對有關銀行處理雷曼迷債最終方案的建議的意見

對有關銀行處理雷曼迷債最終方案的建議的意見 --迷債關注小組上


這兩天,雷曼迷債苦主陸續收到相關銀行的 “雷曼兄弟迷你債券-最終處理方案的建議”函件.被告知已將可獲分派的押品收回款項存入帳號.函件並附有銀行提出的特惠款項的“接納表格”和 “拒絕表格”.限期2011年7月15日或之前,要選擇其中一份表格簽回.

但是,這兩天我們收到一些相關查詢,不少苦主心中依然憤恨不平.該怎麼辦?為此,我們建議, 於6月26日雷曼苦主大聯盟在灣仔小童群益會召開形勢分析會之時, 研討“迷債抵押品價值與分派款項之差額的責任和追討 及 對銀行的最終處理方案提出反建議”事宜.希望各位迷債苦主踴躍參與意見.包括通過電郵,信件或電話表達意見,以集思廣益,統一認識,進行下一步行動.

其實,迷債事件中,誰是誰非,大家心中明白.金融海嘯兩年多,由於銀行管理層短視,對處理迷債事宜採取推搪拖延策略,擠牙膏式的,受到壓力才給出一點.管理銀行的有關官員包庇銀行,不給力,也造成小投資者不甘損失,就得不斷投訴,不斷示威.年復一年.這樣的內耗,對社會,對政府,對銀行,對銀行從業員及家庭,對投資者及家庭傷害已深.是時候尋求徹底解決辦法,結束這種全輸局面.

Thounsands of government employee are Lehman Minibonds victims

Legislators, police officers, customer officers, government employees did ask protesters to help them to protest for public affairs in HK government cover up of bank frauds.

Monday, June 20, 2011

Protesters not satisfied with the Lehman Brothers minibonds deals have been using the offices of a Democratic Party lawmaker.

One female demonstrator was seen - and filmed - going through security in the West Wing of the Central Government Offices to return her props to the office of the legislator.

The lawmaker reportedly admitted providing the protesters a place where they could meet and store their props but denied breaking any rules.

The Legislative Council secretariat would not comment on whether the legislator had breached its regulations.

It did say, however, that according to its rules, the offices should not be used for private purposes or party business.

Almost full payback for 31,000 minibond investors

Wednesday, June 15, 2011

All 31,000 Lehman minibond holders in Hong Kong have got most of their money back in the past two days, with some being repaid nearly 98 percent.

PricewaterhouseCoopers, the receiver of Lehman Brothers Holdings, said yesterday holders of series 10 to 12, 15 to 23 and 25 to 36 of the minibonds received 71.43 to 95.1 percent of their investment in the structured notes.

As well, seller banks provided ex-gratia payments of 50 percent of any shortfall in recovery, capped at 15 percent of the principal. That means investors have received in total 86 percent to 97.55 percent of their principal.

In April, Lehman Brothers won approval in a US court for a change in settling derivative transactions, defeating an objection from Hong Kong minibond holders.

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"We hope the distributions, which will result in significant and substantial returns, will bring an end to what has been a difficult period for investors," PwC said. TONY LIAW

雷曼苦主大聯盟舉辦7.1(星期五)大遊行

監 管 無 方 禍 香 江

特 首 高 官 要 下 台

日期 : 7月1日(星期五) 時間：下午 1：30p.m.

地點：銅鑼灣東角道崇光百貨(SOGO)側

(銅鑼灣地鐵站 "D3"或"E"出口)

花旗ELN,中銀精明苦主在金管局等候王光亞時遞上請願信

要求證監調查16間銀行售買非迷債產品的系統性違規


證監在2009年迷債集體和解方案中，其中一條款是不再調查16間銀行其他雷曼或結構性產品，包括星債，精債(雷曼及非雷曼) 及ELN的系統性違規，但促請銀行採用所謂加強版處理過別苦主的過案。這是極之荒謬的决定。首先，這决定事前從沒有與苦主相討，證監閉門決定做這事實，強迫苦主接受。證監為了促成人數及金額較大的迷債解决，就犧牲了較小數的其他苦主，目的是欺騙全港市民，營做雷曼快速解决的錯覺，難怪連唐英年司長也懞懞地說，” 雷曼不是巳解决了嗎？” 。所謂加強版，只是讓銀行自己找銀行的另一部門，作” 公平” 的再審查，自己人查自己人，結果不難想像，但金管局為何如此有信心、放心，將這重要任務交托給銀行，逃避應有的責任。16間銀行，也利用了加強版對他們的有利之處，對苦主非常強硬，拒絕賠償或多賠少許，加強版是澈底失敗。金管局說如苦主對加強版不滿，可繼續更進，但再更進已沒有用，只是浪費時間。金管局查苦主及證監查銀行，是整個雷曼事件調查程序，分工合作但缺一不可，也不能互相代替。金管局若查出銀行違規，只惠及個別苦主，但證監若查出銀行違規，就惠及全部苦主，所以效力遠比金管局大，而且賠償成數遠比個別苦主高，例如星債，星展銀行全賠給低風險者，高風臉者很多也賠了七成或更高，但在16間銀行買的星債卻賠少很多或不賠，這不同的結果是因為星展銀行不受迷債方案約束，證監可對星展銀行作系統性調查。ELN渣打的集體賠償也是另一例子。至於精明債券，由於只有16間銀行出售，所以在證監沒有對銀行作系統性調查，所以很少苦主有賠或很低賠率。為什麽同是香港人，同是受銀行騙，卻有如此不平等的待遇？

我們促請證監徹消迷債和解方案中的不查16間銀行其他雷曼或結構性產品系統性調查的條款，依照查星展銀行的方向，包括產品風險定位，銷售訓練，風險披露，銷售章程及文件，等等，去調查16間銀行，並將結果公開，早日達至真正的集體和解。證監諸位，不要以為迷債解决等同雷曼解决，自欺欺人，我們這群苦主會抗爭到底！中環也不知何時才可安寕！

SFC and HKMA welcome Minibond Receivers' announcement

Hong Kong (HKSAR) - The following is issued on behalf of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority:

The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) and the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) are pleased to note the announcements by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), the Receivers of the Minibond collateral, concerning the distribution of the underlying collateral for the Minibond series 10 to 12, 15 to 23 and 25 to 36 (the Relevant Series) to the nominal holders of the Relevant Series via the Clearing Systems in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement with Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc. (Lehman Brothers) (Note 1).

The SFC and the HKMA are also pleased to note that the recovery percentages on a weighted basis are on average 1.6% higher than the indicative recovery percentage stated in the announcement by the Receiver dated March 28, 2011. The recovery of collateral at a higher level, together with the additional ex-gratia payment by the 16 Lehman Brothers' Minibond distributing banks (the Banks), will increase the level of recovery of eligible customers to between 85.7% to 97.5% of their initial investment (Note 2).

The SFC's acting Chief Executive Officer, Mrs Alexa Lam said, "Today's announcements signal the final step to be taken by each of the 16 banks under the agreement reached in July 2009.Since then, each of these banks has implemented a repurchase scheme at its expense, instituted internal re-engineering programmes for systems and controls governing the sale of structured products, implemented the enhanced complaints process (which has paid out in aggregate over $600 million to investors) and all 16 banks have created a fund out of their Minibond commission income to pay for the return of the collateral to the maximum possible extent.

Now the collateral has returned to Hong Kong. The distribution will provide very substantial recovery, certainly much better than would have been achieved by any other means, at no cost to investor.This is a good result for Hong Kong."

"We are pleased to note that the collateral recovery arrangement has been executed and the investors of the relevant Minibond series will benefit from the high level of recovery.This is an important milestone which not only allows investors to avoid lengthy litigation and potentially costly fees and legal uncertainty, but also represents the concerted efforts among regulators, the participating banks and the relevant investors to recover the invested amount as far as practicable," the Deputy Chief Executive of HKMA, Mr Arthur Yuen said.

Notes:

1.The Receivers' announcement is available on PwC's website at (www.pwchk.com/minibonds).The recovery and proposed distribution does not cover customers who bought Minibond series 5 to 7 and 9 because the collateral for these series were securities issued by Lehman Brothers and all collateral claims are unsecured debts in the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. PwC has also been appointed as receivers for the collateral for Minibond series 5 to 7 and 9 and will continue to pursue claims on behalf of the Trustee in the interests of holders of these Minibonds (for further information on Minibond series 5 to 7 and 9, please refer to the FAQs dated January 3, 2011 posted on PwC's website).

2.The 16 Minibond distributing banks are: (1) The Royal Bank of Scotland N.V.

(formerly known as ABN AMRO Bank N.V.); (2) Bank of China (Hong Kong) Ltd; (3) Bank of Communications Co Ltd; (4) The Bank of East Asia, Ltd; (5) Chiyu Banking Corporation Ltd; (6) Chong Hing Bank Ltd; (7) CITIC Bank International (formerly known as CITIC Ka Wah Bank Ltd); (8) Dah Sing Bank Ltd; (9) Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd; (10) Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (Asia) Ltd; (11) Mevas Bank Ltd; (12) Nanyang Commercial Bank, Ltd; (13) Public Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd; (14) Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd; (15) Wing Hang Bank Ltd; and (16) Wing Lung Bank Ltd

2011年6月12日要求王光亞介入雷曼事件 星展苦主和大聯盟發言

蓋棺

證監會行政總裁韋奕禮本周三離職，結束了6年的生涯，作為證監行政總裁，究竟他對香港證券業有甚麼貢獻。

在這6年間，證監對違規行為的打擊頗明顯，例如有多名人士因造市，操縱價值而受重罪，坐牢等，但細心分析，大部份受重罪者，坐牢人士，他們都是一般散戶投資者，相反有多少大行，名人受重罪呢?起碼沒有一個要坐牢，這是否本地經常說的官商勾結，是否反映一般散戶行差踏錯便要嚴懲，而在保險投資者利益方面，究竟有多少保障呢?每天證監樓下雷曼苦主的抗爭，而近年大量公司上市，但同時大量不盡不實，虛假的招股內容，究竟與證監有沒有關係，不要忘記證監有審批的責任，但錯誤卻不要負責，是否合理。

其實全球金融監管機構最大的問題，是罰款制度，以美國為例，美證監經常處罰一眾投行，罰款數百萬至數億元，但這些罰款的原因，但多與欺壓客戶，運作出問題有關，理論上有關罰款應作為教育投資者的基金，或賠償給投資者，但本人經常看到，是這些罰款交給證監後，似乎便是證監的收益，在這情況下監管機構的利益隨時在保障投資者之上，而且不會在最初發生事件時處理，因為這樣的罰款有關，要等待事情惡化時，有大量受害人，他們才能以道德高地，高調處理，要求處於罰款，因此過去多年，證券業的問題越來越嚴重。因此希望下任行政總裁，真的以保障金融及證券業為大前提，否則災難仍會不斷出現。

信誠證券劉兆祥（作者為證監會持牌人士）電郵：andes@pru.com.hk

另類歡送 獲雷曼苦主示威送別

另類歡送　獲雷曼苦主示威送別

人生有起有落，證監會行政總裁韋奕禮回顧過去6年證監生涯，發現高、低潮均與雷曼倒閉及迷債有關，臨別秋波，一班為數約廿人的雷曼苦主繼續以「咚咚喳喳」的示威方式在證監會總部樓下送別韋奕禮。

「誤以為製造噪音有用」

雷曼苦主在中環遮打大廈證監會總部樓下示威近年成為中環街景之一，昨日一班示威者繼續高舉韋奕禮的肖像大鬧特鬧。韋奕禮對此情此景只感無奈。他回應說，曾邀請示威人士到證監會詳述自己投資迷債的情況，希望根據實際情況提供協助，結果卻無人應約。

「示威者聽從了差勁的建議，誤以為製造噪音有用，可是，這並非證監會的處事方式。」雖然雷曼倒閉及迷債事件令他一頭煙，但韋奕禮坦言，在證監工作最成功的事，是替大部份苦主爭取到賠償，「他們比買入控（005）的投資者更好，他們可取回大部份賠償，同一時期買入控，至今仍然要輸兩成」。

本港16間分銷迷債銀行今年3月就公佈，連同額外特惠款項，3.1萬名合資格苦主可收回迷債本金85%至96.5%。電盈（008）小股東大聯盟昨晚亦發信，感謝韋奕禮兩年前阻止電盈私有化，保障小投資者權益。

先赴大馬旅遊再返英

任務已成，韋奕禮昨晚隨即飛往馬來西亞旅行，放鬆心情，下周二才回港收拾細軟返英國，準備9月1日出任英國金管局消費者及市場營運部營運總監。根據證監最新年報，韋奕禮2011年度年薪933萬元。

Changing of the guard

With the departure of SFC chief Martin Wheatley, will the watchdog revert to a lighter touch on regulation - or maintain its rage, asks Jasper Moiseiwitsch

As Martin Wheatley leaves this week as the chief executive of the Securities and Futures Commission (SFC), Hongkongers might be wondering who and what are coming next.

The relevance for investors is clear: the new chief will be the last line of defence between the public and another Lehman minibond type of disaster.

The role of the regulator is especially important in Hong Kong, where individuals form a large part of the market, and poor corporate governance is common among listed firms.

"The volume of trading in warrants and futures of the Hong Kong public market is well above the participation seen anywhere else. A strong regulator is the only person who can provide checks and balances to this kind of market," says Alex Duperouzel, a managing director of ComplianceAsia, a consultancy that helps intermediaries comply with SFC regulations.

The commission provides a recent example of how things can go wrong. The SFC on May 24 published the results of a "mystery shopper" survey, in which the commission sent its own people into banks and brokerages, pretending to want to invest. The purpose was to see how well the products were explained.

In the survey, the commission found that, in 12 per cent of cases, sales agents failed to ask about a client's risk appetite when pitching an investment.

The commission also found examples in which sales staff would coach shoppers on risk-profile questionnaires to prod them to take a higher risk rating.

And in the cases when a salesman recommended an investment to a mystery shopper, 16 per cent of the time the agent failed to properly explain the investment, according to the SFC.

The SFC said its mystery shopper campaign showed sales agents failing to understand or explain basic features of the products they were selling. In one example, a shopper posing as a 74-year-old woman with HK$1 million in fixed deposits was advised to invest in leveraged futures and options, with the suggestion that this was a way the woman could avoid risk.

Although the survey shows just small ways in which investors might be vulnerable, the bigger danger is low corporate governance - particularly where management strips cash from listed firms, effectively robbing investors.

The Lehman minibond default was the defining event of Wheatley's tenure. It obliged the SFC to take a more forceful approach to regulation.

The question for investors is, as the Lehman affair fades from memory, will the SFC revert to its tendency towards light regulation?

There are those in the industry who argue that investors would benefit from a looser regulatory touch.

For example, the SFC has made it sufficiently difficult to sell equity-linked notes (ELNs) to public investors that this market has slowed significantly, issuers say.

ELNs are notes embedded with a put option on equities. The SFC's new rules requiring a cooling-off period on investments (in which individuals may change their minds after agreeing to buy it) have affected the instrument.

Issuing banks need to hedge their positions when they sell the instrument. If investors decide during the cooling-off period that they do not want the investment, the bank has to unwind that hedge.

The effect of the new rules is that many banks have since decided that ELNs are not worth the trouble, which largely explains why the product has gone quiet.

ELNs have long been a staple of Hong Kong's structured products market, thanks in part to their simplicity. But now, as they thin out, complaints have arisen that investors are being deprived of a useful instrument.

Investors are also complaining about the amount of paperwork recent SFC reforms are forcing them to complete to invest in certain products.

Fidelity did a survey of investors in February and found that many individuals declined to buy a mutual fund because the process of determining a person's suitability for the investment could take up to two hours.

The survey found that 38 per cent of investors believed the new procedures took too much time, and 27 per cent said they did not add value.

Perhaps most strikingly, the survey reported that 32 per cent changed from investing in mutual funds to other products to avoid the process.

"A high number said they would rather go into individual stocks than do all the procedures required to buy a fund. Or they will buy IPOs, foreign exchange or bonds," says Kerry Ching, Fidelity's country head in Hong Kong. "The unintended consequence of tightened regulation is that investors may buy something that is a higher risk than a mutual fund."

Todd James, head of wealth services for the private bank BSI, says: "I know investors are very frustrated by documentation. They are overwhelmed."

The regulator, therefore, faces a damned-if-you-do, damned-if-you-don't dilemma. It was pilloried during the recent financial crisis by minibond investors, who asked how the commission could permit such a product to be sold to the public. Now it's getting complaints about being too intrusive from the financial services sector.

In between these parties is the government, which will appoint the next head of the SFC as it tries to promote Hong Kong as a financial centre in light of growing competition from Shanghai.

The SFC has to balance all these interests and not always with the independence it would like.

"Hong Kong needs someone who also has the necessary tact to navigate a set of key stakeholders, including the government, stock exchange, mercantile exchange [and] mainland regulators," says Christine Loh Kung-wai, the chief executive of Civic Exchange, a public policy think tank. "It is not an easy job because there are so many vested interests."

jasper.moiseiwitsch@scmp.com

請找出該案件編號,及法官判詞.是以後對銀行訴訟時可引用的判例.對苦主很有利.

附上09年金管局指引,不準銀行在和解協議上有禁止客戶再披露資料的條款.銀行有違指引所做的規定應該是無效的.

再:請大家抄出各自投資的系列產品,在08年2月,3月,4月,5月至少四個月月結單上,產品贖回參考價的升跌百分比(作比較).用作自己投訴個案及舉報107時,舉證銀行根本沒有遵循金管局08年3月(根据當時投資市場的波動,提昇投資產品的風險程度)的指引.違規,講大話及使投資者失去落車機會.

本局檔號：B1/15C
致：所有註冊機構
　　行政總裁

敬啟者：

就有關銷售投資產品的投訴作出公平合理的和解安排

據了解有多間註冊機構與其客戶就一些投訴已達成和解或正就和解進行商討，其中包括涉及銷售雷曼兄弟相關投資產品的投訴。金管局支持這個做法，並鼓勵註冊機構在遵循正確程序的情況下，盡快解決任何與客戶的爭議。

就此而言，本人希望指出註冊機構應留意它們有責任以誠實公平的方法處理所有投訴。尤其貴機構在處理客戶投訴及與客戶商討和解安排時，應確保：

整個過程公平、合理；給予客戶充足時間考慮註冊機構提出的和解條款；

讓客戶有合理機會徵詢第三方（如親屬、朋友、法律或其他專業顧問）的意見；及

和解協議不應載有條文禁止為任何調查目的而向證監會、金管局或其他執法機關披露資料。

銀行監理部
助理總裁
萬少焜 
2009年3月5日

Lehmans 'gave no warning' on CDOs

Lehmans 'gave no warning' on CDOs
Elisabeth Sexton
June 2, 2011

Lehman Brothers Australia breached its duty to its clients says Tony Meagher, SC.

COMMONWEALTH Bank warned its clients about relying on credit ratings when investing in complex financial products but Lehman Brothers Australia did not, the Federal Court heard yesterday.

Tony Meagher, SC, for a class action of 72 local councils, charities and churches, said Lehman breached its duty to its clients because unlike its rivals it failed to disclose that credit rating agencies did not measure all the risks of buying synthetic collateralised debt obligations, or CDOs.

The class action seeks $250 million in compensation from the liquidator of the collapsed investment bank for losses incurred on CDOs sold by Lehman and its forerunner, Grange Securities.
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A research report headed ''Understanding the risks of synthetic CDOs'' published by Commonwealth Bank in 2006 said these products were riskier than similarly rated corporate bonds.

The report said investors should be aware of the ''limitations of only relying on the credit rating''.

Synthetic CDOs offered higher returns than corporate bonds ''to compensate investors for the difficulties faced in selling in the secondary market'', it said.

A firm specialising in advising local government authorities, Grove Research and Advisory, also published warnings which Lehman failed to disclose to its clients, Mr Meagher said.

CDOs suffered from ''high illiquidity'', Grove said in a report circulated in 2004.

''In other words, forced sellers will find it very difficult to find a buyer.''

This week, Mr Meagher referred to evidence in February and March from officials from the three lead members of the class action, Wingecarribee Shire Council, City of Swan and Parkes Shire Council, which he said showed that the views of rating agencies were ''critical'', ''dominant'' and ''vital'' to their investment decisions.

Councils in New South Wales were also subject to a ministerial order restricting their investments to a defined list, which included products carrying specified ratings by Standard & Poor's, Moody's Investors Service or Fitch Ratings.

Queried by Justice Steven Rares yesterday about evidence that Swan had a copy of the bank report, Mr Meagher said it had arrived during a changeover of finance staff at the council ''and that's as far as [the evidence] goes''.

Reading from transcript of evidence given in March by Swan's outgoing finance manager in 2006, Rajah Senathirajah, Justice Rares said: ''He says he might have put it on the file, paid no attention to it.''

Mr Meagher said other documents proved that Lehman, and before it Grange, knew that credit rating agencies did not assess risks associated with price volatility and illiquidity.

Standard & Poor's and Fitch only assessed the risk of a default causing ''the first dollar of loss'' and did not measure the likelihood of an investor losing all its capital.

Closing submissions continue today.

Read more: http://www.smh.com.au/business/lehmans-gave-no-warning-on-cdos-20110601-1fglj.html#ixzz1O2AGV7sh