2011年8月28日星期日

2011年8月27日-新聞透視 警權與自由 1/2

2011年8月27日-新聞透視 警權與自由 2/2

2011年8月27日星期六

戴耀廷對官員評論感憂心 認為官員未能夠掌握人權保障的原則

港大千人集會不滿警方保安

星島日報 – 7小時前寄給朋友列印港大法律系教授戴耀廷表示,對特區政府官員就近期事件的評論感到憂心,認為官員未能夠掌握人權保障的原則。

國務院副總理李克強訪港期間的保安安排引起極大關注,戴耀廷表示,警方的保安安排要合乎比例,除非有足夠理據證明政要的安全受到威脅,否則應以人權優先。

警務處處長事後的發言,以及司長提及「垃圾論」的說法,被戴耀廷質疑,究竟特區政府官員是否明白到本港對於人權保障。他指出,在過去多年來,本港已經建立了一套完備的基本原則,而最基本的是所做的行為應該是合理,以及合乎比例。

不過,他認為目前警方未能提出足夠的理據,能夠說服公眾其行動是合乎比例。

2011年8月25日星期四

Donald Tsang hides HK problems from Li Keqiang official visit



HK police blocked 10 demonstrators from Lehman Sage to hand letters to Vice Premier for banks mis-selling frauds that Donald Tsang cannot solve for three years with inquiry from reporter of pro-China newspaper of this action, Wang Guangya also blames Donald Tsang after receiving letters from these victims before.

Beijing's Hong Kong Problem


Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang's official visit to Hong Kong this week strongly suggests that he is set to succeed Wen Jiabao next year as the country's premier. As Willy Lam writes nearby, Beijing often uses state visits to announce ascendant leaders. When he was vice president, Hu Jintao took a coming-out trip to the U.S. in April 2002, just a few months before becoming Party Secretary.

But the choice of Hong Kong for Mr. Li's debut as the lead contender indicates how seriously Beijing is taking the present tense state of politics within the special administrative region. Despite the territory's continuing economic prosperity, the local political scene looks increasingly unstable amid rising public anger.

It seems that Hong Kong's government of mostly Beijing-appointed officials can make no decision—on dealing with stratospheric property prices, on carrying out big infrastructure projects, on letting go of some of its budget surplus—without stoking public ire. Polls show local residents giving leaders record-low approval ratings. Public protests, a fixture of political life in the territory, are becoming less peaceful; demonstrators at one rally this year dubbed it a "Bauhinia Revolution," a nod to people power movements in the Arab world. Hong Kong's leaders are starting to look more like hapless small-town councilmen than the administrators of a global city. This has Beijing nervous.

What's behind the mess? Wang Guangya, Beijing's top diplomat in the SAR, blames Britain. He told a group of Hong Kong students last month that as a result of colonial rule, the territory's civil servants "don't know how to be their own bosses and masters." Fourteen years after the handover to China, Mr. Wang said, Hong Kong's bureaucrats are stuck in an "I'll do what you tell me what to do" mentality. "Hong Kong was made and marred by Britain," Mr. Wang said.

The remarks touched a nerve. Chief Executive Donald Tsang, himself a former bureaucrat, declared that Hong Kong's civil service was "one of the finest in the world." Others, mostly in the pro-Beijing faction of local politicians, cheered Mr. Wang's forthrightness in decrying the incompetence of Hong Kong's many civil-servants-turned-ministers.

But to blame Hong Kong's governance woes on colonial aftereffects is wrong. Britain did much to transfer power to local bodies over the course of the colonial period. After 1913, London made no attempts to disallow locally enacted ordinances despite constitutional arrangements that gave it clear power to do so. From 1958 on, Hong Kong's annual budget was not referred to London; Britain managed only the territory's foreign policy. Advisory committees for making policy on certain issues made colonial governance consultative, if still far from democratic.

Colonial administrators took initiative on broad policy direction, too—which suggests the opposite of Mr. Wang's charge that Hong Kong's civil servants don't know how to think long-term. On many issues, the local administration governed in open defiance of trends in London. In the 1960s, as Finance Secretary John Cowperthwaite was refashioning Hong Kong as a laboratory for laissez-faire economic policies, planners in both Labour and Tory governments were busy trying to pick winners in British industry.

The real problem is that Hong Kong's society has developed while its rulers remain undemocratic and unaccountable. SAR residents' dissatisfaction will only increase until their territory has a system of government that can win and keep public trust because that government is fully accountable to the public.

Beijing worries about unrest in Hong Kong, but here as elsewhere its hands-on approach can at best buy short-term stability, and then only at the expense of longer-term legitimacy. Mr. Li has a reputation as a reformer, as Willy Lam writes. Hong Kong's people will be watching to see if he is willing to trust them with a bigger role in government—the only way to repair the deficiencies truly at the heart of the territory's unhappiness.

WSJ

2011年8月23日星期二

Hong Kong's challenging changes

By Charlotte Robins
22 August 2011
Hong Kong is one of the world’s fastest growing private wealth management (PWM) markets.

Reforms such as the liberalisation of renminbi regulations and greater access to the mainland Chinese market present new opportunities for the industry.

Yet recent developments to enhance investor protection in the wake of the Lehman mini-bond crisis, and future regulatory and legal developments, such as the Anti-Money Laundering Counter-Terrorist Financing (Financial Institutions) Ordinance (AMLO), presents the wealth industry with notable operational and regulatory challenges.



HK sales suitability increasing

Most relevant to intermediaries providing private wealth services are the changes to the Code of Conduct for Persons Licensed by or Registered with the Securities and Futures Commission (Code).

There is now a clear requirement to assess whether an investor has sufficient knowledge and expertise as well as investment experience.

This includes awareness of risks, in the context of the relevant products and markets before a professional investor (PI) under the Securities and Futures (Professional Investor) Rules (PI Rules).

The SFC has noted that a holistic approach may be adopted, however all relevant and reasonable considerations should be taken into account, including whether a client is, or has worked in, the financial sector for at least one year, or has had training or attended courses relevant to the product.

Additionally, where an existing PI invests in a different product type or market, or where a PI has ceased to trade in the relevant product or market for more than two years, further assessment is called for.



Professional investor rules tightened

Proposed revisions to the PI Rules will allow intermediaries to choose how they demonstrate that a person meets the requisite PI asset threshold tests.

This may include continuing to adhere to existing waivers from the PI Rules, using other robust methods of assessment and considering to what extent self-certification is sufficient.

Until the proposals become law, the current PI Rules should be adhered to, for example the requirement to obtain auditor or custodian statements in support of the asset threshold.

From April 2012 failure to conduct appropriate customer due diligence will become a criminal offence under the AMLO.

Regulators are working on guidelines to assist those they regulate in creating and adhering to suitable systems and controls.

The SFC’s approach to regulation is principle-based, and guidance such as the Code applies to intermediaries conducting various regulated activities.



KYC testing procedures face scrutiny

It is incumbent on the PWM intermediaries to consider carefully how best to reflect the relevant guidance, in practical terms, into their KYC policies and procedures, taking the nature of their industry into account. The rationale behind policy content may need to be documented.

It will not be enough to ask clients to represent that they have the requisite knowledge and experience and that they meet the PI asset test.

Internal policies, client due diligence and documentation should be reviewed to ensure compliance, including appropriate disclosure so that a PI understands the consequences of being treated as such.

Assessment of PIs will be carefully viewed by regulators, including where the "examples" are not referred to (eg, because they are inappropriate).



Adequare reporting essential

It is paramount that assessments satisfy the Code, and that the basis of these – and their results – are recorded in writing, including in due course why self-certification alone is sufficient.

PWM personnel must know their regulatory duties, not least under the Code and internal policies. This may require a regular review of training and ongoing compliance monitoring.

This is reinforced by the Hong Kong Securities Institute’s recent launch of a competency guidelines programme and certification (the Certified International Wealth Manager).

As the PWM market continues to develop, PWM intermediaries will need to review regularly, and critically, their internal procedures and compliance, ensure ongoing training of staff and to monitor activities and the keeping of records.

Charlotte Robins is a partner in Norton Rose’s financial services and regulatory practice in Hong Kong

2011年8月17日星期三

全城鋤金管局之一-監察迷債回購協議的落實有失職

OMD calls me already !!!!


在2009年7月22日的迷債回購協議新聞稿有一條文是這樣說的:「協議亦訂明,分銷銀行將會採取特別措施,以公平合理的方式調查和解決有關銷售及分銷其他結構性產品的所有投訴;」,既然金管局和證監會是協議的締結者,她們對監察該協議的落實有不可推卸的責任。 如果和解成數是釐定銀行有沒有以公平合理的方式解決投訴的一項不可缺少的指標,那就有理由鋤金管局和證監會根本沒有監察迷債回購協議的落實,這是嚴重的失職,也是行政失當。為什麼?由於金管局視銀行與客戶的和解為商業活動,即是說金管局不可以承認曾審閱和解協議的內容,況且和解協議內容也可能牽涉私隱問題,那金管局和證監會憑什麼知道銀行在處理投訴時是公平合理呢?因此她的謊話不就是不攻自破嗎? 如果要向申訴專員公署投訴,其實只需5分鐘,步驟如下 1)打開 https://secure1.info.gov.hk/ombudsman/eform_complaintform_tc.shtml, 2)填上必要的資料, 3)填寫投訴詳情時請參考以下理據並視乎需要編輯內容, 在2009年7月22日香港金融管理局(金管局)及證券及期貨事務監察委員會(證監會)與16銀行達成的迷債回購協議新聞稿有一條文是這樣說的:「協議亦訂明,分銷銀行將會採取特別措施,以公平合理的方式調查和解決有關銷售及分銷其他結構性產品的所有投訴;」,既然金管局和證監會是協議的締結者,她們對監察協議的落實有不可推卸的責任。 由於銀行與客戶的個案資料及和解協議內容牽涉私隱,而金管局視銀行與客戶的和解為商業活動,所以金管局沒有權力去審閱銀行與客戶的個案資料及和解協議內容,因此金管局在缺乏必要的數據(特別是和解成數)之下是不可能盡職審查銀行是否以公平合理的方式處理投訴個案,這樣對受迷債回購協議影響的投資者不公平,所以本人有理由相信金管局在監察迷債回購協議的落實上有嚴重的失職和行政失當。 4)按 “Submit” 鍵提交投訴。

2011年8月13日星期六

致上海商業银行:

雷曼事件至今已經差不多三年多,銀行在盡職審查,風險披露,失實陳述,等方面對投資者嘅風險管理,不盡不實,違規銷售、已是鐵一般的事實。今日雖然已有部份苦主已同銀行和解,但要解決雷曼事件,銀行就必需承擔責任。

事實上,所謂和解方案,苦主都迫於無奈接受,銀行並沒有承擔應該承擔嘅責任,苦主都得不到百分之百的賠償,不平等所謂和解方案,其實是將事實染蓋。

本自救組對上海商業银行強烈要求:


1. 對“迷你債券” 購買者,作出百份百賠償。

2. 對“Constellation” 購買者,作出百份百賠償。

3. 對“精明債券” 購買者,作出百份百賠償。因此三種產品同出一徹。

4. 對其它 ” 無低押品的雷曼產品” 購買者,作出百份百賠償。

5. 對17間銀行之所謂“經驗投資者” 一詞作廢。

6. 不能以“風險評級”作為賠償借口。職員沒有解釋“客戶風險評級” 之重要性。以“交功課”、“節省時間” 藉客戶對其銀行之信任來奪取客戶之買賣合約,賺取佣金,沒有了解當中文件重要意義。

7. 在沒有一手“迷你債券”購買者受權下投票,在沒公開、公平、公証、等藉詞委托羅冰咸達成“同議與破產人之方案” 。

8. 對16間銀行與美國雷曼破產人達成恊議披露。以公開、公平、公証、增加透明度表示解決雷曼事件之決心。

9. 保持追究“委托人” 之責任。

『雷曼事件』已讓廣大市民了解所謂“銀行” 有如“睹妨” 。如今銀行艱辛經營與客戶一起成長的結果毀於一旦,實屬不智。況且尚要銀行職員員工擔當“代罪羔羊”,有礙公司團結和未來發展。祈望“雷曼事件” 能早日解決,此乃智者不二之選!


上海商業银行自救組

二零一一年八月十三日

Lehman European arm vexed over claim treatment


Wed Aug 3, 2011 2:50pm

* $8.9 bln claim pooled with other unsecured claims

* Says should be higher-priority customer claim

By Nick Brown

NEW YORK, Aug 3 (Reuters) - Lehman Brothers' (LEHMQ.PK) European brokerage arm has asked a court to classify its $8.9 billion claim against the failed investment bank as a customer claim, a higher-priority category that could afford it full recovery.

In bankruptcy court papers, Lehman Brothers Inc Europe objected to the refusal by James Giddens, the trustee liquidating Lehman's U.S. brokerage, to give the claim customer status.

Giddens told LBIE in May that, as a Lehman affiliate, it could not be treated as a customer, and would be combined with other general unsecured creditors such as bondholder groups that are likely to see only partial repayment on claims.

Customer claims in bankruptcies, conversely, are usually paid in full.

LBIE challenged Giddens' interpretation of bankruptcy law, saying its status as an affiliate does not inherently bar it from asserting valid customer claims.

The claim, if allowed, could eat up a significant portion of the U.S. brokerage's resources for paying back its creditors.

According to Giddens' April report, Lehman Brothers Inc, the U.S. brokerage, has only about $23 billion in assets. It has already allowed $10 billion in claims against it and is facing billions more in asserted claims from other parties.

LBIE's claim will likely be reduced somewhat by offsetting claims against it by Lehman Brothers Inc, but the amounts remain unclear, according to court documents.

"We are reviewing LBIE's objection and intend to respond formally on Sept. 30, in accordance with the proposed litigation schedule," Giddens' office told Reuters on Wednesday in an emailed statement.

Attorneys for LBIE declined to comment Wednesday.

LBIE filed its court request on Monday.

The claims relate to securities traded by LBIE and held on its behalf by Lehman Brothers Inc, according to court papers. Lehman's estate transferred much of its customer accounts to Barclays Plc (BARC.L) and other firms when it filed for bankruptcy, but LBIE's accounts remained with the estate, according to the filing.

Lehman is scheduled on Aug. 30 to seek the court's permission to hold a creditor vote on a plan to exit bankruptcy that would provide creditors an average of only 20 percent recovery on claims. If creditors approve, it could exit bankruptcy late this year or early 2012 and begin paying creditors soon after.

Lehman declared the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history in September 2008, listing $639 billion in assets -- six times more than any other bankrupt U.S. firm. The filing is considered to be a key catalyst to the financial crisis.

The case is In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York, No. 08-13555. (Reporting by Nick Brown, editing by Maureen Bavdek)

Global Financial Strategy - Hong Kong concludes 99% of Lehman cases

Global Financial Strategy - Hong Kong concludes 99% of Lehman cases

2011年8月8日星期一

8月8日「中國銀行(香港)」雷曼苦主在中環德輔道中分行"遍地開花"

2011年8月4日星期四

Lehman Brothers reaches Hong Kong liquidation deal

(AFP) –

HONG KONG — Lehman Brothers said Thursday it had reached a deal to settle more than $20 billion in claims tied to its Hong Kong business after its collapse, which triggered the global financial crisis.

The agreement was hailed as "another milestone" in a complicated liquidation with creditors across the world demanding more than $300 billion from the former Wall Street titan, in one of history's biggest corporate bankruptcies.

Its collapse in September, 2008, after its risky bets on the US housing market turned bad, sent shockwaves through the world banking system.

Lehman said the deal announced Thursday would settle more than $20 billion in "inter-company claims" between it and its collapsed affiliates in Hong Kong, and may speed up the liquidation.

"This is a genuinely exciting development," said Edward Middleton, a partner at KPMG China who is involved in the Hong Kong liquidation process.

"It is a quantum leap in the progress of the Hong Kong liquidations, and I am sure it will assist our colleagues in the US as well," he added.

Last month, the bank said it struck a deal with a group of other unnamed creditors vying for $65 billion of its assets.

Hong Kong was rocked by Lehman's collapse with tens of thousands of investors losing about HK$15.7 billion ($2 billion) they ploughed into so-called minibonds and other complex products backed by failed firm.

The deal Wednesday was not related to an earlier offer by 16 banks, who sold Lehman products, to refund Hong Kong investors most of their money.

2011年8月1日星期一

8月1日「南洋商業銀行」精明、星債苦主在中環總行"遍地開花"