2011年1月31日星期一

Professor Louis Pauly, who directs the Centre for International Studies

Professor Louis Pauly, who directs the Centre for International Studies in the Munk School of Global Affairs at the University of Toronto, will address the challenges currently facing Hong Kong’s financial industry in the wake of the global crisis of 2008. A noted political economist, Professor Pauly was invited by the Savantas Policy Institute to study the development of Hong Kong as an international financial centre. During the past few months, he carried out an extensive series of interviews with industry leaders and government officials. His findings and conclusions will interest anyone concerned with balancing innovation and stability in a crucial sector of Hong Kong’s present and future economy.

He learnt Minibonds saga from me about HK banks diversify product risks were to replace all old people saving of low risk term deposits into high risk derivative products Minibonds and Ms Regina Ip and will call for more regulations on HK fianacial industry to be published for HK government.

2011年1月29日星期六

Bank of China court cases

courts cases
Minibonds sales should be derivative sales, also BOCHK has engaged in CDOs trading in head office, why there is no training on sales staffs by banks to HK people are very doubtful.

The qualification of sales management in wealth management sections of BOCHK:- most banks used staffs with degrees to sale trusts, derivative products except most Chinese based banks. Why some BOCHK staffs with degree quit and only those without degrees promoted during 2005-2008 to double their income with sales of Minibonds products.

All banks should have staffs to attend training courses in order to be registered in HKMA, how did banks' sales managers reached these positions OK from HKMA is doubtful for HKMA should have investigated about these staffs training lessons.

There were no mentionings in court about what kind of training of these staffs received in order to reach these positions while in Legco these staffs were fully trained by documents supplied by those banks managing directors. Were these documents created by lawyers for the banks last year when the banks hired lawyers for new regulations purpose.

2011年1月27日星期四

2宗雷曼個案在消委會訴訟基金支持下訴訟

2宗雷曼個案在消委會訴訟基金支持下訴訟

2011年1月24日星期一

BOC Hong Kong Manager Warned Lehman Product Buyers of Risks, Court Told

I had told Debra that it is wrong for Ducan to bring politic into court, it will destroy HK seperation of power.

Ducan had said that HK political parties are involved in setting up these charges , and Demoncrate Party is involved. And Ducan disregards the fact that HKMA were sending the names of the victims to police CCB under the law of HKMA to locate any conducts of bank employee that are sufficient to be charged by police during our meetings with HKMA, not any members of Legco.


"A BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. manager facing criminal charges for selling structured products linked to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. warned customers they could lose their money, her lawyer said.

Cheung Kwai-kwai took her customers through sales leaflets for the products, including the part showing that they weren’t principal protected, her lawyer Peter Duncan said in his closing submission today in Hong Kong District Court.

Cheung, 48, pleaded not guilty to seven counts of fraudulently or recklessly inducing customers, including retirees and investors who hadn’t completed primary school, to invest a total of about $770,164 in minibonds and Constellation notes, between 2005 and 2008. Judge Garry Tallentire said today the verdict would be delivered on Feb. 18.

Cheung made statements to customers that the structured products were safe, principal-protected, and failed to disclose that the risk level designated by the bank was “high,” Senior public prosecutor Jonathan Man said today.

Duncan argued the verbal nature of the alleged statements and the lack of notes taken from the meetings meant the prosecution couldn’t prove “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the statements were made.

The Hong Kong unit of Bank of China Ltd. was the biggest seller of so-called Lehman minibonds, $1.8 billion of which had been bought by retail investors in Hong Kong since 2003, according to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority.

‘Less Than Ideal’

Cheung earlier testified that she hadn’t read the product prospectuses and wasn’t aware of the consequences of Lehman’s collapse. Duncan said Cheung’s failure to do so doesn’t constitute fraudulent or reckless behavior.

“She is not facing charges of conducting a less-than-ideal system,” Duncan said today. “She is not charged with how well she did her job.”

Angel Yip, a spokeswoman for BOC Hong Kong didn’t immediately respond to an e-mailed request for comment today. It was one of 16 banks that agreed to a settlement to buy back the products for at least 60 cents on the dollar.

The bank said in April that Cheung and fellow employee Tai Ching had been placed on compulsory leave, and that the matter wouldn’t have a material impact on its operations. A hearing in Tai’s case will be held on Feb. 1.

Richard Turnbull, a prosecutor for the Department of Justice, said in November a conviction would carry a maximum fine of HK$1 million ($128,882) and seven years imprisonment.

The case is Hong Kong SAR v. Cheung Kwai Kwai, DCCC526/2010, in Hong Kong District Court.

To contact the reporter on this story: Debra Mao in Hong Kong dmao5@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Douglas Wong in Hong Kong at dwong19@bloomberg.net "
.

2011年1月22日星期六

First a cure, now comes a diagnosis - Personal Finance - MiamiHerald.com

Personal Finance - MiamiHerald.com: "First a cure, now comes a diagnosis BY TOM HUDSON
Nightly Business Report
Finally. Two and a half years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, almost three years after the federal government arranged fire sale of Bear Stearns and 3 ½ years after the Federal Reserve first acknowledged something was wrong with America's financial system, next week we will hear the definitive answers to what went wrong.
Or maybe not. After a two month delay, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission is due to turn in its report on the near collapse of American finance on Thursday. Not only is this report overdue, it likely will not draw unanimous conclusions about what was to blame for bringing the U.S. economy to a standstill.
Already, the Republicans on the panel released their initial findings. Among the GOP conclusions: it was a financial panic brought on by sophisticated financial products used by sophisticated financial institutions. In other words, it wasn't a housing bubble per se. But Uncle Sam's contribution by investing in home mortgages through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac was significant.
We will see on Thursday if any of the Democratic members of the panel agree.
The trouble with this report designed to ``examine the causes of the current financial and economic crisis in he United States'' is the medicine has already been administered to the patient. Borrowing rates are at historic lows, billions in stimulus dollars have been spent and Congress has OKed financial reforms. And now we learn the causes?
Tom Hudson is anchor of Nightly Business Report, produced by NBR Worldwide and distributed nationally by PBS. In South Florida, the show is broadcast at 7 p.m. weekdays on Channel 2."

Lehman Paid Its Managers, Lawyers $30.5 Million in December

Lehman Paid Its Managers, Lawyers $30.5 Million in December

By Linda Sandler

Jan. 20 (Bloomberg) -- Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., which has now paid its advisers more than $1.1 billion during its bankruptcy, paid its lawyers and managers $30.5 million in December, according to a court filing.

Restructuring firm Alvarez & Marsal LLC, which runs the defunct investment bank through its co-founder, Bryan Marsal, led recipients with $393.4 million in fees for “interim management” for 27 1/2 months of work, including $10.9 million in December, according to yesterday’s filing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan.

Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP of New York collected $254.6 million for acting as the investment bank’s lead bankruptcy law firm through December. Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP got $89.9 million for advising Lehman’s creditors’ committee.

Lehman and its affiliates reported cash and investments of $22.1 billion on Dec. 31, up from $21.4 billion on Nov. 30.

Once the world’s fourth-biggest investment bank, Lehman said this month that it will speed up asset sales to pay unsecured creditors an average of 18.6 cents on the dollar. Its payments to advisers haven’t faced major challenges such as those in the bankruptcy of automaker Chrysler LLC.

Lehman filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history on Sept. 15, 2008, with assets of $639 billion. Creditors include Goldman Sachs Group Inc., UBS AG, the New York Giants and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, as well as individuals who hold Lehman bonds.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

--Editors: Charles Carter, Andrew Dunn.

To contact the reporter on this story: Linda Sandler in New York at lsandler@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: David E. Rovella at drovella@bloomberg.net.

2011年1月17日星期一

DCCC 526/2010 HKSAR Vs CHEUNG KWAI KWAI Judge: Tallentire

Defendant – Cheung Kwai Kwai, aged 48, 2 sons, education in HK, guardate 1982,
Form 5, Kin Cheng Bank-> BOC since until now, ->teller (6 yrs) supervisor, frontline, mid 2002, sales, 2004, senior personal officer, till Dec ’06, personal finance manager.

Witness 1: Mdm Siu, aged 62, primary 3, no occupation, need glasses to read,
Witness 2 : Madam Lee Wai Mun, Background, aged 59, educated in US, occupation nil, before is selling vegetable on market. Retired at end of 2004.
Defense witness : Mr. Wong Lak Hung, a staff of BOC, doing procedure process while defendant introduced insurance. Defendant was at title officer at her printed name card. She do subscription with the original copy.
Witness 3 :LAM wai kwan aged 50, mobile mechanics,
Witness 4, Kwok Siu Fong>
Aged 80, primary 2, retired over 10 years, last occupation before tired is sewing workers.
Witness 5> Mr Wong, aged 62 part-time security guard.
Nov., part-time security guards, secondary school, form 3.


Defendant Expert Witness:- Doctor Tony Philimon. (France)

Dirty tactic of Defense lawyers:

1. Try to mislead witness about checks of risk level in the sale forms as most of the check list were done by banker as witness was telling the truth by saying in police station that these checks were done by the banker, while in court she said that she remember the form had no ticks on risk form. That common tactic of BOCHK officials to put the check of high risk after their customers signed these forms as I found out in meeting with Lehman victims a month ago. While in court Defense is forcing and confusing the old witness to say she herself is telling the lies. That the worst dirty trick I have seen in court.

I myself guess the BOCHK officials usually put these tick of high risk box during photocopy operation hiding from the victims.
Defense is trying to use the timeline of signing time and the discovering bankers frauds time and the wording to confuse old witness.

2. The banker was telling the victim the lies that Minibonds consisted of seven companies bonds, while the truth is Minibonds did not consist of these seven companies bonds, but linked to these seven companies. Everybody in court seems to mix up these informations. Defense is using the dirty trick of no witness would remember what these seven companies names or mixed up with these seven companies names to force the witness to say she is telling the lies. What a dirty sob this lawyer is doing to confuse witness.

The main point here is that banker that told the victim that these minibonds were safe and secure already meant low risk, and these minibonds consist of seven companies bonds were already crimes under misselling frauds. What the banker was hiding the true nature of these high risk minibonds, not giving propectus to customer and hiding the risk level form that must be explained to customer and checking of these form on the first time when the customer first bought these minibonds are the most important of the misselling frauds of the banker and Defense tries to ignore these issue that dealt with the true crimes.

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/08/blog-post.html
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/12/prospectus-of-minibonds.html

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2009/07/blog-post_25.html

3. In the court, it also proves that all public banks that sold Minibonds, including BOCHK is using their database of clients datas to search for witness former occupations, business transation, calls their customer friends similar to criminal investigation of HK police to the witness, and interchange customers datas with other banks to perform dirty underhand tactics to the witness as we know for time since Oct 2008.



4. The defense lawyers forced the witness that she always said Lehman Minibonds were linked to seven entities without knowing what credit link means. But in legco inquiry with banks selling staffs, none of the bank staffs knew about details of Minibonds, the CDOs and CDSs details. In fact all these products were traded by all major banks in HK by banks head offices' staffs and banks' staffs should know about these products after they have been trained by banks. Since Defense lawyers also involved with setting up new selling procedures of these derivative products inside the banks, they should know who are lying.
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/10/dispute-resolution-international-hong.html
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/10/blog-post_25.html
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/10/blog-post_12.html

5. Expert defense witness use charts and statistic to prove to judges that these CDO's were AAA rated without even showing any news to court to prove in fact his datas are far far away from true world. In fact all the accounting companies, rating agencies, major US investment banks are all charged by SEC, FBI and major governments all the world for frauds.

http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/12/role-of-auditors-in-crisis-gets-look.html
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2011/01/ernst-young-faces-us-investigation.html
http://minibondsoctaveconstellation.blogspot.com/2010/10/bad-credit-how-s-moodys-and-fitch.html

2011年1月12日星期三

UK will allow US investigators to probe British auditors of Lehman Brothers

UK will allow US investigators to probe British auditors of Lehman Brothers

Lehman audit breakthrough

Lehman audit breakthrough

An agreement by accountancy regulators in the UK and the US has opened the door to a wider investigation of the role played by Ernst & Young in the collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers in 2008.


The auditor was in charge of examining Lehman's accounting practices, and faces civil fraud charges in the US over a scheme that allowed the bank to hide more than $50bn (£32bn) in short-term debt from its shareholders. The scheme, known as Repo 105, was operated out of London, with approval from a law firm and oversight by Ernst & Young.

A dispute between the US and other countries had blocked American inspections of foreign audit firms since 2008, but the UK's Professional Oversight Board yesterday signed a bilateral information-sharing agreement with the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.

European governments had bristled at US demands to let in PCOAB inspectors, without any reciprocal arrangement. The PCOAB had been barred from sharing information from the US with foreign regulators until Congress passed reforms last year.

Accounting Regulators End Turf Battle

Accounting Regulators End Turf Battle

Accounting regulators in the United States and Britain have resolved a prolonged turf dispute that allowed questionable accounting methods at Lehman Brothers to go undetected.

The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board and its British counterpart, the Professional Oversight Board, agreed on Monday to cooperate as they oversee accounting firms that audit public companies in both countries.

The agreement will open the door for the American oversight board to resume inspections of some 60 British-based accounting firms. The board was allowed to inspect the firms from 2005 to 2008, but has been handcuffed ever since.

Both regulators “are committed to investor protection and to having a strong working relationship with each other,” the American board’s acting chairman, Daniel L. Goelzer, said in a statement, adding that he is “pleased that we have overcome the obstacles that have prevented” the inspections.

The obstacles included an American law that prohibited the accounting board from sharing confidential information with regulators in Britain. The British regulators reacted in kind.

The recent Dodd-Frank financial regulatory law amended the accounting rules to permit exchanging information with overseas regulators, paving the way for Monday’s agreement.

“If we’re going to withhold information from other countries, we can’t expect them to share details with us,” said Frederick W. Lindahl, an associate professor of accountancy at George Washington University. “Dodd-Frank put us in a position to say sure, take a look.”

In a statement, Rhonda Schnare, the American accounting board’s director for international affairs, said she was working out similar agreements with accounting regulators in several other countries.

China and Switzerland are among the nations that have banned the American board from conducting inspections.

Such regulatory blackouts can allow potential accounting scandals to escape notice.

For instance, the American board was unaware that Lehman Brothers was using what some have deemed an accounting gimmick to stay afloat in 2008. Lehman used the British division of accounting giant Ernst & Young to review the transactions, known as Repo 105. The repo transactions, short for repurchase agreements, helped Lehman temporarily hide billions of dollars in assets off its balance sheet.

Lehman executed the transactions in Britain because it was unclear whether they were legal under United States law.

In December, Andrew M. Cuomo, who was then New York’s attorney general, sued Ernst & Young, accusing the firm of helping Lehman Brothers “engage in a massive accounting fraud.” Ernst & Young has said it stands by its audits.

The American accounting board, which is overseen by the Securities and Exchange Commission, is an independent panel created by Congress after the scandals at Enron and WorldCom. Before that, the industry policed itself. The board inspects accounting firms, writes rules and fines violators.

The S.E.C. on Friday appointed a new chairman of the accounting board: James R. Doty, a private securities lawyer and former general counsel at the S.E.C.

Lehman Brothers: US to inspect Ernst & Young's audit

Lehman Brothers: US to inspect Ernst & Young's audit

Lehman's Repo-105 Auditors in UK Lose Shield From US Accounting Probe

Lehman's Repo-105 Auditors in UK Lose Shield From US Accounting Probe

U.S. inspectors blocked from examining whether British auditors of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. improperly cleared questionable accounting will get access to the books under an agreement announced today.

Authorities in the U.S. and U.K. have settled a jurisdictional dispute that since 2008 has prevented the U.S. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board from reviewing British auditors of U.S. companies, according to the agreement.

The U.K. unit of Ernst & Young LLP was largely responsible for reviewing Lehman’s so-called Repo 105 transactions, allegedly used to conceal billions of dollars in debt before the firm collapsed in 2008, according to a report last year by Lehman’s bankruptcy examiner.

The accounting board “was unable to carry out inspections in the United Kingdom -- as well as the rest of the European Union -- due to obstacles raised by the European Commission and European Union audit regulators,” Rhonda Schnare, the board’s director of international affairs, said in an interview.

The PCAOB, which was established in 2002 by the Sarbanes- Oxley Act to oversee auditors of companies with U.S.-registered securities wherever they do business, has been barred by Switzerland and China, in addition to the EU. The new cooperative agreement with the U.K., reported earlier today by Bloomberg News, re-opens one of the world’s major financial centers to joint inspections.

Because earlier federal law wouldn’t allow inspectors to share documentation with their non-U.S. counterparts, the talks to open EU borders were hampered until the Dodd-Frank Act, enacted in July, permitted the exchange.

Bilateral Agreements
In September, the European Commission authorized EU nations to “enter into bilateral agreements” with U.S. regulators of auditors. The commission is working with EU members and the PCAOB, “trying to solve any outstanding issues,” Chantal Hughes, a commission spokeswoman, said in an e-mail.

The new arrangement “reflects the increasingly global nature of the audit market,” Barbara Mills, chairman of the U.K. Financial Reporting Council’s Professional Oversight Board, said in a statement. It will “strengthen and streamline” information access for inspectors in both nations, Mills said.

U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro, whose agency oversees the PCAOB, said in a Dec. 6 speech that she was looking forward to agreements with overseas regulators “that will allow those inspections to go forward.”

The U.K. allowed the PCAOB to examine Ernst & Young’s work in London in 2006. It shut down inspections when the European Commission closed the door in 2008.

New York Lawsuit
New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo sued Ernst & Young over its Lehman work last month, alleging it participated in a “major accounting fraud” by helping the investment bank mask its condition. The state aims to recover more than $150 million Ernst & Young charged Lehman from 2001 to 2008.

Lehman’s Repo 105s were short-term asset sales that included repurchase agreements, which helped the company raise quick cash. The Lehman bankruptcy examiner’s report said the transactions were booked as true sales. The report described three consecutive quarters in which Lehman’s repo transactions totaled $38.6 billion, $49.1 billion and $50.4 billion.

“We stand by the audit opinions issued by Ernst & Young relating to the financial statements of Lehman Brothers,” said Sarah Jurado, a spokeswoman for Ernst & Young in the U.K., in an e-mail. “Ernst & Young is cooperating fully with the regulatory authorities in the U.K. and the U.S., including the PCAOB and SEC, on this matter.”

Other Clients
Ernst & Young has said previously that Lehman’s bankruptcy wasn’t brought on by accounting problems.

Other companies that have filed financial reports audited by the Ernst & Young’s U.K. affiliate, according to information it files with the PCAOB, include BP Plc, Virgin Media Inc., Aviva Plc, Intercontinental Hotels Group Plc and GLG Partners Inc., a hedge fund founded as a unit of Lehman.

The jurisdictional dispute means investors may be unaware that U.S. officials aren’t watching people who audit major portions of global companies including International Business Machines Corp., Coca-Cola Co., General Motors Co., Chevron Corp. and Exxon Mobil Corp., said Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC. “The work of their auditors may not have been examined by the PCAOB,” he said.

Colleen Brennan, a PCAOB spokeswoman, said the board is “acutely aware” that investors haven’t been protected by the regulator in such cases.

China Sovereignty
While China cites sovereignty in its denial of U.S. inspections, EU officials have said they prefer that U.S. authorities rely on the work of European watchdogs. “The EU does not view joint inspections as the final goal of international cooperation,” Hughes said.

The PCAOB, under U.S. law, doesn’t have the option of accepting other countries’ inspection work.

In October, the PCAOB said new requests to audit U.S. public companies from firms operating in blocked jurisdictions will be subject to board hearings and may be delayed.

While U.S. inspectors were denied access to Ernst & Young in London, the U.K.’s Financial Reporting Council’s Audit Inspection Unit reviewed the auditor annually. The U.K. regulators said in their 2008-2009 report that the firm generally maintained good or acceptable standards, while citing weaknesses in “the identification of significant risks.”

In June, the FRC’s Accountancy and Actuarial Discipline Board said it had begun an investigation of Ernst & Young’s auditing of Lehman Brothers International Europe -- specifically “the use and accounting treatment of transactions known as ‘Repo 105s’ and ‘Repo 108s.’”

In October, the U.K. disciplinary board announced another investigation, examining the auditor’s conduct in preparing a report to the U.K.’s bank regulator on Lehman’s 2007 compliance with rules governing the protection of clients’ money.

To contact the reporter on this story: Jesse Hamilton in Washington at jhamilton33@bloomberg.net.

2011年1月11日星期二

Big banks witness soaring legal bills | The Journal Gazette | Fort Wayne, IN

Big banks witness soaring legal bills | The Journal Gazette | Fort Wayne, IN

Linda Sandler | Bloomberg News
NEW YORK – The nation’s largest banks face billions of dollars in legal costs related to their role in the financial crisis, threatening their profits and the stock price gains they made in 2010, analysts said.

JPMorgan Chase, the nation’s second biggest bank, reported $5.2 billion of legal costs in the first nine months of last year, compared with a gain of $10 million in the same period a year earlier. The costs would rise if the bank reserves for multibillion-dollar lawsuits by Lehman Brothers Holdings and the trustee liquidating Bernard Madoff’s firm.

Bank of America, the largest U.S. bank, and Citigroup, ranked third, are also besieged by lawsuits stemming from the credit crisis, brought by plaintiffs such as foreclosed-upon homeowners and institutional investors whose mortgage-backed bonds turned out to be money-losers.

“They’re under legal attack,” said Richard Bove, an analyst at Rochdale Securities in Lutz, Fla. “They’re similar to the asbestos or the tobacco industry, and they’re going to be repeatedly sued in the next few years.”

JPMorgan’s third-quarter net profit of $4.4 billion, up 23 percent from the year earlier, would have been larger if it hadn’t set aside $1.3 billion of pretax income for lawsuits and $1 billion for mortgage repurchases. Banks haven’t yet reported their results for the fourth quarter.

Litigation “ain’t going away,” Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon told analysts on an Oct. 13 conference call. “It’s becoming a cost of doing business.”

At least JPMorgan’s shareholders are more likely to be informed about legal expenses than are some other bank investors. The bank, which used the word “litigation” about 50 times in its latest 10-Q filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, discloses more about lawsuits’ effect on results than Citigroup or Wells Fargo, and has been taking larger reserves than some rivals, according to company filings.

Stephen Cutler, JPMorgan’s in-house lawyer and a former SEC enforcement chief, declined to comment through bank spokesman Joseph Evangelisti.

Bankrupt Lehman is claiming $8.6 billion in collateral from JPMorgan plus tens of billions of dollars in damages, while Madoff trustee Irving Picard is demanding $6.4 billion on the grounds that JPMorgan aided and abetted the biggest Ponzi scheme in history.

Investors concerned that they aren’t getting enough information to assess litigation risks spurred the Financial Accounting Standards Board to issue proposals last year that would make banks estimate legal losses.

2011年1月10日星期一

Ernst & Young faces US investigation

By Benjamin Chiou

Mon 10 Jan 2011

LONDON (SHARECAST) - Accountancy firm Ernst & Young is facing an investigation into its handling of Lehman Brothers accounts now that the path has been cleared for US authorities to examine UK auditors.

Since 2008, the US Public Company Accounting Oversight Board had been prevented from sharing documentation outside the US, stopping a probe into Lehman use of Repo 105 transactions overseen by the UK firm.

However, due to the settlement of a jurisdictional dispute on Monday, the regulator will be able continue its work concerning the lender collapse more than two years ago.

Last month, New York attorney general Andrew Cuomo accused Ernst & Young of committing major accounting fraud?in concealing as much as $50bn of assets from the balance sheet to hide debt.

The Repo 105 transactions that Lehman used were short term repurchase agreements where a loan is classified as a sale, and then contributed towards debt repayments.

This is reflected on balance sheets, showing a company to be less volatile than it is. The group concerned would then be able to repurchase original assets once results are published.

A spokeswoman from Ernst & Young said the firm is cooperating with UK and US authorities, but stands by the audit opinions issued in relation to the accounts of Lehman Brothers, according to Bloomberg.

2011年1月9日星期日

金管局今年開支增10% 預算達10億加強風險監控

【本報訊】巴塞爾新資本協定逐步推行,加上投資產品規範更嚴格,各國央行的營運支出相應增加。消息人士透露,就金管局今年度行政開支及職位編制預算,外基金諮詢委員去年底舉行會議進行商討。

記者︰劉美儀

據悉,因應本地及國際風險監控工作趨增,會議通過該局今年度員工編制將增約5%,包括人事費用在內的行政開支總預算,在去年度修訂預算基礎上,預料今年度調升約10%,令總額增至近10億元水平。

金管局的運作成本及員工支出,是由外基金撥款支付,委員會於每年底就該局年度行政預算及員工服務條款等,向財政司司長提供意見,至於該局員工固定及浮動薪酬調整,則在每年3月底的委員會會議上審議。

合約職位或轉長工

以陳德霖為首的金管局有員工總數逾700人,其發言人接受查詢時回應,該局每年行政預算,經外基金諮詢委員會審議後,由財政司司長批准,並在每年4月出版的年報內,提供相關資料,現階段沒有進一步補充。

消息稱,從宏觀風險監控及政策變化角度看,今年度各國央行要應付的本土及國際事務繁多。以金管局去年4月新成立的銀行操守部為例,當時編制主要透過原來資源整合重組,但隨政策不斷發展及檢討,如信用卡條款標準化等,該部門的人手編制便需增加,或將更多合約制崗位轉為長期聘用。

據悉,該局擬增加編制的部門,主要集中銀行監理、操守及政策等部門。另外貨幣管理部門亦會增添人手,去年度該局整體人手已顯著增加。

根據金管局09年年報所載,2010年度行政開支預算總額為8.95億元,較09年的預算額8.39億元,增加6.7%,較09年實際開支7.8億元,則上升14.7%。

去年人工開支佔八成

人事費用一直佔該局整體行政開支最主要組成部份,去年度有關預算額為6.98億元,佔比78%,09年度實際人事費用支出為6.32億元,佔比81%。年報亦顯示,去年初該局人手編制為697人,其中高層人員編制為14人,去年初該局實際員工總數為646人。

經歷雷曼迷債事件後,金管局及證監會均就保障投資者提出新監管要求,今年起銀行須為非上市投資產品引入冷靜期,該局要求銀行為客戶提供最少兩天「落單冷靜期」,銀行同時要根據證監會指引,給予投資者5天售後冷靜期安排。

A handsome European haircut

A handsome European haircut
For most of the post-Lehman Brothers period, the priority for banking regulators has been to focus on reforms that should strengthen bank balance sheets and liquidity to try to prevent another bank failure. Less visible has been continuing discussion about how to deal with the failure of those reforms to prevent a "too-big-to-fail" bank from getting into strife.

The lesson from the crisis is that systemically important banks can’t be allowed to fail. It’s been an expensive lesson for the taxpayers of the US and Europe, who have had to pick up the tab for the recklessness of their institutions. Another lesson is that there are no established frameworks in place for dealing with too-big-to-fail institutions in distress – the approaches tended to be ad hoc and of the "whatever it takes" variety.

Late last week the European Commission moved a step closer to constructing a legislated framework for dealing with the future failure of any of its banks, opening a consultation process that it intends to lead to legislation by the middle of this year.

What it wants to put in place are common tools and powers across the EU that allow intervention in the affairs of ailing banks by regulators at an early stage and which minimise the eventual cost to taxpayers.

Those powers would include the authority to prohibit dividends, sack the management and sell or transfer assets and liabilities to other institutions. The EC is also advocating the creation of "resolution" funds, levying the banks to create "bail-out" funds that would enable a rescue funded by the industry rather than taxpayers – the ECD refers to it as the "polluter pays principle".

The measure that has already caused most disquiet, however, is the EC’s determination to force bondholders to share in the pain when a bank gets itself into trouble. It proposes giving regulators the ability to write down the debts of a failing bank, or convert debt to equity in what it describes as a "bail-in" concept that would enable a quick re-capitalisation of the institution.

That would be a step beyond the voluntary issuance of contingent convertible bonds that convert to equity when certain minimum capital or liquidity ratios are triggered – the EC proposal would allow regulators to force senior lenders to take a "hair cut".

The proposal would only apply to debt issued by European banks after the measures were legislated, but has already sparked concern that it will lead to a permanent spike in bank borrowing costs and ignite a stampede by the banks to borrow long before the legislation is in place.

It is one of the peculiarities and inequities of the crisis experience that bank creditors have generally escaped loss while taxpayers have been forced to write blank cheques. In Europe the cost to taxpayers of bailing out banks is estimated at about 13 per cent of the EU’s GDP.

There are two layers (at least) of moral hazard generated by banks regarded as too big to fail. One is the risk that it will lead to excessive risk-taking by the institution itself and the other is that its creditors won’t be as vigilant as they would be if they were lending to an organisation without implicit taxpayer support. Risk-conscious creditors can be a disciplining force.

While the big increases in the proportions and quality of capital and liquidity banks are going to have to hold in future ought to reduce the risk of bank failures, it would require far more draconian – and costly – measures than those proposed to completely obviate that risk.

It makes sense, therefore, to plan for those potential failures long before they occur and put the banks, their shareholders and their creditors on notice about how the fate of a future failing bank will be resolved and funded.

In the US the regulators are proposing to put failing banks into receiverships managed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. The EC regime would allow a similar process but would also give regulators a lot more flexibility to reorganise their institutions and reshape their balance sheets while maintaining them as going concerns.

While the EC proposals would inevitably push up the cost of banking services in its member countries to reflect the higher borrowing costs and the resolution fund levies (beyond the increases that will flow from the higher capital and liquidity requirements), employing creditors’ self-interest to discipline bank risk-taking and distancing taxpayers as much as possible from bank balance sheets would appear to be obvious and rational responses to the traumatic lesson and legacies of the crisis.

2011年1月8日星期六

銀行在失實陳述下不受保障 王岸然

銀行在失實陳述下不受保障 王岸然

有留意本欄的讀者,也許會對「失實陳述」這一法律概念有初步認識。無論在民事的合約或是刑事的欺詐行為之中,所謂有失實陳述(Mis- representation)的行為之時,作出失實陳述行為的一方,一定不會受到法律的保障,甚而當詐騙罪成之時,應會受到刑事責任的追究。

最近的嚴重例子,是雷曼的苦主在中環政監會外示威抗議了兩個月,目的是要求報案,報案的指控,是銀行當初在引誘苦主購買雷曼產品之時,作出了大量的失實陳述,而根據〈證券及期貨條例〉第107條,以失實陳述誘使他人作投資行為,事屬違法,理應受到刑事檢控。

本文介紹的案例,非關刑事,而是民事,但同樣與銀行的失實陳述行為有關。不同的是由於銀行有失實陳述的行為,結果是銀行不能受到法律的保障。事件的性質雖然不同,但法律對所有失實陳述的行為皆禁止的精神,倒是一致的。

Wing Hang Bank V Kwok Lai Sim [2009] 4 HKC 71

被告人為一對姐妹,她們將自己的物業按給銀行用以借錢以支持她們兄弟的公司。她們同時給予銀行無限的個人保證(unlimited personal liabilities)。銀行由一律師行作代表,這一律師行又同時代表了姐妹。

姐妹會見了律師行的一位合夥人,連同她們的兄弟及兄弟的太太。在會面時,姐妹簽了一份文件,文件有一附件,為銀行的按揭文件。姐妹之前未有機會看過文件,而在律師面前看文件的時間不及30分鐘。

銀行在較後的時間追討姐妹一筆款項連同利息並要求交出物業。姐妹則指稱她們兄弟所誤導去按揭有關的物業(charge),要求按揭無效。有關的失實陳述,同時亦經銀行的代表(律師)作出,所以按揭文件無效。

高院原訟庭判姐妹勝訴,指文件無效,銀行及律師上訴,而結果上訴庭維持原判,理由如下:

(一) 在會面時,律師草率敷衍,姐妹被要求簽署不同文件,全部她們事前未有過目,作為同時是姐妹的律師,未有儘責。

(二) 按律師會的指引,律師應基於利益衝突的理由停止代表姐妹。

(三) 在比較可信的基礎上,若姐妹認清她們兄弟的財政情況(律師未有清楚詳儘的解說),她們應該不會作為擔保人。

(四) 律師交給銀行的肯定信(confirmation letter)並不足夠,雖然情況是文件已經完備,但無談及姐妹已經充份被告知情況(advice)及得到合適的法律意見。由於律師是銀行代理人(agent),等同銀行作出失實陳述。

(五) 當有失實陳述的情況發生之時,法庭會將與訟雙方的景況回後到失實陳述之前(recession),亦即當有關的按揭合約失效。

這件案例對其他人例如是雷曼苦主的參考價值,在於已簽的文件內容沒有失實的問題,但在簽的過程之中,不提供足夠合適的意見,不作詳儘的解釋,對合約的另一方,就是被失實陳述引誘的情況下簽約,合約在法律之中應被視為無效。

2011年1月7日星期五

Lehman Shows Trans-Atlantic Divide on Derivatives

Lehman Shows Trans-Atlantic Divide on Derivatives

By STEPHEN J. LUBBEN

Hazel Thompson for The New York Times
Christie’s employees carry items from Lehman’s London headquarters into the auction house in September.The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy case underscores that while the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the derivatives industry trade group, provides a single master agreement for use in derivatives trades in the important New York and London markets, the interpretation of that agreement can vary greatly across those two jurisdictions.

While Britain provided the basis for the American legal system, the reality is that derivatives trade group’s one master agreement is being subjected to two fairly different bankruptcy systems.

Start with the basics: Throughout the world, derivatives transactions are usually documented with two main parts. First, the parties enter into a master agreement, which provides basic terms for all trades between those parties.

For example, a hedge fund that wants to conduct a series of derivatives trades with Goldman Sachs will enter into a master agreement with Goldman, or, more realistically, a Goldman subsidiary, although the Goldman parent company might be a guarantor and in most cases will be a “credit support provider” under the master agreement.

Second, the parties will enter into “schedules” that document each individual class of derivatives trade conducted under that master agreement. These schedules document the financial terms of the deal, and often also invoke special rules that the derivatives trade group has formulated for specific transactions. For example, credit default swaps have their own set of rules.

In the Lehman case, we’ve already seen two issues decided in conflicting fashion in London and New York, although to be fair the first did not directly involve the derivatives trade group’s documents. This was the issue concerning “flip” clauses, provisions in derivatives that purport to “flip” the parties’ priority rights in collateral if the senior party files for bankruptcy.

The New York Bankruptcy Court held that such a clause violated the Bankruptcy Code, while courts in Britain upheld the clause as permissible under English law.

Much fuss was made over the fact that the derivatives in question involved an English choice of law clause, but that seems irrelevant to me, given the usual rule that contracts can’t override the Bankruptcy Code. The issue has since been settled.

More recently, the British courts have allowed several Lehman counterparties to exercise what I’ve taken to calling the third option. Normally, when a party to a derivatives contract files for bankruptcy, the debtor’s counterparty has two options: it can waive the default and continue as nothing has happened or it can terminate the deal (or deals, if there are multiple contracts outstanding), with damages based on the current market value of the derivative. In short, default by a party gives rise to an option to terminate, and filing for bankruptcy is an enforceable default in a derivatives contract.

But in the Lehman case, several counterparties have tried to create a third option, whereby they cease performing their obligations under the contract but also refuse to terminate the contract. Termination is unattractive because in most of these cases Lehman is the “in the money” party to the deal.

For example, if a party bought an interest rate swap from Lehman – in other words, agreed to pay Lehman a fixed rate while Lehman paid a floating rate — to hedge against rising interest rates, Lehman is owed money under the contract since interest rates have, in fact, fallen. Termination of the swap would require a large payment into Lehman’s bankruptcy estate.

Seizing on language in the 2002 version of the master agreement that makes performance contingent on there being no outstanding defaults on the derivatives contract, these counterparties have simply left their contracts in limbo. Plainly the hope is to allow the contracts to expire by their own terms without ever invoking the termination procedure, and the obligation to contribute to Lehman’s bankruptcy estate. In short, the counterparties are trying to run out the clock under this third option. From Lehman’s perspective this looks a lot like an effort to destroy a valuable asset of the bankruptcy estate.

The crucial question is whether this third option was ever intended by the drafters of the derivatives trade group’s 2002 master agreement. The International Swaps and Derivatives Association argued in London in favor of the third option, but I think that its actions have to be somewhat discounted, given its general hostility to the normal operation of reorganization systems like Chapter 11.

A more reasonable interpretation of the 2002 master agreement would seem to be that a default is waived if not acted upon within a reasonable time. This is essentially the result reached by the Federal Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan, and avoids the problems that might result if a nonbankrupt counterparty were able to exercise the third option until such time as interest rates rise.

In short, a nonbankrupt party should not be able to convert the swap into an option on interest rates, where they only perform when it hurts the bankruptcy estate.

Nonetheless, for the time being such an option exists in London, but not in New York, even though derivatives traded in these jurisdictions are documented under the same contracts.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Stephen J. Lubben is the Daniel J. Moore Professor of Law at Seton Hall Law School and an expert on bankruptcy.

歐銀行優先債主恐「填氹」

歐銀行優先債主恐「填氹」
歐洲政府在金融海嘯期間動用巨額公帑援助區內銀行,為防範銀行業重蹈覆轍及保障納稅人,歐盟建議銀行優先債券持有人日後要為金融危機承擔損失,有關建議令債券投資者損失機會大增,刺激銀行優先債券的信貸違約掉期(CDS)成本應聲彈升。

歐盟金融事務專員巴尼耶周四表示,銀行倒閉在未來變得可能,必須容許銀行在不拖垮整個金融系統的前提下倒閉,當局考慮提高監管機構權力,有權將「陷困銀行」的所有優先債券撇帳或轉換為股份,但有關權力只適用於新監管機構成立後發行的新債,並有出售銀行資產及中止任何活動等權力。

西葡債息逼近新高
政策組織Re-Define Europe董事總經理卡普爾指,若當局有權將銀行債券轉為股份,便能在短短一晚將銀行資本提高一至兩倍,有助紓緩金融系統恐慌。受消息拖累,反映歐洲銀行優先債券CDS價格的Markit iTraxx優先金融指數升16點子至196點子。

葡萄牙、西班牙將於下周拍債,市場估計投資者將要求更高債息回報,拖累兩國債價回落,葡萄牙十年期國債孳息率在周四率先升至7.03厘,西班牙債息則升至5.45厘,兩者均逼近歐元面世以來新高。比利時在國會改選後近七個月,仍未成功組成執政內閣,加上政治領袖周四重啟談判失敗,刺激當地十年期債息大升12點子至4.07厘。

CMA資料顯示,根據各國CDS成本計算,希臘在去年第四季超越委內瑞拉成為全球最危險「債仔」,而西班牙、葡萄牙及愛爾蘭國債的風險亦高於伊拉克。

UBS Investor Arbitration Suit Over Lehman Notes Results in $2.2M Award - AboutLawsuits.com

UBS Investor Arbitration Suit Over Lehman Notes Results in $2.2M Award - AboutLawsuits.com

An arbitration panel has awarded more than $2.2 million to an investor as the result of a claim against UBS Financial Services over losses associated with Lehman Brothers principal protected notes.
The decision was announced late last month by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which is a non-governmental regulatory body that oversees more than 5,000 brokerage firms throughout the United States.

The panel determined that UBS must pay Thomas F. Motamed, and his wife, Christine, the full amount of losses they claimed were a result of investments in Lehman Brothers note products sold by UBS, including interest back to April 2008 and all of the fees for the arbitration.

Motamed, who is the chairman and chief executive of CNA, a major insurance company, accused UBS of breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation. FINRA rulings typically do not come with explanations of the panel’s decisions.

A number of arbitration claims and lawsuits over Lehman Brothers structured notes have been filed on behalf of investors who were sold the products by UBS and other brokerage firms. Lehman notes were a hybrid financial instrument, constructed from a combination of stocks, bonds, currencies, commodities and derivatives, which were promoted by many brokers as low-risk investments, even as Lehman Brothers faced substantial financial troubles.

The $2.2 million award is the largest so far involving Lehman Brothers notes sold by UBS. The losses were the result of personal investments by the Motameds and unrelated to CNA.

A UBS class action lawsuit over Lehman structured notes was filed in 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of all investors who were sold the investment by the brokerage firm. The complaint alleges that UBS brokers made false and misleading statements about Lehman Brothers Principal Protection Notes that omitted material facts about the risk associated with investing.

Individual investors are also able to resolve disputes against brokerage firms through FINRA for claims involving breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, misrepresentation, breach of contract, unauthorized trading and other claims that investments were improperly handled. Many financial fraud lawyers investigating Lehman Brothers claims on behalf of investors indicate that most individuals are in a better position to recover their losses through FINRA arbitration.

Observers say that more UBS Lehman notes lawsuits could be coming from states and the Securities Exchange Commission could file criminal charges as financial law enforcement investigators look deeper into the brokerage firm’s practices in promoting and selling the notes.

2011年1月6日星期四

JPMorgan Legal Bills Soar in Financial Crisis Aftermath, Menacing Profits

JPMorgan Legal Bills Soar in Financial Crisis Aftermath, Menacing Profits

JPMorgan Chase & Co. and the biggest U.S. banks face billions of dollars in legal costs related to their role in the financial crisis, threatening their profits and the stock price gains they made in 2010, analysts said.

JPMorgan, the second biggest bank by assets, reported $5.2 billion of legal costs in the first nine months of last year, compared with a gain of $10 million in the same period a year earlier. The costs would rise if the bank reserves for multibillion-dollar lawsuits by Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and the trustee liquidating Bernard L. Madoff’s firm.

Bank of America Corp., the largest U.S. bank, and Citigroup Inc., ranked third, are also besieged by lawsuits stemming from the credit crisis, brought by plaintiffs ranging from foreclosed-upon homeowners to institutional investors whose mortgage-backed bonds turned out to be money-losers.

“They’re under legal attack,” said Richard Bove, an analyst at Rochdale Securities in Lutz, Florida, who rates JPMorgan’s stock a “buy.” “They’re similar to the asbestos or the tobacco industry, and they’re going to be repeatedly sued in the next few years.”

JPMorgan rose about 1.8 percent in 2010, while the Standard & Poor’s 500 Bank Index climbed 18.7 percent and Citigroup gained 43 percent. Both banks are based in New York. Bank of America, based in Charlotte, North Carolina, fell 11.4 percent, while San Francisco-based Wells Fargo & Co. rose 14.8 percent, according to Bloomberg data.

Cost of Business
JPMorgan’s third-quarter net profit of $4.4 billion, up 23 percent from the year earlier, would have been larger if it hadn’t set aside $1.3 billion of pretax income for lawsuits and $1 billion for mortgage repurchases. Banks haven’t yet reported their results for the fourth quarter.

Litigation “ain’t going away,” Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon told analysts on an Oct. 13 conference call. “It’s becoming a cost of doing business.”

At least JPMorgan’s shareholders are more likely to be informed about legal expenses than some other bank investors. The bank, which used the word “litigation” about 50 times in its latest 10-Q filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, discloses more about lawsuits’ effect on results than Citigroup or Wells Fargo, and has been taking larger reserves than some rivals, according to company filings.

Array of Suits
Stephen Cutler, JPMorgan’s in-house lawyer and a former SEC enforcement chief, declined to comment through bank spokesman Joseph Evangelisti.

Bankrupt Lehman is claiming $8.6 billion in collateral from JPMorgan plus tens of billions of dollars in damages, while Madoff trustee Irving Picard is demanding $6.4 billion on the grounds that JPMorgan aided and abetted the biggest Ponzi scheme in history.

Almost nine pages of JPMorgan’s third-quarter 10-Q deal with legal issues. They range from home foreclosure investigations by state officials, to shareholder lawsuits against Bear Stearns Cos., which JPMorgan bought in 2008, to suits from nine different Federal Home Loan Banks demanding compensation for mortgage-backed securities bought from JPMorgan, Bear Stearns or Washington Mutual Bank, also purchased in 2008.

Investors concerned that they aren’t getting enough information to assess litigation risks spurred the Financial Accounting Standards Board to issue proposals last year that would make banks estimate legal losses and say how much they’re putting aside. The FASB, based in Norwalk, Connecticut, sets accounting rules for public companies under authority delegated by the SEC.

Expensive Season
The coming year may be the most expensive litigation season since 2005, when JPMorgan and Citigroup each spent about $2 billion to resolve a lawsuit accusing them of helping energy trader Enron Corp. hide billions of dollars in debt from investors. JPMorgan said in its 2009 annual report it got some money back from insurers for the two settlements.

This year, though, the usual fraud and mismanagement suits are dwarfed by the potential liabilities stemming from the collapse of the housing market. Litigation may force banks to pay back about $134 billion for so-called private-label mortgage loans, said Chris Gamaitoni, a bank analyst at Compass Point Research & Trading LLC in Washington. Such loans are considered riskier than mortgage loans issued by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

Book Value
For JPMorgan, its $24 billion share of the potential losses would equal 13 percent of its book value, Gamaitoni said. Bank of America’s $35 billion of possible losses would be 17 percent of book value, he estimated.

While bank stocks rose about 3 percent this week after Bank of America paid $2.8 billion to settle loan disputes with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the banking industry’s liability could be almost five times greater on private-label mortgage loans, Gamaitoni estimated.

“Private-label losses on loans are much higher and therefore the liability from lawsuits is a much larger percent than in the agency market,” he said. “On a book value basis it would be more negatively impactful. If there is a large private- label settlement or court case, the stocks will react negatively. There will be an earnings headwind.”

Bank of America reported $1.2 billion in litigation costs for the nine months through Sept. 30, excluding fees to outside law firms. It is suing or being sued in 5,696 legal proceedings in federal court, compared with JPMorgan’s 3,757 lawsuits, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

Litigation Expenses
Cases for which Bank of America has already reserved some money may wind up costing the bank $400 million to $1.9 billion more than it has set aside, according to its 10-Q. The bank’s nine-month litigation cost of $1.2 billion compared with $477 million a year earlier.

“Our litigation-related expenses are cyclical and are not attributable to a single factor,” said Bank of America spokesman Lawrence Grayson.

Citigroup, now dealing with 1,713 federal court proceedings according to Bloomberg data, tries to settle lawsuits, the bank said in a filing. Shannon Bell, a spokeswoman for Citigroup, declined to comment.

Wells Fargo, the fourth biggest bank, is involved in 2,758 lawsuits, according to Bloomberg data. Mary Eshet, a Wells Fargo spokeswoman, declined to comment.

JPMorgan’s litigation reserves are an “estimate” that, “if wrong, could cause unexpected losses in the future” from lawsuits, fines or penalties not covered by insurance, according to its latest 10-K.

Fight for Right
Dimon articulated the bank’s approach to lawsuits in the October analyst call.

“When we’re wrong, we’re going to settle, and when we’re right, we’re going to fight,” he said.

JPMorgan was the last major underwriter of WorldCom Inc. securities to settle suits started in 2002 after an $11 billion fraud sank the long-distance telephone company and sent Chairman Bernard Ebbers to prison.

Banks have leeway under current accounting rules to report litigation costs, or not. Citibank and Wells Fargo don’t give a dollar amount for legal costs; JPMorgan and Bank of America do.

Among other things, the FASB proposal would force banks to report the basis for the legal claim, the amount being claimed and how the company will defend itself. Banks will have to regularly update their estimated loss, and when it might occur; and in cases where they are “reasonably” likely to lose, they have to estimate their possible range of loss and say how much they’ve put aside to pay for it.

Mission of FASB
“The mission of the FASB is to establish financial accounting and reporting standards that provide useful information to investors,” said Bill Hildebrand, a FASB staff member, in a telephone interview. Hildebrand couldn’t say when the proposal might become a rule.

JPMorgan currently is fighting Lehman’s lawsuit, which alleges the bank and Dimon helped cause its failure by siphoning off badly needed funds.

JPMorgan twice asked a judge to dismiss the suit, saying it took the $8.6 billion in collateral from Lehman under a contract to clear trades for Lehman’s brokerage. So-called safe harbor laws protect a clearing bank from being sued if a brokerage client fails, the bank said in court papers.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck in Manhattan, who hasn’t yet ruled on JPMorgan’s request for dismissal, has at least three times rejected the safe harbor defense in other cases. Bank of America was ordered to return $500 million of deposits to Lehman, and pay $90 million in interest.

Madoff Trustee
Madoff trustee Irving Picard sued JPMorgan on Dec. 2, saying the bank aided the now-imprisoned con man’s fraud from its position “at the very center of that fraud” when it acted as the Madoff firm’s banker.

The trustee unraveling the remains of a $3.5 billion Ponzi scheme run by Thomas J. Petters has also accused JPMorgan of gaining about $280 million from that scam.

Bank of America’s legal proceedings cover five pages of its latest 10-Q -- and 11 pages of small print in a footnote to its latest annual 10-K filing, under Note 14. Like the other banks, it says it may be exposed to losses “in excess of any amounts accrued” for legal liabilities.

Like JPMorgan, Bank of America inherited lawsuits from companies it bought: Countrywide Financial Corp. and Merrill Lynch & Co. Together, they’re facing lawsuits alleging they misled investors in offering documents for more than $375 billion in mortgage-backed securities, the bank said.

Allstate Corp. sued Bank of America and Countrywide on Dec. 28 over $700 million in mortgage-backed securities the insurer bought.

Current Accounting Rules
Like other banks, Citigroup said it follows current accounting rules in setting up litigation reserves “when those matters present loss contingencies that both are probable and can be reasonably estimated,” adjusting the reserves as new information comes in.

Citigroup still faces 14 billion euros ($18.4 billion) of claims for damages resulting from the 2003 bankruptcy of Italy’s biggest dairy company, now called Parmalat SpA, according to the bank’s 10-K annual regulatory filing.

Citigroup in another Parmalat case won $431 million by countersuing, it said in the filing.

JPMorgan fell 42 cents to $44.28 at 2:51 p.m. in New York Stock Exchange composite trading.

Lehman’s case against JPMorgan is Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 10-03266, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan). The Madoff case is Picard v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 10-ap-4932, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

To contact the reporter on this story: Linda Sandler in New York at lsandler@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: David E. Rovella at drovella@bloomberg.net.

Lehman Minibonds (HK)

Information about HK Minibonds and related products misselling fraud of banks .
HK government also involved in setting up the Minibonds misselling frauds and help bank to cover up their mistakes - SFC, HKMA, HK police, Financial department, Chief exacutive officer Donald Tsang and Financial Secretary John Tsang .


觀眾 週 間2010/12/30 下午11:00 – 2011/1/6 下午10:00

來自不同國家的網頁瀏覽次數
香港 152
美国 76
法国 19
英国 18
斯洛文尼亚 10
俄罗斯 6
中国 5
德国 5
加拿大 4
阿拉伯 3

看罷 [梁國雄-(質詢)執行《證券及期貨條例》第107條]

看罷 [梁國雄-(質詢)執行《證券及期貨條例》第107條] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g1sANts6LIY&feature=youtube_gdata ... 相信經歷示威過程的苦主會啼笑皆非。很難想像證監可以如此厚顏說話。

更現實地看,是政府決不敢讓證監真正就 S.107 條展開調查,因為影響太大。側面地看,107條正屬銀行的死穴,所以政府要全力守住,不會打開缺口。

苦主有必要在整固陣線之後,進行更大規模的抗爭行動,道路是艱苦的,但也比從前清楚,迫政府依法檢控銀行從而迫使銀行全面退讓,是最直接有效的手段。但行動須有人馬,須有所堅持,更需苦主的集體智慧,大家宜一同坐下來,集思廣益,從詳計議。

旁觀者

2011年1月5日星期三

LCQ5: Enforcement action on section 107 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance

LCQ5: Enforcement action on section 107 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance
**********************************************************
Following is a question by the Hon Leung Kwok-hung and a reply by the Acting Secretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Ms Julia Leung, in the Legislative Council today (January 5):

Question:

I went with a group of aggrieved investors of Lehman Brothers-related minibonds and structured financial products (Lehman Brothers victims) to the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) on November 22, 2010 to file a report that the persons concerned of some banks and securities companies had made false or reckless misrepresentation when selling such financial products to their customers, suspectedly breaching section 107 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (section 107). In response to the appeal from SFC, Lehman Brothers victims took the initiative to provide further information and requested it be filed for action, but this was rejected by SFC. In this connection, will the Government inform this Council:

(a) given that SFC indicated in its reply to me on December 9, 2010 that Lehman Brothers victims had staged their protest persistently outside the building in which SFC was located, and had not co-operated with SFC and provided it with the necessary information, whether the authorities have assessed if the protest actions of Lehman Brothers victims are covered by the rights protected by the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance; if such an assessment has been made, of the outcome;

(b) given that SFC requires the victims to report information on the case to SFC by post, by fax or by email, and has rejected the victims' request of lodging their complaints by way of reporting in person, but it is clearly stated in SFC's leaflet on "How to Make a Complaint" that members of the public may also "[lodge a complaint] in person" apart from doing so by post, by fax and by email, whether it knows why SFC has deprived Lehman Brothers victims of their freedom to lodge their complaints in person, and whether the Government has assessed if SFC's practice is contrary to the objective of "protecting investors", which is one of the regulatory objectives of SFC under section 4 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance; and

(c) whether it knows under what circumstances SFC, as the statutory authority responsible for enforcing the Securities and Futures Ordinance, may reject the filing of report by a member of the public under section 107 on the criminal offence of a person making a fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation for the purpose of inducing another person to invest, and under such circumstances, which official at the level of Secretary of Department or Director of Bureau can order SFC to discharge this legal responsibility?

Reply:

President,

We understand that a group of investors of Lehman Brothers-related products (hereafter referred as "the Group") approached the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) on November 1, 2010 and said that an enormous number of witnesses intended to come forward to provide evidence to SFC in relation to the enforcement action on section 107 of the Securities and Futures Ordinance (SFO). Section 107 of SFO creates a criminal offence where a person, through a fraudulent or reckless misrepresentation, induces a person to invest in securities.

(a) Between November 1 and 22, 2010, we understand that SFC and the Group had some ongoing correspondences. SFC has communicated to the Group numerous times to offer and explain to the Group the various existing complaint channels for members of the public to report suspected misconduct to SFC. As of now, only four members of the Group have taken up the offer to come forward with details of these complaints. Since November 22, 2010, members of the Group have been protesting almost daily at the building in which SFC is located.

(b) We have enquired into the process of SFC's complaint handling. Accordingly, SFC provides a range of options for members of the public who wish to report suspected misconduct, including personal appointments with SFC staff, completion of specially designed complaint forms and telephone number to lodge complaints by telephone. These procedures enable complainants to tell their stories in their own words so that SFC can then assess the complaint in light of all relevant evidence and data, and make an effective and expedient decision as to further action. The complaint channels are reasonable, in line with SFC's regulatory objectives and with international best practice. They are designed to handle high volume complaints in an efficient way. They have proved to work, as made evident by SFC's expeditious handling of thousands of complaints since the collapse of Lehman Brothers.

SFC has made these complaint channels available to the Group in the same way as it has for every member of the public. However, the Group had insisted that they did not want to "file complaints" using SFC's complaint channels. Instead, they wanted to make "criminal case reporting" by which it appears that they are requesting SFC to open immediate investigation files with each complainant meeting an investigator and providing a statement with an identified officer in charge of the investigation. SFC has explained that it is unable to commence immediate investigations on request under SFO, and that its normal complaint channels cover "criminal case reporting" as well. SFC has requested members of the Group to provide details of their allegations and concerns so that SFC can make a decision as to whether there is sufficient basis to meet the statutory threshold to commence an investigation. SFC staff has explained these matters in person and in writing to the Group on over ten occasions. In addition, SFC has made strenuous attempts to meet the Group and to listen to their concerns. Unfortunately, most members of the Group have declined SFC's offer to meet with them and refused to follow SFC's established avenues for reporting suspected misconduct.

(c) We have been informed by SFC that in no circumstances has SFC rejected the reporting of a suspected breach of section 107 of SFO by a member of the public. On the contrary, as stated above, SFC has encouraged, and stood ready to listen to, legitimate complaints. As of now, SFC has only received details of four of these complaints.


Ends/Wednesday, January 5, 2011
Issued at HKT 15:22

呼籲精明債券苦主到証監支持107行動

一直以來,精明債券苦主好像被忽略了的一群,迷債及星債雖然達不到完美的和解,但總算是有集體的和解。其實迷、星、精債都是相同產品。精債的10,11,12系列跟星債一樣,是爆正掛勾的雷曼,在2010年爆的15,16,21,22系列是因第2層的CDO爆做成,這是精債獨有的,也是最無辜的。精債之所以被忽略及沒有集體和解,是因為人數較小,而又分散在16間銀行,組織鬆散,難於集中力量。而很多苦主已接受了銀行低賠償,受制於合約,不能再在銀行門口抗爭,証監利用這些有利條件,對精明債券調查放軟手腳,現時調查的進度到了那裏,有多少個案成立等的统計資料全部欠奉。証監有沒有對16問銀行違規銷售精明債券作深入調查及找到什麽証據,從而達至集體和解,証監完全沒有交代。

精明債券苦主,千萬不要被邊沿化,只要站在大聯盟的傘下,你們不會感覺人丁單薄,每個大聯盟的成員在背後默默支持你。現在大聯盟已找到了目標,就是用証劵條例107控訴銀行。精明債券系列15,16,21,22(非雷曼) 是最適合用這條例的信貸掛勾產品。因銷售員只對你講那第一層的8間超級無敵大公司怎樣穩陣,但第二層的120間掛勾的是什麽公司,他們的倒閉怎樣引至債券爆煲的機制,在銷售單張,章程及銷售員全部無講,苦主全不知情,爆煲後才知道還有這方式可以爆,這正是107講的蓄意遺漏某項事關重要的事實以致該陳述成為虛假、誤導或欺騙性。精明債券苦主只要用107告銀行,成功機會很高,現在的首要目標是要証監接受筆錄投訴,現在還未成功,所以每天都有苦主在中環証監門口示威。

各位精明債券苦主,請盡力支持107行動,不管是雷曼或非雷曼,不管你已接受了低賠償或無賠償,請盡量抽時間到中環証監門口參與行動。

時間:逢星期一至五,上午10時至下午4時

地點:中環遮打大厦,向德輔道中,中環地鉄站E出口

到達後請找曾先生簽到及商討以後行動

2011年1月4日星期二

$2.2 Million Arbitration Award Issued Against UBS in Case Involving Lehman ...

$2.2 Million Arbitration Award Issued Against UBS in Case Involving Lehman ...

金融政策對金融危機的響應

金融時報(中國)
金融政策對金融危機的響應———宏觀審慎政策框架的形成背景、內在邏輯和主要內容

周小川

我今天講的題目是“金融政策對金融危機的響應”。從目前情形看,金融危機究竟什麼時候結束,還很難判斷,實際情況比想象得還更複雜一些。危機發生後,從理論到實踐,到政策制定等方面都發生了很大的變化,有一部分政策響應已經形成了,還有一部分正在討論、醞釀中。2010年早些時候我曾將金融方面對危機的響應分為五個方面的內容:一是宏觀政策的響應;二是微觀政策的響應;三是市場和金融產品的響應;四是危機應對和成本分攤,也包括預防危機的一些制度性措施;五是國際金融組織體系改革,如大家所看到的,國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行有關份額和治理結構方面的改革。需要強調的是,最近的一個比較重要的提法就是宏觀審慎政策框架。這個政策框架內容豐富,有很多政策被放到這個框架裡面,包括我剛才所說的五個方面當中的一部分內容。從2009年4月召開G20倫敦峰會以來,歷次G20峰會都將宏觀審慎政策框架列入公報文件。從國內來看,黨的十七屆五中全會明確提出要“構建逆周期的金融宏觀審慎管理制度框架”;在近期召開的中央經濟工作會議上,胡錦濤總書記和溫家寶總理的講話也有這方面內容。

一、宏觀審慎概念的形成背景宏觀審慎政策框架形成于2008年國際金融危機深化以後。在討論危機的原因時,一種解釋是系統的正反饋特性。金融界有不少人具有工程背景,所以他們用系統的正反饋特性來解釋金融運行的周期性自我增強或自我減弱,用時下的語言,也就是金融系統的順周期性或逆周期性。例如,危機前形成的躁動型的資產泡沫,市場價格走高和樂觀情緒相互推動;而在危機中由於某種原因導致資產價格下跌,恐慌情緒使得大家都在拋售,導致資產價格持續暴跌並進一步加劇危機,這都體現了典型的順周期性。因此,應對危機就要求減少順周期性,增加逆周期性,這是一個出發點。另一個原因是監管不足,應該加強監管,但是加強監管這個詞的涵蓋過於寬泛,究竟在哪些方面加強監管?實際上也需要針對金融系統存在的問題提出具體的方向,這也會與順周期問題有關。此外,還有標準問題,一些標準定得不對或標準定低了。進一步考慮,標準問題也與系統的周期性有關,一些標準本身增強了順周期性,特別是會計準則的某些規定以及評級公司的滯後評級往往增強了順周期性。

對危機的另一種解釋涉及到系統重要性金融機構的作用。系統重要性金融機構,簡稱SIFIs(Systemically Important Financial Institutions)。很多人一定知道“大而不能倒”(Too Big To Fail)的概念,簡單地說,“大而不能倒”的金融機構就是所謂系統重要性金融機構。對SIFIs的審慎性要求應更高、更強,這是因為一旦這類機構出現倒閉清盤,可能牽涉到很多機構。此外還有道德風險問題,即“大而不能倒”所造成的道德風險。越是具有系統重要性,越不敢讓它倒閉。如果真要讓它倒閉,成本就特別高,就要考慮風險傳遞和成本如何分擔的問題。譬如,是否應該把一部分債權人拉進來承擔風險(Bail-in),或者是否應該設立資本緩衝以提前有所準備是否通過徵收金融稅或金融交易稅來籌措資金應對可能發生的危機應對成本,等等。SIFIs往往關聯性很強,甚至是跨境關聯性很強,出現危機涉及到跨境處理問題,如像雷曼兄弟在倫敦有非常大的業務。又如,冰島幾家銀行在境外有分支機構,出現問題除對冰島這個小國產生巨大影響外,還把其他一些歐洲國家牽連進去承擔損失。再如富通集團,也涉及到其他國家的投資者,我國的平安保險集團也在這家公司有投資。危機爆發並最後導致金融機構清盤時,就涉及到多個國家的股權人、債權人能不能得到平等對待的問題。可見,對系統重要性機構,監管就應該更嚴一些,審慎性標準要提得更高一點,如果出了問題處理也應該更堅決一些。

另外,金融穩定理事會(FSB)對SIFIs的劃分標準進行了深入研究,並將其劃為兩個檔次:全球系統重要性金融機構(Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions,G-SIFIs)和國內系統重要性金融機構(Domestic Systemically Important Financial Institutions,D-SIFIs)。

2009年年初,國際清算銀行(BIS)提出用宏觀審慎性的概念來概括導致危機中“大而不能倒”、順周期性、監管不足、標準不高等問題。這個概念開始並不是太流行,但後來慢慢為大家所接受,並逐步被二十國集團(G20)及其他國際組織採用。G20成立于1999年9月,由八國集團、11個重要新興工業國家以及歐盟組成,其目的是防止類似亞洲金融風暴的重演,讓有關國家就國際經濟、貨幣政策舉行非正式對話,以利於國際金融和貨幣體系的穩定。最初,G20是財政部部長和央行行長會議,但金融危機的爆發使其上升為領導人峰會,即G20峰會。從2008年11月在華盛頓首次召開以來,先後于2009年4月在倫敦、2009年9月在匹茲堡、2010年6月在多倫多以及2010年11月在首爾共開了5次峰會,並成為應對國際金融危機和國際治理改革的一個重要平台。

在G20匹茲堡峰會上,最終形成的會議文件及其附件中開始正式引用了“宏觀審慎管理”和“宏觀審慎政策”的提法。在G20首爾峰會上,進一步形成了宏觀審 慎管理的基礎性框架,包括最主要的監管以及宏觀政策方面的內容,並已經得到了G20峰會的批准,要求G20各成員國落實執行。中國作為G20的重要成員,也存在著如何較好地執行這一政策的問題。對此,在黨的十七屆五中全會形成的決議文件中,已明確提出要“構建逆周期的金融宏觀審慎管理制度框架”,在前幾天召開的中央經濟工作會議上,也提出了這一要求。將這一新概念、新提法引入中央全會文件,我想這在很大程度上和G20形成的共識有關。中國是G20重要的成員國,發揮著重要的核心作用,對於G20形成的共識,我們要在具體實踐中落實和推進。

以上是簡單的背景,下面具體介紹宏觀審慎政策框架的形成邏輯及其主要內容。

二、宏觀審慎政策框架的起因和內在邏輯 如何理解宏觀審慎政策框架的起因及其形成的內在邏輯?我個人感覺它雖包羅多項內容,但並不是一個簡單的政策堆積。實際上,審慎性概念早已存在,如大家都知道的審慎性會計、審慎性監管原則等。強調宏觀審慎性的邏輯是,微觀審慎性的總和不等於宏觀審慎性。微觀審慎體現為每個金融機構都應保持自身的健康性,並通過監管來督促微觀主體的健康性。但即便如此,健康的微觀主體加起來並不能充分保證整體是健康的。舉個例子,對於一個連隊,如果每一個士兵身體狀況通過體檢測試出各項指標都合格,可以說每個士兵的身體都是健康的,都是符合作戰要求的,但作為總和的連隊整體健康素質是否過關恐怕還不好說。為什麼微觀健康的總和不等於整體健康?對此,理論上有以下幾個探討和解釋。

(一)危機的傳染性

經濟學一直不乏對傳染性的研究,現在有人在做危機的傳染性模型。對於傳染性,亞洲國家有切身體會,在亞洲金融風暴中直接感受到了危機在各個國家傳染的過程。1997年上半年危機最早發生在泰國,隨後是馬來西亞、菲律賓、印度尼西亞,然後到韓國、香港,並很大程度上影響了中國經濟。

回到剛才連隊的比喻上,如果每個士兵都健康,但突然有士兵得了傳染性疾病,如果不及時防止其傳染,就可能導致整個連隊出現問題。在金融體系中,這種傳染性主要體現在各金融機構的資產負債表的關聯度上。理論上說,金融機構是為實體經濟服務的,商業銀行的負債通常是企業和居民的存款,資產則是發放的貸款,但實際上由於金融機構間存在大量的同業往來,金融機構之間的業務占很大的比例。不僅銀行如此,保險公司等也較為突出,特別是隨著分工的細化和融資渠道的多樣化,這一趨勢越來越明顯。其他類型的金融機構也都不同程度存在這一現象。這導致了不同金融機構資產負債表的高度關聯,一旦一家出現問題,就很容易相互傳染。

(二)標準問題

在我們體檢時,有一系列的指標,但是否各項指標合格就表明身體一定健康呢?恐怕還需要進一步探討。人類知識是一個不斷演進的過程,隨著醫學的不斷進步,很可能發現某個指標定低了、定錯了,或者還有某種很重要的指標沒有包括進去。對金融健康情況的判斷也是如此,衡量指標本身可能存在問題,需要進一步加以完善。從目前正在改革的角度來看,金融機構健康性的以下衡量指標正面臨審議和變更。

一是資本要求。對商業銀行資本的要求最初有1988年的巴塞爾資本協議(巴塞爾Ⅰ),後來發展到巴塞爾Ⅱ。簡單地說,就是銀行的風險加權資產和資本的比例關係。但實際上這也是一個比較複雜的概念,因為涉及到對不同的資產如何進行風險加權的問題,同時這也是一個標準衡量的問題,存在不少爭議。資本在風險加權資產中到底應該占多少呢?巴塞爾Ⅰ的要求是8%,其中一級資本要占一半,其餘的可以是二級資本;巴塞爾Ⅱ則進一步考慮了操作風險等,因而對資本的要求大致增加了2個百分點。而現在的宏觀審慎性管理框架進一步提高了這個標準,並提出了資本的質量問題,被稱為巴塞爾Ⅲ。如何衡量資本的質量?簡單說就是資本能夠吸收損失的能力。資本是用來幹什麼的?過去中國生意人說有多少本錢做多大的生意,當然也可以借錢,但能借多少還是要看你有多少本錢、能承擔多大的風險。這裡面允許有一個放大的倍數,但超過這個倍數就沒人願意借了。所謂有多少本錢、能承擔多大的風險,實際上就是吸收損失的能力。資本是一個比較複雜的概念,除了普通股,還有優先股、附屬債、長期債等其他一些工具,這些不同種類的資本吸收損失的能力也各不相同。其中,最能吸收損失的是普通股,其他資本吸收損失的能力則在不同程度上有所減弱,有的甚至很弱。用過去的標準看,金融危機中出問題 的一些機構資本充足率並不低,但其中相當一部分並不能吸收損失,或者吸收損失的能力很弱。提高資本質量就要強調提高普通股的占比,對吸收損失能力弱的資本在計量上打折扣,對不能吸收損失的資本則予以扣除。

二是流動性、杠杆率和撥備要求。對應一定的資本水平,金融機構如何進行負債管理?這就涉及到如何把握流動性、杠杆率的問題,這也需要提高標準。在巴塞爾Ⅰ出台之前,某些國家銀行業監管規則中曾經有一段時間非常強調流動性管理,但後來有所淡出。雷曼兄弟事件說明,即使資本充足的機構其流動性也仍有可能出問題,特別是在高杠杆率且過分依靠債務工具尤其是批發性融資的情況下,流動性往往首先出問題。此外,針對風險資產可能引致損失的概率,要提前準備,這就是撥備。撥備採用什麼方式?有所謂的前瞻性撥備、動態撥備等,主要是考慮經濟周期的變化。經濟景氣周期上升階段,可以多計提撥備,以便於在景氣周期下降階段可以消耗這些撥備,這也是逆周期調節的體現之一。資本也是這樣,金融機構在景氣周期上升階段應多積累些資本,以應對景氣周期下降時的資本消耗。

三是會計準則。危機前,人們就對會計準則存在兩大標準不滿意,討論集中在金融工具的計量和減記的規則等問題上。危機開始後,會計準則最開始受到質疑是盯市的公允會計的應用範圍。在雷曼兄弟破產時,一些金融產品價格呈自由落體式下跌,甚至已經沒有交易了,按盯市原則會使資產負債表呈現出驚人的減記,當時 的資產減值讓大多數金融機構都難以承受,導致順周期性信用收縮,因此人們自然對這一會計原則產生了質疑。為此,G20要求國際會計準則委員會和美國財務會計準則委員會進行深入研究,並要求把這兩大會計準則趨同合一。目前看分歧仍很大,趨同有一定的難度,很多美國人傾向于更廣泛地使用盯市的公允會計原則,並擴大至對銀行貸款的計量;另外一些國家則要求限制其適用範圍。

總體看,標準問題非常重要,類似于體檢用什麼尺度來衡量。如果說某人體重超標,就不能只看他有多少公斤,還得看他的身高,否則就不能客觀、有效地衡量。

(三)集體失誤

理論上,有效市場假設相信市場本身是功能完善的,投資者是理性的,市場價格能夠充分反映一切可以獲得的信息,因此市場供求關係得出正確的價格,金融市場是有效市場。這一經濟學理論在現實中受到挑戰,人們懷疑市場並不總是完美的,投資者也不那麼理性,“羊群效應”、“動物精神”、非理性躁動、恐慌等會有所表現。特別在危機時,有效市場假設似乎出了故障,需要研究集體性出錯問題。

集體失誤究竟是微觀現象還是宏觀現象?對此有不同的解釋。以美國次貸危機為例,宏觀上的解釋是,2000年美國納斯達克泡沫破滅後,有一段時間實行低利率政策,導致泡沫積累並最終破滅。微觀的解釋則側重于對微觀行為的分析,如由於對形勢的樂觀,金融機構相互競爭降低信貸標準,放鬆對客戶還款能力的審查,甚至發放零首付和初始利率為零的房貸,推動了房價持續上升,並通過再融資功能,進一步導致買房者的負債擴張和消費膨脹,加上監管未及時跟上,最後引發泡沫;再如,對金融機構過度使用發起—配售模式的分析,抵押貸款機構發放房貸後,很快通過資產證券化工具打包出售,一旦風險資產出現問題,這些機構已經脫身,不再承擔責任。在市場競爭中,某些單個市場主體的行為演變成集體行動,最後體現為宏觀上的偏差,演變為危機的爆發。

這些都是對危機不同視角的解釋,實際上宏觀和微觀因素很可能發揮著相輔相成的作用,理論上可以有多方面的研究。其中,一個重要方面是金融行為學的視角,這也是這次危機以後廣受關注的一個課題。過去,在有效市場假設下,價格反映了全部市場信息,即金融體系以及實體經濟的全部信息,因此金融機構的行為並不重要。這使得很多涉及宏觀政策和金融穩定的分析模型中,都沒有考慮金融機構及其行為。但經濟中實際情況要複雜得多,應該有更深入的研究。

首先是“羊群效應”。簡單說,“羊群效應”即“從效應”,是指人們的思想或行為經常受到多數人影響,從而出現的從現象。人們會追隨大所同意的東西,自己則較少考慮或作出獨立的判斷。從金融市場看,由於信息處理上的困難,投資者面對市場的不確定性往往是通過觀察周圍人群或業界領頭人的行為而提取信息、作出判斷,在這種行為的不斷傳遞中,許多人的行為將大致相同且彼此強化,從而產生從性狂熱或恐慌。“羊群效應”與信息傳導和計算複雜性有關,呈現為 一種非線性特徵。關於信息及其計算問題我後面還會進一步分析。

二是“動物精神”。“動物精神”最早由凱恩斯提出。他認為,人的情緒、心理有著廣泛的影響,投資行為不能用理論或理性選擇去解釋,因為經濟前景根本難以捉摸。因此他提出投資的衝動要靠“動物精神”,即靠自然本能的驅動。後來,諾貝爾經濟學獎得主喬治·阿克洛夫和羅伯特·希勒提出將心理作用和金融行為相結合,進一步發展了“動物精神”的概念,其中包括對“躁動和恐慌”的行為研究。“動物精神”有好的一面,它鼓勵人們承擔風險、推動創新。但“動物精神”也易導致“羊群效應”,即便是在穩定的宏觀經濟條件下,也可能出現非理性躁動的集體性行為,導致泡沫產生。一旦市場出現問題,又可能出現恐慌情緒,大家都在逃跑,甚至落井下石,集中追債。這樣即使一些機構原本看來健康,如摩根斯坦利、高盛在2008年9月時,實際上手頭現金很充沛,但一旦恐慌蔓延,很快就把現金消耗殆盡,陷入危境。由此可見,我們可以從行為金融學角度研究投資順周期行為產生的原因。

三是信息理論和計算的複雜性。現代社會中我們面臨的是海量信息,搜集和整理信息的能力受到很大挑戰。金融業也是如此,每天彭博資訊(Bloomberg)、路透(Reuters)上都有巨量的信息。從信息科學的角度講,存在海量信息的獲取、吸收和消化的耗時和成本問題,於是有大量的市場參與者存在依賴心理,更加依靠評級公司、權威研究機構、投資顧問,以至於過去的投資決策和風險管理一般都要求依據主要評級機構給出的評級,甚至有的中央銀行和監管部門也大量使用國際性評級機構的評級作為其衡量和評判風險程度的基準。但實際上這些評級公司、研究機構也不是神仙,也面臨同樣的信息處理問題。這裡面還存在著順周期性和搭便車問題。

一方面,評級業務本身會有順周期性。在經濟景氣上升周期,評級往往越來越好,導致投資者未看到風險,加大投資力度;而一旦景氣發生逆轉,特別是危機出現時 ,評級不得不掉頭,變化可能非常快,從3A級就一下子跌到C級,導致市場跟著恐慌。這表明評級公司消化市場信息的能力也是有限的,而且還體現出順周期性。在最近的歐洲主權債務危機中,歐洲一些小國也有這樣的抱怨,認為評級公司事先沒有看出什麼問題,在發生危機和融資困難時還一再降級,落井下石。另一方面,過度依賴評級會影響判斷的獨立性。金融從業人員和投資者可以搭外部評級的順風車,只要金融產品滿足了評級標準就不再自行判斷其風險了。長此以往,金融業習慣 了這種做法,過度依賴外部評級,導致投資行為更加趨同,易出現集體失誤。我們既可以從金融部門結構來看這個問題,也可以從信息理論來研究其中更深層次的原因。

另外一個相關理論是計算的複雜性(Computing Complexity)。該理論源於特定數學模型維數增大時求解的可計算性問題,大意是在特定的算法(Algorithm)下,當信息量增加或方程組數量增加時,計算量的增加可能是算術型增長,也可能是幾何型增長。在幾何型增長的情況下,維數問題會使計算能力的需求或計算所需時間呈指數型上升,從而超過任何超大、超快巨型計算機的能力。除非發明新的有效算法。這一理論在選擇計劃經濟還是市場經濟的爭論中曾被用過。假定一國中央計劃部門能有效收集所有重要的有關供給和需求的信息,再假定該部門擁有大型計算機對優化資源配置進行大規模優化求解計算,則計劃經濟的供求匹配和優化效能將不亞于市場經濟。但實際上無法在脫離價格的基礎上收集和消化全部信息,用于優化配置的數學規劃模型的算法也呈現出隨維數而幾何型增長的特性,因此無法實現這樣的巨型計算任務。回到剛才談的金融市場投資和價格形成的過程看,哪怕是小範圍局部的投資也會帶來維數和計算的複雜性問題,也必然演變成信息及其加工計算的成本問題。於是,出現若干尋求出路的傾向,如簡化計算(趨勢型交易、程序交易等),又如依賴專業機構(評級公司、基金經理等)和自含對沖的指數型交易,等等。但這些方法又往往在不同程度上導致羊群效應、集體失誤和順周期性等問題。

信息處理的耗時和費力還導致了所謂的程序交易(Program Trading)。早在納斯達克泡沫破滅前,大量的股票市場投資者就靠計算機根據趨勢進行程序交易。程序交易的模型基本一致,加工信息的來源也大同小異。而且有研究人員試圖證明技術分析能夠解決一切問題,如果關注公司基本面,則會導致極大的計算複雜性,人們乾脆忽略有關公司的大量信息,主要進行技術交易。結果,造成投資行為高度一致,羊群效應非常明顯。後來的納斯達克泡沫留下了對程序交易的深刻教訓。此後,投資界就呼籲人們不要太迷信技術分析和程序交易,還是應著眼于信息的收集和基本面的研究,注重長期投資。

信息問題還與有效市場假設有關。有效市場假設是說金融市場裡面的價格反映了全部的信息,問題是這個價格是如何形成的?當然是由所有的買者和賣者根據他們獲得的信息進行判斷。但是如果他們獲取信息和計算的能力有限甚至出現錯誤的話,信息本身就存在問題,價格所反映的信息也必然不充分甚至有錯,價格形成的有效性就成問題了。可見,信息問題和計算的複雜性涉及到經濟學一些根本的假設和推理過程。

四是激勵機制。激勵機制反映出的主要問題是對風險與收益的激勵不一致。金融危機後很多人對金融機構管理層工資獎金過高表示強烈不滿,現行激勵機制會鼓勵交易者冒比較大的風險,其責任和收益不對稱。另一方面,金融機構自我炮製了一些只在金融體系內部自我循環並增長的產品,脫離了為實體經濟服務的宗旨,也使得金融機構的交易部門快速發展,獲利豐厚。當景氣周期處於上升階段時,交易量越做越大,收益很高,而一旦出現危機,卻要由全社會來參與救助,承擔損失。

當然,金融機構應根據績效來發放工資獎金,即使其中已考慮了撥備和風險,也由於其風險衡量主要參考評級而有偏差,評級的順周期也導致金融機構工資獎金髮放出現順周期性。此外,在績效考核中大量應用公允會計原則,而公允會計原則本身具有順周期性,就會在績效考核上出現交易人員在市場好的時候獲得高額的工資獎 金,而市場下跌時卻難以承擔責任。如果對交易員的激勵有問題,則必然出現對金融機構高管的激勵失當,為獲得高薪而使經營行為更加冒險激進。這方面的失當顯 然會引起集體失誤。

歸結起來,宏觀審慎政策框架的出台有一系列的理論背景和內在邏輯,其中包含很多有研究價值的課題。

三、宏觀審慎政策框架的資本要求宏觀審慎政策框架是一個新概念,但其很多內容其實我們並不陌生,只不過在危機之後,人們把一些應對危機的改進政策加以歸納,也形成了一些新的提法,並放在“宏觀審慎政策”的框架里,成為各國理論和政策界的共識。宏觀審慎性政策框架是一個動態發展的框架,其主要目標是維護金融穩定、防範系統性金融風險,其主要特徵是建立更強的、體現逆周期性的政策體系,主要內容包括:對銀行的資本要求、流動性要求、杠杆率要求、撥備規則,對系統重要性機構的特別要求,會計標準,衍生產品交易的集中清算,等等。危機爆發後,人們首先看到的是資本要求中的缺陷,當然在流動性、杠杆率和撥備率方面也都有不足。從目前進展看,最主要是在資本要求和流動性要求方面已取得進展,其中資本要求的內容比較突出。

限于時間關係,我著重介紹有關資本要求的內容。

這次危機表明,資本充足率低,抗風險與吸收損失的能力就不足,因此需要進一步提高資本充足率。同時,還強調提高資本質量。過去,商業銀行的資本由核心資本和附屬資本構成。核心資本包括實收資本、資本公積金、盈餘公積金和未分配利潤,附屬資本包括可計入的貸款準備金、附屬債券、混合類資本債、可轉債等。

不同層次的資本吸收風險的能力是不一樣的,吸收風險能力最強的是作為一級資本的普通股。這次危機暴露了附屬資本吸收損失能力不足的問題。因此需要擴大核心資本的比重,提高普通股在總資本中的占比。在條件允許的情況下,減少分紅,督促銀行通過留存利潤建立資本緩衝。就是說經濟景氣時,金融機構不要賺了錢都用來分紅,應該積累一點,用于應對經濟差的時候可能導致的資本不足;相應地,在經濟嚴重下滑時,在滿足一定條件時允許銀行釋放資本緩衝,以滿足經濟下行周期的信貸需求,防止信貸過度緊縮。還有就是交叉持股和交叉持債問題,銀行交叉持有的其他銀行附屬債應從附屬資本中扣除。具體看,G20審議批准的巴塞爾協議Ⅲ新資本要求分為以下五個層次。

一是最低資本要求。最低標準仍為8%,但其中普通股充足率最低要求從2%提高到4.5%,一級資本充足率最低要求(包括普通股和其他滿足一級資本定義的金融工具)由4%提高到6%。

二是資本留存緩衝。在最低資本要求基礎上,銀行應保留2.5%的普通股資本留存緩衝(Capital Conservation Buffer),使普通股資本加上留存資本緩衝後達到7% ,以更好地應對經濟和金融衝擊。

三是逆周期資本緩衝。各國可依據自身情況要求銀行增加0-2.5%的逆周期資本緩衝(由普通股或其他能充分吸收損失的資本構成)。主要是根據信用(貸)/GDP偏離其趨勢值的程度進行測算。逆周期資本緩衝主要在信貸急劇擴張從而可能引發系統性風險時使用,以保護銀行體系免受信貸激增所帶來的衝擊。在實際操作中,可將逆周期資本緩衝作為資本留存緩衝的延伸。巴塞爾Ⅲ專門提出,信貸過度增長的國家應加快執行資本留存緩衝和逆周期資本緩衝要求,可根據情況設置更短的過渡期。

四是系統重要性金融機構額外資本要求。SIFIs應在上述最低資本要求的基礎上具備更強的吸收損失能力,方式之一是增加額外資本要求。這樣,可以使系統重要性金融機構更多地積累資本,增強應對系統性金融風險和危機的能力,防止道德風險。

五是應急資本機制。為增強系統重要性銀行損失吸收能力,還可採取應急資本和自救債券(Bail In Debt)等措施。應急資本要求銀行在無法持續經營時,普通股之外的資本都應具有沖銷或轉化為普通股的能力。在銀行陷入經營困境或無法持續經營時,自救債券可部分或全部按事先約定條款自動削債或直接轉換為普通股,以減少銀行的債務負擔或增強資本實力,幫助其恢複正常經營。

按照銀行的部分債權人在危機時也應承擔一定損失的思路,應急資本機制的核心是應急可轉債(Co Cos)的安排。當銀行資本低於某一最低要求的時候,要求CoCos 強制性轉為普通股。過去,一些債務工具也可以作為二級資本,但這些債務工具在發生危機時吸收損失的能力較差。而應急可轉債合約規定,在債券有效期內,當標 的銀行資本充足率低於一個預先設定的水平時,債券必須轉為普通股,從而應急性地提高資本水平。可想而知,在其他條件相同情況下,這類債券價格更低、潛在收益更大,但由於這種債券在必要時將轉換為股權,因此投資者要承擔的風險也相應增大。這種做法還有另外一層含義:在這次應對金融危機過程中,很多國家實際上是用納稅人的錢救助那些瀕臨破產的銀行,這在政治上引起了很大的爭議,而且這些機構發放的薪酬還曾經特別高,尤其是高管層更高,導致公普遍不滿。今後要求通過CoCos建立應急資本補充制度,意味著這類債權人也有可能參與分擔損失,可以進一步提高資本緩衝能力,避免納稅人出錢來救助。按照美國人在這方面的用詞,原先是用納稅人的錢把出了問題的機構給撈出來,稱為Bailout,而借助于CoC os則意味著如果這個機構出了問題,可以把這類債券持有人拉進來共同承擔自救,稱為Bailin。

結合中國的實際情況來看,我國的商業銀行經過這幾年的財務重組和一系列系統性改革,資本實力明顯增強。同時,由於我國金融機構債券市場發展還不足,尤其是一些層次不同的債務工具還缺乏法律法規的支持,債務工具型的資本在我國銀行業金融機構中相對較少。2003年開始,我國借鑒國外經驗,允許商業銀行在一級資本之外發行附屬債,那時國內一些人將其譯為“次級債”,以至於在這次危機中,很多人將它與次貸危機的“次級貸”混淆在一起。總體看,中國的銀行資本主要是普通股,吸收損失的能力比較強。同時,由於商業銀行盈利狀況非常好,進一步保留利潤增強資本的能力應該不錯,因此中國在原有的基礎上應有條件儘快向要求比較高的巴塞爾Ⅲ靠攏。

與資本要求相關,還有幾個重要問題。一是SIFIs的劃分問題。從全球範圍看,究竟應該如何劃分G-SIFIs呢?目前的主流看法是全球大致劃出60家。最大的幾十家金融機構看來是比較明確的,但是到了排名在60家附近的時候,不同金融機構的想法就不一樣了,有的願意歸入,有的不願意。這裡面可能有兩種心理:一方面,如果被劃入G-SIFIs,表明它在全球的重要地位;另一方面,資本要求更高、監管更嚴,相比之下它的資本回報率就會偏低,為預防將來可能出現的跨境清盤也需要更多準備。所以,這條線將很難劃。從國內情況看,我國銀行向新的較高標準靠攏也必然涉及到G-SIFIs的劃分問題。按總市值看,工行、農行、中行、建行等幾大銀行都在全球前十名之內,也是海外上市公司,但是國際業務還相對有限,因此是否界定為G-SIFIs還要進一步研究。

D-SIFIs的界定方面,也存在類似的問題。臨界點左邊和右邊的機構都會有想法,有的想進去,有的想出來。在討論劃分標準怎麼確定時,可以採用一種相對係數的方法。從規模看,工、農、中、建、交肯定是系統重要性銀行,其他稍小于交行的銀行是否屬於系統重要性金融機構呢?可以把交行作為一個臨界點,交行以上肯定是系統重要性銀行,對規模比交行小的銀行,可以將這家銀行資產與交行資產 的比例作為D-SIFIs係數,並以此計算該銀行需要保持的資本要求和其他審慎要求。當這個係數小到一定程度,可以忽略不計,視同為零,這樣處理上就簡單一點。

二是對周期的判斷問題。這次金融危機源於發達國家,發達國家受金融危機衝擊也比新興市場國家嚴重,因此國際上曾有人提出了“脫鉤論”,即新興市場國家與發達國家在本次危機的周期性上開始不一致了。對此,新興市場國家的反應是不願意接受“脫鉤論”。2010年以來,特別是下半年以來,發達國家與新興市場經濟體的宏觀經濟周期確實出現了較明顯的差異。新興市場大國,主要是金磚四國、印尼、土耳其、阿根廷、南非等國經濟複蘇明顯,經濟增長較快,多數已在5%-10%之間,CPI同比則大多已超過5%。而發達國家即使執行量化寬鬆政策後,複蘇仍不夠強勁或不夠穩定,物價仍維持低位。所以從這個角度看,現在新興市場國家與發達國家,特別是與美國和歐洲國家的確不在一個景氣相位。從全球範圍看,我國經濟率先複蘇,但外部條件對我們的複蘇產生了重要影響,所以我們並不是特別有把握經濟是否已經走上常態了。2010年的GDP增長將在10%左右,同時伴隨著資產價格和CPI上升,從這些跡象來看,我們在宏觀上要審慎一點,逆周期就是要對“過度擴張”進行逆向調節。而國際上有一些國家的GDP還在負增長,對它們來說逆周期應該是另外一個方向。因此,逆周期調節對不同的國家來說方向是不一樣的。如果宏觀審慎管理要體現逆周期性,那麼,新興市場國家現在就應該建立逆周期資本緩衝,執行更高的資本充足率標準。

三是激勵問題。要建立宏觀審慎管理,還需要運用激勵機制,使得那些能盡力達到審慎標準的機構得到鼓勵,反之則受到制約。有時我們也說正向激勵,其實激勵搞對了都是正向的,但由於政策作用的複雜性,有時是反直覺性,常會有適得其反的效果,這就成了負向激勵。目前我們有一些行政性的激勵手段,如營業許可、網點擴充許可等,還不夠,即使如吊銷牌照的處罰也屬於臨界措施。因此還需要開動腦筋,結合國情尋找更多一些的激勵手段,來推動金融機構走向更高審慎標準。

例如,我國2004年以來就開始運用的差別準備金調節,原本就有針對上一輪財務重組進度不一而引起資本充足率差異的意思,也有調節個體信貸擴張速度過快的作用,比較適合作為這方面的激勵機制。還有其他政策可用來擴大這一激勵的工具和效果,需要進一步加以研究。

總體看,資本要求的變化是為了建立明確的約束機制,並能預防金融風險和危機,增強損失吸收能力,降低社會損失的可能性。G20首爾峰會正式批准了這個協議。當然各國執行新資本監管要求的時間有快有慢,有些歐洲國家要求走得慢一些。但包括中國在內的一些新興經濟體已出現不同的景氣狀態,在條件允許的情況下,會要求走得快一些。當然,具體怎麼推進還需要進一步研究,同時進一步加強宏觀判斷。這次中央經濟工作會議提出,我國要從適度寬鬆貨幣政策轉為穩健的貨幣 政策,把穩定價格總水平放在更加突出的位置。同時提出,要健全宏觀審慎政策框架,提高貨幣政策的有效性。這更加明確了建立逆周期的宏觀審慎管理方向。

四、宏觀審慎政策框架中的若干其他內容

(一)流動性

宏觀審慎性管理框架在流動性、撥備、杠杆率方面也取得了一定的進展。總體看,宏觀審慎政策框架對流動性要求作出了相對比較簡單的規定;巴塞爾協議III 引入了最低流動性標準,以推動銀行改進流動性風險管理,提高銀行防範流動性風險的能力。在考慮資金的可獲得性和需求的基礎上,巴塞爾銀行監管委員會採取慎重的辦法來確定流動性標準,設計了流動性覆蓋比率和淨穩定融資比率作為流動性的國際標準。流動性覆蓋比率(LCR)主要用來衡量銀行短期流動性水平,其核心是測算各項負債的淨現金流出與各項資產的淨現金流入之間的差額,要求銀行擁有更充足的高質量流動性資產以應對短期內可能出現的資金流壓力。淨穩定融資比率(N SFR)作為LCR的補充,其目的是測算銀行負債和權益類業務提供的資金是否能滿足資產類業務的長期資金需要,用以解決更長期的流動性錯配問題,它覆蓋了整個資產負債表,鼓勵銀行使用更加穩定、持久和結構化的資金來源。

(二)杠杆率

巴塞爾銀行監管委員會還引入了全球一致的杠杆率要求,作為資本充足率要求的補充。杠杆率被定義為銀行一級資本占其表內資產、表外風險敞口和衍生品總風險暴露的比率。使用補充性杠杆率要求,有助于控制金融體系中杠杆率過高問題。

同時,杠杆率指標所要求的銀行風險暴露不經風險調整,將其納入巴塞爾Ⅲ第一支柱,可以彌補內部評級法下風險權重的順周期問題,有助于形成更有效的資本約束。巴塞爾銀行監管委員會管理層建議將杠杆率最低標準初步定為3%。對於參與資本市場業務(特別是表外和衍生產品)較多的全球性銀行而言,上述標準較傳統杠杆率更為審慎。採用新的資本定義和將表外項目納入杠杆率的計算是重要舉措。

(三)撥備

對撥備的規則還未正式出台,但圍繞動態撥備、前瞻性撥備開展了大量的國際經驗交流,並明確了原則上應採取“向前看”的預期損失型撥備制度。2009年11月,國際會計準則理事會(IASB)發佈關於金融資產減值準備計算方法的徵求意見稿,要求會計主體研究和預測金融資產在整個生命周期內的信貸損失,通過運用有效利率方法計算未來損失的淨現值,據此在整個貸款周期內建立撥備。美國財務會計準則理事會(FASB)要求每個期末估計未來預期不可收回的現金流,將其現值計入減值損失。FASB成員稱其為“短期預期損失方法”。2010年5月,FASB發佈徵求意見稿,要求公司通過運用未來預期現金流現值來計量金融資產的減值,但是有抵押品的資產減值則通過抵押品的公允價值來計量。

(四)評級

評級公司的改革問題在宏觀審慎性政策框架中也有所涉及。目前國際社會達成了初步意見,即“要減少對評級公司的依賴”,具體包括減少監管標準和法律法規對信用評級機構(CRA)評級的依賴;減少市場對CRA評級的依賴;央行應對在公開市場操作中獲取的證券資產作出自己的信用判斷,銀行不能機械地依賴CRA評級來評 估資產的信用狀況,投資經理和機構投資者在評估資產的信用時不能機械依靠CRA 評級;市場參與者和中央對手方不應把對手方或抵押品資產的CRA評級變化作為自動觸發器,大幅、任意地要求調整衍生品和證券融資交易的保證協議中的抵押品;證券發行人應全面、及時披露有關信息,使投資者能獨立作出投資判斷並評估證券的信用風險。目前,發達國家主要通過進一步完善信用評級行業立法對信用評級機構實施監管,立法內容主要集中在資質認可、評級執業行為規範、利益衝突監管、信息披露和保密要求等方面。

(五)銀行業務模式

對銀行業盈利模式的要求有兩個方面。一是在發起配售模式中,銀行要把證券化產品保留一部分在自己的資產負債表上,從而表明能夠承擔一定的風險。二是提高對交易賬戶的資本要求。在西方的大銀行中,交易部門創造的利潤非常大,但風險也大。過去對交易賬戶的資本要求非常少,現在提高了這個標準。

(六)衍生品交易與集中清算擔保債務憑證(CDO)和信用違約互換(CDS)這些衍生產品的交易基本上脫離了監管,一旦出了問題,清算很複雜。目前的改進措施有兩種:一是建立中央對手方(C CP),所有的交易都跟中央對手方進行,對所有的交易進行記錄。二是要有集中的清算系統。當前各國普遍意識到,當場外衍生品市場發展到一定規模以至於能夠深刻影響整個金融市場時,有必要通過建立中央清算機制來整合所有未平倉交易及風險敞口信息。這一機制可分為三種不同層次:對交易進行登記的機制(中央登記)、通過清算機構作為中央對手方對交易進行清算的機制(不集中交易,僅集中清算)以及交易所機制(集中交易並集中清算)。目前,G20場外衍生品改革目標中的“中央清算”是指“清算機構作為中央對手方對交易進行清算”,即上述第二個層次,清算機構即成為中央清算對手方。這種中央對手方清算模式在有效防止違約的條件下,能夠大大減少交易的對手方風險。但同時也應該認識到,場外衍生品交易納入交易所及其清算通過中央交易對手方清算平台進行,並不是降低衍生品交易對手風險的唯一方式,關鍵在於提升場外衍生品透明度,降低包括交易對手風險在內的全部交易風險。在場外衍生品交易規則制定過程中還應充分考慮各國國情,由各國金融管理當局自由裁量。

在建立CCP方面,美國要求大部分標準化的金融衍生品通過交易所交易並通過清算所清算,美國證券交易委員會(SEC)正在推進通過中央對手方對客戶的CDS交易進行清算。日本于2010年5月通過《金融商品交易法修正案》,對場外衍生品交易採取集中清算以及交易信息的保存和報告制度。2010年1月21日,日本金融廳公佈了《金融與資本市場機構框架發展》,要求一些場外衍生品交易必須通過中央對手方清算,並提高場外衍生品交易的透明度。英國贊同提高場外衍生品標準化的動議,但不認同需要通過中央對手方進行交易。我國在市場建立之初就建立了集中清算制,目前在擴展集中清算方式,並于2009年11月成立了上海清算所,將逐步推出場外衍生品中央清算對手方服務。


(七)會計準則

會計準則是非常重要的問題,會計準則中公允價值法的順周期性是焦點。很多人反對在危機時還固守公允會計制度,但是美國的投行等業界卻認為盯市公允會計準則更容易盡早發現問題。所以迄今為止,美國的財務會計準則委員會(FASB)和以歐洲為主的國際會計準則委員會(IASB)仍爭吵不下。對此,G20領導人也不滿意。IASB建議以混合模式計量金融工具,即一種以公允價值計量,一種以攤余成本計量。FASB與IASB的方法有根本性的不同,FASB要求所有金融工具均以公允價值計量,其中包括銀行貸款也要用公允價值衡量,但在具體處理上分為兩類:即以公允價值計量且其變動計入“其他綜合收益”或以公允價值計量且其變動計入一般損益。FA SB還建議在以公允價值計量金融工具的同時,在財務報表中列示其攤余成本,以此作為與IASB建議趨同的折衷處理。雖然IASB與FASB在這方面的分歧很難調和,但由於FASB的機構正面臨變革,其建議的影響力可能降低。目前,中國的會計準則正逐漸向IASB全面趨同,全面接受國際財務報告準則(IFRS)。

會計準則領域有很多問題需要處理,有一些是新問題,如金融衍生產品的會計處理問題,如金融機構高管激勵的期權會計處理問題等。如果處理不當,就會導致當期和遠期的利益安排出現偏差。還有一些老問題,最主要的還是金融工具計量和減記問題。如果公允會計原則應用範圍不一樣,自然會導致對損失減記的看法不一樣。這裡面涉及到前面談到的有效市場假設問題。如果認為盯市公允價格合適,也就同時認為價格反映了全部信息,是比別的判斷更好的準則,即便是在泡沫成長期或者是恐慌期仍然是有效的。另一種看法認為,泡沫和恐慌發生時的極點值應該扣除,但扣除以後怎麼辦?有什麼東西可以替代?對這些問題仍有很大的爭議,有待進一步研究解答。總體看,會計問題技術性很強,爭議也比較大,所以進展可能會稍微慢一點,初步計劃于2011年底推出初步收斂意見。

(八)“影子銀行”

“影子銀行”是指行使商業銀行功能但卻基本不受監管或僅受較少監管的非銀行金融機構,比如對沖基金、私募股權基金、特殊目的實體公司(SPV)等等。在發達金融市場,“影子銀行”的規模甚至已經超過了傳統商業銀行。但“影子銀行”游離在監管之外,杠杆率水平和流動性風險都很高,信息也很不透明。同時,“影子銀行”與傳統商業銀行業務盤根錯節,又多通過跨境投資在全球範圍配置資產,很容易引發系統性風險。因此,“影子銀行”帶來市場繁榮的同時,風險隱患也日漸顯現,並最終成為金融危機的重要推手。

部分“影子銀行”可能會像商業銀行一樣具有貨幣創造的功能,並參與貨幣乘數的放大過程,為此還要引起中央銀行貨幣政策的關注,並考慮新情況下貨幣政策傳導機制的變化。

金融危機以後,國際組織和各國政府都加強了對“影子銀行”的監管。一方面是將監管邊界擴展至私募股權基金、對沖基金等“影子銀行”,把這些機構“管起來”。同時,加強對“影子銀行”的資本要求和信息披露,規範交易活動。另一方面是針對“影子銀行”與傳統銀行間存在交叉感染風險的問題,有效隔離風險。例如美國通過“沃爾克規則”,限制商業銀行運用自有資金進行自營交易,將商業銀行投資對沖基金和私募股權基金的規模限制在基金資本和銀行一級資本的3%以內。

此外,還試圖構建覆蓋面更廣的風險處置和清算安排,以有序處置“影子銀行”可能出現的風險。

在我國,“影子銀行”的構成與發達市場國家存在較大區別,對沖基金和SPV 尚未發展,主要是近幾年發展起來的私募股權基金、私募投資基金,以及開展銀信理財合作的投資公司、民間借貸機構等,規模較小,產品結構也相對簡單,風險尚沒有凸顯。但應吸取危機教訓,及時採取措施,加強對“影子銀行”風險的監測、評估,逐步納入監管框架。

以上我主要介紹了危機以來有關宏觀審慎政策框架的形成背景、內在邏輯、相關理論解釋和主要內容。應該說,宏觀審慎政策框架內容十分豐富,但由於時間關係,很多問題沒有深入展開分析。希望今天介紹的這些內容能對大家有所啟發,也難免有不當或錯誤的地方,請大家批評指正,謝謝大家!

(本文根據中國人民銀行行長周小川2010年12月15日在北京大學的演講整理)

雷曼苦主要求行會協助追討賠償

雷曼苦主要求行會協助追討賠償

http://www.lbv.org.hk/content/pages/posts/2011E5B9B41E69C884E697A5E88AB1E69797E88BA6E4B8BBE59091E789B9E9A696E58F8AE8A18CE694BFE69C83E8ADB0E68890E593A1E9819EE8AB8BE9A198E4BFA111125.php

致特首曾蔭權: 雷曼事件未解決

我們是一羣從花旗銀行購買了雷曼有毒產品的苦主,2010年12月15日太陽報報導:『……好唔容易等到唐唐開行會,苦主們同佢訴求,要求政府幫手跟進賠償問題,點知唐唐竟然反問:「乜仲(雷曼事件)未解決咩?」等到煲呔曾到,佢竟然同苦主講:「解決晒啦!」講到好似兩個苦主度呃佢咁,真係請完願仲嬲多幾錢!……』
我們對此極表震驚,想不到特區政府的兩位最高領導人,對雷曼事件兩年多以來從未解決的事實,尤其是花旗誤導銷售雷曼ELN、MLN產品,全不知情,或是假裝不知情,我們委實難以置信。你們每天經過鬧市的中環畢打街一帶,每天都有苦主在各銀行,包括花旗銀行及證監會門外示威抗議,討回公道。縱使你們不踏足街頭,至少也收到有關新聞匯報,現特將2010年12月23日早上香港電台《千禧年代》烽煙節目,有關市民就政府監管金融業不足,錯誤處理雷曼事件及證監會不理會苦主報案等作出投訴的節錄連結,交閣下收聽--請按: 播聽。 另外香港電台《城市論壇》即場電視節目,市民分別在2010年12月12日[1]及12月26日[2]就雷曼事件及銀行業監管不足發表意見,閣下及有關官員也應關注民意及收看,連結在有關注腳。

曾特首,轉眼又是歲末,2011年即將到來,在普天同慶的日子,幸福的你可有想到雷曼苦主的貧困、悲苦與無助,有些身患重病,急需援手。如果你是有良心,如果你真正關心民生,如果你是為市民所想而想,如果你想有所作為,如果你想香港真的成為世界金融中心,如果你要兌現你的競選口號,在餘下的一年半任期內,你要做好呢份工,請你拿出勇氣來,處理香港這個獨一無二的雷曼詐騙爛攤子,最近連國際證監專才韋奕禮也意興闌珊辭去證監會總裁一職,香港雷曼事件已成為國際醜聞,成為香港社會的癌細胞,祗有决心割掉,香港銀行業才有望復原。
看你想怎樣做好你份工!願天主賜給你智慧,願天主保雷曼苦主!

花旗雷曼苦主自救組

2010年12月31日

致: 香港特別行政區
行政會議非官守議員召集人
梁振英議員的公開信

梁議員:

雷曼事件尚未解決 政府仍須努力

我們從傳媒得知,特區政府高層認為雷曼事件已解決,我們不相信特首和衆財金官員,是不吃人間煙火,祗盲目接收金管局的統計數字,哪可能不知道金管局存心包庇銀行。處理雷曼事件不當的始作俑者是特區政府,不理會這是重大的,影響着48000個家庭的社會事件,反而將事件定性為商業合約糾紛,不理會小市民與大銀行在法律上的不對等地位,金管局與証監會自說自話,執法者有法不依,銀行老千行徑,得以瞞天過海,更可恥的是當權者烏虛作假,交出已和解的宗數,以達到粉飾太平為目的。
雷曼事件是本世紀最大的金融騙案,外國不少涉及的人士及銀行與金融機構,陸續遭受法律制裁,在香港過去兩年多以來,雷曼事件所引發的影響,無論在社會、經濟、民生、金融及銀行監管與運作各方面,都極為深遠及不可怱視。可悲的是直到目前,似乎沒有人或機構、銀行要為雷曼事件負責。而雷曼迷債苦主得到的是六、七成的賠償,銀行對抵押品的價值,更隻字不提。其他買入掛鈎衍生產品的苦主,更是一無所有。閣下貴為行政會議召集人,更有可能成為下屆特區首長,我們懇切希望你能運用你的巨大影響力及無比智慧,聯同所有非官守行會議員敦促特區政府,早日協助雷曼苦主,取回賠償!
就香港金融業監管不當,市民不停在電台烽煙節目發聲,在報章及 www.lbv.org.hk 網頁等撰文譴責,雷曼苦主在鬧市示威,在港台《城市論壇》表達意見,港區全國人大代表劉佩及劉夢熊在1月2日節目後都表示關注;市民的聲音,雷曼苦主鍥而不捨的精神,相信你有目共睹,難道你無動於衷?

祝閣下身體健康,心靈舒泰!

雷曼苦主自救組

2011年1月4日

2011年1月3日星期一

Legislators say dispute centre plan 'toothless'

South China Morning Post

Legislators say the government's proposed financial dispute resolution centre has not gone far enough to protect investors.

After a briefing by a government official at the regular monthly financial affairs panel meeting yesterday, lawmakers raised a range of concerns over the proposed centre, warning it has no investigative or punishment power over banks or brokers.

If the government wants to use the resolution centre to offer investor protection, it needs to be a tiger with teeth. But it has no investigative power and cannot impose penalties on banks or brokers. It is a toothless tiger, Civic Party legislator Ronny Tong Ka-wah said.

Following a public consultation last year, the government last month said the financial dispute resolution centre would be set up by the middle of next year.

It will have an annual operating budget of HK$55 million initially funded by the government, the Securities and Futures Commission and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority for the first three years, then by financial institutions.

Later this year the government will need to seek lawmakers' approval for the funding, and signs are it will face an uphill battle.

The decision to set up the resolution centre follows the Lehman Brothers minibonds controversy, which erupted after more than 20,000 investors complained they bought minibonds and other products linked to Lehman after they were misled by staff at banks and brokers. Their investments became worthless overnight after the US investment bank collapsed in September 2008.

Democratic Party lawmaker Kam Nai-wai said only about 70 of the 30,000 Lehman minibond victims opted to use resolution procedures to solve their cases, indicating the method was not popular.

I wonder if the centre will help protect investors. There are no legal procedures to force banks to pay customers. Banks or brokers could well refuse to reach settlement, Kam said.

The government should set up a regulator with power to investigate complaints and to order banks or brokers to pay investors.

The centre will have full-time mediators to facilitate talks between staff of banks, brokers or fund houses and customers on disputes relating to credit cards, loans, stocks and funds and other investment products. However, the mediator can only help the sides to reach voluntarily settlement and has no power to judge which side is in the right, nor order any compensation.

Emily Lau Wai-hing, another Democratic Party lawmaker, said it would be difficult for the party to support the proposed centre.

The Legislative Council is still investigating the Lehman minibond fiasco. The government should consider [waiting] until receiving our recommendations on how to improve investor protection, Lau said.

Tong worried that banks or brokerages may send staff with legal backgrounds to attend the resolution process.

If this happens, it would be unfair to an investors who has no legal background, he said.

The undersecretary for Financial Services and the Treasury, Julia Leung Fung-yee, said the resolution centre was supported by a public consultation last year.

Leung also said all financial institutions, except insurers and pension providers, would be required to join the centre.

Chan Kin-por, the legislator for the insurance sector, said the centre should apply the same standards for both banks and insurance companies and not exclude insurers.

Legislator Paul Chan Mo-po, who represents the accountancy sector, said the centre could only handle claims up to HK$500,000, which he said was too low.

Many investors invest much more than that, Chan said.

Bank of America $590 Million Lehman Order 'Not Final'

Bank of America $590 Million Lehman Order 'Not Final'

Jan. 7 (Bloomberg) -- Barclays Plc said disputes over an $11 billion profit it allegedly made buying bankrupt Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.’s brokerage may not all be resolved in a current trial and might need “further adjudication.”

Barclays is awaiting a verdict from a U.S. bankruptcy judge on whether it owes money to Lehman or the brokerage trustee, or whether it will get the $3 billion it says it’s owed. The assets were at issue in more than 30 days of court testimony at a nonjury trial that ended in October.

The conflict that may not be resolved is over $769 million in securities held in the Lehman brokerage’s customer reserve accounts, which London-based Barclays is claiming and the trustee is holding onto, Barclays said in a filing yesterday in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said last month that a transfer of the funds might violate U.S. law.

The U.K. bank, New York-based Lehman and the trustee all agree that certain evidence on this issue need not be introduced in court, according to the Barclays filing. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge James Peck approved the agreement yesterday, according to the filing.

Kimberly Macleod, a Lehman spokeswoman, said she couldn’t immediately comment. Jeff Zelkowitz, a spokesman for trustee James Giddens, declined to comment.

Barclays was the sole bidder for the brokerage in September 2008 after Lehman filed the biggest bankruptcy in U.S. history.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 08-13555, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

--With assistance from Bill Rochelle in New York. Editors: Andrew Dunn, Fred Strasser

To contact the reporters on this story: Linda Sandler in New York at lsandler@bloomberg.net.

To contact the editor responsible for this story: David E. Rovella at drovella@bloomberg.net.

2011年1月1日星期六

香港特衰症府德失錄

香港特衰症府德失錄

引用 : 『雷曼仍未解決』萬人報案誓師大會 (我 係 王岸然 wongonyin@yahoo.com)

『雷曼仍未解決』萬人報案誓師大會 (我 係 王岸然 wongonyin@yahoo.com