China economist's views

I know friend's brother that is an economist and works as director for H-share company in Beijing. In fact, most directors and think tanks there which are major in economy as background in Beijing do know about CDO in US and Minibonds problems in HK much more that Prof. Chan will admit (because he works in HK government and has to cover up for Mr. Yam):

真想不到，會有港澳研究中心主任寫精明債券，還在亞洲周刊登出。精明債券之前可以說是零報道，不知道這位主任有沒有看過我的精明債券Blog和迷你債券Blog？中國有很多研究主任，我不知道這位研究主任的影響力有多大，但總算有人關注了。

「精明債券」原是糊塗帳？　．蒯轍元

大摩發源於美國、被美國限制銷售的結構性產品，為何能在香港肆無忌憚地賣給普通投資者？
蒯轍元﹕中國智業發展戰略委員會副主任，港澳研究中心主任，中國社會科學院《青年塑造未來》主編、特約研究員。著有《世紀之交的求索》《中國崛起與挑戰》《危機下的中國》及長篇小說《商界恩怨》《角逐》《囫圇在愛河》等，主編《中國經濟大辭典》《中國市場經濟建設全書》等。二零零八年香港金融市場最值得注意的就是雷曼迷你債券事件，但除雷曼債券之外還有不少地雷，其中跟雷曼債最相似的要數大摩（摩根士丹利）發行的「精明債券」。二零零八年十月八日，大摩就「精明債券」系列十、十一、十二發出常見的自問自答，實際就是一個變相的「死亡通知書」。其中一個問題是：「當債券被贖回時投資者將會收到多少？」回答是「以現在的市場價格，我們預計投資者將會失去他們所有的原始投資本金」。十二月八日又布九個系列的CDO（債務抵押證券）發生信用違約事件。投資者幾乎顆粒無收，損失是何等的慘烈……只要市場的大環境不能變好，「精明債券」其他系列也將會步這些系列的後塵，最終結果現在就可預料——除了本金盡失的系列外，剩餘系列大多損失了大部分本金，嚴重的只剩下幾分錢。據統計，大摩發行的精明債券系列共發行了二十二個系列，大約港幣二百二十億元（約二十八點四億美元），幾乎相當於雷曼迷你債券的兩倍。但當初沒有投資者想到，包裝精美的「精明債券」卻孕育著巨大的風險。根據其發行章程，這些債券大多和一系列的公司和主權實體的信用掛，但只要其中一個信用體發生公司和主權信貸事件，而不是全部信用主體發生信用違約事件，大摩就可以提前贖回整個債券，並按當時的債券價值把餘額付給投資者。因此，此類產品的風險要比對單一信用主體的信用調期成幾何級數的增加。然而，無論是大摩還是分銷銀行都未把這一事實、債券操作的原理、特定的風險向客戶予以詳細披露。尤其是大摩並未向投資者披露資產池中究竟有哪些信用主體，平均評級是多少，多少信用主體發生信用違約事件即開始吃到本金——這正是「精明債券」最大風險的關鍵所在。由於不知道抵押物是為何物，加上銷售人員的熱情推薦，這使得投資者誤認為所承擔的只是宣傳廣告上那幾個信用主體的信用風險，而根本不知還要承擔抵押物的信用風險。這簡直就是故意蒙蔽投資者，形同欺騙。此外，根據發行章程，理論上講任何產品都可以成為抵押物的信用主體。而大摩賦予自己及其附屬公司無限的權力，可以對上述抵押物進行無限的更換和買賣，只要大摩可以獲利。而這種條款是很難發生在機構投資者身上的。其實大摩的這種銷售手法在歷史上並不罕見，大摩衍生產品部前僱員弗蘭克·帕特諾伊所著的《誠信的背後：摩根士丹利圈錢遊戲黑幕》（英文原名F.I.A.S.C.O.）對大摩銷售衍生產品的方式方法多有述。書中大量披露了大摩還銷售過其他經過包裝以後看似安全但是實藏風險的產品，但投資者往往對所謂的世界知名投行抱有不切實際的幻想，並被他們表面的虛名所蒙蔽。而恰恰就是這些知名的投行，由於利益的驅動，毫無誠信可言。一九九四年十二月美國奧蘭治縣因投資衍生產品虧損超過十九億美元，瀕臨破產。書中提到「截至一九九八年中，奧蘭治縣一共提出十五起訴訟，控告了二十八個被告，其中包括二十家華爾街公司」，「奧蘭治縣堅持在民事訴訟中追討摩根士丹利和其他公司，聯邦調查仍然在進行當中。一九九八年六月，美林終於堅持不住了，支付了四億美元的巨額和解費。在華爾街訴訟和解史上名列第五」。經過這一系列事件後，美國「證券交易委員會似乎也受到啟發，終於正式通過了強迫上市公司披露擁有的衍生產品種類和風險」。由於美國曾經發生過因銷售衍生產品而導致投資者破產或資不抵債的嚴重情況，這些結構性產品只能賣給有一定規模的機構投資者像對沖基金等。然而，這些發源地都在美國的結構性產品，卻在香港隨便發行給普通投資者，一些老人家連「棺材本」都被騙進去，這不但讓人懷疑這些投行的誠信與道德，也讓我們質疑監管機構為何會批准這樣的產品銷售給零售投資者？「蒼蠅不叮無縫的蛋」。像大摩這樣的投行之所以在香港肆無忌憚的推銷衍生結構性票據給零售投資者，一定是做了充分研究，也肯定鑽了香港監管當局對衍生結構性產品監管不嚴和對此類金融產品缺乏警惕的漏洞。根據美國以往的經驗，大摩肯定是估計到了這種衍生結構性產品發生違約的可能性，並對這種違約的可能性在香港出現的前景做出了預測和提前的安排。例如在發行章程中加入大量的免責條款。從雷曼迷你債券到精明債券，這已經不是單一事件監管的失誤，而是香港金融監管體制系統性的失職，是對類似於大摩這樣的投行所犯錯誤的姑息和縱容，而這種姑息和縱容確是以香港金融市場的穩定和普通民眾的慘痛損失作為代價的，教訓不可以說不深刻。如果監管當局再不對此予以重視，同類的事件還會發生。隨著全球金融市場形勢的逐步惡化，如何能幫助CDO投資者盡可能減少損失，變成了刻不容緩的問題。「雷曼迷你債券」事件已在香港引起了一場風暴，而「精明債券」問題卻是另一個潛在的火藥桶，香港監管當局不應再裝糊塗，或做事後諸葛，應擔負起它們應該擔負的監管責任，讓香港成為真正的金融中心。■

精明債券 10, 11,12 2月26日會公佈得個 0 的贖回價了

Reviews to Legco on bank faults

After reviews on Legco session on 23/2/09 again, most HK government offcials in fact were pointed their fingers at banks especially on our LBV complaints to legco on bank faults:

1. Prof. Chan did concluded that the reasons that there were so many Minibonds sold by banks was because HK banks looked for high commission during the sales of Minibonds thru he never pointed out that from our complaints also pointed out that bonds sales yielded very low commission to bank profits.

2. Yam put the blames on high volumn of sales of Minibonds to the demand of HK market and later on during 2007/8 he blame the banks for all these hard sales of these high risks products to customers and some of banks even refused his demand that Minibonds to be sold as high risks products. In fact, our LBV complaints on SFC/HKMA reports on Minibonds to Legco did pointed out Shanghai Commercial Banks did listed Minibonds as low risk products.

3. SFC was allowing Minibonds to be sold in HK depending on the supply and demand of the markets and the risk level of the investors and all informations must be disclosed to their customers in wording. Right now SFC is looking into Shanghai Commercial Banks for all their wrong doing and also nearly all the banks that sold Minibonds with our LBV complaints. There are also similar sales of these structured products in Europe and lots of lawsuits but nobody did pointed out that structured products were never sold in public banking pretending to be bonds as HK was doing but actually they were false bonds. Right now SFC is already started to put high risk printed in bold letters in all new trust funds documents in HK.

4. Choi, DCE of HKMA, did gave us a hint that HK government especially HKMA was actually promoting Minibonds sales in banks for he said that bonds are not fit for most customers in public banking (for most companies bonds needed to be bought at private banks) and only Minibonds fit HK customers (to be bought at much cheaper price). In our LBV complaints to Legco of the HK police investigations, HK police was asked to search banks records on companies bonds sales records of banks such as Shanghai Commercial Banks for there are actually companies bonds sales happening in HK for some customers in some banks such as HSBC and not for other smaller banks such as Shanghai Commercial Bank and these smaller banks started to sell false bonds such as Minibonds to customers to make huge profits.

Prof. Chan , idiot?

I watch cable TV on Legco session live tonight after demonstrate in Legco this morning. I can't believe that Prof. Chan never read about Minibonds before Lehman defaults but he had given a speech in N.Y. about how HK gov. would deal with CDOs in 2007 and informed HKMA to find CDO products in HK banks and HK insurrance companies. The advertisement for Minibonds were shown in last five years in financial newspapers, that mean Prof. Chan never read HK financial newspapers but only international news and it is very strange to locate such a person for government job in charge of HKMA and SFC. Legco members do not read financial news, that fair since they should care about more social problems in HK but not for economists that never know what happens in HK banks and let him to be in charge of HK financial matters. All the professors and Ph.D I knew from my University all knew what happens in the markets, like Professor in economics act as advisor to HKMA and editors for financial newspaper, Professor in electronic knew what where their students are working in the factories, their products and new type of products in developement etc. etc

HK Gov. cover up of bank frauds

I watched cable TV today on live Legco session, and Yam is still protecting the banks by misrepresentation and omission of the true nature and risk of the so-called Minibond.

1. Yam blame CDO's crisis a once happened in a hundred years to drop in value during 2008. I knew these since 2007, but the banks never told me that the Minibonds I bought contains these CDO that were high risks. So Yam is trying to hide away from his mismanagement of banks and Yam is involved in cover up of these facts.

2. HKMA did not check from bank whether their customers bought the Minibonds from wealth management accounts. Yam said that the public banks are not supposed to check for their customers after they bought the Minibonds. For wealth management accounts, the banks are supposed to look after customers account if their products went from low risk to high risks. The omission of these facts prove that Yam is helping banks to cover up their faults.

3. His under secretary representing HKMA blame the banks to refuse to raise the Minibonds from low risk to high risk. So HKMA is putting all the faults to banks without acknowledge that they were involved to allow banks to sell these false bonds. There were some complaints that banks were selling false bonds, and Yam is covering these faults up saying there are very few complaints about the false bonds.

4. SFC is also trying to cover up the complaint of Minibonds brocedure mislead the customers thinking Minibonds are just bonds for their faults together with HKMA, HK government to let banks to sell minibonds as false bonds.

5. Nobody believed that HK government did not knew about Minibonds in banks, pls see my link in discuss.com.hk http://www.discuss.com.hk/viewthread.php?tid=9059814&extra=&page=9 #131 because these are a very curious things. I read in all Chinese newspapers and there are so many discussion there, but nobody point out as I do that it ok for Legco members not knowing about Minibonds but not for HK government official in charge of financial matters.

Reports of Minibonds crimes to news media

引用:
原帖由 chukwokhung 於 2009-2-9 10:57 PM 發表
大聯盟二月底會有演説，向外國和本地記者，解釋迷債的欺詐成分。最初我以爲只是比外國記者，現在大聯盟證實還包括本地記者，這樣應該會有些作用，雖然不及登報紙廣告震撼。大聯盟是擔心，廣告的 ...
I guess so, that why I has not replied to your email thru I agreed with you in our conversation. There should be many reporters in financial newspaper that understand these crimes (bad milk in financial market) and even some involved in settup up these advertisements in the newspaper. I know editors of these newspaper worked as advisor for HKMA before. If we go thru newspapers, I won't be surprised that more informations will leak out, not less.

Shanghai Commercial Bank faults

Shanghai Commercial Bank top management is involved in forcing their branch managers to sell Minibonds products to customers as Bonds knowing these Minibonds were high risk products.

To : Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd.

cc: 香港金融管理局 銀行服務投訴組, SFC

Dear Madam / Sir,

In related your letter on 24th, Dec. 2008 . the following is observed for my complaint that you sold structure products to me pretending that these are bonds.

a) The Bank's due diligence was faulty, resulting in a rating of the Minibond, Constellation and Octave Notes as "Low to Medium Risk", considerably downplaying the product's true risk level. The bank had not sent me my copy of rating in your records dated on 20th June 2005 and none of the others copy I signed later with Ms Cheung checking the risk tolerance level for me later. In fact, these facts are investegated by the HK police and you are also required to send me the copy of my risk tolerance level to me. (And in two months time up to now at 14th, April, 09, the SCB still never send me any copy of my risk tolerance level)

b) The Bank intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and chacteristics of the Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes, omitted the material risk associated with this product because the Bank understand the true nature and risk of the (Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes) which I later called Minibond in the following notes,but the Bank want to make greater profit for them to replace the Minibond sale as bonds sales.

c) The Bank provided me with incomplete information on the Minibond. There are no mentioned of CDO involved even in the Collateral which stated that these are securities while I was told that these are bonds.

d) The Bank's consistence over 5-6 years in representing the risk of the Minibond as Medium Risk strongly suggests that the Bank either committed intentional misrepresentation and misleading, or that the Bank intentionally proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond. This is already contract to my intention on buying A rated companies bonds that are Low Risk.

1. Faulty Due Diligence

In the letter I received from the Bank, it states that "appropriate for your then risk tolerance level". My contention is that Shanghai Commercial Bank's was faulty, to say the least.

Evidence is as follows:
-a) It was never pointed out to me that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities and that the Minibond's underlying collateral CDO's key asset was CDS with many entities.
-b) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated CDO" or "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond. It was never explained to me what was a CDO, what comprised of a CDO.
-c) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Nor that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO usually consists of tranches with debt at various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-d) I was never told that the most important feature of a synthetic CDO is the tranching of credit risk.
-e) I was never told that the Synthetic CDO's value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Nor that the Minibond's collateral would consist of CDS with many entities which could be in various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-f) I was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked with the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked with many other entities.
-g) I was never told that there was no detailed information being provided on the Synthetic CDO's CDS entities & entities' credit rating, no information regarding the Synthetic CDO portfolio's industry concentration percentage, no information on the impact of the number of portfolio event defaults to the principal loss (e.g. 5%-10% default event could result in 100% principal loss, etc.). I was never told that the Minibond's value would be greatly affected by the default event of underlying Synthetic CDO's CDS entities.
-h) and I was never told that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO could have portfolio average credit quality at BBB / BBB- level which is very different rating from AAA rating.

The Bank should have cautioned its clients about the risk related to the Synthetic CDO collateral. The Bank should also have requested the Minibond
issuer to disclose related CDS information (e.g. CDS reference entities name and credit rating, percentage of portfolio held in each credit rating category, the relationship of reference entities' default rate to the consequent principal loss percentage, etc.), and should have sent such information to the Minibond purchasers /or should have notified the Minibond purchasers of the availability of such information.

I contend that, instead of exercising due diligence, the Bank in fact collaborated, I would suggest fraudulently, with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the Synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.

2. Misrepresentation, Omission of Material Risk
The Minibond was presented as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities". Risk associated with Synthetic CDO collateral and many other undisclosed reference entities was not disclosed. This amounts to misrepresentation and omission of disclosure of true risk.

Further, I was never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and I was not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.

When I was told by Shanghai Commercial Bank about Lehman's bankruptcy in Sept,2008, I was not too worried about my investment in the Minibond. I thought, the 7 reference entities were sound and thus they should be able to pay/repay their interest & debt to the Minibond holders. And the bank manager Mr. Lo told me that there should also be interest payment because Lehman is only look after the trading platform.

3. Incomplete Information on the Minibond
The Minibond's only assets are CDO collateral and Swap agreements. The CDO collateral information was in fact, not only relevant but also crucial material information about the Minibond.

The collateral information was not available at the time of the purchase. The information which was provided to me at the time of purchase was incomplete and insufficient to allow me to make an informed and educated decision to purchase the Minibond. When the collateral information finally became ready & available (usually days before the issue date), the Bank failed to follow up and pass such information on to me. As I had read in yahoo.com that CDO's are bad milk two years ago, I would have definitely cancelled my purchase and requested a full refund, as the information would have contained elements which would have been totally against my objectives for the money that I put into the Minibond.

I was very careful and selective about the 7 reference entities due to the long lock-up period of 4-7 years. To say the least, 'credit linked to 7+100 or more entities' is totally beyond my risk tolerance range for the money. My money was in saving accounts before it was put into this pseudo Minibond.

I would not buy any non A rated companies bonds, even US government bonds as bank understand these when they sold me the Minibonds.

Banks are regulated bodies and are required to provide clients with adequate disclosure of relevant material information, especially for derivative products, in addition to the "Honesty and Fairness" and "Due Diligence". The Bank was, and is, obligated to provide to its clients or notify them of the availability of collateral information that is material information on the Minibond. But the Bank notified me about that they keep looking into information on the risk material disclosure regarding Minibond collateral information and they are all AAA grades. And many of them are different from what they stated later they look at these at the relevant time.

4. Prospectus and Bank's Duty of Care of Clients

In the letter from the Bank (per attachment), it stated that "These rating have been taken from the Product marketing materials, the propectus and would have been publicly available at the relevant time".
a) Not all the relevant material information was made available to me, nor was it discussed with me. The collateral information (or its availability) was never made available to me, nor was it mentioned to me.

"2.Incomplete Information on the Minibond".

The definition of "public available" should at least mean that clients have been told about the name and readiness and availability of relevant material documents. Otherwise, how could clients know what kind of documents exist and are available to them? The bank is not a library which provides information only upon request. The Bank was selling a highly complex credit derivative product to its retail clients and should have properly and fully informed them of all the risks involved.

b) What was the Bank's duty of care to its clients?

SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".

Or should the bank's duty of care be re-defined as: "For a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond, the responsibility of Bank's sales staff is to provide the minimum information to clients, even if the minimum information could be misrepresenting and misleading and, in addition, providing the prospectus to clients only upon request?"
c) Banks' responsibility in selling such a complex credit derivative product to retail clients includes: due diligence on complex derivative products, proper procedures at the point of sale, and the training and supervision of relationship managers. SFC Code of Conduct requires banks "when providing services to clients in derivative products to "assure themselves that the clients understand the nature and risks of the products"

What kind of training and procedures were given by the Bank’s management to the sales staff on complex derivative products like the Minibond?
What was the minimum true nature and risk information that a Bank staff was required to tell a client, other than "not principal-protected on the condition that it was credit-linked to 7 reference entities"?

5. Breach of Code of Conduct, Banks' Duty of Care of Clients

I had few meetings with Ms. Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo of Shanghai Commercial Bank for buying Minibonds. Here are the facts and risks of the Minibond which she mentioned to me:

- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities; She commented that the 7 companies in this series were a very good choice even comparing to reference entities used in other Minibond series;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.

It was obvious that Ms Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo breached SFC Code of Conduct on "explain the nature and risks of the products they were selling".
Ms Jenny Cheung misrepresented the Minibond and omitted most of the risk as mentioned above.

The Bank as a distributor, and Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo as an HKMA registered Bank staff, should have a good understanding of the true nature of credit derivative products like the Minibond, and have an obligation to brief the clients about material disclosure. Both Shanghai Commercial Bank and Jenny Cheung, Thomas Lo failed to deliver such requirements.

SFC Code of Conduct requires banks to ensure that their staff is properly trained.

What kind of training and procedure did the Bank provide to its staff on selling credit derivative products like the Minibond? Why do all the Minibond holders find that the Minibond is today a totally different product from the one which was described to us at the time of sale? Why none of the staff ever explained to us all the untold truths and risks of the Minibond?

6. Banks' Criteria for Categorizing/Profiling Retail Customers

The Bank stated " according to the Bank's records, the level of risk that you were prepared to accept was "medium"/"balanced growth".

a) Did the Bank expect their retail clients to be able to understand the Minibond's Issuer Prospectus 80%+ based on this {age & education level & investment experience & investment object}formula?

b) Does the same logic apply to banks' registered staff? If yes, why is it that none of them provided proper explanation on the Minibond's true nature and risks, other than claiming that they gave the prospectus to their clients?

c) Can the Bank publish the exact criteria that would qualify a person to understand the true nature and risk of a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond?

d) How did the Bank derive such a logic / formula?

In the letter from Shanghai Commercial Bank, it is stated that " the bank considerd the Products as being "low to medium risk", which was appropriate for your then risk tolerance level".

The Minibond were rated as "Low Risk to Medium Risk Investments". This wrong rating is evidence that the Bank either did not truly understand this complex credit derivative product or intentionally downplayed its risk level in order to promote Minibond sales. In fact, by every measure, the Minibond was an “Extremely High Risk Investment”.

Yours sincerely,

立法會研究雷曼兄弟

2009年2月5日 星期四 下午2:56
收件人:
slchan@legco.gov.hk
=================================
意見書 致：香港特別行政區立法會研究雷曼兄弟相關迷你債券及結構性金融產品所引起的事宜小組委員會

Banks involved : Shanghai Commercial Bank - SCB

引言 金管局和證監會收到的衆多雷曼迷債投訴，主要針對銀行的不當銷售，有誤導性的，也有違規性的。 迷債 = 抵押品CDO + 掉期合約(包括跟7個公司破產事件挂鉤). 較少人提到的是，銀行無向客戶提供一些重要的資料，又無向客戶説明一些重要的產品特點和風險，特別是關抵押品CDO的性質和風險。The banks had committed the crime of SFC 107.

金管局, 証監會的謎債事件調查，都指出發行文件有寫“不保本”。可都沒有指出：從銀行銷售人員到迷債顧客都認為這個“不保本”隻是跟7個挂鉤公司有破產事件有關。 為甚麼會出現這種大規模的沒有瞭解產品真實本質，誤解風險的現象？銀行/銷售人員對於產品的特點，性質和風險到底有什么了解?“香港銀行業向來依據最高的專業守則經營”到底是什么？ 銀行是否像图书馆一样，如果客户要求了，就把资料給客户。卻沒有向客戶介紹產品相關的重要資料的責任和義務？ 政府和政府部門應該是以保障大眾利益為第一位，而不能為了保障大企業的利益來跟銀行一起鑽法律漏洞. 殺雞取蛋的做法，會失去了大眾的信心和信任。會對香港的金融中心以及銀行股東的長遠利益造成長遠的危害。在一個金融業發達的城市，消費者權利之一，是保障他們在使用金融服務時權益不會受損。 希望委員會能對以下疑問，作出調查，並將結果公開。

希望各位委員在調查此事件時， 挑(2005-2008)幾個系列的文件，過目一下，也可以瞭解一下文件的內容，文件的讀者不是”迷宗”，黃元山這樣的專業人士。各位委員猜想一下甚麼樣的普通銀行客戶可以明白這個迷你債卷的真實特點，性質和風險, 以及哪些“特點，性質和風險”屬於銀行應該直接向客戶解釋清楚的。

証監會、金管局的產品審批

1. 証監會、金管局當初審批通過迷你債券時曾經跟那些部門人員咨詢過？
Were there anyhigh level HK government top officials involved? Any cover up of the cases? Prof. Chan is clearly involved with cover up of bank frauds.

2. 金管局，証監會，和銀行的各相關部門審查過產品銷售章程(Prospectus)后，是否認為迷你債券 作為品牌來銷售沒有實質資產的所謂的「信貸掛鈎票據」，是一個合適且不會誤導一般小存户的品牌(brand name)？ 這個抵押品風險發生的機會非常高的「假債券」不是高風險產品，而是超高風險。銀行爲什麽覺得「假債券」可以賣給保守型和平穩型的存户？
Do HKMA allowed these to happen, any inspection of banks sales documentsby HKMA for these risks? In fact HKMA did not fully do many inspections of Banks that led to mis-selling of these structure products.

3. 儘管迷你債券／信貸掛鈎票據 是沒有實際資產，多數只有CDO(抵押債項債券)/ Synthetic CDO(合成抵押債項債券)作抵押品，有著長達4-7年鎖定期限、隱藏著復雜的掉期合約衍生產品及相關風險的種種陷阱。 金管局，証監會，和銀行的各相關部門是否認為： 普通银行职员能够完全的理解并向大眾解释清楚产品的真实本质和相关风险？ 因此是適合於由銀行向普羅大眾、一般存户銷售的產品？
Are these CDO used to replace bonds sales in HK as HK government wanted to push these false bonds sales in HK banks? 政務司司長唐英年在接受傳媒訪問時表示，香港要維持國際金融中心的地位，允許市場存在金融衍生工具是理所當然的事4. 金管局，証監會，和銀行的各相關機構和相關部門是否認為：向普羅大眾銷售時，是否應該於產品介紹中明確指出這個產品其實是沒有實際資產的，投資於「迷你債券」的資金不是直接投資到信貸掛鈎企業？

While Bank informed me that all money are paid to invest in bonds while they knew these were used to buy CDOs.

.銀行是否認為沒有必要特地強調迷你債券沒有實際資產？因為有沒有實際資產對於迷你債券的真实本质和相关风险是不重要的？

Did the local banks believed in Lehman Brothers will not steal our money as most of Minibonds related to Lehman Brothers? I heard from international lawyers that in fact these PIFL Minibonds are controlled by HSBC and Lehman Brothers and Lehman Brothers put all their high risk CDO under these Minibonds for HK customers to bear the risks. HSBC still keeps the collaterals.

5. “證監會行政總裁韋奕禮表示、證監會角色並非要監察投資產品價格是否穩定、而是要確保所批核之投資產品，有全面市場披露”。 證監會是否認為： 作為面向普羅大眾、一般存户的所有迷債系列的文件, 都達到了“全面披露”，“清晰，準確和無誤導”的要求？

Why so many misleading information were published in newspaper advertisements, radio broadcast that Minibonds were bonds and SFC never look at newspapers and listen to radio? Right now SFC and HKMA are changing regulations to show that SFC, HKMA are both responsible for their lack of regulations.

6. 金管局，証監會，和銀行的各相關機構和相關部門是否認為：普羅大眾會自然的對「CDO/Synthetic CDO抵押品跟信貸掉期合約」有很好的理解，因而迷你債券/信貸掛鈎票據的的解釋和廣告只須大肆宣揚「跟某某著名機構信貸掛鈎」，「到期時無信貸事件發生，可以拿回全部本金」。而無須對「CDO/Synthetic CDO抵押品」做的解釋？也無須對「掉期合約」做解釋？ 無須第一時間向小存户講明此產品是極高風險，一旦有事可能血本無歸？

Why the bank kept lying to us that these were just bonds and securities with low risks. And banks had to pay back 100% and be charged in court for telling lies.

7. 對於這個沒有投資於實質資產，多數只有 CDO/Synthetic CDO抵押品，而且CDS掉期對手對抵押品的權利大過票據持有者的權利的（迷債）票據 ,作為面向普羅大眾、一般存户銷售的產品. 証監會: 為了保障香港普通投資者的利益， 數年來有沒有考慮過要求迷債文件直接披露披露迷債抵押品跟諸多相關公司挂鉤的事實？ 即:直接披露迷債事實上是跟“7 + 諸多其它”相關公司信貸挂鉤. 迷債文件沒有直接明確披露：迷債除了跟6－7個AAA著名公司挂鉤以外，還跟其它一籃子（可能是100多個）公司信貸挂鉤，而后者的一籃子挂鉤公司的信貸可以是從AAA 到CCC不等。只是大肆宣講“跟6－7家著名公司信貸掛鈎” 是否既有 “誤導” (misleading)，又是“缺乏披露”（non-disclosure)？ 是否遠遠未達到証監會的“清晰，准確， 無誤導、全面披露風險”的要求？
Why all banks told us that the Minibonds only related to these 6-7 companies.

8. 發行章程隻是提到抵押品為 AAA-Securities 或 AAA-CDO /Synthetic CDO 或 CDO +Credit。 沒有對CDO及Synthetic CDO的介紹和相關風險的披露，普羅大眾該如何了正確解這個票據的真实風險和實質資產呢？ 這樣的迷債文件披露達到証監會的“清晰，准確， 無誤導、全面披露風險” 的要求了嗎？

CDO were bad milk and these were still known to very small percent of people and mostly are working in private banking sectors, HKMA and financial newspapers reporters. Do public banks knew about the risks in CDOs. CDOs are mostly related to US housing market and should be rated High Rish. And rating agency are responsible for these wrong rating.

9. 証監會：數年來有沒有要求迷債文件批露一些CDO/Synthetic CDO抵押品 的詳情？ 這符合証監會的 “清晰”，“全面披露風險”的要求嗎？ 文件至少應該說明的破產事件跟抵押品本金損失可以是不成比例的。比如，很有可能是 7％ （或更少）的挂鉤公司的破產事件 造成100％的本金損失. 文件至少應該披露Synthetic CDO其組成部分的信貸評級，占組合的百分比，等等。 而不是只以AAA評級的 Synthetic CDO帶過。 以系列２７為例，抵押品有跟155家公司相關的信貸破產掉期合約. AAA- rated Synthetic CDO發行 的 Portfolio Average Credit Quality 只是 BBB/BBB-.

Many of the banks that sold these minibonds such as SCB had employees to study these credit rating of CDO but they still sold these minibonds as bonds to their customers for profits. I had ask HK police to search SCB computer records to check if there were any bonds sales from SCB of bonds as to maximun the banks profit. The refund to bank of bonds sale is around 1/2 to 1/4% while Minibonds will be at least 1% to 4% figure. And HK Police CCB and SFC should charge these banks.

10. 大多數迷債文件的“本公司債券是甚麼?”一節，有: “誰應購買本公司債券?本公司債券是否適合所有人? 本公司債券並非適合所有人。閣下在決定是否投資前,必須確實了解本公司債券的運作方式,及投資本公司債券是否配合閣下的個人財政狀況及投資目標。 本公司債券僅適合以下投資者: ‧ 尋求美元或港元定息季度利息收入; ‧ 有信心所述的七間該等相關主體在本公司債券發行日至到期日前第二個營業日不會受到信貸事件(即「破產」、「未能償債」或「重組」,包括例如未能償還大額借貸、破產、進行不利的債券重組)影響等事件,且可以承擔當發生任何上述事件後可能損失投資的風險; ‧ 願意接受本公司可選擇延長A組及/或B組債券的到期日;及 ‧ 就任何組別的本公司債券而言,願意接受本公司可選擇在二零零七年九月十五日或其後任何付息日提早償還本金額”. 這四點具體要求是最易讓零售客戶讀懂的。也是對迷你債卷潛在客戶的簡明要求。 証監會數年來是否一直認為這個描述是符合證監會的披露文件要“清晰，准確, 無誤導”的要求？

SFC should also testify against these issues.

銀行的盡職審查, 產品的銷售指引, 職員培訓及職員對產品的認知程度

11. 要求傳召銀行相關管理,批核銷售部門及職員宣誓作証： 11.1銀行對於銀行銷售的產品有沒有進行謹慎的盡職審查(reasonable duty of diligence)？ 盡職審查的結論是什麼？ 不少銀行用「中風險投資」 評級 。銀行是否有意低估迷債的風險評估？

Bonds are mostly low risk investment, why the banks can pretend Minibondsare bonds with low risk just to make more profit? Joseph Yam is responsible for lack of regulations in banking sectors.

11.1講清楚他們在決定銷售這個產品時，是否接受過發行商或相關公司的培訓等。 如果有，培訓的結果對他們對於相關產品的了解和銷售決定其了什麼樣的作用？

I was told by SCB held the meetings with the issuers before they sells these Minibonds, trust funds and these details should be made public.

11.2講清楚他們在決定銷售這個產品的前后，是否曾經閱讀過幾個系列的發行章程 Program Prospectus and Issue Prospectus ？ 他們是否閱讀過任何CDO/SyntheticCDO 抵押品文件 (collateral information)? 他們當時對產品的實質和相關風險的理解是什麼？ Most banks did read these as informed by SCB bank manager and these they said were low risks.

11.3相關管理,批核銷售部門是如何對職員進行培訓，向職員們介紹產品的實質和產品的相關風險？ 效果如何？ - 除了要求銀行職員把一本發行章程給了顧客，知道“跟7個公司挂鉤，破產事件”，“要准備鎖住幾年”，還要求銀行職員知道些什麼呢？ － 有沒有要求銀行職員必須向客戶提到這些產品的真實面目和解釋所有必須披露的風險的？ - 或者是認為：職員無須認識產品的全部實質和全部風險。普羅大眾看過 Issue Prospectus) 就自然會理解到產品的實質和所有相關風險？

In fact, banks never disclose any risks for any of these products.

11.4銀行銷售迷債數年。對於這個以CDO及Synthetic CDO為抵押品的迷債的的真實特徵和相關風險，為甚麼從來不曏客戶提醒？ － 或許是：銀行自己也不明白呢？但是為了迷債的傭金，有意無視對迷債的無知、就不下工夫去瞭解迷債的真相了？ － 或許是；銀行害怕迷債的真實“極高風險，隨時可以血本無歸，只有幾個百分比的利息”的真實面目會嚇跑了客戶，從而影響了迷債的銷售？

The banks did evaluate the Minibonds and related products , for profit they sold to different customers to maximize their profits and put the financial lost to their customers. Customers with large sum, the bank sold Minibonds with collateral that the banks studied to be mainly AAA rated while to other customers with smaller deposits, they sold those with collateral that contained BBB rated CDOs. And these datas can be obtained thru banking staffs.

12. 要求傳召銀行相關銷售職員宣誓作証：

12.1他/她們是否接受過關於迷債/信貸掛鈎票據/結構票據的合適和足夠的培訓？

SCB did know these products were not bonds and that why the banks checked the securities of all CDO involved.

12.2金管局，証監會都在報告中列出了數條關於迷債的風險, 銀行絕大多數銀行職員對於這些風險的認知程度是什麼呢? 否向客戶提到/解釋這些條件和風險?

Most sales would put these Minibonds as low risks.

12.3他/她們當時對相關產品的本質和風險的理解是什麼？ 他/她們當時的理解和現在的理解有沒有不同？ 請他/她們詳述是如何向買迷債的小存户講述產品的實質和相關風險的。

They just told to customers that these were low risk bonds.

迷債的某些系列, 也有銀行用「高風險投資」評級。 銀行職員有沒有向客戶強調這是（極）高風險的產品？ 或者是: 除了提起是跟幾家著名公司掛鈎以外，根本就不向客戶提起風險評級？ 銀行職員讓客戶簽的購買協約，有沒有跟介紹客戶一遍協約的每個條款？

For SCB sales manager, I believed she quit the job for she knew that Minibonds and other related products were high risk products before she quit. I knew in some banks( in fact, that bank is SCB and this is informed to me on April 09) that experience bank clerks refused to sell these products while banks were hiring new bank sales managers to sell these products. For most smaller seven banks in HK, these banks used licensed insurance agents to sell these products. As heard from insurance agents that sold me insurance products, most of these agents working in banks are laid off by bankers to cover their frauds.

12.4產品其實是無實質資產，只有CDO/Synthetic CDO抵押品, 何謂CDO/Synthetic抵押品 , 無實質資產只有抵押品的相關風險是什麼。 銀行有沒有要求職員如實向客戶的實質和這些風險的存在?

Many of these CDO's were packagaed as AAA securities and sold as no risks products to customers. For Minibonds 20, 21 no CDOs were found in the brocedures.

12.5銀行職員對何謂掉期合約, 何謂CDS, 何謂AAA-rated Securitis / AAA-rated CDO/AAA-rated Synthetic CDO抵押品的認知程度 ?

None of these CDS were mentioned during the sales of Minibond and only banks knew about them and cover these information from customers.

12.6銀行職員對“跟7個公司挂鉤” 的理解是什麼？是否知道, 並向客戶解釋以下規則? 一旦第一個(不是第二/三個，是第一個)破產事件發生之后，就必須提早贖回，賣出抵押品，賠100%(不是1/7 or 1/6)的本金給掉期對手. (Constellation就是一個實例).

For SCB, they explained that if one companies default, only 1/7 of the money was lost and these were lies.

13. 許多迷你債卷的抵押品是SyntheticCDO(#20-#36,及一些更早期的) . Synthetic CDO的最重要的資產是信貸破產掉期(CDS)，並不直接擁有其投資組合的債務的。Synthetic CDO (合成債務抵押債券？)的價值是由其投資組合的相關（挂鉤）公司的信貸風險來決定的。 銀行銷售迷你債卷數個系列數年。13.1銀行為什麼從未向客戶解釋： - AAA-rated Securities 未必是指AAA-rated傳統bond. 正如一千萬資產，得講清楚是否全部是現金，還是有股票/住宅/廠房/機器設備等成分。 - AAA-rated CDO 或 AAA-rated Synthetic CDO跟 AAA-rated bond 是完全不一樣的 ? 為什麼從未向客戶解釋： - CDO 到底是由什麼樣的（直接，間接）資產構成的 ? - Synthetic CDO又是什麼呢？其直接/間接的資產構成和相關產品到底是什麼呢？ 13.2銀行為什麼從未給迷你債卷客戶關於 CDO 抵押品的文件? 沒有抵押品的信息，怎麼可以瞭解到迷債的真實面目呢？ But the banks had documents about these CDO and never disclosed them to the customers.13.3银行知不知道相關抵押品的資料,包括抵押品評級的證明與條款及條件, 是迷你債卷 的重要披露文件之一？

The SCB did keep these documents themselves for their sales to study them as informed by the Bank manager during the first sale of Minibonds.

13.4銀行有沒有向發行商或相關機構要求 過關於Synthetic CDO 抵押品的文件資料,包括抵押品評級的證明與條款及條件？

The bank never asked for Synthetic CDO information as checked by my brother-in-law during equiry of Constellation products so they could not explained to their customers when enquired in detailed information, and he never bought the Constellation series from bank.

13.5銀行為什麼從未向客戶解釋：迷你債卷不僅僅是跟標榜的6－7家公司信貸相關，迷你債卷的抵押品其實也是由信貸破產掉期（CDS）組成，迷你債卷的抵押品的價值取決於其挂鉤公司的信貸評級和破產事件。 買入迷你債卷，不僅僅要考慮標榜的6－7家公司的信貸事件，還要考慮許多沒有告知我們的抵押品的挂鉤公司的信貸事件。

AAA-rated Synthetic CDO can have portfolio’s average portfolio quality at BBB/BBB- .

13.6銀行為什麼從未向客戶解釋：迷你債卷的抵押品Synthetic CDO 的破產事件跟 Synthetic CDO portfolio 本金損失可以是不成比例的。 比如，很有可能是 7％ （或許更少）的挂鉤公司的破產事件 造成100％的本金損失。 迷債文件沒有披露這些具體條款。可是銀行應該向客戶提醒和解釋這些可能的風險，以盡職和care of duty to clients. 13.7銀行為什麼從未給迷你債卷客戶關於7家挂鉤公司的信貸事件CDS 文件資料？ 7家挂鉤公司的信貸事件是按First-To-Default規則, 即：一旦第一个破产事件发生之后，就必須赔100%的本金给掉期对手. 就必須提早贖回，賣出抵押品. （1）如果抵押品現價值120% （即增值了），那麼，迷債持有人大概可以拿回20%的本金。100%的本金賠給掉期對手﹔ （2）如果抵押品現價值100% / 或少於100% （即無增減 / 或減值了），那麼，100%的本金賠給掉期對手之后，迷債持有人隻有零了，即：100%本金損失。

Constellation是一例子.SCB had stop sales of Constellation series last year for I could not find the name of SCB in the advertisement of Constellation in newspaper for many months and I suspected the bank knew that Constellation series were very high risk products. Many Constellation series contained Lehman as the reference Entities and SCB told me before that I hold too much Lehman Brothers entities. The Constellation series was sold to me in telephone without any information about these products and SCB is reponsible for all the loss occured to me.

金管局 / 証監會 / 銀行的調查，和風險評估

14. 金管局處理的衆多投訴中，部分立案調查，部分轉交證監會。

14.1金管局是根據什麽準則決定一個投訴要立案調查？14.2金管局是根據什麽準則決定一個投訴要轉交證監會？

HKMA did cover up their responsibility to supervise the banking system?

15. 金管局如何監察銀行職員確切為客户做風險評估 :-

15.1是否以時間為準則？ i.e. 每年一次

15.2是否以每次購買新產品為準則？ i.e. 雷曼迷債每一只系列也做一份評估

15.3是否以產品風險為準則？銀行或銀行職員自行決定售買的產品有否需要做風險評估

I only have one risk report in all six sales of Minibonds and related products from bank and the original copy on the first day of purchase was changed by the bank.

16. 在銀行自己進行的調查中，銀行以“年齡，教育程度／水准，投資經驗，投資目標，等等”來作為風險評估的標准之一。

16.1如果銀行同意迷債是極復雜的信貸衍生產品的話。以上標准可以准確評估到一個人對迷債的特點，性質和風險的了解程度嗎？ 請銀行將“可以正確了解類似迷債這樣極復雜的信貸衍生產品的客戶類別”的“年齡，教育程度／水准，投資經驗，投資目標，等等”的具體條件公布於眾？ 比如：年齡范圍，具體的教育程度／水准條件，甚麼樣的投資經驗 ,如，股票／窩輪／等方面的投資經驗等等的具體定義。 可否請銀行解釋一下，是如何得來以上對迷債這樣的極復雜的信貸衍生產品的客戶風險評估模式的？有沒有研究來証明以上模式的准確率？

16.2如果銀行的客戶評估模式是准確的話，那麼，銀行的迷債銷售職員一定是屬於符合風險評估模式的范圍之內了。銀行的迷債銷售職員還是金管局，証監會登記人員。那麼，銀行的迷債銷售職員應該是屬於“完美了解產品”的類別了？

16.3對於迷債產品有完美理解的銀行的銷售職員關於迷債，對顧客，到底介紹了哪些迷債的特點，性質和風險呢？

16.4為什麼會出現諸多的向長者／低文化人士／不合適人士的銷售？相關的投訴多數也被銀行私下和解了。銀行的銷售職員可是屬於對迷債產品有完美理解的類別啊。

The SCB bank did the risk evaluation themselves against my requirement of buying low risk bonds. And they are suspected to make up their own documents on customers experience in stock trading as listed in my complaint to police.

在這個迷你債卷事件上，香港成事實上的國際金融迷你債劵中心。人們買入迷債，以為是投入跟7個相關公司的資產，卻不知所謂的資產其實只是跟眾多相關公司掛鈎的信貸破產掉期協約。而銀行職員對迷債的“特點，性質和風險”的講解跟迷債的真實“特點，性質和風險”的差距之大就象奶粉跟毒奶粉一樣，讲是奶粉，卻不知道所謂的奶質其實只是毒元素三聚氰胺。

要求銀行以原價向投資者回購迷債 種種跡象都顯示，几年以来，銀行根本有意或无意地沒有對迷債進行足夠的盡職審查。銀行沒有就迷債的真实風險，向银行销售人员做出合适的介绍和培训。导致于银行销售人员没有就迷債的真实特征和風險向客户作出准确的解释, 無向客戶提供關於迷債的全部重要資料. 銀行不應向客戶推介銀行人员本身都不了解的投資產品，加上銷售過程的不當，銀行有責任以原價向投資者回購迷債。 ²

美國的Auction-Rated Securities, 由於銷售銀行 misled clients about the dangers of the investments，銷售銀行百分百地向消費者回購。 ²

多家大煙商，多年前，一直試圖掩蓋尼古丁對人類身體的害處。終於在法庭上敗訴。煙商如果只是寫上“香煙裡含有尼古丁”來販賣香煙，是不會被同意的。煙商必須寫上“吸煙可以致癌”或”尼古丁可以致癌“等明確的警告才可以出售香煙。

Complaint to HKMA

Subject: Structured Products

Dear sir,

I had bought the following structured products from Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd. in San Po Kong Branch from the Branch manager for following

1. Constellation SRN Series 63
2. Octave Notes 6
3. Octave Series 10
4. PIFL Minibond 21
5. PIFL Minibond 34 A
6. PIFL Minibond 20 A

I requested to buy mostly company bonds from them knowing the risk of default of company but they gave me the above bonds (only in statement give me the name structured products) saying they are safer from each minibonds hold 5 to 7 companies bonds. The first time I bought the Minibonds, I was informed that for Minibonds, PIFL that hold the bonds is a offshore company independent of Lehman Brother and HSBC bank USA is the Trustee to hold the securities. Last week, the bank manager informed me about the Lehman Brothers Asia Ltd. problems and he cannot get any informations about Minibonds about the pricing for Lehman Brothers responsible for the pricing. Also there are problems with Ocave Notes and Constellation. Please help me to secure my bonds from bank and also investigate about role of bank in this case . Also theinaction of you will only help internationalnbankings to steal our bonds from our structured products.

Best Regards,

Complaint to OMD

期: 2009 1 14 星期三 上午 2:46


Since Legco will start equiry of Lehman Brother case involving HKMA , so I include my copy of complaints to Ombudsman on HKMA for your information. I had U. of Minnesota alumnus with Ph.D. that used to work for HKMA and later quit to work for 信報 as editor. These people had inside information about HKMA and most news from these newspapers should be true :

1st copy:2008年12月18日 星期四 上午9:14
The following was my complaint against HKMA you received on 12/12/08"

1. From the start, HK Monetary Authority is only giving details about Lehman Brother related Minibonds which is different from what I heard from the banks. So HKMA is trying to mislead HK people about all Minibonds products that they belong to Lehman Brothers as bonds which may face totally loss in Lehman bankrupt case.So from the internet in discuss.com.hk, there are many confusing about Lehman Brother bonds and PIFL minibonds until some people and I point out that minibonds are PIFL products and never do HK Monetary Authority mentions about PIFL products in the news. There is also no charge and investigation of PIFL, Constellation and Octave companies that their Minibonds are sold as bonds in HK banks up to now.

2. There is also no mention of HSBC as trustee of Minibonds until I give the information on discuss.com.hk on the night of 20th and only do HKMA has a few hints about trustee after 21st demonstration by holders of Minibonds. There are no actions against HSBC which allows Lehman Brothers to switch their securities one months before Lehman Brothers went to bankrupt protection in US but only to investigate HK distributors - i.e. banks that sells these structured products. So HKMA actions seem only to put the blames to these HK banks that only act as distributor but not to trustee that supposing protect HK people savings as Minibonds are sold in HK.

3. There are also many discussions in the radio since SARS and HK government were promoting bonds to HK citizens about Minibonds and bonds from HK finance institute and HK gov. and HK Monetary Authority never warned against the minibonds are not bonds and also allow banks to sell them. And I read in the internet there are recordings found in Radio HK about the selling of Minibonds products as bonds and later on proved to be from directors of PIFL. And also from Legistrators after they received my complaint letters about HKMA, I heard that HKMA had promised Legistrators years ago during issueing of HK government related bonds (similar to structured products as these bonds can be later sold in stock market) in the Legistrators meetings that HKMA was very careful to look after these products sold in banks. And also during Legistrators meeting HKMA has told the legistrators that they did actually warned against the banks about Minibonds (includingConstellation series sold by DBS) that they include CDOs which are very high risks products that could not be sold to HK investors but only to institutional investment such as private bankings and goverments such as most Constellation series do include these CDOs. I also read about these CDOs in Yahoo.com in last two years these are very high risks products. But no warning of these products are given to me by banks and HKMA that they have missold me very high risk products. So there is a possible of COVER UP involved by HKMA and HK banks and these are a series crime.

4. For DBS Constellation series, these are poison milk sent to us by Singapore government and banking in last two years to rip off HK people for DBS use their worthless CDO lost to US banks. They just use notes to get all our money back to Singapore and I believe none of money still stay in HK. During the buyback of Constellation series by DBS bank, the Lehman Brothers went bankrupt protection but is still functioning. Also SCB manager of my bank has doubt about the calculating method of DBS and he thinks a large part of the money remaining in the CDO lost to depreciation of the collateral and costs and expenses are huge and unbelievable. Though these accounting method was also approved by HKMA, HKMA never investigates about these cases as Constellation series are all high risk products that cannot be sold in HK banks. But HKMA do cover these facts up from HK citizens as we are never warned as HKMA only asks HK people be careful in theirinvestments. Everybody knows that buying bonds is still the safest way to invest. This is a great fault of HKMA to allow Singapore bank owned partly by Singapore government to sell these high risk products in HK. HKMA is responsible to protect HK monetary system and they are experts in bonds market. This is a very great fault of HKMA to allow Singapore bank to steal money from HK people.

5. All Asia governments Taiwan, and Singapore came up to save the bonds as I read in news that Lehman Brothers was selling all it business including Asia bonds at cheap price and US court only allows sold of Lehman Brothers US assets until now because of asia problems and nothing seems done by HK government. Even after HK government asks HK banks to buy back the PIFL products, the HK government with advise from HKMA still lied to HK people that PIFL products are Lehman bonds that covered by US laws and allow HK banks to stop buy back of these Minibonds and allow international financial institutions to steal our money away from us held by HSBC .

6. During investigating of HKMA relating to HK banks selling of these products, HKMA mainly start with Minibonds holders age over 65 while the other age group will be started later. And this break the rules that the banks have to answer the HKMA in 60 days of the complaints. Under present conditions, the work in process of HKMA will take 20 years to complete in relationship to their requirement of 60 days. This is a delaying tactics of HKMA to help HK banks to steal money from us. And with HKMA examples, the HK banks only start to repay 20-30% of the loss to 65 years or older victims of Minibonds for under British common laws, selling of products to age 65 years or old are crimes for old people are too old to understand these products, same hold true for uneducated HK citizens. And most banks will not repay to all others Minibonds victims with their internal investigations with the help of HKMA delaying tactics, we are unable to locate evidences frombanks for legal actions. and your actions to investigate HKMA delaying actions is urgently required. However, new informations are found about PIFL in the news:

21st Century Business Herald 16 亞洲市場 By 譚璐 2008-12-18
擬在美集體起訴匯豐香港雷曼迷你債投資者"一致行動" 12月17日，CoughlinS t o i a G e l l e r R u d m a n& R o b b i n s L L P 的代表律師PatrickW.Daniels在香港接受記者採訪時表示，起訴美國匯豐的理據，是因為在香港負責雷曼迷你債券發行的公司 P a c i f i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l F i n a n c e L t d ，是由美國匯豐1 0 0 % 控股的公司。本報記者譚璐香港報道在香港擾攘多時的雷曼迷你債券回購事件仍然呈現膠著狀態，對駁公堂是否成為最後的解決之道?美國律師事務所CoughlinStoiaGellerRudman&RobbinsLLP早在11月底已經向香港雷曼苦主大聯盟提出建議，可以安排香港的迷債持有人在美國進行集體訴訟，要求美國匯豐賠償損失。12月17日，CoughlinStoiaGellerRudman&RobbinsLLP的代表律師PatrickW.Daniels在香港接受記者採訪時表示，起訴美國匯豐(HSBCBankUSA)的理據，是因為在香港負責雷曼迷你債券發行的公司PacificInternationalFinanceLtd，是由美國匯豐100%控股的公司。"香港的投資者不是從雷曼兄弟那裡買到這些債券的，是PacificInternationalFinanceLtd發行的，這個公司是獨立于雷曼兄弟運作的。"PatrickW.Daniels說，關於PacificInternationalFinanceLtd這個公司的資料可以從香港證監會那裡找得到。按照PatrickW.Daniels的說法，美國匯豐控制的公司發行了雷曼迷你債券，這些債券由雷曼兄弟負責擔保，同時匯豐又是這些迷你債券的信托人，負責保護抵押品。因此，PatrickW.Daniels認為，"匯豐不是受害者，實質上是雷曼迷你債的擁有者、發行者。

"Here are some further misdeed of HKMA that need further investigations:For complaint No. 1, HKMA should know that PIFL is 100% owned by HSBC since HKMA monitors all banks and financial institute in HK. Will there be any cover up of these facts by HKMA that need investigate.For complaint No. 2, HKMA should know that HSBC issues the Minibonds, and why should HKMA not to investigate about the issuer but only the distributors.For complaint No. 3, after I put complaint letter to the discussion board, somebody is saying HKMA only warn the investment banks about the CDO that are bad milk and these CDO should not be sold to low risk investors. But no investment banks and private banks in HK sell Minibonds, only public banks sell Minibonds in HK. And this means all public banks in HK may not know they are selling high risk products such as Minibonds because HKMA never warn them. And all these banks that bought Minibonds become victim themselves and HKMA is responsible.For complaint No. 5, even all HK banks involved in the buyback of Minibonds are hiring lawyers to protect the bonds hold by HSBC as trustee, but there are no actions from HK government and HKMA.

Regards,

"2nd copy
2008年12月19日 星期五 下午4:11
complaints@omb.gov.
The following was my complaint against HKMA you received on> 12/12/08>
3. There are also many discussions in the radio since SARS
and HK government were promoting bonds to HK citizens about
Minibonds and bonds from HK finance institute and HK gov.
and HK Monetary Authority never warned against the minibonds
are not bonds and also allow banks to sell them. And I read
in the internet there are recordings found in Radio HK about
the selling of Minibonds products as bonds and later on
proved to be from directors of PIFL. And also from
Legistrators after they received my complaint letters about
HKMA, I heard that HKMA had promised Legistrators years ago
during issueing of HK government related bonds (similar to
structured products as these bonds can be later sold in
stock market) in the Legistrators meetings that HKMA was
very careful to look after these products sold in banks.
And also during Legistrators meeting HKMA has told the
legistrators that they did actually warned against the banks
about Minibonds (including
Constellation series sold by DBS) that they include CDOs
which are very high risks products that could not be sold to
HK investors but only to institutional investment such as
private bankings and goverments such as most Constellation
series do include these CDOs. I also read about these CDOs
in Yahoo.com in last two years these are very high risks
products. But no warning of these products are given to me
by banks and HKMA that they have missold me very high risk
products. So there is a possible of COVER UP involved by
HKMA and HK banks and these are a series crime.
Pls see the following in the news:"

16 Dec 2008 [香港經濟日報]港星金融爭霸 種迷債禍根

雷曼兄弟爆煲剛好三個月，財政司司長曾俊華要求證監會及金管局，三個月內提交檢討報告的限制亦將於下周屆滿，據知兩監管機構最快於本周稍後提交報告。在檢討報告揭示制度缺失，並提改善建議前，本報綜合市場各界剖析，重組構成雷曼迷債風暴的來龍去脈。
　　
「有沒有想過，為何香港及新加坡，是全球少數面對大量雷曼迷債零售個案的市場？」有資深市場人士在分析雷曼迷債風暴的來龍去脈時，提出這項發人深省的反問。 　　

市場上確有不少分析認為，要準確了解包括雷曼迷債在內的總值835億元（證監會統計）零售結構產品，如何得以通過重重監管關卡，在過去數年向數以萬計的散戶傾銷的局面，不得不由2002、2003年間，香港與新加坡的「雙城故事」開始。

董施政報告 定調便利產品開發 　
　
當時，港府極力探索在金融風暴及科網泡沫爆破後，帶領本港經濟走出谷底的路向，並定調大力促進金融業為首的四大支柱行業，作為本港經濟的出路；適逢當時新加坡政府亦大力推動當地作為亞洲金融中心，迫使星、港兩地在金融領域上「短兵相接」。
　　
港府推動金融發展的決心，可見於前特首董建華在2003年1月發表的施政報告中，有關金融的部分一改往年加強監管、改善市場質素的主調，除提出推動債券市場發展外，更特別提及「讓金融新產品特別是衍生產品，可以較方便開發」（見附表）。 監管轉寬鬆 產品蜂擁而出
　　「
在我（2002年年間）上任初期時，傳媒每次見面都追問新加坡都推甚麼措施，吸引到多少對�藁�金開業……但最近已沒有多少記者提這方面問題。」一名前任財金官員，2006年間私下對記者說，本港當時在與新加坡競逐金融中心上已「跑出」，反映2002、2003年正處於「雙城」競逐的關鍵時刻。
　　
在這種國際競爭的大氣候下，證監會於2003年2月發表指引，為非上市零售債券及結構產品推售大開方便之門。據新指引，零售債券及結構產品發行商只須在同一系列首隻產品時印備長達數百頁的詳盡基礎文件後，每次印製長約數十頁的簡化版銷售文件。
　　
雷曼迷你債券正如在簡化措施的基礎上，於2003年3月推出首隻信貸掛�沟拿詡�產品後，在其後的5年半（截至2008年9月），不斷推出迷債新系列至共36個，平均每年推出6至7個系列。 撤利率協議 銀行急闢新財路 　
　
監管關卡闖過後，市場人士分析指出，雷曼迷債等推陳出新的投資產品，正好為急欲開拓新財源的銀行提供出路。自2001年撤銷利率協議後，銀行之間的競爭大增，一向是銀行主要盈利來源的按揭業務，其利率由1998年的最優惠利率加2厘，降至去年低點的最優惠利率減3厘，嚴重蠶食銀行的利息收入。
　　
傳統貸存業務轉差，非利息業務乘時而起，成為了過去幾年銀行主力發展的業務，配合�舢敃r監管機構的推動，加上利息持續低企，在2003、2004年香港更出現「零利率」，一眾存戶紛紛找尋其他的投資工具，各項理財產品愈來愈普及。但結果在這個百年一遇的金融風暴中，面對血本無歸的苦果。

"Pls check if HKMA is responsible for their negligent in controlling the Minibonds issuing and their cover up of their responsibility in the controlling of HK banking system.

Regards