被騙者, 盡管被顛倒身份, 一次又一次地去向施騙者投訴; 盡管受盡屈辱, 一次又一次地去接受施騙者的評審覆核. 結果還是被施騙者一拖再拖, 三拖四拖….. 拖延至今, 還得再拖, …. 是因為星展香港為了保護既得利益, 為了包庇個別高級管理人員的罪行, 甚至不惜讓前線員工當箭靶, 以為利用他們的財力及專業優勢和官場人脈, 推搪耍賴, 就可以不了了之, 蒙混過關.

才使Constellation債券問題, 至今得不到合理的實質進展。 為了香港國際金融中心聲譽, 為了香港社會不再受折騰, 我們要求香港監管當局: 正式公開金管局對Constellation債券投資者投訴的調查報告. 反正紙包不住火, 真相誰也蓋不住. 不如早日把真相公諸天下, 使違規者無所遁形, 還受害者一個清白. 何況, 如此大規模的調查行動, 用的是納稅人的錢, 也必須對香港市民有個交代。

投訴者作為被調查的當事人, 也應該有權知道調查的結果。並要求香港監管局對執迷不悟的違規犯罪者採取嚴肅執法行動。

我們要求星展香港: 切實承擔責任, 按照協議精神, 對堅稱: Constellation債券不是適合他們投資的產品的受害者作出賠償. 包括在有 “協議”之前, 已個別與星展簽署和解之4或5級風險類別客戶, 有關這些個案, 因為銀行當時只考慮到受害者單方面因素, 遺漏了星展銀行方面的系統性違規銷售, 和產品風險定錯級別等更為重要的因素.

所以, 這些個案的賠償額都是完全不合理的. 星展香港並須承諾在2-3個月內, 支付與 “協議”中, 中低風險客戶同等條件的和解款項予他們。 我們善意的提醒星展管理層, “協議”只是說: “金管局不打算就該等客戶(指: 接納星展香港和解建議的低風險客戶)的雷曼相關Constellation債券個案, 對星展香港採取執法行動.”

也就是說: 不棑除對那些沒達成和解/或遺漏銀行系統性犯錯因素致使和解賠償不合理的個案, 對星展香港採取執法行動. 所謂不平則鳴, 受害者得不到合理賠償, 只有被逼不斷提升抗議行動. 其實星展香港及其職員的違規事實已是相當清楚, 證據確鑿. 我們相信: 只要香港法制還在,

公義尚存, 只要受害者們鍥而不捨, 必定可以把星展香港所有罪證赤裸裸地揭露出來, 公諸於世, 繩之以法。 到那時, 星展香港銀行名譽掃地, 管理層的袞袞諸公: 包括前行政總裁葉約德, 董事總經理王潔鳳, 零售銀行主管 莊希 以及Cheung Yiu Tong Sunny, 投資產品組董事Wong Kwong Lam Richard, 營業及銷售董事Sion Huang….等, 將有人會被刑事檢控或紀律處分, 將可能有人因此被定罪而身敗名裂。

所以, 從速與所有客戶達成和解並給予足夠賠償, 反而才是你們的最理智選擇. 勿逼苦主走上法律途徑, 所謂開弓沒有回頭箭, 望各位勿失時機, 擇吉而為。

被評為4 , 5 級星債苦主自救組

US credit card debt rises for first time since collapse of Lehman Brothers

US credit card debt rises for first time since collapse of Lehman Brothers

Lehman administrator boosts advisory team

Lehman administrator boosts advisory team

以煲呔曾為首的財金高官如此這般的高論

以煲呔曾為首的財金高官如此這般的高論

SEC Said to Review Principal-Protected Note Sales

SEC Said to Review Principal-Protected Note Sales
July 02, 2010, 12:53 PM EDT
By Zeke Faux and Joshua Gallu

July 2 (Bloomberg) -- The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission has asked several financial firms how they market “principal-protected” notes after investors said they lost more than $1 billion on the securities when Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed, according to people familiar with the matter.

The agency’s Division of Corporation Finance is looking at how companies describe the products’ risks and whether the term “principal protected” misleadingly implies the investment is guaranteed not to decline in value, said one of the people, who declined to be identified because the inquiry isn’t public.

Citigroup Inc., which used the phrase in its May marketing materials, removed it from a brochure filed June 15 with the SEC. “Citi is working with other banks and industry participants regarding the description of these products,” said spokesman Alexander Samuelson, who declined to comment on the inquiry.

Barclays Plc, Morgan Stanley and Bank of America Corp. are among banks that in offering documents filed with the SEC describe some structured notes, which are bonds packaged with derivatives, as “principal protected.” Individual investors in the U.S. bought $34 billion of all types of structured notes last year, according to StructuredRetailProducts.com, a database used by the industry.

Findings made by the SEC’s corporation finance division may be referred to the enforcement division, which investigates fraud. Kenneth Lench, head of the agency’s Structured and New Products enforcement unit, declined to comment on whether the enforcement division is looking into the securities. John Heine, an SEC spokesman, also declined to comment.

‘Marketing Materials’

Firms must include “full and accurate” disclosures of risks when marketing complex products, such as principal- protected notes, to individual investors, Lench said in a June 25 telephone interview.

“You’ve got these long disclosure documents, but oftentimes there are marketing materials and those have to be accurate as well,” Lench said.

Kristin Friel, a spokeswoman for Barclays, Mark Lake, a spokesman for Morgan Stanley, and Selena Morris, a spokeswoman for Bank of America, declined to comment.

Issuers of principal-protected notes combine bonds with derivatives to offer investors bets on stocks and commodities, with a promise to return their initial outlay regardless of performance. That still leaves counterparty risk, or the danger of not being fully repaid because the issuer itself goes out of business, which is generally spelled out in the prospectuses.

‘Properly Sold’

When Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September 2008, the principal-protected notes that it had guaranteed plummeted in value. A group of investors said in a lawsuit seeking class- action status that the firm sold at least $1.7 billion of the securities. The investors also claimed that UBS AG brokers provided “misleading” information when using the term “100 percent principal protection” to market the notes.

Allison Chin-Leong, a spokeswoman for UBS, said that the Zurich-based bank “properly sold” the Lehman products, “following all regulatory requirements, well-established sales practices and client disclosure guidelines.”

In April, Citigroup offered to compensate more than 2,700 Spanish investors who lost money on Lehman structured notes, without admitting liability. Some buyers of Lehman principal- protected notes have won restitution from their brokers in Financial Industry Regulatory Authority arbitration cases. Finra, the industry-funded brokerage regulator, sent a notice to brokers last year telling them to ensure that marketing materials for the securities are “fair and balanced.”

--Editors: Mitchell Martin, Chapin Wright

To contact the reporters on this story: Zeke Faux in New York at zfaux@bloomberg.net; Joshua Gallu in Washington at jgallu@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Alan Goldstein at agoldstein5@bloomberg.net: Lawrence Roberts at lroberts13@bloomberg.net.

What can we expect from Martin Wheatley?

What can we expect from Martin Wheatley?
7 February 2011 8:33 am | By Steve Tolley

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Last week Martin Wheatley was announced as the CEO-designate of the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority.

In a consultation paper last summer, the Government suggested the CPMA would be a consumer champion, though the day after Wheatley’s appointment the Treasury select committee called on the Treasury to drop the label.

Wheatley has extensive experience of stock market regulation through his five years as head of the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission, a period as deputy chief executive of the London Stock Exchange and a stint on the FSA’s listings advisory committee.

He has overseen more than 170 prosecutions for market manipulation in three years in Hong Kong. His record on pleasing consumers is however a little more patchy.

When Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008, hundreds of protesters gathered outside the regulator’s office in Hong Kong, some reportedly burned pictures of Wheatley.

Local investors were angry after being sold products called constellation notes by local banks as safe products which turned out to be riskier than banks apparently let on. Although this CNN footage seems to show warnings about the risk of losing everything were not exactly hidden away.

They might as well have wished upon a star. The constellation notes turned out to be linked to Lehman mini-bonds and many people lost their savings.

Although the bank did not admit liability (do they ever?) the regulator reached an agreement with the bank to pay out more than £50m in compensation, though there was no thank you party for Wheatley.

He has been reported as saying it is not the job of a regulator to determine whether a particular product is suitable for the whole of the retail market and to do so would probably end up in no products being approved. Interesting comments considering the FSA’s current work on product intervention.

Facts and Figures managing director Simon Webster says he hopes Wheatley has changed his mind by the time he joins the FSA in September before the CPMA begins to operate.

He says: “That is the FSA position, to be retrospective. You go off and do it and then we will tell you you are wrong and fine you, rather than being proactive. It is exactly the opposite of what we need.”

Lehman reaches settlement with German affiliate

Lehman reaches settlement with German affiliate

Feb 3 (Reuters) - Bankrupt financial company Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc (LEHMQ.PK) has reached an agreement with its German affiliate Lehman Brothers Bankhaus that will allow $6.6 billion of the German bank's claims against the parent company.

Bankhaus, Lehman's second-largest foreign affiliate, said in a statement on Wednesday that it has also decided to support the revised plan of reorganization filed by Lehman Brothers Holdings last week.

Settling intercompany claims has been one of the most complex parts of Lehman's bankruptcy because of the large number of transactions between the parent company and its subsidiaries.

The settlement must still be approved by German and U.S. bankruptcy courts.

"This agreement is a milestone in the resolution of the Lehman proceedings and is in line with our overall approach to favor compromises with affiliates and avoid lengthy and costly litigation," Lehman's chief executive, Bryan Marsal, said in a statement.

Lehman last week proposed a new plan for dividing up billions of dollars among its creditors and offered a bigger payment to bondholders, provided they support the plan.

The plan, key to Lehman's exit from the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, came after an earlier version filed in April met strong opposition from hedge fund Paulson & Co, the California Public Employees Retirement System and other bondholders. For details click on [ID:nN2596652]. (Reporting by Dena Aubin, editing by Matthew Lewis)

Martin Wheatley wins top job at new City watchdog CPMA

Martin Wheatley wins top job at new City watchdog CPMA

Martin Wheatley wins top job at new City watchdog CPMA
Thursday, 3rd February 2011
PROFILE
DAVID CROW
WHEN Martin Wheatley announced his departure from the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) he received an ominous send-off. Locals, angered by his ultimate responsibility for regulating loss-making Lehman mini-bonds, gathered outside the watchdog’s offices to play traditional Chinese funeral music while they burned pictures of Wheatley.

It appears their prediction of his demise was premature; yesterday, Wheatley was named as the inaugural head of the Consumer Protection and Markets Authority (CPMA).

Once the CPMA is spun out of existing the FSA – which is being chopped – it will serve as the main regulator for Britain’s securities markets, as well as overseeing how financial firms treat their customers. In the interim, he will become managing director of the FSA’s Consumer and Markets Business Unit.

Despite the protests that accompanied his departure, Wheatley’s stint at the SFC was marked by several successes, including a raft of insider dealing cases that saw ex-Morgan Stanley boss Du Jun jailed for seven years.

He joined the SFC in 2005 from the LSE, where he was deputy chief executive. He had been in the running for the top job in 2001 but lost out to Dame Clara Furse (who was on the panel that recommended Wheatley to the chancellor).

The news will be galling for the FSA’s director of enforcement Margaret Cole, who was seen as the front running internal candidate. It comes on the same day that her team at the FSA secured a record jail term for insider dealing.

雷曼苦主可向國際證監會申訴 - 王岸然

Requests for Information should be sent to:

General Secretariat
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
C/ Oquendo 12
28006 Madrid
SPAIN
Tel: +34 91 417 5549
Fax: +34 91 555 9368
Email: mail@iosco.org

For information regarding customer dispute resolution procedures and investor protection mechanisms of self-regulatory organizations in particular jurisdictions, see the SROCC Website.

Press/Media Enquiries
All press and media enquiries should be directed to the Communications Manager at:


Phone: +34 91 417 5549
Out of Office Hours: +34 679 969 004
Email: press@iosco.org


雷曼苦主可向國際證監會申訴 - 王岸然
(轉自“我係王岸然”)

筆者在另一報刊的專欄曾經談及，若然香港的證監會拒絕依法執行〈證券及期貨條例〉中第107條，為欺詐或妄顧事實或作出失實陳述的行為作出刑事檢控，對苦主可考慮到國際證監會組織（IOSCO, International Organization of Securities Commissions）作出申訴，效果會令香港證監會及香港政府在國際上名譽掃地，從而產生強大的壓力，迫政府依法執法，還苦主一個公道。

文章刊出後有相當多人詢問筆者這是甚麼一回事，對國際證監是甚麼東西未有認識，筆者特在本欄再介紹。

國際證監不是聯合國下的組織，沒有官方身份，是民間組織，但其名譽及影響力極大，是極具權威的國際監管組織，是互助也是互利組織，亦方便了各國證監的人才可以自由流通。這組織成立於1983年，香港的證監會在成立後的第二年1993便已經加入成為正式會員。中國證監會於1995年亦加入該組織，成為正式會員。

據其網頁資料，國際證監現時共有196會員，正式會員114；聯擊會員11個，附屬會員有71個，是國際上獨一無二，並無類其他組織。組織有強大的司法互助功能，有多條正式協定，包括性的商業行為準則、審計標準、金融合併監管、會計標準、洗黑錢行為，而直接與雷曼苦主有關的，為〈跨國證券與期貨欺詐〉協定。在上述的範圍之內，各國的證監有責任互通資訊，互相合作，包括代別國的證監在本土進行調查工作。香港的〈證券及期貨條例〉在03年通過之時，便因而加入條款，授權香港證監在司法方面與國際合作。

為了履行對國際證監的責任，條例加入新的條文，為前〈證監會條例〉所沒有，其一是載明證監會須落實的監管目標，與雷曼苦主有關連的，是對公眾投資者有適當保障，儘量減少犯罪失當行為；要減少系統風險。這些目標香港證監做不到，是失禮於國際的。

從國際證監的網頁，大家亦可以得知國際的共同監管目標，是要保護投資者，要監管，監督和進行國際公認的一致的執法標準（Internationally recognized and consistent standard of regulation）。證監會在雷曼事件的前後有履行這些國際的監管指標嗎？答案明顯是否定的。

107條所針對的失實陳述及詐騙性行為，是普通法中固有，亦是各國的法律中大同小異地存在的犯罪行為。試問有哪一處國家的法律容許商人自由詐騙顧客？

證監與香港警方，面對雷曼事件之後數以萬計的投訴，到今天竟然只有準備或正在起訴兩件涉及107條的案件，筆者更懷疑只是選擇兩件證據不強的案件檢控作為交待，這與公然欺壓苦主，公然保護銀行何異？

雷曼苦主應告訴國際證監及各主要大國的證監，香港的證監只是一個聽命於特區政府的傀儡，完全沒有獨立性。 雖有高薪，國際上有良知的證監精英千萬別到香港工作，亦提醒國際社會，千萬不要僱用曾經在香港證監會工作過的人，這些人就算精英能幹，但欠缺的是對專業的忠誠與良心。

韋奕禮或成CPMA主管

韋奕禮或成CPMA主管




　　【本報特訊】即將在本年中離任證監會行政總裁一職的韋奕禮（Martin Wheatley），有機會獲任命為英國即將成立的監管機構的主管。據英國傳媒報道，韋奕禮將被任命為新成立的消費者保障及市場處（Consumer Protectionand Market Authority）（CPMA）主管，有關任命更有可能在本周初宣布。

　　報道又指出，即將由韋奕禮擔任主管的CPMA，將會在2012年從英國金融服務處（FSA）分拆出來。除了分拆CPMA外，FSA亦會分拆出另一個監管機構Prudential Regulatory Authority。

　　在分工上，主要以零售客戶為主的金融企業，將會由CPMA進行監管；預料現時由FSA監管的兩萬家機構，將由CPMA接手。至於Prudential Regulatory Authority，將會由英倫銀行行長擔任主席，以監管當地銀行及保險公司等企業。有關方案，是源自去年英國財相奧斯本對當地金融監管機構作出改革的一部分，包括將英倫銀行的角色，改變成市場的主要監管者。

　　韋奕禮從06年6月起獲委任為本港證監會行政總裁，以作風強硬見稱，在職期間致力打擊內幕交易，包括對操控市場者進行起訴。不過在其五年任期中，亦留下了不少遺憾。其中「雷曼兄弟」倒閉後在港引發的雷曼迷你債券事件，過去兩年多一直成為本港各監管機構及金融機構的夢魘。因投資雷曼迷你債券而蒙受損失的投資者，不斷指控證監會失職，韋奕禮更成為投資者批評及嘲諷的對象。

NY v. Ernst & Young: Who Cares Whether Lehman Brothers Followed GAAP?

NY v. Ernst & Young: Who Cares Whether Lehman Brothers Followed GAAP?

The Accounting Cycle
NY v. Ernst & Young: Who Cares Whether Lehman Brothers Followed GAAP?
Op/Ed
By: J. Edward Ketz



January 2011 — As stated in the previous essay, the Attorney General of New York filed a complaint against E&Y in the Lehman Brothers case. In particular, the plaintiff alleges that "E&Y substantially assisted Lehman Brothers ... to engage in a massive accounting fraud" and that E&Y helped the firm to "take advantage of a technical accounting rule, known as FAS 140, to treat these Repo 105 transactions, which in reality were short-term financings, as 'sales'".


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Late in the Complaint the Attorney General discussed the substance of the transactions and suggests that E&Y should have looked at the substance instead of the form of the Repo transactions (¶64). This perhaps is a more important paragraph than the former Attorney General comprehends, else he would have mentioned it earlier and more frequently. This is because the case for the plaintiff that depends on GAAP is by no means a slam dunk and perhaps is shaky. The case would be stronger if he said the accounting was improper, notwithstanding whatever the FASB said on the matter.

In particular, this case is eerily similar to the Continental Vending case from the 1960s, and that did not bode well for the accountants. It too turned first on the issue of leverage and second on rules versus economic substance.

The facts in the Continental Vending case (US v Simon 425 F.2d 796) are as follows. Harold Roth was president of Continental Vending Machine Corporation and owned about 25 percent of it and its affiliate, Valley Commercial Corporation. From time to time Continental would raise cash by giving Valley negotiable notes, and Valley would discount them at the bank and hand over the proceeds to Continental. On its books, Continental had a “Valley payable.” In addition Roth would borrow money from the parent corporation in an indirect manner. Continental would loan money to Valley, giving rise to a “Valley receivable,” and Valley in turn would lend the cash to Roth. Roth used the funds primarily to invest in the stock market.

Near the end of fiscal 1962 Valley could not pay off its debts, so Roth pledged his securities as collateral, and most of these securities were Continental stocks and bonds. When the financial statements were prepared, the firm netted a portion of the Valley receivable against the Valley payable, it did not disclose the fact that Roth had borrowed money from the firm, and it did not disclose the nature of the collateral of the loan. Shortly thereafter, Continental had a cash flow problem and the securities held as collateral lost value, and the firm declared bankruptcy.

Federal prosecutors charged three persons in Lybrand, Ross Brothers, and Montgomery with criminal fraud. While agreeing with the facts presented by the federal prosecutors, the defendants relied on a number of expert witnesses, all of whom stated that the deficiencies mentioned above were not part of generally accepted accounting principles. The trial judge issued directions to the jury that negated this perspective by maintaining that “the ‘critical test’ was whether the financial statements as a whole ‘fairly presented the financial position of Continental as of September 30, 1962, and whether it accurately reported the operations for fiscal 1962.” The jury found the defendants guilty. The auditors appealed, but the circuit court affirmed the decision. The auditors then appealed to the Supreme Court, but it denied certiorari.

The major result of this case is that the courts do not rely exclusively on whether the external auditors attest to an entity’s application of generally accepted accounting principles. Instead, the standard is fairness. This is the proper outcome, for managers cannot be allowed to loot corporations and cover it up with transactions that abide by generally accepted accounting rules (also known as cleverly rigged accounting ploys or CRAP).

A. A. Sommer, former commissioner at the SEC put this case into perspective as follows:


Judge Friendly … said in effect that the first law for accountants was not compliance with generally accepted accounting principles, but rather full and fair disclosure, fair presentation, and if the principles did not produce this brand of disclosure, accountants could not hide behind the principles but had to go beyond them and make whatever additional disclosures were necessary for full disclosure. In a word, “present fairly” was a concept separate from “generally accepted accounting principles,” and the latter did not necessarily result in the former.

While the FASB and the SEC and the accounting firms have shied away from the concept of “fairness,” the courts have embraced it. Interestingly, the courts ended up in a place quite similar to that in Statement of Financial Concepts No.1 The court said that corporate managers should report assets and liabilities and stockholders’ equity and revenues and expenses as fairly as possible and then to communicate these results fairly to the firm’s investors and potential investors.

Notice the similarities between the cases. Both Lehman Brothers and Continental Vending wanted to manage their financial leverage. They both accomplished this by reducing assets and liabilities by some number; while keeping the equity the same, the leverage ratios shrunk materially. Both Lehman Brothers and Continental Vending relied on GAAP to obtain the desired hiding of liabilities. And both Lehman Brothers and Continental Vending supplied deficient, uninformative disclosures on these transactions.

E&Y finds itself in a position similar to Lybrand, Ross Brothers, and Montgomery. It appears that E&Y will defend itself based on accounting rules, just as Lybrand, Ross Brothers, and Montgomery said it followed GAAP. The ultimate question is whether the judge of jury will find this sufficient. Is it a reasonable defense to follow the rules or is a professional auditor responsible for attesting that the financial statements as a whole fairly present the financial position and the results of operations?

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