2010年2月27日星期六

The Role of the World Bank

IMF冀擁新權力監督全球金融體系
【01:00】2010年02月27日
【on.cc專訊】 國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)總幹事卡恩周五表示,IMF希望擁有新的權力監督全球金融體系。

卡恩在華盛頓發表演說時稱,隨着全球經濟走出數十年來最嚴重衰退,IMF需要與時並進,提升它的管治。





Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank


Appendix
The International Finance Corporation's approach to combating fraud and corruption in project finance
As the world's largest source of financing for private sector projects in developing countries, International Finance Corporation (IFC) is deeply concerned about the potential for corruption in the projects it finances. In congruence with the World Bank's perspective, the IFC must act to fight corruption in order to retain the confidence of its shareholders and the financial markets on which it relies. Moreover, the avoidance of corruption is necessary to ensure that the IFC's investments are successful, that its resources are being used effectively, and that its developmental objectives are met.

The IFC's strategy to combat corruption in its operations is concentrated in the following two areas identified in the Bank's strategy:

Control of fraud and corruption in projects.
Institutional strengthening.
The IFC's efforts to combat corruption in the private sector will complement those of the Bank in the public sector to the extent that the IFC's activities focus in the private sector.

Control of fraud and corruption in projects. The IFC controls fraud and corruption in the projects in which it invests by employing appropriate methods and procedures at every stage of the investment process.

The IFC's investment staff conduct a due diligence review of the individuals involved and their primary businesses. On-site visits are made to both project and nonproject installations to obtain a first-hand impression of the sponsor/operator and its affiliated companies. The IFC generally will not invest in a project if it does not know the identity of its partners, or if it believes that a sponsor/operator may be controlled by an undisclosed third party, or if the project may be sponsored, directly or indirectly, by individuals holding public office.

Before making an investment, IFC staff perform an investment appraisal in which the IFC must be persuaded that the interests of the sponsor/operator in undertaking the project are compatible with those of other investors. The appraisal must establish to the IFC's satisfaction that the contractual undertakings made to structure the project (such as supply, distribution, and off-take agreements) do not unfairly benefit some of the parties to the transaction at the expense of others. Each party's share of the investment's rewards must be known by the IFC and judged to be commensurate with the risks taken and the contributions made by the party. This analysis is a necessary step to uncovering potential conflicts of interest, as a project typically brings together both strategic and passive investors with different agendas and motivations.

The IFC's first line of defense against corrupt costing is its extensive experience and familiarity with industry best practices, technologies, and capital costs in a broad range of industrial sectors. The IFC's project team of investment officers, engineers, and lawyers—which sometimes includes outside specialist consultants—will be familiar with best practices, time to completion, and current world prices of capital goods in the major industries. Thus the team can identify significant price anomalies and distortions that may mask corrupt practices. The IFC will not finance a project if material deviations from fair pricing cannot be explained by specific, acceptable circumstances.

The IFC will not invest in a project if a lack of transparency in the awarding of a concession or a contract makes it impossible to determine that business is being conducted on an arm's-length basis between a government and a project company. At an early stage in the process of evaluating a proposed project—the initial project summary—IFC management reviews the structure of the project and examines the relationships between the parties. If a project is found wanting in any of these areas, management directs staff to agree on improvements with the various parties to the transaction.

After making its investments, the IFC supervises them closely and on a regular basis. The IFC consults periodically with the management of investee companies, sends field missions to visit the enterprises, and requires quarterly progress reports during project implementation. In some projects a full-time, on-site lender's representative may be required during the project's construction phase. The IFC requires, in its capacity as lender, that investee companies provide it with quarterly and annual financial statements (the latter are audited) and insurance reports and give it direct access to the company's external auditors for the purpose of reviewing the company's accounts, operations, and the management letter.

The IFC's direct presence and relationships in developing countries also aid in supervision by alerting it to problems that may indicate the occurrence of a corrupt practice in an IFC-financed project. Staff of the IFC's resident and regional missions assist in this process by maintaining direct contacts with various government agencies, NGOs, and other parties in local financial business communities. Outside counsel employed by the IFC to help prepare legal documentation and negotiating terms and conditions for an IFC investment also may transmit information to the IFC that they are uniquely positioned to obtain because of their contacts in local legal and business communities.

Institutional Strengthening. The strengthening of institutions in developing countries sometimes occurs as a secondary effect of the IFC's efforts to control fraud and corruption in projects. However, the IFC also engages in activities whose primary purpose is to build and strengthen institutions—and these activities help combat corruption. In this regard the IFC advises its member governments on how to create new institutions and strengthen existing institutions so that disclosure and transparency in the conduct of financial transactions will be improved and administrative discretion conducive to corruption will be eliminated. The IFC's Capital Markets Department plays an important role in this area—for example, providing advisory services for the establishment of stock exchanges and securities commissions in IFC member countries.

The IFC also combats corruption through operations of the Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS), a joint service of the IFC and the Bank. FIAS works at the request of IFC member governments, helping them to build effective institutional frameworks for investment promotion strategies and to interact with potential foreign investors. FIAS helps governments achieve their foreign direct investment objectives. Its advisory services seek to stimulate inflows of foreign direct investment by creating a more favorable investment climate in the member country. FIAS's advice typically focuses on reforming laws, policies, and procedures needed to increase those inflows.

The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency's approach to combating fraud and corruption in guarantees
With a mandate to encourage the flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to developing member countries and transition economies, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has a natural interest in the issue of corruption as an inhibitor of FDI flows. While there may not be hard and fast evidence on the role corruption plays in deterring FDI, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is an important factor. Companies are often concerned not only about the initial payments to be made to make a deal but also about their inability to predict the scope and extent of future possible payments. Moreover, as noted elsewhere in the report, companies from some countries, such as the United States are prohibited from paying bribes or offering other extraordinary incentives in order to make a deal. Thus they are at a disadvantage in doing business in countries in which corruption is endemic.

MIGA's focus on corruption comes through both its guarantees activity and its technical assistance programs. In terms of guarantees, MIGA can cancel a contract with an investor if it learns that the investor is not complying with the legislation of the host country. Moreover, MIGA is not legally obliged to pay compensation on a claim against its insurance if it can prove that the investor did not comply with the laws of the country receiving the FDI.

As part of its technical assistance to member countries on attracting FDI, MIGA's technical assistance arm, Investment Marketing Services, includes corruption in its training sessions on attracting and retaining foreign investment. The topic is treated under the heading of investor decisionmaking, stressing the need for transparency and clearly identifying the payment of bribes as an important issue that needs to be addressed.

2010年2月26日星期五

精明債券

精明債券
出自維基百科,自由嘅百科全書
跳去: 定向, 搵嘢

精明債券(Octavenotes,精債)係種信貸掛鈎、結構性金融貨,摩根士丹利(Morgan Stanley)賣咗兩百幾億噉嘅嘢,用啲無向投資者公布嘅資產(風險高低都有)做抵押,包括藍籌大公司、大細國、CDO[8],基本原理係投資人幫大行做擔保,間中收下息,當其中抵押公司資產爆幾間,本金就會蝕一闕;幾間抵押資產摺埋爆煲,發行人有權強制甚至無償贖回[1],股民可能一個仙都攞唔返。如果想賣出,而家呢啲嘢市價跌幅高達99%。[2]。

賣呢挺嘢嘅係大摩經空殼公司 Victoria Peak International Finance,發行章程雖然被證監會審批,但用咗好多財經行話[3],其中風險普通街坊難明解,抵押品評級係乜又要事後至知[4]。

10-12系列嘅精債同雷曼兄弟掛鈎,一早爆咗[5];有投資者自己用6% 起賠點(en:attachment point)同6.75%止賠點(en:detachment point)計,15,16,17系列再爆一間零就玩完[6]。

因為風險大,呢味嘢喺美國淨係准賣畀機構投資者,但香港證監會唔管,阿婆阿伯都買到,結果有人領嘢。

2010年2月25日星期四

沈聯濤自述:在香港證監會的風雨7年

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4328

creator of the Minibond

2010年2月24日星期三
The former Lehman Asia Pacific CDO & Structured Credit Team
Who was the creator of the Minibond ?
The product was created by the CDO & Structured Credit Asia Pacific of Lehman Brothers.

Who is Leon Hindle ?
Loen Hindle was Managing Director and Head of CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.

Other Senior members in the Lehman Brothers Asia Pacific for CDO & Structured Credit products related may include:

George Sun: is Managing Director and Head of Global Credit Products Sales for Lehman Brothers in Asia ex-Japan. Mr. Sun heads up a team that is responsible for the distribution of all credit products including money markets, high grade credit, high yield credit, loans, private placements, structured credit, CDOs, and emerging market assets.

Ian Croft: is a senior vice president and is responsible for corporate credit securitisation opportunities in Asia ex-Japan, as well marketing and distribution of structured credit products in Singapore and South East Asia.

Patrick Kaye is a Senior Vice President, responsible for Lehman Brothers’ Principal and Structured Finance practice in non-Japan Asia. He and the group arrange securitization financings on behalf of clients as well as asset-based principal investments on behalf of the Firm.

Tay Teck How is a Vice President, in the CDO & Structured Credit, Asia Pacific, Lehman Brothers.

Steve Baker is a Senior Vice President in the CLO Banking group at Lehman Brothers US. Steve is focused on origination, structuring and placement of corporate credit securitizations, CLOs and related products.

Meeting with HKMA (Constellation Notes)

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4312



The Managements responsible for Constellation Notes bank frauds in HK.
http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4341

2010年2月23日星期二

首懲賣迷債違規 星展職員釘牌3月

首懲賣迷債違規 星展職員釘牌3月

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://paper.wenweipo.com [2009-11-21]
放大圖片
 ■星展銀行發聲明指出,該行一直以客戶利益為依歸。 資料圖片

 【本報訊】(記者 顏茜) 金管局首次就雷曼相關產品銷售失當懲處銀行銷售人員。金管局昨宣布,因星展銀行前僱員梁慧茹向客戶銷售Constellation結構債券時行為失當,決定暫停其牌照3個月,由昨日起至2010年2月19日。金管局並稱,雖然今次證明銀行犯錯,但不會指令銀行賠償給個別客戶,該局現時亦有其他紀律行動個案已進入後期處理程序。星展銀行發表聲明,指該職員於06年已主動離職。

 調查發現,梁慧茹於2006年3月受僱於星展銀行時,向一名客戶銷售Constellation信貸相聯可贖回債券時,未有盡責地向客戶披露及解釋該產品的風險,以及未有按照銀行的內部管控程序,為客戶填妥風險披露聲明。梁慧茹昨日起被停牌3個月,金管局指她曾要求上訴,但之後主動撤回。

行方:已賠償 冀不再犯

 星展銀行昨發聲明指出,該行一直以客戶利益為依歸,自雷曼倒閉後,該行隨即作全面而獨立的內部檢討,檢視銀行的監控系統及程序。儘管事件發生在3年前,在該行嚴謹的銷售指引下,仍發現有缺失,星展表示感到失望,而該行將不斷提升內部監控及加強員工培訓,以確保將來不再有同類事件發生。

765宗迷債投訴 擬再開刀

 對於Constellation產品的客戶投訴,該行指已完成檢視每一個投訴個案,亦已向一些不適當銷售和不符合該行最高標準的個案作賠償。星展強調,該行是本港第一間向因雷曼相關產品而蒙受損失的投資者作出賠償的銀行。

 金管局負責證券法規執行的助理總裁李令翔表示,這是金管局首次就雷曼相關投資產品對有關人士採取紀律處分,現時亦有其他紀律行動個案進入後期的處理程序,該局將於適當時候作出公布。該局現正就765宗雷曼兄弟相關非迷你債券投訴個案考慮採取紀律行動。

 雷曼苦主大聯盟召集人陳光譽肯定金管局的紀律行動是一個「好好的開始」,並希望金管局對銀行的懲處不單停留在前線員工層面,應進一步追究銀行管理層責任。陳光譽又促請證監會公布對銀行雷曼迷債銷售從上而下調查的結果,讓當局紀律行動不局限於雷曼非迷債投資產品的銷售行為。

甘乃威

經驗投資者"與金管局助理總裁李令翔先生會議
2010-01-11 16:00
今日(11/1),我陪同十多位"經驗投資者"的代表與金管局助理總裁李令翔先生召開會議。會議上,多位雷曼的苦主都表達很多銀行的"加強版投訴處理機制"未能有效及公平處理各雷曼苦主的投訴。

金管局亦只表示如果"加強版投訴處理機制"未能解決投訴,金管局亦會作出調查及會於三月底完成絕大部份個案的調查。

與大新及豐明“雷曼定息保本票據”投資者及金管局會議
2010-01-18 16:00
今日(18/1),我聯同有“回購建議”的大新及豐明“雷曼定息保本票據” 十多位投資者與金管局李令翔先生會議。會議上,多位投資者都表達銀行的銷售過程存在欺騙的手法,他們對銀行的回購建議及警方緩慢的刑事調查,表達十分不滿。

金管局研究銀行應否銷售高風險產品

金管局研究銀行應否銷售高風險產品
11.10.2008 08:42

金管局助理總裁李令翔表示,會研究零售銀行應否再銷售高風險投資產品,認為即使銀行有足夠的風險披露,但銷售高風險產品時,所受的信譽風險太高。 李令翔又指,調查涉及雷曼兄弟相關投資產品的投訴時,會審視銀行是否有適當理據,向低風險承受能力人士推銷高風險產品,亦會檢討銀行體制是否有不妥當的地方

2010年2月22日星期一

《王岸然》教育調解無助防止雷曼事件

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4289

《王岸然》教育調解無助防止雷曼事件

香港政府據稱是因為汲取雷曼迷你債券事件的教訓,計劃推出兩項保障金融產品小投資者的措施,包括成立投資者教育局,及成立金融糾紛調解中心。這完全是本末倒置,逃避責任,港府明顯地不願從迷債事件中汲取教訓,不肯認真面對問題,只是虛與蛇委,做些表面的工夫,應付社會上的責難。


調節制度,從來都是存在的,香港有專業的調解學會,有足夠的相關法律,何用再增加一個新的金融糾紛調解中心。若說這中心可以更專業地集中處理金融糾紛的調解,難道現有的調解員不可以擔當同一類工作?個別的調解員當然可以進修培訓金融知識,從而專門處理這類調解,便已經足夠。當局要做的,只是為小投資者準備一份名冊而已。


正如律師醫生,大家都受同樣的基本訓練,專業化之後亦會各自專長於某一範圍,法官亦是一樣,某一類案件會交付某一類法官負責審理,取其專長之所在。香港政府若然要成立甚麼金融調解中心,需要提出成立中心的特殊理據,明顯是沒有。


迷債的內情,能顯露的越多,更顯問題的結構性。結構性問題在於金融官員包括任志剛。證監會的高層自始至終到今天真相已經公開的情況下,這些人的基本思維皆是從保護大財團大銀行大資本家的利益為出發。投資者特別是小投資者從來就沒有平等受保護的地位,雷曼事件已經是很清楚,只是世人永遠會因為貪念而被騙,亦所以處於強勢的一方永遠有誘因去欺騙小投資者,只看制度上是否有制衡與平衡,事實已經證明沒有,而搞個金融調解中心只屬一種化妝,企圖誘騙新的人上當,出發點是可鄙的。


早就有人提議成立金融申訴專員,為何政府不從這一思路進發?現在的經驗,是大量小投資者在銀行零售櫃位(counter)被近乎行騙的違規銷售(Mis-selling)手法所誤導,購買了有問題的毒債,而事後在政府的偏幫之下,被迫接受六成的「和解」方案,公道嗎?筆者只問一個問題,為何金管局及證監已經調查了以千計的投訴個案,到今天還沒有一個銀行的負責人受到刑事檢控?是不是香港連一個金融海盜也沒有,一切都是那群苦主做戲的結果?


政府建議另一事就是成立甚麼投資者教育中心。當前由證監會所推行的投資者教育,在金融海嘯之後,已經被證明是徹底的失敗。急需再教育的,不是小投資者,而是金融從業員,而是負責金融監管的官員,他們要受的教育,是商業道德倫理的重要性,是獨立負責任而且專業地履行公職的重要性,是維持社會公平公義對投資者的重要性,這些人全部都是失職的。


直到今天,我們只見到一個證監會的前高級經理肯本善良心公正地說話,其他坐向社會成就高薪自肥的人,都只是在弄虛作假 !

2010年2月21日星期日

CNNGo.com

CNNGo.com
- Feb 05, 2010

Good news for Minibond holders: Retail investors who bought Lehman Minibond notes can expect to recover between 21.5 percent and 70.8 percent of the amount

追究銀行僱員的刑事上責任

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4282

[陳敬慈]一些回憶:以支持陳巧文和叛逆的一代

[陳敬慈]一些回憶:以支持陳巧文和叛逆的一代

2010年2月17日星期三

第二批精債「爆煲」

http://hk.myblog.yahoo.com/hanhoco/article?mid=4260

2010年2月2日星期二

《信報》誰要為雷曼事件負責By 王岸然

《信報》誰要為雷曼事件負責By 王岸然
經過高秉忠兩天的公開聆訊,相信一直有研究、留意雷曼迷債事件的人,不難明白事件的來龍去脈。簡單地說,這是前朝弄出來的禍,是人禍而不是天災,就算不是有百年一遇的金融海嘯,這件事情同樣會出現,只是遲早的問題。
由於事件的遠因比筆者原先估計的為早,現在的曾蔭權政府財經班子完全未上位,二○○一年時陳家強還在大學教書,曾俊華在海關工作,負責打擊翻版碟,而曾蔭權當時失勢,行行企企之餘就只是負責城市清潔的工作。作為行政會議成員,他理應知情,但談不上要負責,除非有證據顯示他二○○五年掌權之後,有人提議他要正視證監會一會兩管可能出現的問題,而他不理,這就另當別論。
在兩天的聆訊中,泛民議員最有興趣追問,是高秉忠證供之中提及在二○○一年時,當時的證監主席一反證監會十多年的工作常規,直接與前線的監管者開會,要求提供一些快贏方法(Quick Wins),以期盡快搞活經濟。這位沈聯濤主席的做法絕對可笑,這類超級施壓的結果,無異是希望負責審批投資產品的專家放寬他們一貫的標準,以便更多的新投資產品可以推出市場,而類似雷曼迷債這類新的衍生工具投資產品,正是在當時開始出現。
聆訊中泛民議員一再追問,無非想由高秉忠的口中,得知事件的真正負責人,是「董建華」三個字。這是不合理的,因為以高秉忠的位置,就算知道,也只是從沈聯濤或其他高層口中得知,在法律上只屬傳聞證據(Hearsay),不足以證明事實的存在,但作為線索,作為引申的依據,則是十分充足。
「快贏」方法
雷曼特權小組下一步應做的,是以高秉忠的作證為依據,傳召相關人物作供,而這四人,明顯要為雷曼迷債事件的出現,負上終極的責任。這四人分別是證監會前主席沈聯濤、前金融專員任志剛、前財政司梁錦松,自然還有前特首董建華。當然,如果可以的話,應傳訊數個證監會前副總監,特別是「公司財務部」的主管,只是這些外國人早已離任,是否願意到港協助調查,頓成疑問。(順帶一提,議員其實可以親身到外國找這些前證監高層詢問,媒介也可以這樣做,要找尋事件的真相,非不能,是不為也。)二○○一年港府推行高官問責制,梁錦松上任財政司,若大家還記得,他希望香港的經濟曼克頓化,他是沈聯濤的直屬上司,他曾經對沈聯濤給予指示,是極有可能的,而這就成為沈聯濤逼下屬提供「快贏」方法去搞活經濟的最大原因。
為何又關任志剛事?筆者似乎一直在本欄「追殺」任專員,但事實上整件事件與他有脫不開的關係。沈聯濤在出任證監主席之前,是金融管理局的副總裁,是任志剛的得力助手,二人關係密切,沈聯濤被調去主管證監,是任專員當時勢力擴張的結果,而當時銀行界取消統一存款利息後,需要增加其他類別的業務,任專員本來就是以保護銀行家的利益為己任,他聯同梁錦松,要求沈聯濤主持下的證監會拆牆鬆縛,結果弄出後來的災難,是正常不過的推論,是否如此,若不是,「快贏」之說從何而來?有待特權小組的調查了。
人為悲劇
還有是在二○○五、○六年,本來證監會之內已經花了一年的時間,準備了一套監管中介人不良銷售手法(Mis-Selling)的守則,準備供銀行業使用,但不知為何沒有了下文。證監本來就有守則(經發牌制度)規管證券業界,這是為何證監去年可以逼「新鴻基」及另一證券行百分之一百賠償給雷曼苦主,但銀行的監管完全是金管局的責任,任志剛曾否背後施加影響力,阻攔新守則的通過,不是他又是誰人,正是特權小組的調查要點所在。
無論如何,在高秉忠作證之後,雷曼迷債事件之所以會在香港發生的謎底,基本上已被解開。證監會沒有在適當的時間,做好適當的預防措施,是悲劇的所以發生原因,而悲劇原本是完全可以避免,背後阻礙證監會工作的原因,是當時的政府金融高官自私地考慮個人利益,要求任內有「快贏」的政績的結果。一想到兩位前朝人物梁錦松與任志剛今天還有為祖國的金融業貢獻經驗,只能祝祖國的投資者好運。
無論對苦主、對社會大眾而言,一句悲劇與不幸,並不是結果。有兩點法律上及制度上可以解決事件的責任及令到事件有較令人滿意的結果。大概香港市民不以為要用納稅人的金錢補償雷曼苦主是合理,但證監會在二○○四年起設立了一個「投資者賠償基金」,在弄清責任之後,這基金足以賠償給苦主。另外,只要證明銀行確有詐騙的行為,當局可以刑事起訴銀行的高層,有這一權力,逼銀行出資負擔部分的賠償自然可能。
就這兩點,筆者會另外專文討論,筆者一直認定雷曼苦主有理由亦應有權得到百分百賠償,並非是一個意見咁簡單

香港人權監察:警方處理1月16日反高鐵示威的手法

香港人權監察:警方處理1月16日反高鐵示威的手法

2010年2月1日星期一

SFC organization and their frauds

Mr. Ko is one of the heads of the Investment Product Division (IPD) and the minibond was approved by the Corporate Finance Division (CFD), and at the material time the CFD was under the supervision of Mr Ashley Alder. The split between IPD and CFD is to offer an artificial regulatory loophole to Lehman Brothers.

The one the Legco should ask is Mr. Ashley Alder who left the SFC in 2004 and returned to Herbert Smith, the English law firm. He has got a lot of explanation to do regarding his years in the SFC from 2001 to 2004.We should focus on the KEY issues as you can expect the government to throw up a lot of peripheral matters to make everything looks confusing.


I believe that Mr Ko was the manager that approved products selling targeted for the insurance industry. One thing that I am quite sure that he said in the hearing .. "He did not approve minibonds".

As to the suing... we sue SFC in the civil court on systematic charges that are common among all victims in each product.. In other words, all the victims can file the same court paper on the same charges as it is not individual case (mis-selling) anymore. We shall get minimum use of legal spending as we could use "do it yourself" court filing. The key thing is to find a charge that can stand to win big in the court. Once one victim won.. all the victims can follow. If all the victims are to submit all at once, it could cripple the legal system.

If the above works, it is likely that we wait for the JR as there will be more illegal findings on SFC or HKMA or to overturn the 60%/70% buyback. Anyway, we intend to do the preparation work in parallel.. ie. running with the two legs

Question?
So, what was Mr. Ko doing and what was he involved in approving? I didn't understand. I thought he was involved with approval process of at least the Mini-bonds or Constellation. Sounds weird.


Mr Ko was not involved with the approval process on minibonds, constellation as well as ELN. Perhaps, we could ask the legco to summon those who were actually involved with the approval process on the above products at Ko 's level.

The SFC did what it did because of government pressure back in 2001. Who pressed the government not to regulate?? The local and overseas (mainly USA) banks because they stood to make a lot of money with a spineless regulator. To punish the really culpable is not to sue SFC, after all most of those in 2001 have gone. To make your outrage felt, why don't you walk away from those crooks bankers with your money. GO somewhere else, wire your fund (at least a large chunk of it) overseas. Invest in some other assets that is not likely to benefit the crooks bankers. This is more preferable than law suit. Moreover we have too many spineless judges as well.

Foreign banks also issue Minibonds of their own but they would not sell to their own customers, like UBS. And you may only get 0.01% interest in money market funds oversea. In fact, in HK buying assets in cash may be the only way out and I've never seen these lawyers smile working on these deals right now.

Some call it 'social dynamic' which means that you do not know and probably need not concern too much about the exact impact of certain action because the causal relationships involved are multifarious and intractable.

證監2部門 被指審批迷債過鬆

證監2部門 被指審批迷債過鬆
證監會前僱員高秉忠繼續發揮水門事件的「深喉」本色,昨日出席立法會雷曼迷債小組聆訊時,大爆主管證監會兩大執行部門的執董於2001年起交惡,雙方數年間不相交往,凸顯證監會執行部門之間各據山頭、缺乏協調的情況。
前僱員︰融資與投資產品部交惡
  高秉忠在聆訊中指出,2001年11月時,首批結構性票據產品出現,由於不熟悉公司法下審批產品可運用的權力,負責審批的企業融資部有感根據《公司條例》下的審批有關產品,不及當時的《投資者保障條例》(其後合併為《證券及期貨條例》)般具彈性。
  他續稱,投資產品部當時與法律部討論後,結論是審批投資產品時,如發行人要求就某些公司法下的規定給予豁免,則執行部門有權要求附加條件,但卻惹來企業融資部激烈反彈。
  「我們收到的回覆被『劃花晒』,企業融資部主管的評論,我在此亦不便讀出來,當中有些用語比較粗鄙。」高秉忠直言,自此之後,企業融資部與投資產品部之間再沒有就政策交換意見,雙方職員只有工作層面接觸,截至2004年企業融資部執董離職後,才再現轉機。
指2部門欠協調 未附保障要求
  歐達禮(Ashley Alder)於2001年7月獲委任證監會企業融資部執董,及至2004年離任後,由何賢通接掌該部門,而張灼華則自2001年2月起,一直主管投資產品部(當時包括中介團體部)至今。
  兩大負責產品審批的部門,未能就審批方式作協調,高秉忠認為是導致企業融資部未有在審批包括迷債的結構產品時,仿效投資產品部的做法,按公司法要求附加保障投資者結構要求的原因。
  至於證監會被指在雷曼爆煲後全面停頓產品審批,高秉忠則證實情況確實如此,批評有關做法失當,更是促使他在雷曼爆煲後十日首次請辭的導火。另被問及對在港設立超級監管機構的看法時,他則表示贊成,原因是他近年觀察監管機構的工作文化,往往有「向下看」的情況,即其他負責銀行、保險監管機構的投資者保障做得較證監會差時,便避免採取行動,以免招徠業界人士抨擊。
  兩次出席聆訊後,議員對高秉忠爆料意猶未盡,擬於稍後另定會期再傳召出席小組聆訊。
30 Jan 2010