2010年8月30日星期一

TODAYonline | Business | Structured products to be simpler

TODAYonline | Business | Structured products to be simpler

Stefan
Updated 11:40 AM August 26, 2010

Rather accidentally, I attended a seminar on structured investment products a few years ago. There were also a number of reps from MAS attending the same seminar. Going through the course material, it occurred to me that all those structures were essentially about the issuing bank getting financially naive clients into selling valuable optionality to the bank in return for a slightly higher coupon or capital protection. ALL these products are a rip off and the risk disclosures in the prospectuses totally sales driven and inadequate.

Confirming MAS' regulatory role wrt such instruments, one MAS representative told me later that the scope of their responsibility is to ensure that the prospectus is formally correct and not to protect the retail investor from buying such products... Investors who are offered such products (incl. old staples such as dual currency deposits) by their investment advisors or some bank staff approaching them while they are waiting for service in the bank hall should seriously consider taking their money elsewhere.

Investors should at least try to find out how much profit they give to the bank by asking how much the bank would pay them if they wanted to undo the investment immediately (e.g. next day) after they buy it. Promise: you will be surprised. You should also let them run a number of stress scenarios to gauge the risk on your investment if the market underlying your investment moves against you.

2010年8月29日星期日

雷曼事件未解決 苦主要政府聖誕前交代

雷曼事件未解決 苦主要政府聖誕前交代


雷曼破產至今已近兩年,事件仍未解決。有苦主直言「忍無可忍」,要求政府於今年聖誕節前向所有苦主作出合理交代,否則會再次訴諸法律,要求法庭覆核銀行配售雷曼股票掛票據的合法性。

近三百名雷曼苦主昨齊集旺角社區會堂提出抗議,帶領今次行動的簡浩明表示,約有二千二百名客戶於渣打銀行購買雷曼股票掛票據,當中千多名客戶已作出投訴,七成個案獲金管局轉介至證監會跟進。

2010年8月20日星期五

銀行理虧 應全數回購迷債

銀行理虧 應全數回購迷債 - July 6, 2009

筆者第一和第二篇在《信報》發表文章都是寫迷債,至今超過半年了。先有新鴻基證券和凱基證券百分百退款予苦主,現有中銀賠償60%的建議。雖在法律上沒有判決誰對誰錯,也說明了理虧在何方。

從一開始,整個銷售安排都是隱瞞着迷債的真正結構,怪不得到現在,還有很多人包括財金官員都認為,如雷曼不倒,天下就無事,況且雷曼當日還是A+評級的。先讓筆者再簡單的解說這批迷債來糾正誤解。

其 實,迷債真的是一批公司債券,但不是由雷曼發行的,而是由那間空殼公司Pacific Finance 所發。雷曼並無給予擔保,法律上更做到無任何股權瓜葛。一間空殼公司發債來做什麼?對不起!他們從沒有清楚地告訴小投資者們,只說小投資者借給它的錢還有 三A級CDO作抵押!有抵押,看來真不錯。

其實,它是用你的錢去買那些無實質資產作支持的 CDO。這CDO又是什麽來的?跟誰買?對不起!市場千變萬化,空殼公司當日不能作實告訴你,要待集資完結,把握到好時機才去買。這等同授權給它任買,只 要買的是三A便可。空殼公司每年給你五厘息(36系列),而三年後有無錢還,就看這批CDO造化了。簡單來說,這跟買高風險基金並無兩樣。現在大家都知這 些CDO是什麼了,原來還有很多都是雷曼自己發行的。也就是說,如CDO市場崩潰,就算雷曼不倒,小投資者都要虧本。最近大摩的精明債出事,就是如此。

轉移視線刻意隱瞞
只 看上面,你會買迷債嗎?一般人都不認識CDO,每年回報又只有五厘,根本不合風險回報比例,當然不會買!雷曼就來一招轉移視線,把產品來個包裝,就是跟小 投資者們買個credit default swap(CDS)。在36系列中,他先選了七間本地大銀行、大藍籌,說如任何一家出事,我雷曼就充公你們小投資者在 Pacific Finance 的債權,你就從我雷曼手上接過那家出事公司的債務。

這招真管用,使人覺得是在冒大藍籌的風險而收五厘息,頗吸引!其實,CDO 的風險從沒轉移,還是在小投資者頭上。但大家知否那些CDO的回報又怎會只得五厘?雷曼成功把高風險的CDO賣予小投資者,就只付那可憐的五厘息,而 CDO的高回報就保留給自己,奸狡吧?但這是商業社會,你情我願。要害之處是他們隱瞞了上面的安排。怎隱瞞呢?

在宣傳單張上,只有三個重點 大字標題:3年期,5厘息,本金與7大公司掛鈎;再加大備注:不保本,就是這樣。對於CDO的交代,真是小之又小,更在小標題上把它變為空殼公司給你的抵 押品之一,只在那些小字(fine-print)中才短短說出替投資者買CDO和CDO也是風險所在的事實。

就算在正式的銷售檔, Issue Prospectus 中開始的十多頁,都只是大篇幅談那七間大公司的背景、評級如何,七間大公司出事時小投資者會有什麼損失。對CDO的敘述,全在文件的中後半部,篇幅也小得可憐。這樣,你就先入為主以為迷債只跟七大藍籌掛鈎了。

又且看正式的銷售檔怎樣作最後的推薦,說迷債適合哪類型投資者(第11頁):

1. 滿足收定息者(講了等於沒講);

2. 對七大藍籌充滿信心者 (轉移視線);

3. 不介意未到期空殼公司也有權提早贖回迷債者;

4. 願意承受虧本風險者,而在七大藍籌出事或迷債被提早贖回時就最易虧本。

何時要提早贖回,其一就是CDO債務人不能依時還款予空殼公司。但這裏沒說清楚,更跟七大藍籌風險混在一起,胡混過關。這是什麼產品推銷策略?是否蓄意把真正風險埋藏?

筆者初看檔時,也不知CDO的風險並非賣回給雷曼,要一直看下去,看到放在附件中的CDS合約本身才知道,此風險還是留在小投資者身上。此合約又真是非常「專業」,即是全部艱澀英文,要行內人細心閱讀才能明白。筆者有一次跟David Webb 討論此點,連他也看錯了。

銀 行本身又怎去推銷?筆者一直從事企業融資,但多年前在上一間銀行工作時,也應零售部老總要求,幫他們向大孖沙們推銷類似產品。生意人重利錢,沒有兩三個開 的,都不會冒險;迷債只有五厘,我說不可能的。零售部只一路說這是藍籌低風險,正就是上面那幾個重點,還有叫我們打人情牌。我們不久就停止銷售,只因回報 不吸引,無人問津。

銀行有責任作盡職審查
不 過,就從無人向我們解釋過背後有CDO的安排。銀行有市務發展部和法律合規部,應是來支援作前線的營銷營業隊。為何當時無人能解讀迷債?是雷曼在刻意隱 瞞?是銀行零售管理層只追求佣金而不盡職審查和瞭解產品?還是一般商業銀行,特別是零售部,根本就沒有經驗和專業知識去理解日新月異的財資產品?銀行實在 不應單單提供一個零售網絡予投資銀行向公眾行銷。

在資訊永遠分配不均的現實下,銀行有責任作盡職審查,提供公正分析予一眾缺乏這方面知識的 小投資者。今次迷債事件正正暴露了這結構性問題。求佣金利潤,沒錯,但卻沒有足夠專業知識和監管去制衡。銀行與客戶之間的互信已全部消失了。雖然筆者也是 從業員,但幫理不幫親,銀行不全數回購,說不過去。

有朋友問,三A的CDO,也是三A,跟一般的三A公司債有何不同?這個筆者去年也寫過, 這裡篇幅有限,不能再重複了。簡單的說,替公司評級,主要看他的生意前景,是實在的。CDO不是單一公司,是一個組合,有一大群債務人,除了看大經濟環 境,更看重的是這一大幫債仔之間每人的財務變動會否影響他人,又或加多一個債務人會否抵銷另一個的風險,從而降低整個組合的風險。這是統計學上的co- variance問題,也是基金組合投資的基本理論。

看似科學,實則很多時跟現實脫節。筆者賣過賭氣溫的天氣衍生產品,煤氣公司、滑雪場買 來對沖,但個個就是怕冬天不夠寒冷無生意,怎有人來接他們的「冷盤」?不也是一般的投資基金。但為何他們不是投資在財務,而是投資天氣衍生產品?理論上, 天氣跟財經產品上落的 co-variance 是零。把天氣買進基金組合裡,是絕對有優化作用的。數是這樣計,但此產品在港行不通,就是脫離現實,沒實體,風險真是計算不來。CDO風險,評級也如是

2010年8月18日星期三

任枝明公司追中銀400萬

高院:任枝明公司追中銀400萬
訴訟:區域法院、高等法院
曾競逐1998年立法會會計界功能組別選舉的大律師任枝明,其顧問公司Top Express Consultants Limited 昨日入稟高院,指6年前起遭中銀香港職員誤導,先後5次購入不同系列的雷曼迷債,直到兩年前雷曼「爆煲」,手上迷債變為廢紙,而且銀行更拒絕回購,遂向中銀香港追討400萬元本金及利息。
採訪:羅毓傑 案件原告為Top Express Consultants Limited,被告為中國銀行(香港)有限公司。

入稟狀稱,Top Express 為一所教育機構,營辦會計及商業課程,自1998年起成為中銀香港客戶。Top Express一方稱自己並非專業投資者,沒有接觸過槓桿或結構性投資產品,投資本金都是過往收入所得。

職員強調風險低可保本

據Top Express稱,6年前起兩名中銀香港高級職員獲悉Top Express有資金未作投資,先後5次向後者推銷雷曼迷你債券,並指投資風險低,絕對保本,利潤亦較定期存款高,但簽約時職員未有清楚解釋合約,或給予足夠時間閱讀條文。Top Express先後5次向中銀購入不同系列的迷債產品,合共投資逾400萬元。

入稟狀指,直至2008年9月雷曼兄弟破產,Top Express方得知投資於迷債的400萬元本金血本無歸。Top Express認為迷債具投資風險,與中銀香港職員推銷時說法有異,銀行職員更是去年起才以書面承認迷債為高風險產品。入稟狀又指,中銀香港在去年7月起向投資者提出六成回購方案,但不包括Top Express。

回購不包括公司投資者

Top Express數度要求中銀香港回購均被拒,對方理由是Top Express為一間公司,並非個人投資者,因此不會提出回購。Top Express稱,由於中銀職員疏忽,沒有清楚解釋購買雷曼產品的風險,並且誤導Top Express以為產品絕對保本,故要求中銀香港賠償400萬元本金及利息。

Top Express東主任枝明活躍於教育界及政界,曾任職中文大學會計學副教授及公開大學持續教育部總監,亦是民建聯前中央委員,曾角逐1998年香港立法會會計界別選舉,以及2003年與2007年區議會選舉。

案件編號:HCA1241/2010

轉載自:新報 2010年8月15日(日) 版

2010年8月17日星期二

「精明債券」銀行向我不當銷售的理據(大新)

銀行向我不當銷售的理據
苦主: chukwokhung | 2010-08-04 | 爭取賠償 |

理據1:我被評估為平穩型,而「精明債券」是高風險產品。

原因: 我理解的「高風險」與銀行分別很大,而銀行也無解釋風險高在那裏。

銀行的辯解: 我已在認購表格簽署了「風險承受聲明」,可以購買高於自己承受能力的產品。

我的反駁: 我相信,銀行定期存款一定是最低風險;債券的風險稍高,所以屬於中風險;而「精明債券」因爲有幾間公司,所以屬於高風險也是正常的。

理據2:銀行無向我表明原來還有100多間公司,亦無列出100多間公司的名字。

原因: 100多間公司的風險,一定比幾間公司大得多,而且這100多間公司的名字,很多對一般香港人都十分陌生。

銀行的辯解: 銷售時並不知道那100多間公司的名字,我也可以在購買後向銀行索取。

我的反駁: 即使不知道公司的名字,也應該表明還有100多間公司。

其實,銀行可以提供之前系列公司的名單給我參考。例如:我正在買系列15,銀行可以提供系列14或13的100多間公司名單。

銀行作爲分銷商,有責任向客戶提供所有相關的資料,怎可以叫客戶自己找?客戶又怎知道有什麽資料?

況且,購買後才知道那100多間公司,也不能取消交易,只能在二手市場沽出,由於贖回價遠低於原價,我也要蒙受損失。

理據3:銀行無向我指出,100多間公司的N間死亡,我就會損失全部本金。

原因: N是多少影響至大。如果N是50,也還可以。如果N < 10,就十分危險,100多間不知名公司,在7年間有幾間出事,極之可能。

銀行的辯解: 銷售時並不知道那100多間公司。

我的反駁: CDO文件並無指出N,讀者需要根據裏面的Attachment Point和Detachment Point,自行算出N。

銀行作爲專業人士,連N也不懂得算出!難道銀行要我自己算出來嗎?銀行作爲專家也不懂,我又怎會懂得呢?

理據4:銀行無解釋100多間公司的風險

原因: 銀行如果説明還有100多間公司,我是無理由會買的。

銀行的辯解: 銀行每周向客戶提供產品贖回價,另每個月均在月結單中給予有關產品的價格變動等資料,足以反映市場當時的風險狀况,客戶可以隨時選擇止蝕。

我的反駁: 我一直以爲「精明債券」的風險只在那幾間公司,只要那幾間公司無事,就無問題,因此對贖回價不以為然。而這些產品一般都是持有至到期,贖回價偏低,中途贖回都會蒙受損失。

2008年9月,雷曼事件發生,我醒覺原來風險還有發行商摩根士丹利。當時,摩根士丹利也被傳會倒閉,不過,只要摩根士丹利無事,我還是無問題。

直至2008年12月中,我收到銀行轉寄自摩根士丹利的信件,才發現竟然還有100多間公司,其中幾間還已經倒閉,這才要命!贖回價偏低原來是因爲那100多間公司!那時,贖回價已經跌至比一期利息還要低,我不如搏收多一期利息!

銀行說我可以隨時選擇止蝕,這要我一早知道,贖回價反映的是那100多間公司的風險,不是那幾間公司和發行商的風險。

銀行等公司出事後才寄信通知,已經太遲了,爲什麽不一早告訴我那100多間公司呢?

理據5:「精明債券」的利息的確像企業債券

原因: 2007年3月,按揭證券公司推出的2年期美元債券,利息為4.8%。「精明債券」15和17的年期長達7年,和按揭證券公司相比,利息根本一點都不高。

銀行的辯解: 像企業債券不等於是企業債券。

我的反駁: 銀行作爲專業人士,無理由不知道「精明債券」只是被包裝成企業債券,更加應該向我披露隱藏的100多間公司。

2010年8月12日星期四

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHPDocument 14Filed 08/09/10Page 1 of 18

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
Document 14Filed 08/09/10Page 1 of 18

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTSOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDC SDNYDOCUMENTELECTRONICALLYFILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED:~$ ~(C)

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0017 (
WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
MEMORANDUM & ORDERHSBC USA, INC., et al.,
Defendants/Appellees.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - X

KA KIN WONG, et al.,10 Civ. 0096 (WHP)Appeal from Bankruptcy
Plaintiffs/Appellants,Case No. 08-13555 (JMP)
-against-
HSBC USA, INC., et al.,Defendants/Appellees.

WILLIAM H. PAULEY III, District Judge:

Plaintiffs/Appellants Ka Kin Wong and six other noteholders appeal from twoorders of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck,Bankr. J.)(the "Bankruptcy Court") dated November 23, 2009 and December 3, 2009 dismissingtheir Class Action Complaint (the "Complaint") with prejudice.While the events giving rise tothis adversary proceeding are complicated, two discrete issues are presented on appeal: (1)whether Plaintiffs have standing to sue, and (2) whether amendment of the Complaint would befutile.For the following reasons, this Court affirms in part, reverses in part, and vacates in part
Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHPDocument 14Filed 08/09/10Page 2 of 18
the Bankruptcy Court's orders.

BACKGROUND

1.Parties on Appeal

Plaintiffs seek to represent a class of purchasers of structured finance notes-alsoknown as "Minibonds"between June 16, 2003 and September 15, 2008. (Appellants'Designation of Contents of the Record Designation Number ("DN") 1: Complaint against HSBC,USA, et al. dated Mar. 12, 2009 ("Compl.") ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs brought claims against PacificInternational Finance Limited ("Pacific Finance" or the "Issuer"), the issuer of the Minibonds, aswell as several other entities and individuals. (Compl. ¶¶ 27-38.) The underlying transactionsand relationships among the various entities are opaque.

On appeal, Plaintiffs pursue their claims against only two entities: HSBC BankUSA, N.A. ("HSBC Bank" or the "Trustee"), and Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.("LBSF"). HSBC Bank is the trustee of collateral securing Pacific Finance's paymentobligations to the Minibonds holders and LBSF. In the Complaint, Plaintiffs mistakenly namedHSBC Bank's predecessor as trustee, (DN 6 Ex. 2: Affidavit of Song Qun Sworn, ProgrammeProspectus dated Mar. 12, 2007 at 7), and now appeal the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave toamend the Complaint to name HSBC Bank. Defendant LSBF is a bankrupt Delawarecorporation and a debtor in the underlying bankruptcy proceedings, which involve severalLehman entities (the "Lehman Bankruptcy"). (Compl.IT38, 67.)

II.The Minibonds Program

Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief relating to $1.6 billion in Minibonds

Case 1:10-cv-00017-WHP
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issued by Pacific Finance in separate, but virtually identical, series. (Compl. ¶ 45.) PacificFinance sold the Minibonds to retail investors located primarily in Hong Kong, and marketedthem as "credit-linked" to financially stable companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral.(Compl. ¶¶ 45, 47, 51.) As a consequence of Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc.'s ("LehmanBrothers") collapse, the Minibonds are now worthless. (Compl.T~67-69, 101-04.)

While the Minibonds were issued by Pacific Finance, Lehman Brothers and otherLehman entities designed the Minibonds program. (Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, 50, 82.) The details ofLehman Brothers' involvement emerged during an inquiry conducted by Hong Kong regulatoryauthorities. In that proceeding, officers of HSBC Holdings Plc ("HSBC Holdings"), thecompany at the top of the HSBC pyramid, testified that Lehman Brothers appointed HSBC Bankas trustee of the Minibonds collateral.'(Compl. ¶ 82.) Lehman Brothers also compiled theprospectus for each Minibonds series. (Compl. ¶ 82.) Pacific Finance existed only "to issue the[Minibonds]. It [was for] all intents and purposes a creature of Lehman's design .... [PacificFinance was] not an active company ... and HSBC's role as a Director [was] not an active role.. . ." (Compl. 182.) Indeed, the Complaint alleges that Lehman Brothers and LBSF, not the Issuer, "selected the collateral" for the Minibonds. (Compl. ¶ 50.)

Pacific Finance secured its obligation to pay interest to the Minibonds holdersthrough two related transactions.'First, Pacific Finance purchased notes from Saphir FinancePublic Limited Company (the "Saphir Notes"). (DN 9 Ex.1, Ex. B: Tenth Supplemental Trust

1 The Hong Kong testimony in the Complaint does not distinguish among the various HSBC andLehman entities. At times, it is difficult to discern the specific entity referenced in the testimony.

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Deed ("Tenth Deed") at 1.) The Saphir Notes were placed in trust with HSBC Bank as Trustee.(Tenth Deed at 1.) Pacific Finance also executed a credit default swap agreement with LBSF.(Tenth Deed at 1; Compl. 154.) Under the credit default swap, LBSF agreed to pay PacificFinance a sum equal to what Pacific Finance owed the Minibonds holders in exchange for theinterest earned by Pacific Finance on the Saphir Notes. (Tenth Deed at 15-16.) Because LehmanBrothers and LBSF exercised control over the Minibonds program, Plaintiffs assert that LBSF"negotiate[d] with itself over the essential terms of the swap agreements." (Compl. 150.)

The Saphir Notes are governed by a principal trust deed and a supplemental trustdeed issued for each series of Minibonds. (Compl.IT84-85.) These trust deeds and theprospectuses advertising the Minibonds sale set forth the "duties and obligations" of the Trusteeand the Issuer. (Compl.~T84-87.) The trust deeds contain,inter alia,provisions governing thepriority of payment in the event the Saphir Notes are liquidated. (Compl.IT84, 90.) The partiesdisagree about the operation of these provisions and who has priority to the Saphir Notes.Choice of law provisions in the trust deeds provide that they are to be construed under Englishlaw. (DN 9 Ex. 1: Principal Trust Deed ("Principal Trust Deed"), Sec. 17(a).) The prospectusesrepresented that "neither Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc. nor any of its subsidiaries or affiliateshas any equity interest in, or any control over, us [Pacific Finance/HSBC]." (Compl. ¶¶ 84, 87.)

According to the Complaint, Pacific Finance is controlled by HSBC Bank(Cayman) Limited ("HSBC Cayman"). (Compl. 129.) In turn, HSBC Cayman is controlled byHSBC Holdings. (Compl. ¶ 31.) HSBC Holdings also controls the Trustee's predecessor,

2 Plaintiffs brought claims against other entities and individuals alleging rights to collateralpurchased as part of additional transactions. (Compl.118,32-37, 110, 118.) Because Plaintiffsdo not appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of these claims, that collateral is not at issue.

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HSBC Bank USA.3(Compl. 13 1.)
Another HSBC entity---HSBC Bank Plc-filed a claim for $234 million in theLehman Bankruptcy. (DN 30 Ex. 6: Amended Schedule of Assets and Liabilities for LehmanBrothers at 3.) In addition, a Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner's report published after the orderson appeal discloses that HSBC Holdings and Lehman Brothers cooperated extensively duringLehman's collapse to ensure that Lehman Brothers satisfied its obligations to HSBC Holdings.(Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, dated Mar. 11, 2010 at 1321-26.)

III.Procedural History

On October 3, 2008, LBSF filed for bankruptcy. (Counter-Designation of ItemsTo Be Included In Record On Appeal ("C-DN") 10: Supplement to Proof of Claim in Chapter 11Case of LBSF ¶ 10; Compl. ¶ 67.) Thereafter, LBSF's counsel informed HSBC Bank that anyattempt to liquidate the Saphir Notes may be subject to the automatic stay provisions of theUnited States Bankruptcy Code and demanded the Trustee cease all further action. (DN 30 Ex.5: Pls.' Opp'n to Def. [LBSF's] Mot. to Dismiss the Compl., Letter dated Nov. 25, 2008.)HSBC Bank complied.

On March 12, 2009, Plaintiffs filed an adversary proceeding in the BankruptcyCourt. Count One of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the Minibonds collateral isthe property of the Minibonds holders, not the bankruptcy estate, based on breaches of contractand fiduciary duty by the Issuer and Trustee. (Compl. ¶¶ 97-108.) Count Two seeks to enjoin LBSF and the Trustee from impairing the Minibonds collateral and requests transfer of the

3 This Court presumes that an amended complaint would include the same allegation.
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collateral to the Minibonds holders. (Compl.IT109-13.) Count Three seeks a resulting orconstructive trust on the Minibonds collateral for the benefit of the Minibonds purchasers.(Compl. ¶¶ 114-21.) Finally, the remaining counts of the Complaint-Counts Four throughThirteen-assert damages claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence,unjust enrichment, and aiding and abetting against the Trustee, the Issuer, and the Issuer'sdirectors and parent company. (Compl. ¶¶ 122-89.)

On May 27, 2009, LBSF and HSBC Bank USA each moved to dismiss theComplaint. (DN 5: Notice of HSBC USA, Inc.'s Mot. to Dismiss the [Complaint], Abstain orStay the Adversary Proceeding; DN 9: Notice of Mot. of [LBSF] for an Order Dismissing theAdversary Compl.)

In a ruling from the bench, Bankruptcy Judge Peck dismissed the Complaint. TheBankruptcy Court dismissed Counts One through Three for lack of standing on three principalgrounds. First, relying on the trust deeds and English law, the Bankruptcy Court held thatPlaintiffs lack standing to bring a direct claim against Defendants. The relevant provisions of thetrust deeds state that "[a] person who is not a party to [the deed] has no right under the Contracts(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 [("Contracts Act of 1999")] to enforce any term of [the deed]except and to the extent (if any) that [the deed] expressly provides for such Act to apply to any ofits terms." (Principal Trust Deed at 3; Tenth Deed at 3). The Bankruptcy Court held that"[t]hese provisions fit squarely within the tenets of governing English law," which "provides thatit is a trustee and not a beneficiary of a trust that is the appropriate party to bring an action onbehalf of the trust beneficiaries." (Tr. of Nov. 18, 2009 Hr'g (the "Bankr. Ct. Ruling") at 25.)

Second, the Bankruptcy Court held that it would be futile to allow Plaintiffs to
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amend the Complaint to bring a derivative claim on behalf of the Trustee. (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at26.) Construing English law, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that a trust beneficiary may stepinto the shoes of the Trustee and sue on its behalf only in special circumstances. (Bankr. Ct.Ruling at 26.) Applying this standard, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned that (i) the "mere fact thatthe trustee has not filed a lawsuit [seeking to enforce Plaintiffs' right to the Minibonds collateral]is not a sufficient `special circumstance;"' and (ii) the fact that an HSBC affiliate filed a proof ofclaim in the Lehman Bankruptcy does not establish that the Trustee is conflicted because "thereis no allegation of any actual conflict." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 26.)

Third, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that it would be futile to allowamendment of the Complaint to name the proper trustee-HSBC Bank-"for the reasons setforth in this ruling." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 22.) However, it is not apparent from the transcript ofthe ruling what those reasons were.

The Bankruptcy Court also dismissed Counts Four through Thirteen because theywere "not related to the debtors' proceedings." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.) The Bankruptcy Courtstated that an adversary proceeding is considered related to a bankruptcy case "if the outcomemight have a conceivable [e]ffect on the estate." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 28.) After noting thatCounts Four through Thirteen "involve tort, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary dutyclaims against various defendants, none of whom are debtors" in the Lehman Bankruptcy,(Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 27), the Bankruptcy Court held that "[i]nasmuch as Counts [Four] through[Thirteen] comprise actions governed by foreign law between two or more non-debtors, suchclaims, regardless of the outcome, will not affect the debtor's bankruptcy cases.... Resolutionof these claims will have no [e]ffect on the rights of debtors or creditors in the debtors'

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bankruptcy cases, nor will it have any [e]ffect on the debtors' estates." (Bankr. Ct. Ruling at 29.)DISCUSSION

1.Standard of Review

A district court reviews a bankruptcy court's findings of fact for clear error and itslegal conclusionsde novo.Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8013;In re Vouzianas,259 F.3d 103, 107 (2d Cir.2001);In re Bennett Funding Grp., Inc.,146 F.3d 136, 138 (2d Cir. 1998). The dismissal of acomplaint is a legal conclusion which is subject tode novoreview.Selevan v. N.Y. ThruwayAuth.,584 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2009) ("We reviewde novoa district court's dismissal of acomplaint for lack of standing.");see alsoRaine v. Lorimar Prods., Inc.,71 B.R. 450, 452(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (`Because this is an appeal from [a Bankruptcy Court's] decision on a motionto dismiss for failure to state a claim, purely legal considerations are involved, and thus thiscourt's review must bedenovo.").When reviewing such a dismissal, a court "accept[s] allfactual allegations in the complaint and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor."ATSI Commcn's, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd.,493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).

Generally, "[a] bankruptcy court's denial of a request to amend [the complaint] isreviewed for abuse of discretion."In re Calpine Corp.,406 B.R. 463, 472 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(citingIn re Enron Corp.,419 F.3d 115, 124 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, "[i]f that denial wasbased on an interpretation of law," such as the determination that an amendment would be futile,a court employsde novoreview. SeeDougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of ZoningAppeals,282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002);see alsoRicciuti v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,941 F.2d119, 122-24 (2d Cir. 1991) (reviewingde novothe lower court's determination that amendment

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would be futile).
A court "should freely give leave [to amend the Complaint] when justice sorequires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Particularly where a court grants a motion to dismiss, "theusual practice is to grant leave to amend."Hayden v. Cnty. of Nassau,180 F.3d 42, 53 (2d Cir.1999).A court may deny leave to amend as futile only "if the proposed claim could notwithstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."Lucente v. Int'l Bus. Mach.Corp.,310 F.3d 243, 258 (2d Cir. 2002). Indeed, futility means that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his amended claims."Pangburn v. Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotations and citations omitted).

II.Claims Against LBSF: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs appeal the dismissal of their direct claims against LBSF and the denialof leave to replead those claims derivatively. This Court addresses Count Three of theComplaint separately for the reasons articulated in Section IV,infra.

a.Direct Claim Against LBSF

Plaintiffs appeal the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of their direct claims againstLBSF on two principal grounds: (1) Plaintiffs have standing under English law to sue LBSFdirectly because LBSF is a co-beneficiary under the trust; and (2) the Bankruptcy Court'sreliance on the provisions of the trust deeds prohibiting non-parties from enforcing the deeds'terms was misplaced. Because Plaintiffs lack standing under English law to bring a direct claimagainst LBSF, this Court need not address Plaintiffs' second contention.

Under English law, a trustee generally has "a duty to protect and preserve the trust

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estate for the benefit of the beneficiaries ...."Alsop Wilkinson v. Neary,[ 1996] 1 W.L.R.1220, 1224 (Ch.). As such, "[n]ormally [it is] the trustee who has a right of action [and] is theproper person to enforce [the trust]."Hayim v. Citibank NA,[1987] A.C. 730, 733 (P.C.); seealsoAlsop,1W.L.R. at 1224 ("Trustees have a duty to ... represent the trust in a third partydispute."). Plaintiffs seek to circumvent this general principle by invoking the so-called"beneficiaries dispute" theory.Under that theory, "where the dispute is between rival claimantsto a beneficial interest in the subject matter of the trust.... the duty of the trustee is to remainneutral and ... leav[e] it to the rivals to fight their battles."Alsop,1W.L.R. at 1225.

Plaintiffsargue this theory applies here because LBSF persuaded the Bankruptcy Court that it is abeneficiary rather than a third party under the trust.

As a threshold matter, Plaintiffs mischaracterize the Bankruptcy Court's ruling.The Bankruptcy Court did not describe LBSF as a trust beneficiary. Instead, relying onGregsonv. HAE Trs. Ltd.,[2008] EWHC 1006 (Ch.), the Bankruptcy Court found that the Trustee wasthe appropriate party to bring an action on behalf of the trust beneficiaries, InGregson,a trustbeneficiary brought suit against the director of a corporate trustee for impairment of trustproperty. The beneficiary argued that a corporate trustee's claims against its directors are heldfor the trust's beneficiaries, thereby empowering them to sue directly.Gregson,EWHC 1006 at119,22.TheGreszsoncourt rejected this notion and described the general rule that "a director ofa trustee company does not owe a fiduciary duty to the beneficiary of the trust," and absent thatduty, a trust beneficiary has no direct claim against the director.Gregson,EWHC 1006 atIT44,56, 69.

As theGregsonanalysis illustrates, the core inquiry is whether the potentially

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liable third party owed a duty to the trust's beneficiaries. SeeGregson,EWHC 1006 at¶T44,46, 57-58 (stating that if a direct claim against the directors was valid, it would "circumvent theclear and established principle that no direct duty is owed by the directors to the beneficiaries");see alsoRoberts v. Gill & Co,[2010] UKSC 22, ¶¶ 46, 110 (S.C.) (beneficiary sought to amendto bring a derivative claim where it was "accepted that a claim that the [third parties] owed aduty of care to the beneficiaries would be difficult to sustain").While LBSF is a party to thetrust deeds, Plaintiffs do not allege the existence of any fiduciary relationship betweenthemselves and LBSF, Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court properly held that Plaintiffs lackstanding under English law to sue LBSF directly.

b.Derivative Claims Against LBSF

The Bankruptcy Court also concluded that re-pleading derivative claims againstLBSF would be futile because Plaintiffs cannot allege the existence of special circumstances. Inmaking this determination, the Bankruptcy Court considered Plaintiffs' allegations that theTrustee failed to bring suit against LBSF and that an HSBC entity filed a proof of claim in theLehman Bankruptcy.

Under English law, a trust beneficiary may bring a derivative suit against a thirdparty when "special circumstances" are present. The "special circumstances"rule, articulated inHayim v. Citibank NA,provides:

[A] beneficiary has no cause of action against a third party save inspecial circumstanceswhich embrace a failure, excusable orinexcusable, by the trustees to the beneficiary to protect the trustestate or to protect the interests of the beneficiary in the trustestate.Hayim,A.C. 730 at 748. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom recently addressed the

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"special circumstances" rule and summarized the relevant authorities as follows:
The special circumstances which were identified in the earliestauthorities as justifying a beneficiary's action were fraud on thepart of the trustee, or collusion between the trustee and the thirdparty, or the insolvency of the trustee, but it has always been clearthat these are merely examples of special circumstances, and thatthe underlying question is whether the circumstancesaresufficiently special to make it iust for the beneficiary to have theremedy.Roberts,UKSC 22 at746, 114 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court of the United Kingdomnoted that a court has "wide latitude in evaluating ... special circumstances," taking into account"all [of] the relevant circumstances."Roberts,UKSC 22 at ¶¶ 76, 78, 114.

Through the prism of these English law principles, this Court concludes that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that Plaintiffs cannot allege special circumstances. Despite representations in the Minibonds prospectuses that neither Lehman Brothers nor any of itssubsidiaries exercised control over the Issuer, Lehman Brothers designed the Minibonds programand directed the Issuer's activities.As a party to the trust deeds, LSBF was substantiallyinvolved in that process. The Issuer then created a trust that, in certain circumstances, distributesits only collateral to aLehmanentity, rather than the trust'ssolebeneficiary. Juxtaposed againstthe promise that the Minibonds would be secured by highly-rated collateral, this is an odd result.SeeRoyal Brunei Airlines Sdn Bhd v. Tan,[1995] 2 A.C. 378, 386-87 (P.C.) ("If, for his ownpurposes, a third party deliberately interferes in that relationship by assisting the trustee indepriving the beneficiary of the property held for him by the trustee, the beneficiary should beable to look for recompense to the third party as well as the trustee.");see alsoRoberts,UKSC22 at ¶¶ 46, 114 ("[T]he underlying question is whether the circumstances are sufficiently specialto make it just for the beneficiary to have the remedy.");In re Field,[ 1971 ] 1 W.L.R. 555, 561

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(Ch.)(holding that special circumstances existed and "justice require[d] that the plaintiff, who isthe only other person interested [in the property], should be allowed to have [his claim] properlytried before a court"), Furthermore, the recently released Examiner's report reveals cooperationbetween HSBC and Lehman Brothers at the highest levels during Lehman Brothers' collapse.

Given the totality of these circumstances, this Court cannot find that it is "beyond doubt that theplaintiff[s] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] amended claims."Pangburn v.Culbertson,200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

On appeal, the parties advance arguments concerning the operation of the trustdeeds' payment priority provisions and potential class certification problems caused by asettlement arranged by Hong Kong regulatory authorities.While interesting, these arguments areextraneous to the issue of standing; they concern the merits of Plaintiffs' claims and are notbefore this Court on appeal. At this stage of the litigation, Plaintiffs should be permitted toreplead Counts One and Two as derivative claims against LBSF. The Bankruptcy Court's denialof leave to replead is reversed.

III.Claims Against the Trustee: Counts One & Two

Plaintiffs also contend that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying leave to amendthe Complaint to name HSBC Bank as the Trustee. The Bankruptcy Court held that amendingthe Complaint would be futile for the reasons set forth in its ruling, but did not articulate thosereasons.

As an initial matter, the Bankruptcy Court's analysis of English case law ignoredthe differences between Plaintiffs' relationship with the Trustee and Plaintiffs' relationship with

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LBSF and the other dismissed entities. Under English law, "the basic right of a beneficiary is tohave the trust duly administered in accordance with the provisions of the trust instrument ... andthe general law."Target Holdings Ltd. v. Redferns,[1996] 1 AC 421, 434 (H.L.).When atrustee unlawfully administers the trust, a trust beneficiary may sue the trustee directly. SeeHayim,A.C. at 735 ("The beneficiaries have a right to enforce the trust directly against the ...trustee.");Bartlett v. Barclays Bank Trust Co. Ltd.,[1980] 2 W.L.R. 430, 444, 452 (Ch.)(holding a trustee liable to the trust beneficiaries for willful "breach of trust");see alsoTargetHoldings,1AC at 437 ("A trustee who wrongly pays away trust money ... commits a breach oftrust and comes under an immediate duty to remedy such breach.").

The Bankruptcy Court heldthat the trustee is the proper party to bring suit on behalf of a trust beneficiary.While that mayexplain Plaintiffs' lack of standing to sue LBSF directly, it does not resolve the issue of whethera beneficiary has standing to sue his trustee. Indeed, Counts One and Two are premised onalleged breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by the Trustee for failing to distribute the SaphirNotes to Plaintiffs.

The standing provisions of the trust deeds provide that a non-party to the trust hasno right under the Contracts Act of 1999 to enforce any of the deeds' terms.While theBankruptcy Court held that these provisions fit squarely within English law, it merely quoted theprovisions without analyzing their language or the statute on which they rely. Notably, theContracts Act of 1999 allows a non-party to a contract to enforce the contract's terms if they"purport[] to confer a benefit on him," Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 1 (U.K.), but expresslystates that it does not "affect any right or remedy of a third party that exists or is available apartfrom th[e] Act." Contracts Act of 1999, c. 31, § 7. Thus, while the trust deeds deprive Plaintiffs

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of rights derived from the Contracts Act of 1999, Plaintiffs may hold rights outside of the Act, anissue the Bankruptcy Court did not consider.

Finally, the Bankruptcy Court's rationale for dismissing Counts Four throughThirteen fails to render futile an amended complaint naming the correct trustee. The BankruptcyCourt reasoned that these counts involve questions of foreign law which will have no effect onthe rights of debtors or creditors in the underlying bankruptcy. The applicable rule is that "[a]proceeding is `related to' a [bankruptcy] case ... if the outcome might have a `conceivableeffect' on the estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citingIn re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp.,980 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1992)). A conceivable effect is onewhich "could alter the debtor's rights, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positivelyor negatively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of thebankrupt estate."In re New 118th LLC,396 B.R. at 890 (citingIn re Pacor, Inc.,743 F.2d 984,994 (3d Cir. 1984),overruled on other grounds byThings Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca,516U.S. 124, 134-35 (1995)). In this case, Plaintiffs seek to prevent the transfer of the SaphirNotes-worth $1.6 billion-to the bankruptcy estate. The effect of $1.6 billion on thebankruptcy estate is self-evident.Moreover, by instructing the Trustee to postpone distributionof the Saphir Notes, LBSF-not Plaintiffs-tethered the Saphir Notes to the LehmanBankruptcy. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One andTwo against the Trustee is reversed.

IV.Constructive & Resulting Trust Claims: Count Three

In Count Three of the Complaint, Plaintiffs seek to impose a constructive or

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resulting trust on the Mimbonds collateral.While the Bankruptcy Court made a passingreference to these claims, it provided no analysis in its ruling. Understandably, the BankruptcyJudge was juggling a host of complex and urgent issues. Nonetheless, this Court cannot discernwhy the constructive and resulting trust claims were dismissed. SeeIn re Gucci,309 B.R. 679,685 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("This Court ... has no way of knowing whether and to what extent thedefense or elements thereof were rejected as a matter of law, [and] the reasons for any suchrejection ....").A constructive trust relies on equitable, as opposed to contractual and formaltrust, principles.See, e.g.,Counihan v. Allstate Ins. Co„194 F.3d 357, 361 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Aconstructive trust is an equitable remedy ... [whose] purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment.").Without some analysis of why standing principles derived from the trust deeds' and English lawapply to claims for a constructive or resulting trust, denial of leave to replead Count Threeagainst both the Trustee and LBSF was inappropriate. SeePanaburn,200 F.3d at 70 (denial ofleave to replead is warranted only when it is "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set offacts in support of [the] amended claims").Moreover, it is not evident whether these claims aregoverned by English law, an issue the Bankruptcy Court did not address. Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated and remanded for further consideration.

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CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Counts One andTwo against LBSF is affirmed, and its denial of leave to replead those claims derivatively against LBSF is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's denial of leave to replead Counts One and Twoagainst the Trustee is reversed. The Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of Count Three is vacated.This action is remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with thisMemorandum and Order.

Dated: August 9, 2010
New York, New York

SO ORDERED:

WILLIAM H. PAULEY IIIU.S.D.J.

Counsel of Record:

Jason C. Davis, Esq.
Robbins Geller Rudman & Dowd LLP100 Pine Street, Suite 2600
San Francisco, CA 94111

Counsel for Appellants

Howard Grant Sloane, Esq.Cahill Gordon & Reindel LLP80 Pine Street
New York, NY 10005

Counsel for the HSBC Appellees

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Richard W. Slack, Esq.
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10153

Counsel for Appellee Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.

David S. Cohen, Esq.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP
1850 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Counsel for Intervenor Official
Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Lehman Brothers HoldingsInc. et al.

2010年8月10日星期二

Hope for HK Minibond investors

Hope for HK Minibond investors

2010年8月9日星期一

Lehman, HSBC May Be Sued Over Worthless ‘Minibonds’

Aug. 9 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc may be sued over $1.6 billion in worthless securities sold to retail investors, primarily in Hong Kong, a judge in New York ruled.

U.S. District Judge William H. Pauley III today reversed part of a decision by Lehman’s bankruptcy judge, who threw out a suit by seven holders of structured financial notes called minibonds. The plaintiffs seek to represent a class of investors in the notes from June 16, 2003, to Sept. 15, 2008, Pauley said in his decision.

Pacific International Finance Ltd. issued the minibonds and marketed them as linked to the credit of financially sound companies and backed by AAA-rated collateral, Pauley said. The minibonds became worthless as a result of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008.

A Hong Kong regulatory authority investigation disclosed that Lehman designed the minibonds program and used Pacific Finance to issue them, Pauley said. Lehman selected HSBC Bank USA as trustee of the collateral securing the notes, Pauley said, citing testimony in the Hong Kong proceeding.

In two orders, issued in November and December, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck ruled that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that any attempt to revise their complaint would be futile.

In today’s ruling, Pauley reversed the dismissal of one count against HSBC and Lehman and permitted the plaintiffs to amend two dismissed counts.

Neil Brazil, an HSBC spokesman, said the firm had no immediate comment on the ruling. Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, didn’t return a voice-mail message seeking comment.

The case is Wong v. HSBC USA Inc., 10-cv-00017, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

--Editors: Peter Blumberg, Michael Hytha.

To contact the reporter on this story: Bob Van Voris in New York at rvanvoris@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: David E. Rovella at rvanvoris@bloomberg.net.

2010年8月8日星期日

“沃爾克規則”弱化與美國金融改革力度

“沃爾克規則”弱化與美國金融改革力度

美國最新金融監管改革法案有三個方面值得我們關注:一是新法案明顯弱化了“沃爾克規則”;二是新法案將對美國金融業產生深遠影響,但其本身仍有局限性;三是我們應關注美國金融監管改革對全球的影響,但更應結合中國金融市場發展的現實情況來推進中國國內的金融監管改革。

  ⊙馬素紅 羅寧


  自全球金融危機爆發以來的兩年多時間里,美國推出了多個版本的金融監管改革方案,關於各方案細節的激烈談判和辯論一直在進行當中,各版本的提案和法案也幾經修正和博弈。近日,美國金融監管改革終於修成正果——最終版本的金融監管改革法案在獲得美國參議院通過之後,已于7月21日經美國總統奧巴馬簽署並正式成為法律。

  美國最新金融監管改革法案(以下簡稱“新法案”)有三個方面值得我們關注:一是新法案明顯弱化了“沃爾克規則”;二是新法案將對美國金融業產生深遠影響,但其本身仍有局限性;三是我們應關注美國金融監管改革對全球的影響,但更應結合中國金融市場發展的現實情況來推進國內的監管改革。
 
  新法案對“沃爾克規則”的弱化是與此前版本的最大不同  與之前的一系列版本最大的區別在於,新法案沒有對金融機構規模進行限制,並保留了金融機構擴大自營交易的機會,將最嚴厲的部分——“沃爾克規則”予以弱化,說明該法案是各方妥協的結果,並未完全觸及改革的實質性內容。從表面上看來,這是華爾街金融機構的大力游說以及國際層面不認同“沃爾克規則”等雙重因素導致的結果,但實質上,這種妥協更體現了美國致力于在強化金融監管與保持自身金融競爭力之間取得平衡。

  “沃爾克規則”在今年初被正式提出後,盡管得到美國總統奧巴馬的首肯,但在美國國內受到了較大質疑,特別是遭到了華爾街金融機構的強烈反對。反對派的主要理由是,綜合化經營和自營交易行為本身不是金融危機的罪魁禍首,雷曼和貝爾斯登均是單一投行模式,華盛頓互惠銀行則是單一的商業銀行模式,這些金融機構的倒閉和是否從事自營交易無關。

  由於華爾街大型金融機構代表著美國的核心競爭力,是保持美國金融創新在全球範圍內一枝獨秀、不斷吸引國際金融資本和其他寶貴資源的重要因素,因此,美國金融監管改革不太可能通過實施過於激進的限制性措施,從實質上遏制華爾街的創新動力。新法案對“沃爾克規則”的弱化,與其說是對華爾街的妥協,不如說是對美國總體競爭力的更深層次考慮。

  此外,美國對“沃爾克規則”的修正和折中也受到國際環境的影響。歐盟明確表示不會跟風效仿“沃爾克規則”,英國也表示不打算將投資銀行從綜合性銀行中分離出來,並無意限制銀行規模。在這種背景下,美國若單邊突進,只會導致更多的國際資本和大型金融機構轉而選擇歐洲或其他地區,從而使美國成為“監管套利”的犧牲品。

  這在美國金融監管史上已有前車之鑒:在安然、世通等財務欺詐事件爆發後,美國于2002年頒佈了《薩班斯—奧克斯利法案》,旨在杜絕此類丑聞再次發生。但過於嚴苛的監管以及由此引致的企業上市成本過高問題,導致美國資本市場的吸引力下降,大量客戶流失,甚至境外企業紛紛退市。有了上述教訓,美國在新一輪監管改革中,不得不更加注重在加強監管與保持自身金融競爭力方面取得平衡,避免新的監管舉措過於嚴厲而降低美國金融市場的吸引力。
 

 新法案將對美國金融業產生深遠影響,但難以杜絕危機再次爆發  1.對金融機構“大而不倒”難題的破解。新法案主要從兩方面解決“大而不倒”問題:一是提高大型金融機構的風險撥備水平,並在資本、杠杆率等方面制定更為嚴格的監管標準,以抑制銀行規模擴張的動力。二是建立合理的退出機制。新法案規定,在大型金融機構對金融系統形成嚴重衝擊的極端情況下,可由監管部門接管並對其進行拆分,同時設立新的破產清算機制以防止金融機構倒閉再度拖累納稅人救助。

  上述規定是美國監管部門對本輪金融危機反思後做出的政策選擇,旨在降低未來大型銀行機構“綁架”國民經濟、擴大系統性風險的可能。但筆者認為,新法案對銀行規模進行限制並不必然有其合理性:首先,對大型銀行的監管強化,可能導致信貸意願受到抑制,並通過加劇信貸緊縮進一步影響全球經濟的複蘇進程。其次,與中小銀行相比,大型銀行在促進一國經濟發展、為大型企業服務和穩定金融市場方面起到不可替代的作用,也是一國金融競爭力的重要體現。再次,金融行業自身的規模經濟與範圍經濟效應,以及市場競爭中的優勝劣汰往往使得金融機構資產與業務的擴張成為一種必然趨勢,規模限制措施是對金融業競爭自然演化格局的一種人為干預。

  2.金融創新將更加回歸實體需求。本輪金融危機爆發前,美國金融市場一直以市場自由化程度高、金融創新活躍而備受稱道。但過度金融創新也使得“次級按揭貸款”、信用違約掉期(CDS)等金融工具脫離了監管控制(eg. http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/08/blog-post.html),過高的杠杆率最終導致了金融風險集中爆發。新法案將複雜衍生品納入監管範圍及交易所交易,有助于降低過度金融創新、衍生品交易失控與衍生品泡沫的風險,有利於促進金融產品創新的規範化和理性化發展。受金融監管全面強化的影響,金融創新的步伐活動可能出現放緩,創新動力受到削弱,預計金融機構的各種業務創新將進入一段“緘默期”,金融產品的衍生化進程也將有所減緩,未來的金融創新將更加回歸實體經濟需求。

  3.美國金融機構的業務模式和盈利能力受到影響。針對新法案對金融機構業務範圍和營業規模進行的限制,美國金融業未來發展有兩種可能:一是監管力度增強和業務範圍的限制,將使美國大型銀行的業務結構更多向傳統的商業銀行回歸;二是金融自由化和創新不會受到根本性遏制,華爾街更可能通過新的創新來規避監管新規,即所謂的“道高一尺,魔高一丈”。結合全球金融發展的大趨勢和美國保持自身競爭力的需要,筆者認為,第二種可能性更大。

  新法案對金融機構盈利能力的影響已成定局。據《經濟學人》(The Economist)的相關預測,受金融改革法案實施的影響,預計美國規模最大的銀行2013年利潤將縮水5%-20%。法案對業務範圍的限制可能影響摩根斯坦利集團總收入近2%;高盛可能至少有10%的收入將面臨縮水。

  據高盛的預測,新法案將導致美國大銀行正常利潤總共下降13%,其中摩根大通和摩根斯坦利受到的衝擊最嚴重,正常利潤分別縮水95美分/股和74美分/股;其次是富國銀行和花旗,盈利分別減少29美分/股和12美分/股。但總體來看,目前美國銀行業對對沖基金的投資比例為5%左右,只是略高于新法案設置的3%上限,且新法案給予銀行長達7年的過渡期,因此銀行短期盈利能力受到的衝擊有限。

  4.新法案的局限性使其無法杜絕危機再來。首先,新法案對導致金融風險產生的宏觀經濟政策因素尚無有效措施。盡管新法案將系統性風險監管列為重點,但其只限于加強微觀層次監管和中觀層次監測,對宏觀經濟政策則採取了迴避。危機的防範是一項系統性的工程,如果缺少宏觀經濟政策的調控與配合,系統性風險的積聚恐難以徹底根除。

  其次,新法案並未就跨境金融監管的協調配合提出針對性舉措。新法案的具體內容更多的是對本輪金融危機期間美國金融監管所暴露問題進行修補。為維護全球金融市場的穩定,亟須加強國際層面的跨境金融監管,這是美國單邊金融監管改革所無法做到的。

  再次,美國固然可以通過加強自身的金融監管來提高美國金融體系的穩定性,但在經濟金融全球化、大型金融機構跨國化已成為大趨勢、大潮流的背景下,金融風險的跨境傳染和溢出是難以避免的。因此,如果全球金融體系的穩定性沒有實質性的增強,美國金融業乃至整個美國經濟也無法屏蔽危機、偏安一隅。


  

  從中國金融監管改革的角度關注美國金融監管法案  總體來看,新法案針對本輪金融危機中美國金融機構所暴露出的過度杠杆化風險、衍生品交易風險等等制定了相對嚴厲的、較為有效的監管規則。雖然新法案中“沃爾克規則”有所弱化,但仍會在一定程度上減緩金融產品的衍生化進程,並推動美國金融市場規範化和理性化發展。

  對中國而言,目前面臨的問題並非金融創新過度,而是創新不足,金融市場發展仍處於初期階段。過於嚴格的監管措施與經營限制可能會抑制金融創新的步伐,不利於中國金融機構業務的拓展與實力的壯大,也不利於中國金融市場深化發展。整體來看,當前中國在國際金融市場大舞台上仍處於相對較弱的地位,在此背景下,我國金融監管改革不應單純效仿美國金融監管最新法案,而是吸取其在金融衍生品風險風險防範以及系統性風險控制等方面的有益措施,以推進我國金融監管改革的步伐,實現金融市場的穩定可持續發展。

  另一個值得強調的問題是,美國在全球金融市場中的重要地位決定了新法案的通過將為全球金融監管改革樹立新的標尺。鑒於美國不僅處於金融領域發展前沿,而且在IMF和國際清算銀行等國際組織具有主導性的發言權,因而,美國國內金融改革法案也將深刻影響新巴塞爾協議的修訂和全球金融改革未來發展的方向。

  針對美國可能利用其影響力主導全球金融監管規則的問題,中國應密切關注美國金融監管法案的國際推廣,盡早介入並積極參與當前的國際金融監管改革,主動反映中國金融業的意見和訴求,使國際金融監管改革體現“共同而有區別”的原則,即在統一的基本框架下,使各國能根據自身面臨的不同問題制定切實有效的防範和化解金融危機的政策和措施,防止國際監管改革在美國的施壓下導致“政策趨同”與“一刀切”,保障我國經濟、金融全球化進程中的利益,提升我國在國際組織與國際規則制定中的地位和影響。

  (作者單位:中國工商銀行城市金融研究所)次貸危機以來美國金融改革歷程  2008年3月,時任美國財長的保爾森公佈“美國金融監管體系現代化藍圖”,提出了短期和中期的金融監管體制改革建議以及長期的最優監管框架。

  2009年3月,美國財政部公佈“金融監管改革框架”,改革計劃包括:防範系統性風險、保護消費者和投資人利益、消除監管漏洞、促進國際監管規則協調一致。

  2009年6月,美國奧巴馬政府公佈“金融監管改革:新基礎”白皮書,提出加強對金融機構和金融市場的監管、保護消費者和投資者、賦予美聯儲更大的權力以監管系統性風險、改進監管的國際合作等。

  2009年12月,美國議院通過金融監管改革法案,提出設立消費者金融保護局以維護金融消費者的利益,並要求加強對沖基金監管及賦予政府更多權利監管大型金融機構和經濟中的系統性風險。

  2010年1月,奧巴馬提出向大型金融機構開征“金融危機責任費”以償還納稅人向其提供的特別援助。

  2010年1月,奧巴馬批准“沃爾克規則”議案,主要內容包括限制金融機構的規模和禁止銀行機構從事高風險的自營交易。 (e.g.http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/04/blog-post.html)

  2010年5月,美國參議院通過金融監管改革法案,主要內容包括:禁止商業銀行進行自營交易、加強衍生品交易監管、成立消費者保護機構、成立統一的金融監管委員會以及針對倒閉金融機構建立清算機制等

2010年8月5日星期四

Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change

Financial Regulation in Hong Kong: Time for a Change

Structured Securities: A New, Tough Emperor Rules, Hong Kong

Structured Securities: A New, Tough Emperor Rules, Hong Kong

The final word from the SFC on structured product reform - 1 June 2010

The final word from the SFC on structured product reform - 1 June 2010

Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has issued its consultation conclusions on the rules by which it will regulate structured products and the conduct of intermediaries selling those products. The new rules significantly effect the way that products are designed and sold.

The SFC adopted most of what it proposed initially. Issuers owe new obligations to investors during the tenor of a structured investment product.

They will come into effect on a date yet to be published, but issuers will only need to comply with documentation requirements at the time their product programmes are renewed.

Background

The SFC issued its “Consultation Conclusions on Proposals to Enhance Protection for the Investors Public” (Conclusions) on Friday evening, 29 May 2010. The Conclusions follow a consultation paper issued in September 2009 and several months of consultation with industry participants. A summary was set out in our alert - Reform of the sale of unlisted structured products in Hong Kong - the devil is in the detail - 29 September 2009.

This Alert examines the key changes and the departures that the SFC has made from what it proposed in its earlier consultation paper. The changes are complex. They affect:

■the exercise by the SFC of its approval of structured products offered to retail investors;
■the way distributors sell those products to their clients; and
■the obligations of issuers to provide information to investors after the issue of those products.
The Conclusions:

■apply to unlisted structured products (including equity linked deposits), unit trusts, mutual funds and investment-linked assurance schemes;
■do not apply to listed structured products (such as warrants and CBBCs) except that intermediaries must now explain the risks involved as part of enhanced know-your-client (KYC) procedures - see below; and
■include the final version of a Handbook that will govern the SFC’s approval, and after-sale supervision, of unlisted structured investment products, funds and investment linked assurance schemes.
Just to recap

The Conclusions detail the mechanics of a public offer of each category of product. The Conclusions run parallel with another set of conclusions that will remove the statutory regulation of structured products from the Companies Ordinance (CO) to the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO). Those parallel conclusions are described in our previous alert - SFC takes tough line on structured product reform - 27 April 2010.

Key features of the Handbook

SFC approval and breaches of the Handbook

The Handbook codifies the principles the SFC will apply in its approval of structured investment products (SIP Code). “Structured investment product” is defined in the Handbook to include a product which is required to be authorised by the SFC under the SFO, or which involves derivative arrangements and is regarded in the market as an equity, index, commodity or credit-linked investment product.

Issuers are required to notify the SFC of all “material” breaches of the Handbook. It does not matter that the breach is of a short duration or caused by factors outside the control of the issuer.

Issuers must cease to issue structured products if they fail to comply with the Handbook and take remedial action. The SFC’s suggested requirement that compensation be paid to investors for any such failure has been removed.

Qualification of an issuer, guarantor and product arranger

The SFC requires a locally licensed dealer to be appointed as product arranger when a structured product is issued by:

■a special purpose vehicle; or
■when neither the issuer nor guarantor is regulated in Hong Kong.
The product arranger must take responsibility for compliance by the issuer with the Handbook.

The second appointment is surprising in the situation where the issuer or a guarantor is regulated by an internationally recognised regulator. The local arranger is likely to be a much smaller, related entity of the issuer or guarantor.

The SFC has clarified that an issuer and guarantor will only be disqualified from acting if any disciplinary hearings “materially affect” the issuer’s or the guarantor’s financial condition, status as a licensed or regulated entity, or ability to perform its licensed on regulated activity.

The SFC will accept financial information being prepared in accordance with internationally recognised financial reporting standards. It will not insist on the use of International or Hong Kong Financial Reporting Standards.

The SFC will not insist that issuers undertake to the SFC that the product is “fair” and “appropriate” or that, the structured product continues to comply with the SIP Code.

There appears to be growing support from the SFC for incorporating by reference information available outside the offering documents. The key is to ensure that investors are notified of, and have access to, such information.

Key Facts Statements (KFS)

The KFS should form part of the offering document “although they may be produced as physically separate documents”. Issuers will be reluctant to detach the KFS from the fuller disclosure in the offering document for fear of being accused that the KFS summary is incomplete. It would be usual to qualify reliance on the KFS issued on its own but the SFC has said “it will not consider it an acceptable practice…to insert disclaimers…with a view to minimising or avoiding liability…”.

It would appear that publishing the KFS separately to the offering document runs the serious risk of criminal and/or civil liability for misrepresentation.

The SFC is prepared to be flexible and permit the KFS to exceed four pages if that is useful for investors.

Helpfully, the SFC has removed its earlier requirement that English and Chinese versions of the offering document be of equivalent standing.

SPV structures

Lehman Minibonds were issued by a special purpose vehicle (SPV). Investors took risk on:

■Lehman as a swap counterparty;
■highly rated credit linked notes (CLNs);
■the credit of a number of local banks and corporations.
There is on-going controversy as to the effectiveness of the mechanism by which payments to Lehman as a defaulting swap counterparty were expressly deferred to payments to the SPV/investors.

Following the Conclusions, a structure of that type would now require:

■extensive disclosure about the swap counterparty (in SFC terminology, the “Key Product Counterparty”) and the swap. It is now clear that a Key Product Counterparty is a party on whom the issuer relies in order to make payments. It does not apply to a “balance-sheet” hedge;
■SFC approval of the asset which secures the obligations of the SPV. The asset must be “liquid and tradeable” - unlisted CLNs are unlikely to qualify. The SFC expects that the collateral will normally be diversified. Investors must be informed of any default in the collateral; and
■SFC approval of the reference asset. A key factor in determining whether a reference asset is eligible is the availability of information about the asset in English and Chinese. Again, it is unlikely the SFC will approve credit as a reference asset.
For these reasons, a structure similar to Lehman Minibonds is unlikely to receive approval.

The SFC has agreed however not to insist that investors in structures of this type must always rank first in right of payment to all other creditors (such as the swap counterparty) of the SPV.

Payment waterfalls will require extensive disclosure, as will any other matter that might impede investors recovering their investment (such as the laws of another country). Lehman Minibonds provide a lesson as how the laws of the United States (which govern the liquidation of Lehman) conflict with the laws of England (which govern the Minibond documents).

Transitional

The Handbook will become effective upon its publication in the Government Gazette but issuers of existing authorised structured products will only need to comply with the Handbook at the time their product programmes are renewed.

The SFC has reserved the right to obtain specific undertakings from issuers when it approves offering documents.

Distribution of structured investment products

KYC - investor characterisation

Except in the case of professional investors, distributors are required to assess their client’s knowledge of derivatives and characterise the client based on their knowledge of derivatives. Factors relevant to determining such knowledge include training, work experience and trading experience.

In the case of an execution only sale of a derivative structured product, if the client does not have derivatives knowledge:

■if the product is listed, the distributor must provide a written or audio-recorded explanation of the risks associated with the structured product to the client; and
■in case of unlisted structured products, the distributor must warn the client and determine whether the transaction is suitable for the client. The distributor should not proceed with an “unsuitable” transaction for the client unless that is the best interests of the client.
This requirement is new and must be satisfied in addition to other existing KYC procedures set out in the Code of Conduct.

Professional Investors

The SFC agrees not to change the existing HK$8 million portfolio requirement.

In determining whether to classify an investor as a “professional”, a distributor may, in addition to the existing factors set out in the Code of Conduct, adopt a holistic approach and take into account the investor’s knowledge and expertise in each different type of product. Helpfully, the SFC recognises that the factors set out in the Code of Conduct are examples only of what is to be taken into account in determining whether to treat an investor as a professional. That assessment is to be updated when the investor ceases to trade in the relevant product for more than two years.

Disclosure of monetary and non-monetary benefits

Distributors must disclose:

■the receipt of any monetary benefit from an issuer (directly or indirectly) as a percentage ceiling of the investment amount (eg “up to x%”);
■the trading profit made on a transaction where the distributor purchases a structured product from an issuer and then sells the structured product to the investor as a percentage ceiling of the investment amount; and
■all other benefits by a making generic disclosure of the existence and nature of the benefits.
The SFC acknowledges that the disclosure of benefits and other mandated information such as the capacity in which the distributor is acting, may be set out in an account opening form or subscription form.

Advertisements

The SFC Code codifies the existing market practice for advertisements. A new requirement is that advertisements must be reviewed by a senior manager of the issuer. The SFC has confirmed its intent that the senior manager will not be personally liable for the accuracy of advertisements. It is unclear how senior managers will avoid liability (it is not proposed to expressly give any comfort in the Handbook). The reality is that there will be considerable focus on the senior manager if any error is found in an advertisement he approves.

Gifts

Distributors may offer to an investor discount fees and charges but not gifts such as supermarket gift coupons and audio visual equipment for the purpose of promoting any investment product.

Audio recording

Audio recording is not mandatory. The SFC has confirmed that the existing record keeping requirements are sufficient.

Transitional

The timing for the changes to the Code of Conduct is:

■restrictions on the use of gifts - three months following the publication of the amendments to the Code of Conduct in the Government Gazette;
■commission refund obligation - when the SIP Code takes effect; and
■all other requirements - 12 months following publication in the Government Gazette.
After-sale supervision

Ongoing disclosure

Issuers, guarantors and Key Product Counterparties must disclose:

■annual and interim financial statements - only summaries of those statements need to be translated into Chinese (if not in Chinese); and
■if published, quarterly financial statements and other financial information that is required to be publicly filed - no translation is required if made available in English.
This reflects the existing practice for issuers and guarantors of listed structured products. It can be a time consuming (and, in the case of translations, costly) process.

An issuer and guarantor must keep the SFC and investors informed of changes in their financial condition which would reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on their ability to perform their obligations under the structured product. The SFC does not propose to make available to issuers a website for the dissemination of information to investors. Issuers must instead determine how to efficiently disseminate that information in a timely manner.

Cooling-off - two regimes

Under the Handbook, cooling-off:

■must be provided for all SFC-approved unlisted structured products with a scheduled tenor of more than one year;
■applies during the period commencing five business days after the investor places an order for the structured product; and
■entitles the investor to receive a refund of the principal invested and sales commissions paid less a market value adjustment (including any swap break costs) and a reasonable handling fee to cover the administrative costs of the issuer and distributor.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued on 20 May 2010 its own pre-sale cooling-off rules for implementation by all banks no later than 1 January 2011. The HKMA’s rules differ from those of the SFC in that they apply:

■to all unlisted derivative products (whether or not approved by the SFC);
■only in the two calendar day window before the investor buys the structured product. The SFC’s rules apply after the structured product is purchased; and
■only to retail customers aged 65 or above and to first-time buyers. Even then, the rules may not apply if the investor’s investment in structured products is less than 20% of his aggregate investments. The SFC’s post-sale cooling-off rules apply to all retail customers.
Market-making and indicative valuations

The SFC will not require issuers to provide daily indicative valuations of the structured product. The Issuer must instead provide indicative bids on a bi-weekly basis for all structured products with a scheduled tenor of more than six months. Bids are not required if the pricing is affected by market disruption or suspension of trading. Bids may be subject to intra-day change.

Firm bids must be provided upon request made by an investor on a market-making day. The issuer may set reasonable maximum order sizes or a maximum aggregate buy-back limit on a given market-making day.

Issuers are to decide whether to use websites or other means by which to communicate bid prices to investors.

Summary

All the changes have been expected for some time and have been extensively debated. There are welcome modifications to the SFC’s original stance including:

■flexibility concerning the length of the KFS;
■clarification about the obligation of an issuer and guarantor to disclose changes in financial condition and the need to translate financial information;
■clearer rules as to the obligation to make a market in the structured product; and
■recognition of existing practices concerning KYC.
Mallesons Stephen Jaques will shortly conduct client seminars explaining the proposals in detail.