2宗雷曼個案在消委會訴訟基金支持下訴訟

2011-01-28 | 爭取賠償 |
最少1宗是精明產品, 有可能和雷曼無關

消委會訴訟基金成立以來，處理逾1,100宗個案，678宗獲訴訟援助，3宗涉及雷曼產品投訴。當中1宗雷曼產品訴訟達成和解協議，其餘2宗則仍在進行訴訟。消委會主席張炳良指，訴訟基金管理委員會去年成立專責小組檢討，認為要加快處理程序，並清晰界定支援對象。他又指，法庭現鼓勵訴訟雙方先和解，但對社會利益重要的個案，消委會將堅持興訟，並會先向法庭說明。

轉載自：【on.cc 東方互動 專訊】2011年1月27日(四)

事主因消委會訴訟基金大律師還未看文件 , 認為消委會訴訟基金是假幫事主

「雷曼苦主大聯盟」舉辦5.29.大遊行 "要求中央介入雷曼事件"精明苦主讀信

HKMA on investigation of Constellation Notes

HK not ready for more interventionist style of regulation, Wheatley says

25 May 2011 by Oliver Jones

While Hong Kong’s financial services sector has enhanced its “conduct process” on the heels of the 2008 mini bonds’ investment saga by making products simpler to understand, the city is deemed not ready for a more interventionist style of regulation, according to outgoing Securities and Futures Commission chief executive officer (CEO) Martin Wheatley.

After almost six years, Wheatley is set to leave the SFC on June 8 and take up a new role, on September 1, as managing director of the UK Financial Services Authority’s (FSA) Consumer and Markets Business Unit and CEO-designate of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), one of two successor bodies to the FSA.

In Hong Kong, “we have enhanced the conduct process. Financial service providers are focussing more on suitability of clients and providing information in short, clear and concise documents, giving investors a better chance (of being able to make an informed decision). The products are simpler but the sales process is slower.”

But he adds, “you still don’t resolve the agency conflict”: that investors don’t know whether or not the agent is acting in their best interests. There is still the potential that investors are not receiving good, independent advice. The conflict can be removed by banning commission rebates. By taking the view that, “if investors want financial advice, they have to pay for it. It is a different way to intervene for a cleaner relationship.”

Wheatley remarks that, “in the UK, we are moving towards a more interventionist style of regulation than I think Hong Kong is comfortable with.” He adds that Hong Kong’s financial services sector has evolved hugely over the last six years and is on the cusp of a very exciting period. The rest of the world is seeing growth prospects in Asia and issuers, investors and institutions are deciding that they need a presence where they are comfortable with the legal system and the market structure.

He also notes that one can design products with no risk, but that they will offer no return. “If a car manufacturer was tasked with designing a car with no risk, he would design a car that goes at 3mph to eliminate risk for the driver”, but then he would still need to address the question of risk for pedestrians. The issue is the balance of risk.

In the UK, the regulators are taking on the additional role of forming a judgement as to whether a product is good or bad for investors. But by taking on that role there is the potential of building up the perception that, if a product is not banned by the regulator, then it is implicitly being approved.

In his last formal public speech as the chief executive officer of Hong Kong’s SFC, Wheatley outlined “Regulatory developments in Hong Kong and globally” at a professional development seminar organized by the Hong Kong Securities Institute on May 23.

“I don’t think I could have gone back to do that job without the experience gained in Hong Kong,” remarks Wheatley. Starting at the SFC in September 2005, he witnessed the listing of three of China’s big four banks before Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy in 2008 and subsequent focus on “cleaning up the mess created by mini-bonds and other products.”

“I understand quite a bit (about product complexity) given what we’ve gone through in Hong Kong,” he notes. In a low interest rate environment, people wanted better returns and, after the dot.com bust, capital protection. Normal products could not deliver both and, “over the last decade, we moved into a world of product complexity.”

The transition to more complex products required trade-offs - such as including capital protection but at the cost of giving up some return – and a combination of debt, equity and derivatives. But the more derivatives are used in the product, the more difficult it is to understand.

Wheatley adds that he was returning to the UK at a very interesting time, and that – while the regulators in the UK are charged with similar objectives, of consumer protection and ensuring that the right information is provided by financial service providers, the approach in the UK will be very different to Hong Kong’s.

精明債劵的近况 (2011年5月)

精明債券不論是雷曼及非雷曼類，到目前還未有任何進展，在5月19日眾苦主與甘乃威議員開會，慶幸得到甘議員的協助，部份被金管局定為不成立的投訴個案，陸續獲金管局接見，苦主們可以趁此機會，向金管局積極查詢自已的情況，苦主們要細心聆聽，再組織理據，反駁判决。

由於金管局網页沒有精債非雷曼的統計數字，我們很難評估情况，在甘乃威議員力促下，金管局終於公開了2011年3月底的數字，如下：

收到的投訴個案 634

調查中 152

巳完成調查 193

其中

尚待决定 9

表面證據不足 183

巳作初步纪律决定 1

正在準備纪律處分 1


銀行巳與投訴人和解 289

從上述數字得出，在193宗完成調查中，有183宗不成立，(尚待决定的9宗不算) ，即95%已完成調查的個案都不成立，纪律處分只有2宗，即1%，這比其他雷曼產品 (迷，星債及ELN) 的不成立個案多很多及纪律處分個案少很多，也暗示了金管局對非雷曼精債的處理態度，因為非雷曼精債爆的是抵押品，即CDO。是第二層與120間公司信貨掛勾的結搆性產品，所有銷售員在銷售時頂多提及第一層極高評級的8間公司，但對這120間公司是什麽，及怎樣引至精債爆煲，就完全沒有披露，如果金管局認為此等風險因數是無關重要，不須要披露，那就無話可說，但事實上這是關鍵性的風險因數，試問如銷售員有向你解釋，除了第一層的8間公司其中一間死可使債券爆煲之外，另外如果還有第二層的120間不知名及評级公司如死了若干間(约10間以下) ，都會使債券爆煲，你會買嗎？所以金管局若查了100宗，理應至少有95宗表面證據成立才對，現在剛好相反，我們強烈要求金管局公間為何有95%不成立的理據。

做成精債(雷曼及非雷曼) 沒有集體和解的核心原因是源於迷債的集體和解方案條件之一，是不再對16間銀行銷售其他結構性產品(星債，精債，ELN) 作系統性調查，金管局及證監為了快速達至人數較多及金額較大的迷債的解决，就強迫我們弱者接受極不公平的事實，比銀行的行騙手法更卑鄙。事前從來沒有諮詢我們，而精債，星債及迷債結構都是一樣，不能只查星債，迷債但不查精債，每一產品，每一受害人都要同等對待。我們強烈要求金管局或證監立刻恢復對16家銀行對精債銷售系統性調查，以達至集體和解方案。

大聯盟將於5月29日舉行遊行，請各苦主自備精明債券標語，踴躍參加。

精明債券苦主自救組

2011年5月25日

上海商業銀行誤導性的 “產品風險程度低至中”

1. 去年, 原星展香港總裁葉約德女仕在立法會(雷曼相關)調查小組聆訊中, 及26/ 3/2010星展香港提交給該調查小組的陳述文件第14.3 /14.5段(附件1). 提供了星展銀行將Constellation債券產品定為中低風險程度第2級風險的因素, 這些因素蓄意遺漏星債掛勾公司以 “首先失責為基準”這一事關重要的事實, 妄顧實情地作出失實陳述. 也直接導致產品風險評為中低級風險程度的錯誤結果. 但給上海商業銀行是說明四級高風險。

2. 上海商業銀行把關鍵的, 但帶誤導性的錯誤資料: “產品風險程度低至中”, 印在給本人確認交易的Constellation債券系列63的重要文件<債券申購表格>上, 對本人產生誤導.

3. 上海商業銀行把誤導性的 “產品風險程度低至中”, 和制定這個 "產品風險程度時, 被遺漏的風險因素 "首先失責為基準"條款, 沒有印在<債券申購表格>上, 凸顯上海商業銀行在評估Constellation債券風險時, 沒有理 "首先失責為基準"這一風險因素, , 令債券可以避開風險披露不足並可以順利過關發行. 另一方面, 使我相信銀行說的 “中低風險產品”和相信經過政府審批的投資產品應該 “不會騙人”, 意圖更容易成功地誘使本人投資高風險產品.

Regulators can stop repeat of minibond debacle with risk rating system

Britain's incoming financial regulator has recognized shortcomings in its regulatory tradition where supervisors keep an eye on sellers rather than the products that they offer the market (UK's new financial regulator vows to step in fast to stop mis-selling, May 12). Martin Wheatley admits product regulation will be inevitable.

Since the eruption of the Lehman Brothers minibond debacle, the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has maintained it is the responsibility of the selling intermediary to determine whether products are suitable to the investor. Mr Wheatley, the outgoing chief executive of the SFC, appears to have had an epiphany on the road to London.

The commission and/or the Hong Kong Monetary Authority must similarly have an obligation to the public to accredit a risk-to-capital warning for all investment products sold in this jurisdiction.

A standard rating system grading risk to capital on a scale of one to 10 would not be difficult to implement. Many investment companies already grade their products by risk, and the industry could be required to make an annual submission of its own risk assessment for all investment products that it wishes to sell in Hong Kong for the regulator's vetting and accreditation.

Our regulators should not forgo this responsibility as it will protect the public by making them aware of their exposure to capital risk, and will also protect the financial industry from future claims of mis-selling and misrepresentation.

Our officials at the SFC and the Monetary Authority are the highest-paid regulators on the planet, and they should regulate in the public interest - after all, it is the Hong Kong public which pays their handsome salaries.

Roger Emmerton, Wan Chai

Legco members still look into Lehman CLN products

Our Ref : CP/C 635/2008
Telephone : 2526 4027 / 2869 9225
Facsimile : 2521 7518

13 April 2011

Complaint regarding the sale of investment products
related to Lehman Brothers by banks

Further to our letter of 24 September 2010, this Secretariat has relayed your concern and request to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). On the Members' instruction, this Secretariat is now providing the HKMA's reply to you for your perusal.

According to HKMA, we note that your complaint is concerned with six investment products, including three Minibonds (i.e. Minibond Series 20, 21 and 34), two Lehman-related credit linked notes (CLN) (i.e. Octave Notes Series 10 and Constellation Note Series 63) and one non-Lehman-related CLN (i.e. Octave Note Series 6B).

For the three Minibonds, we understood that you and Shanghai Commercial Bank (SCom) have entered into settlement agreement under Lehman Brothers Minibonds Repurchase Scheme. HKMA stresses that unless dishonesty, fraud or other criminal elements are involved, HKMA does not intend to continue its investigation into the case of any eligible customer who has accepted the repurchase offer made by the distributing bank.

For the non-Lehman-related CLN, which matured on 15 February 2011, we note that the principal and the final coupon payment of the product have been credited to your account maintained with SCom. Moreover, HKMA has informed that you had withdrawn your complaint in relation to this product with the HKMA through SCom on 28 February 2011.

For the two Lehman-related CLNs, SCom has already notified you that the expiry date of the settlement offer had been extended to the second half of 2011. As you has not indicated to SCom that you would refuse to discuss the settlement matters with SCom, the settlement negotiation between you and SCom is still in progress.

The Members have acknowledged that there is a settlement negotiation for the two Lehman-related CLNs, thus they have instructed this Secretariat to keep in view of it. This Secretariat would then consult Members on its result and get back to you in due course.

Thank you for writing to us.

Yours sincerely,

(Miss Amanda LEUNG)
for Secretary General

HK investors in "mini-bond" scandal accept deal

By KELVIN CHAN
AP Business Writer
Published: Friday, May. 20, 2011 - 4:52 am

HONG KONG -- Thousands of Hong Kong investors who faced big losses from financial products tied to collapsed investment bank Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. have voted to accept a deal to get some of their money back.

Officials from accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers who have been overseeing the process of salvaging money for the buyers of the products, said investors voted in favor of the agreement during three days of meetings that ended Friday.

Sixteen banks who sold the products said in March that they would buy back the so-called "mini-bonds" from investors for up to 96.5 percent of their value - an improvement on about 60 percent in a 2009 agreement.

"Mini-bonds" and other financial products were sold to more than 40,000 investors, including retirees who invested their life savings. The value of the products, estimated by the government at $2.6 billion, plummeted after Lehman collapsed.

Lehman became the largest corporate collapse in U.S. history when it filed for bankruptcy protection in September 2008 and listed $613 billion in debt.

In Hong Kong, which is an important Asian financial center, the losses provoked widespread anger, street protests, government probes and a push for tougher regulations.

Some investor groups urged people to reject the deal after it was announced in March, but voting results showed near-unanimous acceptance.

PricewaterhouseCoopers said the vote showed that most people preferred to get "significant and substantial recoveries" rather than face more costly litigation.

Investors will receive different amounts, with everyone receiving at least 70 percent of their money back and two-thirds getting at least 80 percent. Four percent of investors are to get more than 90 percent back.

Payments will start in June.

Read more: http://www.sacbee.com/2011/05/20/3641300/hk-investors-in-mini-bond-scandal.html#ixzz1MyPCEq5H

撫平迷債風波三日會「決生死」

雷曼迷債持有人將於今日起一連三日開會，就是否接納取回迷債扺押品方案作表決，由於絕大多數苦主已接納銀行在○九年所提出的回購協議，銀行在掌握壓倒性的投票權下，方案通過的機會可謂相當大。不過，由於不同系列迷債接受回購的比例有一定差異，銀行未敢肯定迷債持有人特別會議是否「十拿九穩」，故一連三日的會議，對徹底解決纏繞多年的雷曼迷債風波甚關鍵。

各系列都同意

由於迷債方案需要每個迷債系列，都得到至少四分三持有人贊成，才可通過，只要其中一個系列未能獲得足夠贊成票，方案都不能過關。今日率先作表決的是系列十至十二及系列十五至十九，抵押品接管人羅兵咸永道將於會後公布當日表決結果。

然而，由於迷債分銷銀行在○九年所提出六至七成的回購建議，已獲絕大多數苦主接納，在這次迷債持有人會議上，亦由銀行代表作投票表決。至於被界定為「經驗投資者」而不獲回購的苦主，雖然被納入新賠償方案，有權在會議上投票，但由於只有寥寥數百人，難以跟銀行的壓倒性票數相比，所以預料賠償方案很大機會通過。

雷曼苦主大聯盟陳浩偉聲言繼續反對方案，因為賠償比例如何計算缺乏透明度，而且被界定為經驗投資者的苦主，亦不獲銀行賠償特惠款項，對這些投資者並不公平。他稱聯盟曾向這批苦主作統計，贊成及反對方案者各佔一半，但由於銀行已掌握大部分票數，所以方案通過機會很大。

根據方案，迷債苦主將可取回投資本金的百分之八十五至九十六點五，相比銀行與監管機構在○九年七月提出的六至七成回購方案，有所增加。然而，迷債抵押品的價值自金融海嘯以來有所回升，所以一直有聲音要求增加這方面的透明度，抵押品接管人應提供迷債抵押品的最新價值，讓苦主審視賠償方案是否合理。

不過，由於迷債抵押品有其他持份者，抵押品接管人羅兵咸以跟雷曼清盤人有保密協議為由，一直未有披露抵押品的最新估值細節。早前立法會議員曾向羅兵咸提出質詢，要求在持有人表決前提供最新估值資料。

羅兵咸認為，倘若不接納方案，改而訴諸法律途徑的話，訴訟開支龐大之餘，即使勝訴，回報或低於這次提出的方案，故建議苦主接納方案，如果方案通過，抵押品價值可望於六月底向苦主分發。

苦主坦言無奈接受

儘管賠償並非百分百，有苦主坦言無奈接受。成小姐是迷債持有人，但因被指為經驗投資者，未能受惠○九年的回購方案，這次雖然納入新賠償方案，但不獲銀行補償特惠款項，所以在新方案下只獲賠七成。「我至今未獲賠分毫，唯有先錢，將來再考慮打官司取回餘款。」她說。記者劉思敏

Lehman investors in Australia and NZ to share in $100m

Glenda Korporaal
From: The Australian
May 17, 2011 12:00AM

MORE than 1000 Australian and New Zealand retail investors who bought Lehman Brothers-backed Mahogany Capital notes will receive $100 million of their $150m in investments in a settlement reached by the Perpetual Trustee Company.

The terms of the deal with Lehman subsidiary Lehman Brothers Special Financing, which was reached in a New York court last November, were kept confidential until now.

The retail investors in the credit-linked notes -- who range from individuals and charities to local councils and self-managed superannuation funds -- are expected to get their money back over the next few weeks.

The settlement follows several years of litigation undertaken by Perpetual, which was trustee for the notes in both the US and Britain. Investors in some $75m worth of credit-linked notes issued by Mahogany Capital notes series 1 will receive up to 85c in the dollar, while investors in Mahogany Notes series 11 will get 69c in the dollar for the $50m investment.

The notes were sold in Australia between 2005 and 2007 by Mahogany Capital, a subsidiary of Grange Securities, which is now a wholly owned subsidiary of Lehman Brothers Holdings.

Mahogany investors have received no payments on the notes since Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September 2008 in the wake of the global financial crisis. Mahogany Capital was listed on the ASX but suspended more than two years ago.

It was placed into administration in December 2009 and liquidators were appointed in July.

The details of the settlement will be closely watched by a group of 72 local councils, churches and charities in Australia that also invested in another $260m of Lehman-backed notes and are involved in a Federal Court class-action against the liquidator of Lehman Brothers Australia.

Chris Green, group executive of Perpetual Corporate Trust, said the complex matter had been hard fought and highlighted the need for trustees to be "agile and strategic" in assessing whether to take appropriate action on behalf of investors.

"In this matter we were focussed . . . on what was the most appropriate and achievable in terms of delivering the best outcome for Mahogany investors," he said. "Our ability to secure a settlement was important given that it comes at a time when many creditors remain in limbo given conflicting decisions in England and US courts on the issue of noteholder priority."

The Perpetual settlement will also be watched closely by investors in some $10 billion worth of Lehman-backed notes also battling through the courts in Britain and the US for a return of their funds. The six-month confidentiality period saw Perpetual taken to court in March by Stephen Parbery, the liquidator of Lehman Brothers Australia, seeking the details of the deal.

Core Pacific-Yamaichi International (H.K.) Limited agrees with SFC to repurchase Minibonds, Octave Notes and Constellation Notes from clients

at original values

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) has issued a reprimand to Core Pacific-Yamaichi International (H.K.) Limited (CPYI) in respect of its internal systems and controls relating to sales of Minibonds, Octave Notes and Constellation Notes (collectively, Lehman Brothers-related structured products) following an investigation by the SFC (Notes 1 & 2).

The investigation of the SFC raised a number of concerns with CPYI’s internal systems and controls relating to the sale of Lehman Brothers-related structured products. Specifically, SFC’s concerns were related to:

the adequacy of product due diligence on Lehman Brothers-related structured products before they were sold to clients;
the adequacy of training and guidance given to its sales staff to enable them to understand the investment return characteristics, structure and risk profile of Lehman Brothers-related structured products; and
the establishment and implementation of proper guidelines and monitoring procedures on the sale and marketing of Lehman Brothers-related structured products to clients.

CPYI does not admit any liability arising from these matters, but acknowledges the seriousness of these concerns. CPYI has agreed with the SFC to:

offer to repurchase from all its eligible customers (Note 3) all outstanding Lehman Brothers-related structured products at a price equal to the principal amount invested by them, less any coupon payments received; and
offer to pay compensation to all its eligible former customers (Note 4) in respect of their previous holding(s) in Lehman Brothers-related structured products in an amount equal to the principal amount invested by them, less any coupon payments, residual value and/or sale proceeds received.

The total amount that CPYI offers pursuant to the repurchase and compensation offers is approximately HK$9.6 million.

CPYI has also agreed to:

immediately implement special enhanced complaints handling procedures to resolve, in a fair and reasonable manner, all complaints in relation to the sale and distribution of structured products other than Lehman Brothers-related structured products;
engage an independent reviewer, to be approved by the SFC, to review its systems and processes relating to the sale of structured products and to report to the SFC, and to commit to the implementation of all recommendations by the independent reviewer; and
to engage a qualified third party, as approved by the SFC, to review and enhance its complaints handling procedures, and to commit to the implementation of all recommendations by such third party.

The SFC considers that this agreement resolves its concerns about CPYI’s sales practices in respect of Lehman Brothers-related structured products and is in the best interests of the investors. The repurchase or compensation scheme should ensure that eligible customers and eligible former customers who accept the repurchase or compensation offers will receive return of their capital.

This agreement is also forward looking and should ensure that CPYI remediates its systems and processes to meet the standards expected from a licensed corporation which distributes investment products and/or provides investment advice to its clients.

The SFC considers this to be an appropriate outcome in light of the nature and extent of the concerns with CPYI’s sales practices that SFC’s investigation raised.

The SFC acknowledges that CPYI has fully co-operated with SFC’s investigation and has acted responsibly in agreeing to compensate eligible customers and eligible former customers.

End

Notes:

1. CPYI is registered under the Securities and Futures Ordinance to carry on business in Type 1 (dealing in securities), Type 4 (advising in securities) and Type 6 (advising on corporate finance) regulated activities.
2. CPYI has sold about HK$1.25 million worth of Lehman Minibonds in series 5, 7, 10, 12 and 20; about HK$12 million worth of Octave Notes in series 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 19, 21 and 22 (CPYI was one of the distributors of these series of Octave Notes); and about HK$0.7 million worth of Constellation Notes in series 40 and 43.
3. Eligible customers are CPYI customers who have open position(s) in the Lehman Brothers-related structured products. Eligible customers will not include experienced investors (meaning investors who in the three years preceding their first purchase of the Lehman Brothers-related structured products, executed five or more transactions in Structured Products) and customers who were licensed persons at the time of their first purchase of the Lehman Brothers-related structured products.
4. Eligible former customers are either CPYI customers whose holding(s) in the Lehman Brothers-related structured products has/have been mandatorily redeemed, or CPYI customers who sold their holding(s) in the Lehman-related structured products after the date on which Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (i.e. 15 September 2008).

Page last updated: 12 May 2011

致：中央人民政府駐香港特別行政區聯絡辦公室主任彭清華先生

香港西營盤干諾道西160號西港中心

尊敬的彭清華主任﹕

雷曼事件實在令香港的聲譽受損，國際金融中心地位已岌岌可危：主要由於香港特區政府、證監會、金管局、以至本港金融業及銀行業，一直逃避責任，並未全力徹底解決銀行違規銷售雷曼有毒產品所引起的賠償問題；不少被銀行以不良銷售手法誘騙而失去一生積蓄的，都是缺乏經驗的小投資者、退休人士、老人及家庭主婦，尤其是購買了掛鈎票據，或精明債券等的複雜衍生工具的，至今未有一毛錢的賠償。獲得部份賠償的大多是16間分銷雷曼迷債銀行的苦主、星債的星展銀行苦主、上商的CMS, 以及最近才收到賠償通知的渣打銀行ELN苦主。仍堅持不提供任何賠償方案的有花旗銀行、RBS及恒生。

要求證監全面調查精明債券摩根士丹利

證監經常在電視上宣傳教育投資者，高回報產品必定是高風險，投資時必定要小心，量力而為。精明債券是高風險但是低回報產品，高風險不是第一層掛的機構，而是隱藏著的第二層掛勾的120間各類高、中、低風險公司，很多是持有劇毒的次按資產，此120間公司只要大約10間公司出事，債券就被強制贖回，在漫長的4至7年期間，就算沒有金融風暴，出事的機會也很大。它是低回報產品，因為利息只高當時定期一至二厘，但本金被鎖4至7年，不算是高回報，只算是穩定。如此劣質的產品，狡猾的設計者想到，如放在證券行之類的金融機構，一來裹面多為有經驗投資者，不會上當，二來投資者不多，想過辦法，把它包裝成像債券的模樣及冠以精明債券，掛頭牌是中華人民共和國，錯覺是買了中國國債，夠穩陣，肯定吸引警覺性低及貪穩定收息的一眾。剛好這時證監吹著快嬴風氣，精債獲批在16間銀行發售，結果大買。達到大摩設計的目的。以大摩資深國際投行的老謀深算，或許可以把他們的罪責掩飾到天衣無縫，但是利用自己的專業知識，設計風險與回報的不對稱產品，來騙取零售市場中一些初級小投資者的金錢，就是不誠實行為，就是專業的不道德行為。

證監對不誠實的毒債設計者的處理也有不公平，迷債設計者新鴻基證券早巳被罰全數賠償，星債設計者新架坡星展，因不在香港，沒有辦法。精明債券設計者大摩，現時還在香港，但在精債事件上好像被忽略，不須付任何責任。我們要求證監徹查大摩，從設計概念到分銷到16間銀行的整個過程，公開調查報告，及懲處大摩的不誠實行為。

我們懇求尊敬的中央領導，為我們苦主主持公道，施以援手，協助我們取回一生血汗錢，幫助維持本港作為金融中心的聲譽和樹立特區政府的管治威信。

精債苦主自救組上

Hong Kong Fines Bank of America Arm

By YVONNE LEE

HONG KONG—Hong Kong's securities regulator said Thursday it has issued a reprimand to an arm of Bank of America-Merrill Lynch and fined it 3 million Hong Kong dollars (about US$386,000) for inadequate systems in relation to the sale of two index-linked notes in 2007.

The move follows broader criticism of city regulators by some local investors over their handling of other financial instruments that ended up nearly worthless as a result of the 2008 financial crisis.

The Securities and Futures Commission said in a statement the decision follows an investigation that found Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Ltd. had failed to properly assess the financial situation and investment objectives of more than 40 of the 72 customers who invested in the index-linked notes during 2007. The SFC didn't say how much money was invested in the notes or to what indexes they were linked.

A spokesman for the company, a unit of Bank of America Corp., declined to comment.

The commission also found that key product information was provided to clients only after they had agreed to invest in the index-linked notes, and Merrill Lynch kept inadequate documentation to explain the rationale behind the advice they had given to their customers.

"Merrill Lynch will implement enhanced complaint-handling procedures to review client complaints regarding its distribution, sale, and provision of investment advice in relation to unlisted structured products other than the two index-lined notes," the statement said.

In its statement, the commission said Merrill Lynch has agreed to repurchase from customers holding the outstanding index-linked notes. The value of the repurchase offers is expected to be around US$3.67 million, or the amount they had invested.

In addition, Merrill Lynch agreed to offer top up payments to customers who bought the index-linked notes through Merrill Lynch and redeemed them for less than their principal invested, the statement said.

The notes are separate from other investment instruments known as minibonds, which were linked to the now-defunct U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers. Hong Kong lenders sold millions of dollars worth of minibonds before Lehman Brothers collapsed in 2008. The bankruptcy triggered a slump in the value of the products and sparked protests by investors, who complained they had been misled by banks' staff when buying the products. The banks have argued that they disclosed risks, but some have reached settlements.

Hong Kong heading for crisis of credibility over IPO frauds

Leo Goodstadt is a smart chap. He was deputy editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review in the old magazine's glory days, and he headed the Hong Kong government's Central Policy Unit in the run-up to the handover.

But although he's worked for government on the inside, he's no establishment poodle. In the past he's been scathing about Hong Kong's remote officials and their overly cosy relationships with big business. And what he has to say about how the government should deploy its vast fiscal reserves makes a lot of sense.

So no doubt Hong Kong's financial regulators are feeling pretty pleased with themselves after Goodstadt gave them top marks in a new book published earlier this month.

In Reluctant Regulators, Goodstadt praises the hands-on prudential approach of Hong Kong's regulators. He credits it with preserving the stability of the city's banking system during the 2008 financial crisis, and contrasts it to the disastrous light-touch policies adopted by regulators in London and Washington.

When it comes to financial regulation and financial services supervision, Hong Kong has a record of excellence, Goodstadt told a lunchtime audience last week.

But although there is some merit in what Goodstadt says, there is a gaping hole in his argument. His analysis focuses exclusively on financial system stability. But preserving systemic stability is only one element of good regulation. Regulators must also be responsible for protecting investors' interests.

Unfortunately Goodstadt ignores this aspect of regulation. The phrase Lehman minibonds gets just one mention in his entire book.

If he'd given more thought to the duty of regulators to protect ordinary investors, it is unlikely Goodstadt would have given Hong Kong such high marks. True, the minibond investors kicked up such an almighty fuss that they eventually won a refund and the rules governing the sale of similarly complex structured products have been toughened, but little has really changed. Despite the minibond scandal, the city's financial institutions continue to make vast profits peddling toxic trash to hapless investors.

Customer protection simply isn't the regulators' priority. The Securities and Futures Commission is responsible for supervising conduct in the securities market, but under existing regulations it lacks the teeth needed to safeguard investors.

Meanwhile, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority is ultimately responsible for overseeing the securities arms of the city's banks, and the HKMA doesn't consider investor protection to be part of its job at all. As a result, Hong Kong's banks have a free hand to neglect even basic due diligence, promoting share offerings on the stock exchange for companies whose prospectuses are little more than works of imaginative fiction.

The regulatory failure is scandalous. A prospectus is intended to be a legal document containing all the information an investor needs to decide whether to buy into an offering or not. It's accuracy should be beyond doubt.

Yet over the last year the SFC has queried more than 80 per cent of the prospectuses filed by deal sponsors, complaining repeatedly about significant errors and obvious inaccuracies in draft copies. Infamously last week, China Forestry, which floated late in 2009, was forced to admit that almost all the key information in its regulatory filings, including its financial statements, had simply been made up.

So far the SFC has been unwilling to hit the sponsors of these dodgy deals with massive fines, and unfortunate investors have found themselves unable to take legal action on their own behalf.

Company directors are typically based on the mainland, beyond the reach of Hong Kong law. And under Hong Kong regulations, deal sponsors and auditors have no direct obligation to shareholders and so cannot be sued.

And even if they could sue, as shareholder rights activist David Webb has repeatedly argued, the lack of provisions in Hong Kong for class action lawsuits means that the cost of taking legal action is prohibitive for the vast majority of investors.

The result is a culture of impunity that threatens fatally to undermine Hong Kong's credibility as a well-regulated financial centre.

If you can't trust a company's financial statements, then you can no longer value its shares with any confidence. And if you can no longer value a company's shares, what you end up with is casino capitalism. You no longer have investors, just speculators who only buy securities in the hope of flipping them back to the market in the hope of making a quick capital gain.

So although Hong Kong's regulators may have done a fine job of preserving the financial system's stability, their neglect of investor protection is creating not a world class international financial centre, but a giant casino. That is hardly a record of excellence.

Hong Kong braced for structured product comeback

By Peter Shadbolt

Published: May 6 2011 17:12 | Last updated: May 6 2011 17:12

For more than two years, minibond protesters in Hong Kong have been as much a part of the urban landscape as the bronze lions standing sentinel outside the offices of HSBC.

Noisy, ragged, and extremely persistent, the protesters could sometimes be seen retiring with bowls of noodles, leaving a recorded protest message on a megaphone on the pavement, and allowing the two police officers on duty effectively to continue the protest for them.

While a hardcore of protesters remain, peace has recently broken out in minibond land.

In March, the 16 banks involved in the fiasco agreed to buy back a large chunk of the financial products at the centre of what became a major scandal in Hong Kong. The minibond affair had ripples that extended to Singapore and elsewhere in Asia, but nowhere was the damage more evident than in Hong Kong.

Some 40,000 investors in Hong Kong – many of them mum-and-dad investors and retirees who had been promised “guaranteed” returns – ploughed a total of HK$15.7bn ($2bn) of their savings into minibonds, credit default swap baskets, and other complex products backed by Lehman before it went bankrupt in 2008.

Savings were wiped out overnight and minibond holders went on the rampage, picketing banks and financial institutions across the city. Some 18 months later, victims groups managed to wring a settlement of between 60 to 70 per cent out of the banks.

While most were happy with the 2009 settlement, some were still bitter with the recent 85 to 96.5 per cent offer.

“The simple fact is, these banks have deceived us,” Eddy Chan, the chairman of a victim’s group told a news conference. “They tricked us time and time again. Actually, I think we deserve more than 100 per cent because of the time and energy we wasted on the fiasco.”

By any standard the minibond saga represented a low point in the banking regulatory framework of Hong Kong.

While some accuse Hong Kong’s Securities and Futures Commission of letting banks off the hook by dropping further investigation into the sale and distribution of minibonds after the first settlement, banks have begun to take measures to regulate the sector.

Most banks now make sure customers read risk statements.

Other proposals from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority under discussion include the separation of deposit-taking activities from investment-selling activities in bank branches. The authority also said that all conversations related to sales of investment products should be recorded.

Despite this, and more than two years on, structured products are braced for a long climb back.

“While they’re off the bottom, they’ve still got a long way to go,” says one Hong Kong banker.

From a giddy high of $350bn in 2007, structured products have sagged globally to a year-to-date figure of $28bn, according to estimates from Credit Suisse, showing just how far they have to go.

Nevertheless, the bank has been making a tentative return to structured products as the appetite for risk begins to grow.

The Taiwanese retail market – where volumes have been down as much 90 per cent from the 2007 peak – has effectively been closed since the collapse of Lehman Brothers, but Credit Suisse completed the Taiwanese regulator’s new requirements for non-professional investors late last year to launch the largest structured product of 2010.

The first to re-enter the market after the regulatory clampdown, the bank has had to fulfil intensive legal requirements, as well as requiring offshore distributors to appoint an onshore “master agent” who assumes responsibility for the product and posts a bond to cover investors.

The structures, too, are tamer than the type of wildcat notes that were popular before the crisis. In this case, the bank teamed up with Cathay Life on an eight-year, New Zealand-dollar denominated Kospi 200-linked note, launched in June with a notional of around $110m.

Its second Taiwan structure is made up of a six-year, Australian-dollar denominated Topix index-linked notes at a notional $167m. At maturity, the notes pay a lump sum, with a potential uncapped upside depending on the performance of the Topix. Cathay Life, meanwhile, has taken the notes and put them with life insurance policies in a deal that is similar to variable annuities.

With Credit Suisse holding open the door, other banks – including UBS, Deutsche Bank and Barclays Capital – have rushed in through the cracks, albeit with limited transactions of around $30m.

Income-linked structures such as the one being embarked on by Credit Suisse were already popular before the crisis and mark a cautious return to form in structured products in Asia. Singapore, only late last year, allowed nine of 10 financial institutions to resume selling structured products after a ban of between six months and one year.

The bank believes the structure will be popular in Taiwan where a deposit rate of less than 1 per cent is an incentive to investors to look to higher interest rate countries such as Australia and New Zealand.

The offering from Credit Suisse, who was not involved in the minibond scandal, is typical of a less sophisticated approach to structured products where simplicity is now key.

Instead of difficult-to-understand, opaque products, analysts say structured products in Asia are more likely to pursue equity-linked, currency-linked and dual deposit, dual-currency deposit structures in the future.

Mary Ma on Minibonds

editor@thestandard.com.hk
To the editor:
Please read my blog on :News on Minibonds, Octave Notes, Constellation Notes :
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/ to show how stupid and little knowledge of your HK reporter is. Others HK newspapers are doing fine. Many of these news in my blog I has also sent to varies government agencies and political parties. In fact, unlike HK local newspaper that seldom reporting true news about Minibonds frauds, the main newspapers that do really covering Minibonds news are mainly foreign reporters such as Boomberg that sent reporters to cover most Minibonds criminal cases.

香港將從6月1日起對信貸評級機構實施監管

香港證券及期貨事務監察委員會(Securities and Futures Commission, 簡稱：香港證監會)上週四表示﹐將從6月1日起對信貸評級機構及其評級分析員發牌並作出規管。

香港證監會在公告中稱﹐所有打算在2011年6月1日或之後提供信貸評級服務的信貸評級機構及其評級分析員﹐已可以開始向證監會提交申請。

香港證監會行政總裁韋奕禮(Martin Wheatley)表示﹐相信向在香港營運的信貸評級機構發牌並將他們納入規管制度是符合公眾利益的做法﹐也符合全球發展趨勢。

香港證監會稱﹐為協助業界過渡至新制度﹐證監會已發出通函說明若干牌照規定﹐包括提交牌照申請的時間表、對申請牌照的評級分析員勝任能力的規定以及豁免現任評級分析員參加監管架構考試的準則。

Rethinking investor protection – the case for more regulatory intervention

Martin Wheatley last night made a strong case for greater regulatory intervention in retail and wholesale financial products in his International Distinguished Lecture to the Australian Centre for Financial Studies.

Martin Wheatley, CEO Securities and Futures Commission, Hong Kong and CEO designate of the UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) last night delivered a thoughtful presentation entitled “Rethinking investor protection”.

He stated that “the global financial crisis had precipitated regulatory actions in immediate response to the massive problems that threatened to bring down the global financial systems.” Then Wheatley noted that governments and regulators are now taking “a more considered approach to reforms”.

In the words of Wheatley, soon to be one of the UK’s most powerful regulators, “pivotal to the reform process” will be “enhancing investor protection regimes”.

Wheatley acknowledged that “black letter” rules are not the perfect solution, but he noted that “you can’t legislate ethical behaviour”.

And “to rebuild investor confidence and to tackle the challenges posed by product markets featuring a much broader spectrum of complexity” will require “greater use of judgement, a forward-looking perspective, and pre-emptive actions to stem any potential build-up of risk before significant damage is done”.
Mr Wheatley concluded that “financial markets are about managing and pricing risk, not its elimination”.

Hong Kong regulator fines HSBC investment unit

Wed May 4, 2011 6:03am EDT

May 4 (Reuters) - Hong Kong's securities watchdog has fined a unit of HSBC Holdings Plc HK$3 million ($386,319) for not following adequate procedures in relation to the distribution of equity-linked notes, the regulator said in a statement.

The Securities and Futures Commission said on Wednesday it also partially suspended the licence of HSBC Trinkaus Investment Management for two years from April 30, 2011, preventing it from dealing in or advising investors on structured notes.

The case is related to equity linked notes HSBC Trinkaus issued to high net-worth clients prior to the 2008 financial crisis, according to a source with direct knowledge of the investigation.

The SFC said the investment manager did not have adequate procedures in place to ensure it conducted adequate due diligence on the notes before making recommendations to their clients.

The source only a relatively small number of individuals were affected compared to the 30,000 Hong Kong retail investors hit by the Lehman Brothers minibond default.

HSBC Trinkaus's annual report says its Hong Kong unit employed 10 people at the end of 2009, and posted a net income of $1.5 million. (Reporting by Rachel Armstrong; Additional reporting by Denny Thomas and Alison Leung in HONG KONG; Editing by Matt Driskill)

致 : 總理溫家寶 中聯辦

致 : 總理溫家寶

中聯辦 

中國銀行願意對「雷曼迷你債券」的苦主提出七成至九成多的退還和解方案，因為銀行和迷債抵押品接管人羅兵咸永道會計師都知道抵押品現時價值，而和美國次按無關。

但對港澳研究中心主任蒯轍元指出一五系列精明債券投資者可謂損失慘重而不理，雖然表面上與此系列掛的七家大型機構都完好無損，但是投資此系列的本金卻是和作為抵押品的一百二十一家公司的信貸掛 ，但第二層的120間掛勾的是什麽公司，他們的倒閉怎樣引至債券爆煲的機制，在銷售單張，章程及銷售員全部無講。這121間公司，質素參差，評級由AAA至CCC，AAA的只佔少數。

對此，銷售章程完全沒有透露，章程只是表示，抵押品為AAA評級的CDO。事實上，獲得AAA評級的，是CDO的抵押品，不是CDO裏面的121間公司。

投資者買的，不是那7間著名公司的債券，而是AAA評級的CDO抵押品。

「精明債券」的真正風險

 顯然，「精明債券」的最大風險，並不在於那7間著名公司，而是在於CDO裏面的121間公司。
CDO裏面的121間公司，只要有9.1間出事，「精明債券」就要提前贖回，抵押品套現後，全數賠償給雷曼，投資者會損失全部本金。

假如抵押品的價格較最初下跌，投資者仍然不能保本。

「精明債券」要保本，就要CDO裏面的121間公司，在7年内，少過8.2間出事，還要抵押品的價格有所上升。
 
「與中國信貸掛 鈎」表面非常穩健的精明債券，原來背後還有以百多家歐美公司債務做抵押品的條約，當一定數目，約4至7家公司出現信貸問題，債券即時變廢紙，血本無歸。這項風險在購買時隻字未提，銷售章程至今亦未收過，她指銀行的銷售方法等同詐騙，雖然已投訴，但兩年來證監、金管局、立法會未見結論，即使最終判銀行違規，譴責罰款，但按現時法例，仍無法強制銀行賠償給事主。

迷債AAA CDO部份是沒有出事的 ，但陳家強太太在職的摩根士丹利 AAA 次按CDO 出事是中銀有意不進行披露美國的大型民間貸款機構CIT Federal Home Loan Mortage , Federal National Mortage 的 AAA CDO破產 是和美國次按有關的原因, 那SFC就可去告中銀不理國際貨幣基金組織提出了預警。

中銀 和廣北 -在立法局 盡職審查不作解答, 因和廣北是知道CDO是高風險的.而產品章程必須交客戶, 並詳細解釋, 而中銀全沒有解釋高風險的CDO部份. SFC就可去告中銀的是故意誤導高風險的CDO部份.

20 FEB 2009 立法會雷曼小組首次公開聆訊，傳召財經事務及庫務局局長陳家強作供。余若薇向他指出，07年11月，國際貨幣基金組織提出了預警，敦促香港特區政府監察結 構性產品的風險問題；翌年5月，陳家強在紐約演說中，亦詳細解釋次按產生的問題，顯示他熟悉次按危機及衍生工具的問題。余若薇質問陳家強，發表演說前，是 否已察覺有關產品在香港市場廣泛銷售予普羅大眾？有否在9月迷債「爆煲」前向小投資者提出預警？有否有在任何階段提醒小投資者，雷曼迷債是信貸掛勾票據， 並非一般人理解像「五隧一橋」的債券？陳家強說上述演辭只是論述次按危機的成因。

法庭審判中銀載晶，大聯盟有人去聽審 , 載晶是有問中銀高層迷債三十五是沒有次按 CDO ，但中銀是知迷債產品只有精明債券是有AAA次按 CDO而且是高風險， 中國銀行是詐欺法庭及記者。

而中銀 和廣北故意不理 精明債券是想去除中銀監察結 構性產品的風險問題的錯 ，和陳家強香港高官官商勾結，使香港政府不調查和追究大摩在香港發行「精明債券」的責任。所以現在只有中央才有權調查而聽取總理溫家寶 的港澳研究中心主任蒯轍元所言 而使港府和香港的監管機構嚴厲調查和追究大摩在香港發行「精明債券」的責任。

精明債券 投資者上

龍吟虎嘯：被曾政府玩弄於股掌

香港回歸十幾年，組建了三屆政府，產生了兩位特首，以此貫徹落實「一國兩制、港人治港」，但成效很差。兩位特首在管治上錯漏百出，一塌糊塗，時時激起民憤，政府推出的政策措施更是遭到全城聲討，還有多項政策被立法會否決。與此同步的是，香港正在沉淪，經濟民生每況愈下，競爭力銳降，被邊緣化……

對此，北京當然很急，知道這樣下去香港經濟繁榮不保，社會穩定堪憂。於是，不斷在經貿上向香港「送大禮」，為香港開拓市場和刺激消費；以及不斷對香港各界呼籲「支持特區政府依法施政」，以為只要大家團結一致支持政府，香港就能搞好。

北京的這個「支持特區政府依法施政」之說，不但對香港市民「經常講，反覆講」，更重要的是已經成為香港「愛國愛港陣營」的金科玉律，是「政治紀律」。因此，「愛國愛港陣營」從各政黨團體到立法會議員到媒體喉舌，十幾年來不管行政長官、特區政府如何胡亂施政，如何顢頇無能，如何激起民憤，如何荒唐透頂，他們都要一邊倒的「保駕護航」，歌功頌德，捧臭腳。他們這樣做，實際上是「助紂為虐」，只能令香港愈來愈糟，也令本來就十分差勁的政府管治更加惡劣。

對此，曾蔭權政府特有體會，而且按住了北京的「命門」，知道自己不管怎麼亂來，本地「愛國愛港陣營」都要奉旨支持自己「依法施政」。但本地「愛國愛港陣營」中也有很多「獨立思考」之士，知道曾政府的施政正在毀掉香港，不能盲目支持，必須有所建言、批評乃至反對和匡正。

這時，曾蔭權政府就會向朝廷告乃狀，誣衊說，連自己人都沒有「支持特區政府依法施政」，將自己的無能和錯漏轉嫁於別人。而朝廷又不辨是非，把「支持特區政府依法施政」視為高於一切，不理他們施的是甚麼差政、亂政。結果人妖顛倒、黑白混淆，且被曾政府玩弄於股掌而不知也。

柳扶風

香港人權法案條例 - 第383章 香港人權法案條例 - LONG TITLE 詳題 VerDate:30/06/1997 本條例將《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》中適用於香港的規定收納入香港法律，並對附帶及有關連的事項作出規定。

香港人權法案條例
- 第383章
English version :
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=8448

香港人權法案條例 - LONG TITLE
詳題 VerDate:30/06/1997

本條例將《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》中適用於香港的規定收納入香港法律，並對附帶及有關連的事項作出規定。

(1991年制定)

[1991年6月8日]
(本為1991年第59號)

香港人權法案條例 - I
導言 VerDate:30/06/1997


香港人權法案條例 - SECT 1
簡稱 VerDate:30/06/1997

本條例可引稱為《香港人權法案條例》。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 2
釋義 VerDate:01/07/1997

(1) 在本條例中，除文意另有所指外─
“人權法案”(Bill of Rights) 指在第II部列出的香港人權法案；
“生效日期”(commencement date) 指本條例的實施日期；
“先前法例”(pre-existing legislation) 指在生效日期前制定的法例；
“法例”(legislation) 指可藉條例修訂的法例。

(2) 人權法案受第III部規限。

(3) (*不採用為香港特別行政區法律)

(4) 本條例不得解釋為政府或任何主管當局、團體或個人有權從事活動或實行行為，破壞人權法案確認之任何一種權利與自由，或限制此種權利與自由
逾越人權法案規定之程度。 [比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第五‧一條]

(5) 香港境內依法律、公約、條例或習俗而承認或存在之任何基本人權，不得藉口人權法案未予確認或確認之範圍較狹，而加以限制或減免義務。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第五‧二條]

(6) 人權法案中每一條的標題並無立法效力，亦不在任何方面更改、限制或擴展該條的含義。

(7) 凡在本條例中提述《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》，即提述已交存聯合國檔庫的《公民及政治權利國際盟約》文件。

(1991年制定)
___________________________________________________________________________
註：
* 見《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於根據〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉第一百六十條處理香港原有法律的決定》。該決定刊載於第
1冊第13/1頁。
“人權法案”(Bill of Rights)
“生效日期”(commencement date)
“先前法例”(pre-existing legislation)
“法例”(legislation)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 2
釋義 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 在本條例中，除文意另有所指外─
“人權法案”(Bill of Rights) 指在第II部列出的香港人權法案；
“生效日期”(commencement date) 指本條例的實施日期；
“先前法例”(pre-existing legislation) 指在生效日期前制定的法例；
“法例”(legislation) 指可藉條例修訂的法例。

(2) 人權法案受第III部規限。

(3) 在解釋及應用本條例時，須考慮本條例的目的是將《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》中適用於香港的規定收納入香港法律，並對附帶及有關連的事
項作出規定。

(4) 本條例不得解釋為政府或任何主管當局、團體或個人有權從事活動或實行行為，破壞人權法案確認之任何一種權利與自由，或限制此種權利與自由
逾越人權法案規定之程度。 [比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第五‧一條]

(5) 香港境內依法律、公約、條例或習俗而承認或存在之任何基本人權，不得藉口人權法案未予確認或確認之範圍較狹，而加以限制或減免義務。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第五‧二條]

(6) 人權法案中每一條的標題並無立法效力，亦不在任何方面更改、限制或擴展該條的含義。

(7) 凡在本條例中提述《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》，即提述已交存聯合國檔庫的《公民及政治權利國際盟約》文件。

(1991年制定)
“人權法案”(Bill of Rights)
“生效日期”(commencement date)
“先前法例”(pre-existing legislation)
“法例”(legislation)


香港人權法案條例 - SECT 3
對先前法例的影響 VerDate:28/02/1998

(1)-(2) (*不採用為香港特別行政區法律)
@(3)-(4) (由1998年第2號第2條廢除)

(1991年制定)
___________________________________________________________________________
註：
* 見《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於根據〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉第一百六十條處理香港原有法律的決定》。該決定刊載於第
1冊第13/1頁。
@ 第3(3)及(4)條由1997年第107號增補。關於1997年第107號的暫時終止實施，請參閱第538章第2(1)及(2)條。

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 3
對先前法例產生的影響 VerDate:18/07/1997

第(3)及(4)款自1997年7月18日終止實施，請參看《1997年法律條文(暫時終止實施)條例》(1997年第126號)。

(1) (1997年2月23日全國人民代表大會常務委員會決定不採用為香港特別行政區法律)

(2) (1997年2月23日全國人民代表大會常務委員會決定不採用為香港特別行政區法律)

(3) 現宣布立法機關的意圖為本條例的條文(包括人權法案所載的保證)適用於所有法例，不論該法例影響政府、公共主管當局及私人間的法律關係，
或只影響私人間的關係。 (由1997年第107號第2條增補)

(4) 為免生疑問，第(3)款自《1997年香港人權法案(修訂)條例》(1997年第107號)的生效日期起實施。 (由1997年第
107號第2條增補)

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 3
對先前法例產生的影響 VerDate:01/07/1997

(1) (1997年2月23日全國人民代表大會常務委員會決定不採用為香港特別行政區法律)

(2) (1997年2月23日全國人民代表大會常務委員會決定不採用為香港特別行政區法律)

(3) 現宣布立法機關的意圖為本條例的條文(包括人權法案所載的保證)適用於所有法例，不論該法例影響政府、公共主管當局及私人間的法律關係，
或只影響私人間的關係。 (由1997年第107號第2條增補)

(4) 為免生疑問，第(3)款自《1997年香港人權法案(修訂)條例》(1997年第107號)的生效日期起實施。 (由1997年第
107號第2條增補)

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 3
對先前法例產生的影響 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 所有先前法例，凡可作出與本條例沒有抵觸的解，須作如是解釋。

(2) 所有先前法例，凡不可作出與本條例沒有抵觸的解釋的，其與本條例抵觸的部分現予廢除。

(3) 現宣布立法機關的意圖為本條例的條文(包括人權法案所載的保證)適用於所有法例，不論該法例影響政府、公共主管當局及私人間的法律關係，
或只影響私人間的關係。 (由1997年第107號第2條增補)

(4) 為免生疑問，第(3)款自《1997年香港人權法案(修訂)條例》(1997年第107號)的生效日期起實施。 (由1997年第
107號第2條增補)

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 4
(*不採用為香港特別行政區法律) VerDate:01/07/1997

(*不採用為香港特別行政區法律)
___________________________________________________________________________
註：
* 見《全國人民代表大會常務委員會關於根據〈中華人民共和國香港特別行政區基本法〉第一百六十條處理香港原有法律的決定》。該決定刊載於第
1冊第13/1頁。

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 4
日後的法例的釋義 VerDate:30/06/1997

在生效日期或其後制定的所有法例，凡可解釋為與《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》中適用於香港的規定沒有抵觸的，須作如是解釋。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 5
緊急狀態 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 如經當局正式宣布緊急狀態，而該緊急狀態危及國本，得在此種危急情勢絕對必要之限度內，採取減免履行人權法案的措施，但採取此等措施，必
須按照法律而行。

(2) 根據第(1)款採取之措施不得─

(a) 抵觸依國際法所負並適用於香港之義務，但依《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》所負之義務除外；

(b) 引起純粹以種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教或社會階級為根據之歧視；或

(c) 減免履行人權法案第二、三、四(一)及(二)、七、十二、十三及十五條之規定。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第四條]

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 6
人權法案遭違反時的補救 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 法院或審裁處─

(a) 在就觸犯本條例的事件而採取的法律行動所引起的訴訟中，而該訴訟是屬其司法管轄權範圍內者；及

(b) 在涉及觸犯、違反或威脅違反人權法案的事件而屬其司法管轄權範圍內的其他訴訟中，
可就該項觸犯、違反或威脅違反事件，頒發它有權在該等訴訟中頒發而認為在該情況下屬適當及公正的補救、濟助或命令。

(2) 任何訴訟，不得以它是與人權法案有關為理由而被裁定是超出任何法院或審裁處的司法管轄權範圍。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 7
本條例的約束力 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 本條例只對以下各方面具有約束力─

(a) 政府及所有公共主管當局；及

(b) 代表政府或公共主管當局行事的任何人。

(2) 在本條中─
“人”(person) 包括團體，不論其是否法團組織。 (由1995年第68號第2條修訂)

(1991年制定)
“人”(person)

香港人權法案條例 - II
香港人權法案 VerDate:30/06/1997

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 8
香港人權法案 VerDate:30/06/1997

香港人權法案如下所列。

第一條

享受權利不分區別

(一) 人人得享受人權法案所確認之權利，無分種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教、政見或其他主張、民族本源或社會階級、財產、出生或其他身分等等。
(二) 人權法案所載一切公民及政治權利之享受，男女權利，一律平等。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二及三條]

第二條

生存的權利

(一) 人人皆有天賦之生存權。此種權利應受法律保障。任何人之生命不得無理剝奪。
(二) 非犯情節最重大之罪，且依照犯罪時有效並與人權法案規定及《防止及懲治殘害人群罪公約》不抵觸之法律，不得科處死刑。死刑非依管轄法院終
局判決，不得執行。
(三) 生命之剝奪構成殘害人群罪時，不得認為本條授權以任何方式減免依《防止及懲治殘害人群罪公約》規定所負之任何義務。
(四) 受死刑宣告者，有請求特赦或減刑之權。一切判處死刑之案件均得邀大赦、特赦或減刑。
(五) 未滿18歲之人犯罪，不得判處死刑；懷胎婦女被判死刑，不得執行其刑。
(六) 不得援引本條，而延緩或阻止在香港廢除死刑。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第六條]

第三條

不得施以酷刑或不人道處遇
亦不得未經同意而施以試驗

任何人不得施以酷刑，或予以殘忍、不人道或侮辱之處遇或懲罰。非經本人自願同意，尤不得對任何人作醫學或科學試驗。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第七條]

第四條

不得使充奴隸或奴工

(一) 任何人不得使充奴隸；奴隸制度及奴隸販賣，不論出於何種方式，悉應禁止。
(二) 任何人不得使充奴工。
(三) (甲) 任何人不得使服強迫或強制之勞役。
(乙) 本項所稱“強迫或強制勞役”不包括下列各項─

(i) 經法院依法命令拘禁之人，或在此種拘禁假釋期間之人，通常必須擔任之工或服役；

(ii) 任何軍事性質之服役，及在承認人民可以本其信念反對服兵役之情況下，依法對此種人徵服之國民服役；

(iii) 遇有緊急危難或災害禍患危及社會生命安寧時徵召之服役；

(iv) 為正常公民義務一部分之工作或服役。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第八條]

第五條

人身自由和安全

(一) 人人有權享有身體自由及人身安全。任何人不得無理予以逮捕或拘禁。非依法定理由及程序，不得剝奪任何人之自由。
(二) 執行逮捕時，應當場向被捕人宣告逮捕原因，並應隨即告知被控案由。
(三) 因刑事罪名而被逮捕或拘禁之人，應迅即解送法官或依法執行司法權力之其他官員，並應於合理期間內審訊或釋放。候訊人通常不得加以羈押，但
釋放得令具報，於審訊時、於司法程序之任何其他階段、並於一旦執行判決時，候傳到場。
(四) 任何人因逮捕或拘禁而被奪自由時，有權聲請法院提審，以迅速決定其拘禁是否合法，如屬非法，應即令釋放。
(五) 任何人受非法逮捕或拘禁者，有權要求執行損害賠償。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第九條]

第六條

被剝奪自由的人的權利

(一) 自由被剝奪之人，應受合於人道及尊重其天賦人格尊嚴之處遇。
(二) (甲) 除特殊情形外，被告應與判決有罪之人分別羈押，且應另予與其未經判決有罪之身分相稱之處遇。
(乙) 少年被告應與成年被告分別羈押，並應儘速即予判決。
(三) 監獄制度所定監犯之處遇，應以使其悛悔自新、重適社會生活為基本目的。少年犯人應與成年犯人分別拘禁，且其處遇應與其年齡及法律身分相
稱。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十條]

第七條

不得因違約而被監禁

任何人不得僅因無力履行契約義務，即予監禁。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十一條]

第八條

遷徙往來的自由

(一) 合法處在香港境內的人，在香港境內有遷徙往來之自由及擇居之自由。
(二) 人人應有自由離去香港。
(三) 上列權利不得限制，但法律所規定、保護國家安全、公共秩序、公共衞生或風化、或他人權利與自由所必要，且與人權法案所確認之其他權利不抵
觸之限制，不在此限。
(四) 具有香港居留權的人進入香港之權，不得無理褫奪。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十二條]

第九條

驅逐出香港的限制

合法處在香港境內但沒有香港居留權的人，非經依法判定，不得驅逐出境，且除事關國家安全必須急速處分者外，應准其提出不服驅逐出境之理由，及聲請主管當局或主管
當局特別指定之人員予以覆判，並為此目的委託代理人到場申訴。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十三條]

第十條

在法院前平等及接受公正
公開審問的權利

人人在法院或法庭之前，悉屬平等。任何人受刑事控告或因其權利義務涉訟須予判定時，應有權受獨立無私之法定管轄法庭公正公開審問。法院得因民主社會之風化、公共
秩序或國家安全關係，或於保護當事人私生活有此必要時，或因情形特殊公開審判勢必影響司法而在其認為絕對必要之限度內，禁止新聞界及公眾旁聽審判程序之全部或一
部；但除保護少年有此必要，或事關婚姻爭執或子女監護問題外，刑事民事之判決應一律公開宣示。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十四‧一條]

第十一條

被控告或判定犯有刑事罪的人的權利

(一) 受刑事控告之人，未經依法確定有罪以前，應假定其無罪。
(二) 審判被控刑事罪時，被告一律有權平等享受下列最低限度之保障─
(甲) 迅即以其通曉之語言，詳細告知被控罪名及案由；
(乙) 給予充分之時間及便利，準備答辯並與其選任之辯護人聯絡；
(丙) 立即受審，不得無故稽延；
(丁) 到庭受審，及親自答辯或由其選任辯護人答辯；未經選任辯護人者，應告以有此權利；法院認為審判有此必要時，應為其指定公設辯護人，如被告
無資力酬償，得免付之；
(戊) 得親自或間接詰問他造證人，並得聲請法院傳喚其證人在與他造證人同等條件下出庭作證；
(己) 如不通曉或不能使用法院所用之語言，應免費為備通譯協助之；
(庚) 不得強迫被告自供或認罪。
(三) 少年之審判，應顧念被告年齡及宜使其重適社會生活，而酌定程序。
(四) 經判定犯罪者，有權聲請上級法院依法覆判其有罪判決及所科刑罰。
(五) 經終局判決判定犯罪，如後因提出新證據或因發見新證據，確實證明原判錯誤而經撤銷原判或免刑者，除經證明有關證據之未能及時披露，應由其
本人全部或局部負責者外，因此判決而服刑之人應依法受損害賠償。
(六) 任何人依香港法律及刑事程序經終局判決判定有罪或無罪開釋者，不得就同一罪名再予審判或科刑。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十四，二至七條]

第十二條

刑事罪及刑罰沒有追溯力

(一) 任何人之行為或不行為，於發生當時依香港法律及國際法均不成罪者，不為罪。刑罰不得重於犯罪時法律所規定。犯罪後之法律規定減科刑罰者，
從有利於行為人之法律。
(二) 任何人之行為或不行為，於發生當時依各國公認之一般法律原則為有罪者，其審判與刑罰不受本條規定之影響。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十五條]

第十三條

被承認為法律人格的權利

人人在任何所在有被承認為法律人格之權利。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十六條]

第十四條

對私生活、家庭、住宅、通信、名譽及信用的保護

(一) 任何人之私生活、家庭、住宅或通信，不得無理或非法侵擾，其名譽及信用，亦不得非法破壞。
(二) 對於此種侵擾或破壞，人人有受法律保護之權利。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十七條]

第十五條

思想、信念及宗教自由

(一) 人人有思想、信念及宗教之自由。此種權利包括保有或採奉自擇之宗教或信仰之自由，及單獨或集體、公開或私自以禮拜、戒律、躬行及講授表示
其宗教或信仰之自由。
(二) 任何人所享保有或採奉自擇之宗教或信仰之自由，不得以脅迫侵害之。
(三) 人人表示其宗教或信仰之自由，非依法律，不受限制，此項限制以保障公共安全、秩序、衞生或風化或他人之基本權利自由所必要者為限。
(四) 父母或法定監護人確保子女接受符合其本人信仰之宗教及道德教育之自由，得受尊重。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十八條]

第十六條

意見和發表的自由

(一) 人人有保持意見不受干預之權利。
(二) 人人有發表自由之權利；此種權利包括以語言、文字或出版物、藝術或自己選擇之其他方式，不分國界，尋求、接受及傳播各種消息及思想之自
由。
(三) 本條第(二)項所載權利之行使，附有特別責任及義務，故得予以某種限制，但此種限制以經法律規定，且為下列各項所必要者為限─
(甲) 尊重他人權利或名譽；或
(乙) 保障國家安全或公共秩序，或公共衞生或風化。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第十九條]

第十七條

和平集會的權利

和平集會之權利，應予確認。除依法律之規定，且為民主社會維護國家安全或公共安寧、公共秩序、維持公共衞生或風化、或保障他人權利自由所必要者外，不得限制此種
權利之行使。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十一條]

第十八

條結社的自由

(一) 人人有自由結社之權利，包括為保障其本身利益而組織及加入工會之權利。
(二) 除依法律之規定，且為民主社會維護國家安全或公共安寧、公共秩序、維持公共衞生或風化、或保障他人權利自由所必要者外，不得限制此種權利
之行使。本條並不禁止對軍警人員行使此種權利，加以合法限制。
(三) 本條並不授權採取立法措施或應用法律，妨礙《關於結社自由及保障組織權利之國際勞工組織一九四八年公約》中適用於香港的規定所規定之保
證。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十二條]

第十九條

關於結婚和家庭的權利

(一) 家庭為社會之自然基本團體單位，應受社會及國家之保護。
(二) 男女已達結婚年齡者，其結婚及成立家庭之權利應予確認。
(三) 婚姻非經婚嫁雙方自由完全同意，不得締結。
(四) 夫妻在婚姻方面，在婚姻關係存續期間，以及在婚姻關係消滅時，雙方權利責任平等。婚姻關係消滅時，應訂定辦法，對子女予以必要之保護。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十三條]

第二十條

兒童的權利

(一) 所有兒童有權享受家庭、社會及國家為其未成年身分給予之必需保護措施，不因種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教、民族本源或社會階級、財產或出
生而受歧視。
(二) 所有兒童出生後應立予登記，並取得名字。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十四條]

第二十一條

參與公眾生活的權利

凡屬永久性居民，無分人權法案第一(一)條所列之任何區別，不受無理限制，均應有權利及機會─
(甲) 直接或經由自由選擇之代表參與政事；
(乙) 在真正、定期之選舉中投票及被選。選舉權必須普及而平等，選舉應以無記名投票法行之，以保證選民意志之自由表現；
(丙) 以一般平等之條件，服香港公職。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十五條]

第二十二條

在法律前平等及受法律平等保護

人人在法律上一律平等，且應受法律平等保護，無所歧視。在此方面，法律應禁止任何歧視，並保證人人享受平等而有效之保護，以防因種族、膚色、性別、語言、宗教、
政見或其他主張、民族本源或社會階級、財產、出生或其他身分而生之歧視。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十六條]

第二十三條

少數人的權利

屬於種族、宗教或語言少數團體之人，與團體中其他分子共同享受其固有文化，信奉躬行其固有宗教或使用其固有語言之權利，不得剝奪之。
[比照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》第二十七條]



香港人權法案條例 - III
例外及保留條文 VerDate:30/06/1997

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 9
武裝部隊及拘禁在懲治機構內的人 VerDate:30/06/1997

負責香港外交事務的政府的武裝部隊成員和在這些部隊服務的人，以及在任何性質的懲治機構內受合法拘禁的人，受到為維持部隊紀律及囚禁紀律而不時由法律批准施加的
限制所規限。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 10
受拘禁的少年 VerDate:30/06/1997

凡在任何時候缺乏適當的監獄設施，或凡成年人與少年混合拘禁互相有利，則人權法案第六(二)(乙)及(三)條並不要求被拘禁的少年與成年人分開收押。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 11
出入境法例 VerDate:30/06/1997

對於無權進入及停留於香港的人來說，本條例不影響管限這些人進入、逗留於及離開香港的出入境法例，亦不影響這些法例的適用。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 12
沒有居留權的人 VerDate:30/06/1997

人權法案第九條並不賦予沒有香港居留權的人就驅逐他出境的判定要求覆判的權利，亦不賦予他為此目的而委託代理人向主管當局到場申訴的權利。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 13
行政會議及立法會 VerDate:01/07/1997

具追溯力的適應化修訂─見1999年第34號第3條
人權法案第二十一條並不要求在香港設立由選舉產生的行政會議或立法會。

(1991年制定。由1999年第34號第3條修訂)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 13
行政局及立法局 VerDate:30/06/1997

人權法案第二十一條並不要求在香港設立由選舉產生的行政局或立法局。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SECT 14
暫時的保留條文 VerDate:30/06/1997

(1) 自生效日期起計的1年期間內，本條例受附表所列的條例規限。

(2) 根據或憑藉附表所列任何條例而─

(a) 作出的任何行為(包括在行使酌情決定權時作出的行為)；或

(b) 授權或規定的任何不行為，或在行使酌情決定權時發生的任何不行為，
若是在生效日期1週年之前發生，不受本條例影響。

(3) 在生效日期1週年之前，立法局可為以下所有目的或以下任何目的而藉決議修訂本條─

(a) 規定自生效日期1週年起計的1年期間內，本條例受該局修訂中所指明列於附表內的條例規限；

(b) 規定根據或憑藉立法局修訂中所指明列於附表內的任何條例而─

(i) 作出的任何行為(包括在行使酌情決定權時作出的行為)；或

(ii) 授權或規定的任何不行為，或在行使酌情決定權時發生的任何不行為，
若是在生效日期2週年之前發生，不受本條例影響；及

(c) 廢除本款。

(4) 在本條中，提述某條例時，包括提述根據該條例訂立的任何附屬法例。

(5) 雖有第3條的規定，本條仍然實施。

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SCHEDULE
附表 VerDate:05/11/1998

具追溯力的適應化修訂─見2003年第1號第3條
[第14條]

第14(1)及(2)條適用的條文

《入境條例》(第115章) (由1997年第80號第103(1)條修訂)

《社團條例》(第151章)

《刑事罪行條例》(第200章)

《防止賄賂條例》(第201章)

《廉政公署條例》(第204章) (由2003年第1號第3條修訂)

《警隊條例》(第232章) (由1998年第315號法律公告修訂)

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SCHEDULE
附表 VerDate:01/07/1997

具追溯力的適應化修訂─見2003年第1號第3條
[第14條]

第14(1)及(2)條適用的條文

《入境條例》(第115章) (由1997年第80號第103(1)條修訂)

《社團條例》(第151章)

《刑事罪行條例》(第200章)

《防止賄賂條例》(第201章)

《廉政公署條例》(第204章) (由2003年第1號第3條修訂)

《警察條例》(第232章)

(1991年制定)

香港人權法案條例 - SCHEDULE
附表 VerDate:30/06/1997

[第14條]

第14(1)及(2)條適用的條文

《入境條例》(第115章) (由1997年第80號第103(1)條修訂)

《社團條例》(第151章)

《刑事罪行條例》(第200章)

《防止賄賂條例》(第201章)

《總督特派廉政專員公署條例》(第204章)

《警察條例》(第232章)

(1991年制定)

FASB Changes Rules for Lehman-like Repo Agreements

FASB Changes Rules for Lehman-like Repo Agreements

The Financial Accounting Standards Board has issued an Accounting Standards Update that would revise the rules for how companies can deal with repurchase agreements like the kind Lehman Brothers used to temporarily move billion of dollars of assets temporarily off its books before reporting its quarterly results.

Leslie Seidman


ASU No. 2011-03, “Transfers and Servicing (Topic 860): Reconsideration of Effective Control for Repurchase Agreements,” is intended to improve the financial reporting of repurchase agreements (“repos”) and other agreements that both entitle and obligate a transferor to repurchase or redeem financial assets before their maturity.

“The board revisited its standards on transfers and servicing to respond to concerns from financial statement users who felt the criteria for determining effective control for such transactions should be improved,” said FASB Chairman Leslie F. Seidman in a statement. “The new guidance improves transparency by eliminating consideration of the transferor’s ability to fulfill its contractual rights and obligations from the criteria in determining effective control.”

In a typical repo transaction, an entity transfers financial assets to a counterparty in exchange for cash with an agreement for the counterparty to return the same or equivalent financial assets for a fixed price in the future. Topic 860, Transfers and Servicing, prescribes when an entity may or may not recognize a sale upon the transfer of financial assets subject to repo agreements. That determination is based, in part, on whether the entity has maintained effective control over the transferred financial assets.

Lehman Brothers’ use of so-called “Repo 105” repurchase transactions was cited as one of the causes behind the collapse of the investment bank in 2008. The bank’s former auditing firm, Ernst & Young, has been the subject of lawsuits by former Lehman investors as well as the New York Attorney General.

The amendments in the standards update are intended to improve the accounting for these transactions by removing from the assessment of effective control the criterion requiring the transferor to have the ability to repurchase or redeem the financial assets, as well as implementation guidance related to that criterion.

In explaining the differences from International Financial Reporting Standards, FASB noted that the International Accounting Standards Board’s derecognition guidance is provided under IAS 39, "Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement." The consideration of a transferor’s ability to repurchase or redeem financial assets transferred on substantially agreed terms, even in the event of default by the transferee, is not required under IFRS. The amendments in the FASB update improve convergence, the board said, by eliminating from U.S. GAAP the need to consider this criterion.

The final standard is available at www.fasb.org.