BOC Hong Kong Staff Plead Not Guilty on Lehman Notes (Update1)

(Adds November trial dates in second paragraph.)

By Kelvin Wong and Debra Mao

June 1 (Bloomberg) -- Two BOC Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd. managers pleaded not guilty in the city’s District Court today to fraudulently selling structured products linked to Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.

Judge Stanley Chan set Nov. 8 as the date for the trial of Tai Ching, 38, and Nov. 25 for the trial of Cheung Kwai-kwai, 47.

Cheung was charged with ten counts of fraudulently or recklessly inducing others to invest money in the securities between 2005 and 2008. She told investors they carried “no economic risk of loss” and they would only suffer partial loss of their principal in the unlikely case of a credit event, according to court documents. Tai was charged with one count of the same crime.

The minibonds, or custom-made securities linked to the credit worthiness of companies, were backed by collateralized- debt obligations and often sold to elderly, mentally ill and poorly educated people, according to an Hong Kong Monetary Authority investigation made public by lawmakers a year ago.

BOC Hong Kong was the biggest seller of so-called Lehman minibonds, $1.8 billion of which were bought by retail investors in Hong Kong since 2003, according to the HKMA.

The local unit of China’s third-largest bank by market value was among a group of 16 banks that agreed to a settlement arrangement with the HKMA and the city’s Securities and Futures Commission to buy back the products for at least 60 cents on the dollar.

A third BOC Hong Kong employee was arrested on March 26, and is due to appear in court in August, according to Hong Kong police spokeswoman Michelle Mak. The three are free on bail and were placed on compulsory leave, BOC Hong Kong said April 11, citing company policy.

The cases are Hong Kong SAR v. Cheung Kwai Kwai, case no. DCCC526/2010 and HKSAR v. Tai Ching, case no. DCCC527/2010, Hong King District Court.

For Related News & Information: Top legal stories today: {TLAW } Bloomberg legal resources: {BLAW } Structured notes and OTC Derivatives: {STNT } Asia Structured Notes: {TNI STN ASIA BN }

--Editors: Douglas Wong, Joost Akkermans

To contact the reporters on this story: Kelvin Wong at kwong40@bloomberg.net; Debra Mao in Hong Kong dmao5@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: Douglas Wong in Hong Kong at dwong19@bloomberg.net

不妥協不罷休不放棄.mpg

CNSNews.com - Obama Brings His War on Wall Street to New York on Thursday

CNSNews.com - Obama Brings His War on Wall Street to New York on Thursday

Lehman liquidators in Asia defy legal action

Lehman liquidators in Asia defy legal action
By Sundeep Tucker in Hong Kong

Published: April 25 2010 19:57 | Last updated: April 25 2010 19:57

The liquidators of Lehman Brothers’ main Asian assets have continued to sell assets in Thailand in spite of legal challenges to thwart divestments.

The failed US bank left a property exposure in Thailand of close to $1bn when it failed in 2008 and three senior executives at KPMG, the court-appointed liquidator, face legal action in Bangkok from groups angered by its sales.

Eddie Middleton of KPMG told the Financial Times that the liquidator’s plans had not been deflected by the action, filed by a former joint venture partner of Lehman.

“We have continued to press ahead with our asset realisations strategy in Thailand in spite of challenges in some quarters,” he said in an interview.

The comments are the first public response to the action taken last November by Destination Properties, based in Bangkok, which has claimed to Thai police that the liquidators failed to follow due procedure when selling some assets.

Some creditors insist that the sale of Lehman property assets in Thailand should be subject to Thai, and not Hong Kong, bankruptcy proceedings.

The local police investigation is ongoing and no charges have been brought, although analysts have warned that the legal tussle could scare off potential buyers of the assets.

Mr Middleton accepted that the current violent political turmoil on the streets of Bangkok was having an impact on the timing of the asset sales because potential buyers were “nervous” about travelling either within the city or abroad.

He said that KPMG had to date generated $1.5bn through realisations of Lehman assets, spanning property, convertible bonds and derivative positions.

KPMG is liquidating eight main Lehman entities registered in Hong Kong, which were responsible for the bulk of the bank’s non-Japanese operations in the region.

The book value of the combined assets is $25bn, with the vast majority relating to inter-company transfers to Lehman units across the world, while creditor claims total $34bn.

“We have achieved a lot over the past 18 months as liquidators but we recognise there is a long way to go,” he said.

Mr Middleton was speaking on Friday after a gathering in Hong Kong of representatives of the special “protocol committee” established among global liquidators to minimise litigation relating to inter-company transfers.

The meeting was attended by Daniel Ehrmann, of Alvarez & Marsal, the restructuring group that is unwinding Lehman’s US estate, which last month published a flagship draft re-organisation plan.

Mr Ehrmann said: “We are feverishly trying to secure agreement for our plan to avoid falling into costly litigation that will eat in to creditor recoveries.”

Mr Middleton described the talks as “productive” but said that each liquidator would have to carefully consider its respective position “as there are areas we might have to disagree on”.

KPMG Sells Another $600 MM of Lehman Asia Assets, But Long Road Ahead

KPMG Sells Another $600 MM of Lehman Asia Assets, But Long Road Ahead



Lisa Chapman, Big4.com
June 21, 2010

We have blogged extensively about PricewaterhouseCoopers’ role as the administrators or Lehman Brothers Europe, including their $24,000 per hour price tag to the bankrupt holding entity (http://www.big4.com/?page=blog_item&url=pwc-administration-of-lehman-translates-to-24000-per-hour-491).

On the other side of the world, KPMG is handling the liquidation of Lehman’s Asian operations.

In September 2008, the Hong Kong High Court appointed three key KPMG partners, Eddie Middleton, Paul Brough and Patrick Cowley as provisional liquidators of 8 Lehman Brothers entities in Hong Kong, finally confirming this team in March 2009.

Since that time, it appears that KPMG has been successful in selling assets worth $1.5 billion. And the Financial Times of London reports that another $620 million of Asian assets, portfolio of loans, bonds and equity positions in the region has been realized.

For creditors, this is some bit of good news, as the average recovery rate has been close to 100%, meaning that 100 cents of each dollar has been recovered.


Another $300 million of disposals is in the offing, is mostly comprised of investments in China and India. Warren Phillips, the KPMG partner in charge of the disposals, told the Financial Times, “I’ve been surprised by how quickly the values of some of these assets have come back.”

Which brings the total to around $2.5 billion, if our math is correct. It’s not very clear how much there is to go, or the number of realized value keeps on ratcheting up as more asset sales are made.

In any case, the liquidation is exceedingly complex.

It has been variously described as “difficult to quantify and litigate”, “millions of transactions”, “frighteningly difficult:”, “tall order”, “thick layer of confusion and complications”, “borrowers who are unscrupulous”, “most challenging”, “so intertwined” etc. etc. Add to this litigious creditors, different bankruptcy regimes all over Asia, loss of information when folks when to Nomura and other troublesome factors.

Essentially, Lehman left behind a gigantic mess when it went bankrupt overnight. When things were humming along, it was a reasonable operation, even a going concern and HQ was able to keep all the complex inter-company transactions in decent shape. But the unraveling shows that each Lehman entity was a counter-party, lender or borrower from another Lehman entity in the same or different country. And add to that the frequent use of the notorious Repo 105. Which leaves a huge snarl of millions of transactions and open items when the rubber band which held the bank together, just snapped.

Which means that there’s going to be years and years of hard work (and consequent fees) for the 70-strong KPMG team.

And Eddie Middleton perhaps says it best, “I’m sure that there will be things like that (referring to the 1991 Bank of Credit and Commerce International collapse) that would keep Lehman going for a very long time.”

Lehman’s $620m Asian assets disposal eases creditors’ load

Lehman’s $620m Asian assets disposal eases creditors’ load
By Robert Cookson in Hong Kong

Published: June 21 2010 18:42 | Last updated: June 21 2010 18:42

The Hong Kong-based liquidators of Lehman Brothers’ Asian operations have sold $620m of the failed investment bank’s portfolio of loans, bonds and equity positions in the region.

The transactions, which achieved an average recovery rate of 100 per cent, represent the first major disposals from the $2.6bn “principal investments and loans” portfolio built up by Lehman.

The sales are likely to provide some comfort to Lehman’s creditors, who had worried about the ability of liquidators to dispose of assets without taking big losses.

Warren Phillips, the KPMG partner in charge of the disposals, told the Financial Times that his team was close to selling a further $300m of the portfolio, which is mostly comprised of investments in China and India.

“I’ve been surprised by how quickly the values of some of these assets have come back,” he said.

Most of the transactions so far have involved the sale of assets back to the issuer or borrower, a tactic KPMG has employed in divesting a separate portfolio of Asian property loans and bonds.

About $200m of the disposed assets were “pre-IPO” investments Lehman had made in Chinese companies ahead of planned stock market flotations, which then failed to materialise because of the financial crisis.

Ruinian International, a Chinese health food group that listed in Hong Kong in February, was one of 15 companies that had bought back the Lehman stakes as markets have recovered, Mr Phillips said.

But while many of the most liquid assets in the portfolio are off the books, KPMG is still seeking to offload more than $1bn of loans, bonds and equity stakes that could be harder to shift.

The liquidators are faced with a complex range of legal and regulatory jurisdictions across Asia, some of which are unsympathetic to foreign creditors.

破產清算人出售雷曼亞洲資產

破產清算人出售雷曼亞洲資產


（香港）英國《金融時報》報導，香港的雷曼兄弟亞洲業務清算方，已售出這家破產投資銀行在此地區6億2000萬美元（約馬幣19億8000萬令吉）的資產，其中包括貸款、債券和證券頭寸。

上述交易是對雷曼構建的26億美元“資本投資和貸款”資產的首次大規模處置，平均收回率達到100%。

這些出售可能會讓雷曼債權人稍感安慰，他們此前擔心清算方能否在不蒙受重大損失的情況下處置資產。

主要是在中印投資

負責這些資產處置的畢馬威（KPMG）合夥人菲利普斯（Warren Phillips）告訴英國《金融時報》，他的團隊接近出售另外3億美元資產，這些資產主要是在中國和印度的投資。

“有些資產的價值恢復得如此之快，令我感到驚訝。”

迄今為止，大多數交易包含了將資產回售給發行方或借款方，這是畢馬威在剝離單獨的亞洲房地產貸款和債券投資組合時所運用的一種策略。

約2億美元被處置資產是首次公開售股（IPO）前的投資，雷曼在一些中國企業計劃中的股票發行前做出了這些投資，由於金融危機，這些公司後來沒能上市。

菲利普斯表示，由於市場好轉，15家公司已回購了雷曼所持股權，2月在港上市的中國健康食品集團瑞年國際便是其中之一。;


23 Jun 2010

《盧建恆》迷債苦主興訟的理據

《盧建恆》迷債苦主興訟的理據
chukwokhung | 2008-11-27 | 訴訟：區域法院、高等法院 | (535 Reads)
香港銀行公會宣布銀行同意以市值回購迷債，縱使未必能在短時間內完全解決問題，但對紓緩壓力應有所幫助。二十多家牽涉在內的銀行，顯示了他們對此事件的重視和對化解問題的意願，實由於四個方面的因素所促成。

銀行回購迷債原因

首先，此事對涉案銀行的信譽有很壞的影響，讓此事能迅速部分化解，總比繼續讓其發酵為好。其次是由所有涉案銀行變相承擔責任，對銀行而言不會是一個過於巨大的數額，相對於金融海嘯而言，實是微不足道。如能順利於較短的時間排解此事，然後集中精力去面對金融海嘯危機，是合乎邏輯的決策。第三是特區政府及監管機構應運用一定的影響力，促使涉案銀行配合，因為每天有大批苦主到處衝擊政府部門和銀行，或到立法會門外示威，對安定繁榮沒有好處。最後一點因素較少人論及，就是倘若迷債苦主進行訴訟告上法庭，天秤會較有可能倒向一眾苦主。筆者相信，涉案銀行龐大的法律顧問團已替銀行進行了法律風險評估，成敗機會各自心中有數。


三種「失實陳述」

迷債苦主若要提出訴訟，可能有幾個理據支持。第一個理據是憑藉涉案銀行在引導客戶參與迷債時作出了「失實陳述」（Misrepresentation），誤導其客戶（苦主）投資高風險的衍生產物。失實陳述定義是陳述者清晰而毫不含糊地向被誤導者作出重要的但與事實不符的、錯誤的說明（False statement of fact），並由於該錯誤陳述，導致達成某項合約。

失實陳述大致可有幾種：第一種是「詐騙性質的失實陳述」，這是指立約的一方在作出一項陳述時明，知該項陳述是不真實的，仍向受害者作出該陳述。一經法庭判定，則受害者可以撤銷合約，並向作出失實陳述者追究民事詐騙（Tort of deceit）的賠償責任，索取不論是否可合理地預見的損失。

第二種為「疏忽性質的失實陳述」，陳述者在作出失實陳述時沒有合理理由相信該陳述是真確的。受害方據香港法例第二百八十四章——《失實陳述條例》有權取得猶如詐騙性質的賠償，除非作出該失實陳述的人能證明他有合理理由相信當時所作出的陳述是真確的。

如此，詐騙性質失實陳述和疏忽性質失實陳述兩者在舉證的責任上有明顯的不同，前者的舉證責任在被誤導方（迷債苦主），後者的舉證責任則在陳述方（銀行）身上。對銀行而言會有一定難度，因為他要向法庭證明在作出該陳述時，他是有合理理由相信當時其所作出的陳述是真確的，何況銀行對客戶之間有着謹慎從事的職責（Duty of care）。

第三種是「完全清白的失實陳述」，它必須沒有詐騙及疏忽，而陳述者須在作出失實陳述前已採取了合理謹慎步驟查證核實所涉陳述的內容屬真確無誤。銀行方面可能作出的辯解是銀行職員謹是向客户提供意見，不是陳述，故沒有造成失實陳述。從重要案例（註一）顯示，由於銀行職員與其客户在資訊上的嚴重不對稱，熟悉該等事務的一方（銀行）向其客戶所作出的意見，法庭會認定銀行職員已謹慎而有技能地作出陳述。

迷債苦主除了考慮以失實陳述向涉案銀行提出訴訟外，還可以考慮以「不當影響」（Undue Influence）為由提出訴訟。不當影響的基本精神就是倘若有人濫用其與另一人的「關係」而取得不公平的得益，法庭會作出衡平的干預。在案例（註二）中已說明不當影響包括兩個要素：首先涉案雙方必須存在有一個關係以便造成所需的「影響」，而且一方曾濫用該影響。

以「不當影響」提訟

不當影響大致可分為「實質性不當影響」及「推定性質不當影響」兩大類。前者就是當某些人濫用其法律賦予權利迫使另一方簽訂合約從而取得不公平的得益。索償方須證明辯護方濫用了雙方的關係從而取得利益。此外，還須證明所涉交易在常理的情況下不應該會發生的。必須注意的是，舉證的責任在於索償方，對迷債苦主而言，有頗高的難度。倘迷債苦主以推定性質不當影響提出訴訟，索償方首先要證明索償方在處理其本身所涉的事務上對辯護方一直以來存在着信託及信任；而事實上，迷債苦主和銀行之間明顯存在着信託和信任的關係，不然的話，不會發生數以千計的迷債苦主將其存放於定期戶口的資金經過銀行職員的游說，改投在如斯高風險的迷債中，以謀取僅僅多1至2個百分點的利息回報。

其次是索償方要證明所涉交易應「給予解釋」（Call for explanation），即在常理不應發生的交易，故須尋求解釋。迷債苦主們要跨越此兩關，應不會太困難，但往後舉證的責任便落在辯護方（銀行）身上，他們要證明銀行沒有向迷債苦主施予不當影響致使索償方作出錯誤的決策，參與迷債而損失。如此，銀行須證明迷債苦主在當時是獨立地及充分地了解其投資的情況下作出決策。一般情況下，銀行是比較難去作出有效而實質的舉證，例如，證明迷債苦主已經聽取了獨立財務顧問的意見，然後作出決策，相信這正正是一眾迷債苦主所欠缺的，否則，不會導致如此慘烈的田地。倘若能成功判定為推定性質不當影響，則所涉合約（或交易）應可予撤銷。

第三種理據其實已於10月17日報章所報道，就是有兩個迷債個案分別涉及「文盲老婦」及「精神病人」。銀行對此兩個案件迅速和解，因為合約法中，前者會受到法庭對「貧窮及無知」者的保護，以免老人家被不良分子蓄意誤導簽訂不公平的合約而被騙去其僅餘的資產（註三），而後者則明顯沒有訂立合約的能力，二者均會被法庭判令撤銷。

苦主不應接受的條件

銀行公會雖然宣布銀行同意以市值向迷債苦主購回迷債，並委聘獨立會計師對迷債進行估值。但根本的問題是為什麼是以市值回購？迷債不斷縮水，有報道說市值僅為原來的一成至五成。但銀行此舉顯然可以一舉數得，一方面讓迷債苦主取回部分資金以緩和對抗情緒；同時，也可以向政府有所交代，將來在法庭上也可顯示銀行對減低受害者損失的誠意。最後，此舉對社會的形象有正面作用。但迷債苦主絕對不應接受可能附加在是次回購中的「不再追究銀行責任」的前提條件，因為，涉案銀行不會願意為迷債而被告上法庭，因而會作出庭外和解建議。

案例附註
(1) Esso Petroleum v Mardon (1976)Howard Marina and Dredging Co. v A Ogden and Sons(1978)
(2) Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge (2002)
(3) Earl of Aylesford v Morris (1873)Fry v Lane (1888)香港特許秘書公會資深會員

轉載自：信報 2008年10月17日(五)

High risk Octave Notes 15 sold by Bank of China

The sales of high risk Octave Notes 15

According to your letter dated 17 June 10 file 10-03052, your bank lied that the following informations were given to me but in fact none had received. So your bank has committed SECURITIES AND FUTURES ORDINANCE - SECT 107 Offence to fraudulently or recklessly induce others to invest money:

HKMA Joseph Yam had mentioned in Legco that Octave Notes are high risk products and these informaiton and documents were hidden from me during sales

1. The brochure was not given to me during the sale, and nothing were explained to me according to the rule of SFC ordinance and your bank and sales had lied about proper procedures were followed in your letter.

2. The sales had intetionationly not given even the photocopy of this brochure together with sales documents to me that I signed saying the photo copying machines were not working and hide away all the information after sales. And even when I asked for the copies few weeks later and also later this year, your bank refused to give me the documents until I gave the warning that I should inform HKMA. I got the evidence and cards of your staffs in Bank of China that involved this year.

3. Your bank had stoten the coupons belonging to me after sales, and the sales said that she was not responsible to send these coupons out but only the bank of China was responsible. In fact, I read in the news that Bank of China did give these coupons that should be belong to me to their staffs after sales of Octaves Notes to their staffs as the bonus. In fact, stealing is a criminal offense committed by Bank of China.

4. Your banks had not explained the sales documents risk level and hide these information from me during sales. So your bank's procedures are used for training your staffs to raudulently or recklessly induce others to invest money in non-bonds products while in facts your banks are telling your customers that these are bonds. Your banks also committed the crimes of SFC ordinance 107.


5. You had not explained the doubtful information listed on you sale document up to now and in your letter you stated that are nothing wrong there in and asked me to check with HKMA, does this mean you HKMA and SFC did look at your sales document. I believed this is false and this is a breach of Bank rules from HKMA.

6. You sales only showed me the photocopy of the brochure of Octave Notes and asked me to look at those corporations in large letters and stated that these were the bonds that I bought from Octave Notes and refused even to give the photocopy of the brochure for me look at the fine print without any explaination of the Notes involved and said this was equivalent to bonds (in Chinese). This is the right training your bank was given to your staffs in sales of these documents against rule of SFC and HKMA stated in you replied letter and your bank should be proper punished by SFC and HKMA as your totally neglect all the rules of HKMA of sales of these products as investigated nowsdays in Legco on Lehman Minibonds and related products even thru Octave Notes 15 is non-Lehman related products.


_______________________________________________________________________________

Enclosed more evidence of Bank of China involvement in setting up bank frauds in sales high risk Octave Notes 15 as bonds.

For my purchase of Octave Notes 15 from Bank of China, the sale staff intentionally refused to give me sale documents on the same day, even thru I bought CNY bonds around three times before and every time Bank of China bank staffs gave the sales documents. This is against HKMA rule of sales of bonds and derivative products.

The sales staff asked me to check the price of Octave Notes in the monthly statement. And bank of China intentionally listed Octave Notes as bonds to commit the bank frauds, in fact Octave Notes are not bonds. Enclosed statement of 31/3/2008 for your information.

On this year 2010 I had gone three times for two weeks to request the sale documents and the bank staffs refused to give me the sale documents. Only for the last time that I told Bank of China bank managers that it is against rule of HKMA for I had meeting with HKMA before concerning Minibonds. Then the bank gave me the copy of the document. So Bank of China is intentionally breaking the bank rules of not giving the sales document to customers.

I never received any true document from Bank of China for Octave Notes 15 and even I talked to Bank of China staff in the complaint (file no. 10-03052) the Bank of China is saying there is nothing wrong to hide the sales document from me. So Bank of China is behind all the systematic bank frauds involved in hiding the sales documents together with their staffs to commit the crimes in their letter.

There are no informations given to me about CDOs involved with Octave Notes 15, no training document provided to me about how Bank of China trained their staffs to sale these notes, no informations were given to me about these CDOs involved, and the staff only told me that Octave Notes 15 are just bonds. So Bank of China is involved together with their staffs to hide these information from me and committed the bank frauds.

On the sale document, Bank of China added a line

Although I have been advised that I am suitable for investing in a lower or similar relative risk level fund comparable with my risk appetite, I still wish to invest in the above bonds and have decided to do so.

This line is unreasonable for sales of fund? and then applied to bonds? . Even in sales of low risk CNY bonds some staffs ticked this line and some didn't (evidence encolosed). So this should be a Bank of China senior management and directions evidence to show that these people intentionally trained their staffs to intentionally trick customers to buy high risks junk bonds CCC graded that were in fact non-existing in the HK market at that time. So Bank of China senior managements should be procecuted in these matters.

媒體自由急劇惡化，香港排名遜於毛里求斯 - 即時新聞 - 香港人網 Myradio 線上討論區 網上電台 | 論壇 | 網絡廣播 - Powered by Discuz!

媒體自由急劇惡化，香港排名遜於毛里求斯 - 即時新聞 - 香港人網 Myradio 線上討論區 網上電台 | 論壇 | 網絡廣播 - Powered by Discuz!: "[時事] 媒體自由急劇惡化，香港排名遜於毛里求斯"

DBS: 一直隱瞞關於 Constellation Underlying Securities (實為信貸掛鈎產品合成CDO）的關鍵信息

DBS: 一直隱瞞關於 Constellation Underlying Securities (實為信貸掛鈎產品合成CDO）的關鍵信息




“The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,”
SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami said in the statement.



美國證監指控高盛欺詐，指控高盛未向投資者披露大型對沖基金保爾森公司對該產品沽空的「關鍵信息」。

高盛自辯：給這些大客戶們提供了跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露。
高盛的客戶是機構投資者，是真正的經驗投資者了！高盛給這些大客戶們提供了跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露。高盛唯一沒有給這些機構投資者提供的信息是產品的對家以及銷售該產品的真正原由。


類似的 合成CDO 產品 賣給 機構投資者的時候， DBS 的做法也是跟高盛一樣，給機構投資者們提供跟 CDO 相關的詳細披露的。可是，當DBS把 合成CDO 產品 打包成 面向零售銀行客戶們的信贷挂钩产品的時候，DBS 給客戶們提供了些甚麼披露呢？
關於 Constellation Notes underlying securities , DBS 給客戶們提供了些甚麼詳細披露 ?
DBS Constellation Notes 章程對於其 underlying securities 可是甚麼具體披露都沒有啊！



DBS Constellation Notes 章程 提到 抵押品為 3A 評級，卻根本不提這抵押品究竟為何類產品，連這抵押品為一層信貸掛鈎產品“合成CDO”都欠奉。以 3A 評級 來帶過這抵押品實為另一層信貸掛鈎產品的實質。3A 評級 是 DBS Constellation Notes 投資者們 得到的 關於 抵押品 的 披露。 “3A 評級 ” 是 跟 “合成CDO”相關的唯一「關鍵信息」嗎？ “3A 評級 ” 是 客戶們 應該得到的 關於星展星債 的 唯一「關鍵信息」嗎？ 為甚麼 Constellation Notes 投資者們沒有（如其它非機構投資者們一樣）得到通常應該得到的關於“合成CDO”的「關鍵信息」？？


DBS 可是 Constellation Notes 的 策劃／設計者，安排者和 銷售銀行。還有誰可以比DBS更清楚Constellation Notes 的 underlying securities 的 本質和相關風險了呢？



「為何風險最高的貸款產品會賣給最不在行的借款人？答案就在問題中──最不在行的借款人是最容易被哄騙買入這些產品的。」 - Paul Krugman.




衍生工具複雜且深藏危險，星債 之設計者和銀行分銷商都是金融界的專業人員，更是深明此理。
如果發行產品的投行和銷售商們給客戶們介紹了產品的真實面目，這樣買入者就不會有悔。当然，众多的客户们很可能在可以理解产品的真实特征和风险之前，就已经决定不买这么复杂，听不懂的产品了。

星債的問題在於用漂亮的騙局幌子來跟銀行的客戶們介紹和銷售迷債，投行和銀行分銷商根本不想讓客戶瞭解迷債的真實特徵和風險，如果可以大講跟7個公司信貸掛鈎，為甚麼卻不可以明確提醒客戶：”星債還要跟100多個各種評級的公司信貸掛鈎“？？？

看看在雷曼事件上，香港證監會和金管局是如何做的？
香港證監會和金管局只是竭盡其所能，替行騙者們開罪， 以“3A 評級 ” 和“產品不保本”來為行騙的投行和銀行辯護。


請問香港證監會和金管局：
“3A 評級 ” 和“產品不保本”就足以構成星債合成CDO的重大關鍵信息了麼？
這是香港作為金融中心的標準麼？
還是香港作為金融詐騙者天堂的招牌？


DBS Constellation Notes 可不是只發行了一個系列的產品，Constellation Notes 是以類似的結構，從2003至2007年間發行了的諸多個系列的產品！Constellation Notes 章程對於其underlying securities 一貫是甚麼具體披露都沒有！是太複雜而無法披露，還是太嚇人而不想披露给投资者知道？

Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy

Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy
Joseph Stiglitz (2010)

Why Read It?

• Describes the course of the global financial crisis, which began in 2007, and the underlying causes.

• Argues that much more radical reforms are needed than those currently being implemented, if the world is to avoid similar systemic crises in the future.

• Shows why the bailout has been only marginally effective and explains how it could have had a much more positive impact.

Getting Started

Freefall describes how the United States’ addiction to consumption rather than saving caused the global financial crisis. Stiglitz argues that the crisis originated in an overheated housing market, which was stimulated by politicians’ desire to encourage lending and keep the economy growing, despite the obvious risks involved. The author is highly critical of the US government’s policy responses, which he describes as a series of disasters. Consequently, Stiglitz believes that the United States’ failure to address the problems of excess borrowing, high consumption, and low wages means that the country will experience a Japanese style
recovery.

Author

Joseph Stiglitz (b. 1943) was Chief Economist at the World Bank until 2000. He is currently University Professor of the Columbia Business School and Chair of the Management Board and Director of Graduate Summer Programs, Brooks World Poverty Institute, University of Manchester. He won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 2001 and is the author of various best-selling books including: Globalization and Its
Discontents; The Roaring Nineties; Making Globalization Work; and The Three Trillion Dollar War.

Context

• Following the Asian financial crisis of 1997, Stiglitz warned that free-market ideologues at the US Treasury and the International Monetary Fund had botched the policy response to the crisis.

• He forecast that unless these institutions entered into a dialog with their critics, further crises would
follow.

• Explains in a lucid, easily digestible style how the crisis was inevitable, given that the United States’ deregulated financial markets were awash in liquidity as a result of low interest rates.

• Argues that these factors, when combined with a global real-estate bubble and skyrocketing subprime lending, created a toxic bubble.

• Attacks the Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan and his successor Ben Bernanke for failing to indentify and prevent the housing bubble from developing.

• Argues that the problems that the United States and the world face entail more than a small adjustment to the financial system.

• Calls for the authorities to seize the opportunity created by the crisis to establish a new financial and economic system that will generate meaningful jobs and narrow inequalities in society.

Impact

• Stiglitz’s long-standing record as a critic of unfettered free-market capitalism, and his constant warnings of the dangers posed by deregulated financial markets, give added credibility to the book.

• However, there is also a sense that Stiglitz is settling scores with his critics, and the book is undermined by the fact that a sustainable global economic recovery now appears to be underway.

Freefall: Free Markets and the Sinking of the Global Economy

HK structured product providers warm to 'cooling off' period - Risk.net

HK structured product providers warm to 'cooling off' period - Risk.net

"http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=5466"

Hong Kong SFC to Step Up Investor Protection Measures (Update1)

(Updates with the measures from fourth paragraph.)

By Kelvin Wong

May 28 (Bloomberg) -- Hong Kong’s securities regulator boosted protection for retail buyers of so-called structured products, after losses on notes guaranteed by failed Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. led to a HK$6.3 billion ($813 million) settlement between banks and investors.

Issuers of structured products will be required to give buyers a “cooling off” period of five days after the sale and allow them to unwind the investments, Martin Wheatley, chief executive officer of the Securities and Futures Commission, told reporters at a briefing today.

“We believe the changes we’re planning are practical and sensible,” Wheatley said. “We try to avoid over-reacting as banks still need to do business after all.”

Hong Kong is seeking to strengthen regulations after thousands of individual investors lost money on notes guaranteed by Lehman, which went bankrupt in 2008. Hong Kong banks in July offered to pay at least 60 cents on the dollar to investors in the Lehman-backed products, hoping to end a yearlong dispute that sparked street protests across the city.

The refund will apply to structured products with maturities of one year or longer. The SFC also plans to ban the giveaway of “inappropriate gifts,” such as supermarket coupons and electronic appliances, as incentives, Wheatley said.

Some of the measures could be implemented as early as July, Wheatley said.

Derivative Products

Last week the Hong Kong Monetary Authority told retail banks to give some investors at least two days before selling them non-listed derivative products they want to buy.

People aged 65 or older and first-time buyers who purchase a derivative product worth more than 20 percent of their assets are covered by the HKMA cooling-off period.

An estimated $1.8 billion of minibonds were sold to more than 40,000 investors, the SFC has said. The notes were guaranteed by Lehman and linked to debt of Hong Kong companies including Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. and Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. Among buyers were elderly and poorly educated people as well as mentally ill individuals.

--Editors: Andreea Papuc

To contact the reporter on this story: Kelvin Wong at kwong40@bloomberg.net

香港特別行政區 《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》

王慧麟﹕剝奪的權利幾時還？
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=5395


香港特別行政區
參照《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》提交的
第三份報告的項目大綱
引言
政府現正準備擬備香港特別行政區（香港特區）參照聯合
國《公民權利和政治權利國際公約》（公約）提交的第三份報告。
2. 我們按照既定做法，擬訂了報告的項目大綱，臚列計劃包
括在報告內的主要標題和個別項目。現請各界人士根據大綱所列的項
目，就公約的實施情況給予意見，並建議其他應列入報告的新增項
目。
3. 我們會仔細考慮所有收集到的意見及建議。任何人士或團
體如有意提出意見，可在二零一零年七月十五日或之前，透過以下途
徑，把意見遞交政制及內地事務局：
郵寄： 香港中環下亞厘畢道
中區政府合署（東座）3 樓
政制及內地事務局（第 5 組）
傳真： 2840-0657
電郵： iccpr_consultation@cmab.gov.hk
4. 除非提交意見書的人士／團體特別要求把意見及／或其身
分保密，否則意見書一般可應要求讓公眾查閱，包括提出意見的人士
／團體的姓名／名稱。
5. 公約全文載於政制及內地事務局網頁， 網址如下：
http://www.cmab.gov.hk/doc/tc/documents/policy_responsibilities/the_right
s_of_the_individuals/iccpr_c.doc
6. 本大綱提及的“上一份報告＂，是指中央人民政府在二零
零五年一月提交，而聯合國人權事務委員會（委員會）在二零零六年
三月審議的香港特區報告。該份報告載於政制及內地事務局網頁，網
址如下： http://www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/issues/prc_2.htm 。而“ 第一份報
- 2 -
告＂則指在一九九九年一月提交和經委員會在同年十一月審議的香港
特區報告，該報告載於：http://www.cmab.gov.hk/tc/issues/prc.htm。
7. 第三份報告的主要內容將包括：
(a) 自二零零五年提交上一份報告後，有關重要發展的資料／
解說。下文的各個標題，已列出我們初步認為有“重要＂
發展的範疇。各界人士可提出他們認為應納入報告的其他
新增項目，並說明為何他們認為有關事宜屬於重要，並與
公約在本港實施有關，以及就政府處理這些事宜的表現提
供意見；
(b) 在二零零六年審議期間仍在發展而我們曾承諾會將有關的
未來進展或結果告知委員會的事宜的最新發展；以及
(c) 就委員會在上一份報告的審議結論（副本載於附件）提出
的關注事項和建議所作出的回應。
第 I 部：香港特別行政區概況
8. “概況＂部分依據聯合國現行報告編寫準則訂明的標準格
式、形式和所需涵蓋內容撰寫。這部分會載列與適用於香港特區的人
權公約的實施情況有關的一般性和事實性資料。
第 II 部：主要報告
9. 這部分依據委員會訂明的現行指引，載述有關公約第一、
第二及第三部第一至二十七條在香港特區的實施情況的具體資料。
第一條：民主發展進程
10. 我們會告知委員會自二零零四年後，有關香港特區政制發
展的重要進展。
第二條：確保每個人都享有公約所確認的權利
11. 我們會就這條文向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述幾方面
的重要發展：
 人權機構
- 3 -
 平等機會委員會
 申訴專員
 投訴警方
 人權教育
12. 我們會特別就審議結論第8 及第9 段有關委員會建議成立
獨立人權機構，以及由獨立機構調查對警方作出的投訴，作出回應。
第三條：男女享有平等機會
13. 我們會告知委員會，特區政府會另行根據《消除對婦女一
切形式歧視公約》擬備香港特區的第三份報告。我們並會告知委員會
下述事項的發展：
 同值同酬
 諮詢及法定組織
 擔任公職的女性
 小型屋宇政策
 《消除對婦女一切形式歧視公約》
 婦女事務委員會
第四條：緊急狀況
14. 我們會告知委員會，有關第四條的情況並無改變，與第一
份報告第88 至92 段所解釋的相同。
第五條：禁止破壞公約確認的任何權利和自由
15. 我們會告知委員會，有關第五條的情況並無改變，與第一
份報告第93 段所述的相同。簡言之，《基本法》第三十九條確認了公
約條文的地位。《香港人權法案條例》使公約適用於香港特區的有關規
定，在本地的法律中生效。
- 4 -
第六條：生存的權利
16. 我們會向委員會報告在四支紀律部隊（警方、懲教署、香
港海關及入境事務處）以及廉政公署看管期間死亡的人數。我們並會
闡述死因裁判官就這些死亡個案進行研訊所得的結果以及在有關程序
方面所作出的改善。
第七條：不得施以酷刑或不人道待遇亦不得未經同意而施以試驗
17. 我們會向委員會提供有關下述事項的最新資料：
 指稱施行酷刑的事例
 紀律部隊及廉政公署的訓練
 遭遞解離境的人士
18. 我們會特別就審議結論第10 段有關給予被遞解離境人士的
保障作出回應。
第八條：不得使充奴隸或奴工；不得強迫或強制勞役
19. 我們會告知委員會，有關情況並無改變，與上一份報告第
86 段所解釋的相同。簡言之，《香港人權法案》第四條第(一)及第(二)
款禁止任何形式的使充奴隸及奴隸販賣，並禁止使充奴工。《香港人權
法案》第四條第(三)款禁止強迫或強制勞役，而香港特區亦無這些問
題。
第九條：人身自由和安全
20. 我們會告知委員會有關下述事項的最新發展：
 法律改革委員會所發表的《拘捕問題研究報告書》
 對違反入境法例的外籍人士覊留安排
 越南難民及從中國內地到港的越南人
- 5 -
第十條：被剝奪自由的人的權利
21. 我們會告知委員會，囚犯的權利、懲教機構的規章和管理
及監獄規則方面的情況，與上一份報告所載述的大致相若。我們會提
供資料，說明下述事項（如適用的話）的最新情況：
 因犯的權利
 懲教機構的規章和管理
 罪犯自新
 少年犯自新
 “等候行政酌情決定＂而被拘留的少年罪犯
 為在中國內地被扣留的香港居民提供協助
22. 我們會特別就審議結論第11 段有關香港特區與中國內地有
關當局之間通報香港居民在內地遭扣留的機制作出回應。
第十一條：不得因不履行合約而被監禁
23. 我們會告知委員會，有關這條文的情況並無改變，與第一
份報告所解釋的相同。
第十二條：遷徙往來的自由
24. 我們會向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述事項的重要發
展：
 永久性居民及非永久性居民的旅行證件
 合法進入香港
 為香港以外地區遇上困難的香港居民提供協助
第十三條：驅逐出香港的限制
25. 我們會向委員會提供有關遞解離境及遣送離境的最新統
計。
- 6 -
第十四條：在法院之前平等及接受公正公開審問的權利
26. 我們會向委員會提供資料，說明下述事項的重要發展：
 民事司法制度改革
 獲得法律服務的權利
第十五條：刑事罪和刑罰沒有追溯力
27. 我們會告知委員會，有關這條文的情況沒有重要的發展。
第十六條：被承認為法律人格的權利
28. 我們會告知委員會，有關這條文的情況並無改變，與上一
次報告所述的相同。
第十七條：對私生活、家庭、住宅、通訊、名譽及信用的保護
29. 我們會向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述幾方面的重要發
展。我們會特別就審議結論第12 段提出有關因應執法機構截取通訊和
進行秘密監察，為個別人士設立保障和申訴機制的建議作出回應：
 《截取通訊及監察條例》
 個人資料私隱
 法律改革委員會就纏擾行為發表的報告
第十八條：思想、信念和宗教自由
30. 我們會就這條文提供有關宗教自由及宗教團體的最新資料
及統計。
第十九條：意見和發表的自由
31. 我們會告知委員會有關意見和發表的自由（包括下述事
項）的重要發展。審議結論第13、第14 及第17 段對保障立法會議員
及傳媒工作者的安全，令他們免受恐嚇及騷擾，以及《刑事罪行條
例》內有關叛逆和煽動罪行的定義表示關注，我們會就此作出回應。
- 7 -
 新聞自由
 叛逆和煽動罪行
 保障立法會議員及傳媒工作者的安全，令他們免受恐嚇及
騷擾
 廣播媒介的規管及發牌制度
 香港電台
 電影分級制
 對電影檢查監督和檢查員的決定提出上訴
 管制淫褻及不雅物品
 公開資料守則
 《聯合國（反恐怖主義措施）條例》
第二十條：禁止鼓吹戰爭
32. 我們會向委員會提供有關立法禁止種族歧視的最新情況，
包括禁止種族中傷和嚴重中傷。
第二十一條：和平集會的權利
33. 我們會就這條文向委員會提供有關《公安條例》各方面的
最新情況。
第二十二條：結社的自由
34. 我們會告知委員會下述事項的最新情況：
 《社團條例》
 規管職工會的活動
 促進人權的機構
- 8 -
第二十三條：家庭——社會的重要組成部分
35. 我們會向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述事項的重要發
展。我們會特別就審議結論第15 段對居留權的政策和措施引致家庭問
題的關注作出回應。
 家庭福利服務
 分離家庭
 修訂《婚姻訴訟規例》
 內地新來港定居人士
第二十四條：兒童的權利
36. 我們會告知委員會有關兒童權利方面的發展。我們會特別
就審議結論第16 段所提及處理家庭暴力問題的措施，包括為警務人員
提供培訓及資源的調撥，作出回應。這條文之下的事項包括：
 《兒童權利公約》
 推廣兒童的權利
 兒童服務
 虐待兒童及家庭暴力
 檢討《領養條例》
 法律代表
第二十五條：參與公眾生活的權利
37. 我們會向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述事項的重要發
展：
 政制發展
 行政長官選舉
 立法會選舉
- 9 -
 檢討區議會
 區議會選舉
 鄉村選舉
 政府諮詢及法定組織
第二十六條：受法律平等保護的權利
38. 我們會告知委員會下述事項的最新發展。我們會特別就審
議結論第19 段所提出有關立法打擊種族歧視的建議作出回應。
 立法禁止種族歧視
 年齡歧視及性傾向歧視
 殘疾歧視
第二十七條：少數族裔人士的權利
39. 我們會向委員會提供最新資料，說明下述事項的重要發
展：
 有關少數族裔人士的行政指引及支援服務
 加入公職
政制及內地事務局
二零一零年六月

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