Shanghai Commercial Bank faults
Shanghai Commercial Bank top management is involved in forcing their branch managers to sell Minibonds products to customers as Bonds knowing these Minibonds were high risk products.
To : Shanghai Commercial Bank Ltd.
cc: 香港金融管理局 銀行服務投訴組, SFC
Dear Madam / Sir,
In related your letter on 24th, Dec. 2008 . the following is observed for my complaint that you sold structure products to me pretending that these are bonds.
a) The Bank's due diligence was faulty, resulting in a rating of the Minibond, Constellation and Octave Notes as "Low to Medium Risk", considerably downplaying the product's true risk level. The bank had not sent me my copy of rating in your records dated on 20th June 2005 and none of the others copy I signed later with Ms Cheung checking the risk tolerance level for me later. In fact, these facts are investegated by the HK police and you are also required to send me the copy of my risk tolerance level to me. (And in two months time up to now at 14th, April, 09, the SCB still never send me any copy of my risk tolerance level)
b) The Bank intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and chacteristics of the Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes, omitted the material risk associated with this product because the Bank understand the true nature and risk of the (Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes) which I later called Minibond in the following notes,but the Bank want to make greater profit for them to replace the Minibond sale as bonds sales.
c) The Bank provided me with incomplete information on the Minibond. There are no mentioned of CDO involved even in the Collateral which stated that these are securities while I was told that these are bonds.
d) The Bank's consistence over 5-6 years in representing the risk of the Minibond as Medium Risk strongly suggests that the Bank either committed intentional misrepresentation and misleading, or that the Bank intentionally proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond. This is already contract to my intention on buying A rated companies bonds that are Low Risk.
1. Faulty Due Diligence
In the letter I received from the Bank, it states that "appropriate for your then risk tolerance level". My contention is that Shanghai Commercial Bank's was faulty, to say the least.
Evidence is as follows:
-a) It was never pointed out to me that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities and that the Minibond's underlying collateral CDO's key asset was CDS with many entities.
-b) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated CDO" or "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond. It was never explained to me what was a CDO, what comprised of a CDO.
-c) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Nor that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO usually consists of tranches with debt at various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-d) I was never told that the most important feature of a synthetic CDO is the tranching of credit risk.
-e) I was never told that the Synthetic CDO's value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Nor that the Minibond's collateral would consist of CDS with many entities which could be in various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-f) I was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked with the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked with many other entities.
-g) I was never told that there was no detailed information being provided on the Synthetic CDO's CDS entities & entities' credit rating, no information regarding the Synthetic CDO portfolio's industry concentration percentage, no information on the impact of the number of portfolio event defaults to the principal loss (e.g. 5%-10% default event could result in 100% principal loss, etc.). I was never told that the Minibond's value would be greatly affected by the default event of underlying Synthetic CDO's CDS entities.
-h) and I was never told that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO could have portfolio average credit quality at BBB / BBB- level which is very different rating from AAA rating.
The Bank should have cautioned its clients about the risk related to the Synthetic CDO collateral. The Bank should also have requested the Minibond
issuer to disclose related CDS information (e.g. CDS reference entities name and credit rating, percentage of portfolio held in each credit rating category, the relationship of reference entities' default rate to the consequent principal loss percentage, etc.), and should have sent such information to the Minibond purchasers /or should have notified the Minibond purchasers of the availability of such information.
I contend that, instead of exercising due diligence, the Bank in fact collaborated, I would suggest fraudulently, with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the Synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.
2. Misrepresentation, Omission of Material Risk
The Minibond was presented as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities". Risk associated with Synthetic CDO collateral and many other undisclosed reference entities was not disclosed. This amounts to misrepresentation and omission of disclosure of true risk.
Further, I was never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and I was not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.
When I was told by Shanghai Commercial Bank about Lehman's bankruptcy in Sept,2008, I was not too worried about my investment in the Minibond. I thought, the 7 reference entities were sound and thus they should be able to pay/repay their interest & debt to the Minibond holders. And the bank manager Mr. Lo told me that there should also be interest payment because Lehman is only look after the trading platform.
3. Incomplete Information on the Minibond
The Minibond's only assets are CDO collateral and Swap agreements. The CDO collateral information was in fact, not only relevant but also crucial material information about the Minibond.
The collateral information was not available at the time of the purchase. The information which was provided to me at the time of purchase was incomplete and insufficient to allow me to make an informed and educated decision to purchase the Minibond. When the collateral information finally became ready & available (usually days before the issue date), the Bank failed to follow up and pass such information on to me. As I had read in yahoo.com that CDO's are bad milk two years ago, I would have definitely cancelled my purchase and requested a full refund, as the information would have contained elements which would have been totally against my objectives for the money that I put into the Minibond.
I was very careful and selective about the 7 reference entities due to the long lock-up period of 4-7 years. To say the least, 'credit linked to 7+100 or more entities' is totally beyond my risk tolerance range for the money. My money was in saving accounts before it was put into this pseudo Minibond.
I would not buy any non A rated companies bonds, even US government bonds as bank understand these when they sold me the Minibonds.
Banks are regulated bodies and are required to provide clients with adequate disclosure of relevant material information, especially for derivative products, in addition to the "Honesty and Fairness" and "Due Diligence". The Bank was, and is, obligated to provide to its clients or notify them of the availability of collateral information that is material information on the Minibond. But the Bank notified me about that they keep looking into information on the risk material disclosure regarding Minibond collateral information and they are all AAA grades. And many of them are different from what they stated later they look at these at the relevant time.
4. Prospectus and Bank's Duty of Care of Clients
In the letter from the Bank (per attachment), it stated that "These rating have been taken from the Product marketing materials, the propectus and would have been publicly available at the relevant time".
a) Not all the relevant material information was made available to me, nor was it discussed with me. The collateral information (or its availability) was never made available to me, nor was it mentioned to me.
"2.Incomplete Information on the Minibond".
The definition of "public available" should at least mean that clients have been told about the name and readiness and availability of relevant material documents. Otherwise, how could clients know what kind of documents exist and are available to them? The bank is not a library which provides information only upon request. The Bank was selling a highly complex credit derivative product to its retail clients and should have properly and fully informed them of all the risks involved.
b) What was the Bank's duty of care to its clients?
SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Or should the bank's duty of care be re-defined as: "For a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond, the responsibility of Bank's sales staff is to provide the minimum information to clients, even if the minimum information could be misrepresenting and misleading and, in addition, providing the prospectus to clients only upon request?"
c) Banks' responsibility in selling such a complex credit derivative product to retail clients includes: due diligence on complex derivative products, proper procedures at the point of sale, and the training and supervision of relationship managers. SFC Code of Conduct requires banks "when providing services to clients in derivative products to "assure themselves that the clients understand the nature and risks of the products"
What kind of training and procedures were given by the Bank’s management to the sales staff on complex derivative products like the Minibond?
What was the minimum true nature and risk information that a Bank staff was required to tell a client, other than "not principal-protected on the condition that it was credit-linked to 7 reference entities"?
5. Breach of Code of Conduct, Banks' Duty of Care of Clients
I had few meetings with Ms. Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo of Shanghai Commercial Bank for buying Minibonds. Here are the facts and risks of the Minibond which she mentioned to me:
- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities; She commented that the 7 companies in this series were a very good choice even comparing to reference entities used in other Minibond series;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.
It was obvious that Ms Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo breached SFC Code of Conduct on "explain the nature and risks of the products they were selling".
Ms Jenny Cheung misrepresented the Minibond and omitted most of the risk as mentioned above.
The Bank as a distributor, and Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo as an HKMA registered Bank staff, should have a good understanding of the true nature of credit derivative products like the Minibond, and have an obligation to brief the clients about material disclosure. Both Shanghai Commercial Bank and Jenny Cheung, Thomas Lo failed to deliver such requirements.
SFC Code of Conduct requires banks to ensure that their staff is properly trained.
What kind of training and procedure did the Bank provide to its staff on selling credit derivative products like the Minibond? Why do all the Minibond holders find that the Minibond is today a totally different product from the one which was described to us at the time of sale? Why none of the staff ever explained to us all the untold truths and risks of the Minibond?
6. Banks' Criteria for Categorizing/Profiling Retail Customers
The Bank stated " according to the Bank's records, the level of risk that you were prepared to accept was "medium"/"balanced growth".
a) Did the Bank expect their retail clients to be able to understand the Minibond's Issuer Prospectus 80%+ based on this {age & education level & investment experience & investment object}formula?
b) Does the same logic apply to banks' registered staff? If yes, why is it that none of them provided proper explanation on the Minibond's true nature and risks, other than claiming that they gave the prospectus to their clients?
c) Can the Bank publish the exact criteria that would qualify a person to understand the true nature and risk of a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond?
d) How did the Bank derive such a logic / formula?
In the letter from Shanghai Commercial Bank, it is stated that " the bank considerd the Products as being "low to medium risk", which was appropriate for your then risk tolerance level".
The Minibond were rated as "Low Risk to Medium Risk Investments". This wrong rating is evidence that the Bank either did not truly understand this complex credit derivative product or intentionally downplayed its risk level in order to promote Minibond sales. In fact, by every measure, the Minibond was an “Extremely High Risk Investment”.
Yours sincerely,
cc: 香港金融管理局 銀行服務投訴組, SFC
Dear Madam / Sir,
In related your letter on 24th, Dec. 2008 . the following is observed for my complaint that you sold structure products to me pretending that these are bonds.
a) The Bank's due diligence was faulty, resulting in a rating of the Minibond, Constellation and Octave Notes as "Low to Medium Risk", considerably downplaying the product's true risk level. The bank had not sent me my copy of rating in your records dated on 20th June 2005 and none of the others copy I signed later with Ms Cheung checking the risk tolerance level for me later. In fact, these facts are investegated by the HK police and you are also required to send me the copy of my risk tolerance level to me. (And in two months time up to now at 14th, April, 09, the SCB still never send me any copy of my risk tolerance level)
b) The Bank intentionally, misrepresented the true nature and chacteristics of the Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes, omitted the material risk associated with this product because the Bank understand the true nature and risk of the (Minibond, Constellation or Octave Notes) which I later called Minibond in the following notes,but the Bank want to make greater profit for them to replace the Minibond sale as bonds sales.
c) The Bank provided me with incomplete information on the Minibond. There are no mentioned of CDO involved even in the Collateral which stated that these are securities while I was told that these are bonds.
d) The Bank's consistence over 5-6 years in representing the risk of the Minibond as Medium Risk strongly suggests that the Bank either committed intentional misrepresentation and misleading, or that the Bank intentionally proceeded with the Minibond sale without thorough understanding of the risks related to the Minibond, all for the purpose of maximizing the sale of the Minibond. This is already contract to my intention on buying A rated companies bonds that are Low Risk.
1. Faulty Due Diligence
In the letter I received from the Bank, it states that "appropriate for your then risk tolerance level". My contention is that Shanghai Commercial Bank's was faulty, to say the least.
Evidence is as follows:
-a) It was never pointed out to me that the Minibond was not invested into any debt / loans / bonds issued by any of the 7 reference entities and that the Minibond's underlying collateral CDO's key asset was CDS with many entities.
-b) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated CDO" or "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" was not the same as a "AAA-rated" bond. It was never explained to me what was a CDO, what comprised of a CDO.
-c) It was never mentioned or explained to me that a "AAA-rated Synthetic CDO" may not invest into any debt/loan/bond at all. Nor that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO usually consists of tranches with debt at various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-d) I was never told that the most important feature of a synthetic CDO is the tranching of credit risk.
-e) I was never told that the Synthetic CDO's value is decided by the credit risk of its portfolio holding. Nor that the Minibond's collateral would consist of CDS with many entities which could be in various rating categories from AAA to CCC.
-f) I was never told to be aware that the Minibond was, in fact, not only credit-linked with the 7 reference entities, but also credit-linked with many other entities.
-g) I was never told that there was no detailed information being provided on the Synthetic CDO's CDS entities & entities' credit rating, no information regarding the Synthetic CDO portfolio's industry concentration percentage, no information on the impact of the number of portfolio event defaults to the principal loss (e.g. 5%-10% default event could result in 100% principal loss, etc.). I was never told that the Minibond's value would be greatly affected by the default event of underlying Synthetic CDO's CDS entities.
-h) and I was never told that a AAA-rated Synthetic CDO could have portfolio average credit quality at BBB / BBB- level which is very different rating from AAA rating.
The Bank should have cautioned its clients about the risk related to the Synthetic CDO collateral. The Bank should also have requested the Minibond
issuer to disclose related CDS information (e.g. CDS reference entities name and credit rating, percentage of portfolio held in each credit rating category, the relationship of reference entities' default rate to the consequent principal loss percentage, etc.), and should have sent such information to the Minibond purchasers /or should have notified the Minibond purchasers of the availability of such information.
I contend that, instead of exercising due diligence, the Bank in fact collaborated, I would suggest fraudulently, with the Minibond issuer, hiding the risk of the Synthetic CDO from the Bank's retail clients, with the objective of increasing the sale of the Minibonds.
2. Misrepresentation, Omission of Material Risk
The Minibond was presented as "Credit Linked to 7 Reference Entities". Risk associated with Synthetic CDO collateral and many other undisclosed reference entities was not disclosed. This amounts to misrepresentation and omission of disclosure of true risk.
Further, I was never told exactly how the proceeds of the Minibond sale would be used and I was not told that such proceeds were in fact not invested into any real debt/loans of the reference companies.
When I was told by Shanghai Commercial Bank about Lehman's bankruptcy in Sept,2008, I was not too worried about my investment in the Minibond. I thought, the 7 reference entities were sound and thus they should be able to pay/repay their interest & debt to the Minibond holders. And the bank manager Mr. Lo told me that there should also be interest payment because Lehman is only look after the trading platform.
3. Incomplete Information on the Minibond
The Minibond's only assets are CDO collateral and Swap agreements. The CDO collateral information was in fact, not only relevant but also crucial material information about the Minibond.
The collateral information was not available at the time of the purchase. The information which was provided to me at the time of purchase was incomplete and insufficient to allow me to make an informed and educated decision to purchase the Minibond. When the collateral information finally became ready & available (usually days before the issue date), the Bank failed to follow up and pass such information on to me. As I had read in yahoo.com that CDO's are bad milk two years ago, I would have definitely cancelled my purchase and requested a full refund, as the information would have contained elements which would have been totally against my objectives for the money that I put into the Minibond.
I was very careful and selective about the 7 reference entities due to the long lock-up period of 4-7 years. To say the least, 'credit linked to 7+100 or more entities' is totally beyond my risk tolerance range for the money. My money was in saving accounts before it was put into this pseudo Minibond.
I would not buy any non A rated companies bonds, even US government bonds as bank understand these when they sold me the Minibonds.
Banks are regulated bodies and are required to provide clients with adequate disclosure of relevant material information, especially for derivative products, in addition to the "Honesty and Fairness" and "Due Diligence". The Bank was, and is, obligated to provide to its clients or notify them of the availability of collateral information that is material information on the Minibond. But the Bank notified me about that they keep looking into information on the risk material disclosure regarding Minibond collateral information and they are all AAA grades. And many of them are different from what they stated later they look at these at the relevant time.
4. Prospectus and Bank's Duty of Care of Clients
In the letter from the Bank (per attachment), it stated that "These rating have been taken from the Product marketing materials, the propectus and would have been publicly available at the relevant time".
a) Not all the relevant material information was made available to me, nor was it discussed with me. The collateral information (or its availability) was never made available to me, nor was it mentioned to me.
"2.Incomplete Information on the Minibond".
The definition of "public available" should at least mean that clients have been told about the name and readiness and availability of relevant material documents. Otherwise, how could clients know what kind of documents exist and are available to them? The bank is not a library which provides information only upon request. The Bank was selling a highly complex credit derivative product to its retail clients and should have properly and fully informed them of all the risks involved.
b) What was the Bank's duty of care to its clients?
SFC Code of Conduct requires that "Intermediaries were still under an obligation pursuant to the Code of Conduct to explain the nature and risks of the product they were selling", and "make adequate disclosure of relevant material information".
Or should the bank's duty of care be re-defined as: "For a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond, the responsibility of Bank's sales staff is to provide the minimum information to clients, even if the minimum information could be misrepresenting and misleading and, in addition, providing the prospectus to clients only upon request?"
c) Banks' responsibility in selling such a complex credit derivative product to retail clients includes: due diligence on complex derivative products, proper procedures at the point of sale, and the training and supervision of relationship managers. SFC Code of Conduct requires banks "when providing services to clients in derivative products to "assure themselves that the clients understand the nature and risks of the products"
What kind of training and procedures were given by the Bank’s management to the sales staff on complex derivative products like the Minibond?
What was the minimum true nature and risk information that a Bank staff was required to tell a client, other than "not principal-protected on the condition that it was credit-linked to 7 reference entities"?
5. Breach of Code of Conduct, Banks' Duty of Care of Clients
I had few meetings with Ms. Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo of Shanghai Commercial Bank for buying Minibonds. Here are the facts and risks of the Minibond which she mentioned to me:
- Credit Event of the 7 reference entities; She commented that the 7 companies in this series were a very good choice even comparing to reference entities used in other Minibond series;
- No liquidity and had to hold till maturity;
- Get 100% principal back on maturity if no credit event happens.
It was obvious that Ms Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo breached SFC Code of Conduct on "explain the nature and risks of the products they were selling".
Ms Jenny Cheung misrepresented the Minibond and omitted most of the risk as mentioned above.
The Bank as a distributor, and Jenny Cheung and Thomas Lo as an HKMA registered Bank staff, should have a good understanding of the true nature of credit derivative products like the Minibond, and have an obligation to brief the clients about material disclosure. Both Shanghai Commercial Bank and Jenny Cheung, Thomas Lo failed to deliver such requirements.
SFC Code of Conduct requires banks to ensure that their staff is properly trained.
What kind of training and procedure did the Bank provide to its staff on selling credit derivative products like the Minibond? Why do all the Minibond holders find that the Minibond is today a totally different product from the one which was described to us at the time of sale? Why none of the staff ever explained to us all the untold truths and risks of the Minibond?
6. Banks' Criteria for Categorizing/Profiling Retail Customers
The Bank stated " according to the Bank's records, the level of risk that you were prepared to accept was "medium"/"balanced growth".
a) Did the Bank expect their retail clients to be able to understand the Minibond's Issuer Prospectus 80%+ based on this {age & education level & investment experience & investment object}formula?
b) Does the same logic apply to banks' registered staff? If yes, why is it that none of them provided proper explanation on the Minibond's true nature and risks, other than claiming that they gave the prospectus to their clients?
c) Can the Bank publish the exact criteria that would qualify a person to understand the true nature and risk of a complex credit derivative product like the Minibond?
d) How did the Bank derive such a logic / formula?
In the letter from Shanghai Commercial Bank, it is stated that " the bank considerd the Products as being "low to medium risk", which was appropriate for your then risk tolerance level".
The Minibond were rated as "Low Risk to Medium Risk Investments". This wrong rating is evidence that the Bank either did not truly understand this complex credit derivative product or intentionally downplayed its risk level in order to promote Minibond sales. In fact, by every measure, the Minibond was an “Extremely High Risk Investment”.
Yours sincerely,
7 則留言:
I am still waiting for HK police action for my request to search all Shanghai Commercial bank computer records of how many coorporate bonds that they have sold for values up to 100,000 USD per bond since 2005. I talk to my friend that did suceed in buying coorporate bonds in HK and I believe that only HSBC did sold some coorporate bonds in HK and mostly were Hutchison bonds. And I have also bought Town Gas coorporate bonds in Europe for even private banks cannot find coorporate bonds in HK markets. That how poorly HK government is promoting bonds sales in HK markets since 2003 and now HK government has to cover up for all these HK bank frauds to save their faces. HK banks are so greedy that they have no interest in selling coorporate bonds in HK with high cost of bonds , so there are a small base of customers that get no yields for banks, low volume and very littler profit every year but with Minibonds and derivative products, a huge profit can be make by these greedy pirates (HK banks) daily. HK government promotion of 穆斯林債卷can be avaliable only in HSBC. Other banks will sell their own Islamic minibonds for high profits if they have chances. Right now the only way to save HK financial system is to punish these pirates bankers and put them to jail and with large sum of fines for these bankers frauds.
有投訴經金管局轉介的當然行先，我朋友遲至去年12月尾才寫信給金管局在上月下旬就和銀行會談。看來現在就是輪到那些未寫信投訴的都會安排會面理解情形，樓上有人說帶 mp3，隨你罷，你識咁做時銀行方面亦會咁做 ...
If your values of Minibonds is more than USD100,000. And you want to buy coorporate bonds, and the bank sold you Minibonds, that means this is a case of Bank frauds and you should report to Police as I did. I you know that those worked in bank did knew that Minibonds were not bonds but the top managements wanted them to sell these minibonds to customers for profits, than the bank should pay you back 100% plus interest. That should be the case for Shanghai Commercial Bank. And from legco the bank should pay fines up to three time the value of the Minibonds they sold to their customers to government and under SFC investigations, the bank investment license can be stopped for three years.
Shanghai Commercial Bank frauds
For Minibonds series 20, the bank manager take this brocure out from his table and informed me that the Minibonds consisted of the following 7 bonds:
Bank of America Bank of America Corporation Aa3 A+
Corporation 二零一一年一月十五日到期
7.40%後償債券
(ISIN: US060505AG97)
Citigroup Inc. Citigroup Inc. Aa2 A+
二零一零年十月一日到期
7.25%後償債券
(ISIN: US172967AZ49)
The Goldman Sachs The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Aa3 A+
Group, Inc. 二零一二年一月十五日到期
6.60%債券
(ISIN: US38141GBU76)
Deutsche Bank Deutsche Finance (Netherlands) BV A1 A+
Aktiengesellschaft （荷屬安的列斯分行）
二零一二年三月二十七日到期
5.375%後償債券
(ISIN: DE0008516428)
— 6 —
該等相關主體參考債項穆迪評級標普評級
JPMorgan Chase & Co. JPMorgan Chase & Co. A1 A
二零一一年二月一日到期
6.75%後償債券
(ISIN: US46625HAJ95)
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Merrill lynch & Co., Inc Aa3 A+
二零零九年二月十七日到期
6.00%債券
(ISIN: US590188JP48)
渣打銀行渣打銀行A3 A-
二零零九年五月六日到期
5.375%後償債券
(ISIN: XS0097105661)
This was bank fraud case and this happened in HK, Singapore and Taiwan for most of the Minibonds bank frauds cases. But only in HK, government did not take any actions after HK police, HKMA were reported for more than 10,000 cases involved . This proves that high officials in HK government are involved in HK banks frauds cover up.
節錄(部份)自：壹週刊 2008年10月9日(四) 970期
揪出$360億迷債魔手
銀行前線員工推銷迷你債券時手法不當，當然難辭其咎，但原來度出「迷你債券」這絕世好橋，兼負責替雷曼兄弟推廣的，就是新鴻基金融旗下資產管理部的行政總裁李建平。過去四、五年，他與雷曼合作無間，設計這類結構性產品，並以債券名義推向零售銀行，最諷刺的是這位「迷債」魔手，正正是監管機構證監會的諮詢委員。
事實上，雷曼迷你債券事件，不單揭露了部分銀行銷售手法有欺詐之嫌，最令人憤怒的是負責把關的證監會，以及金管局旗下銀監處等薪高糧準的財金官員，竟如此無能，讓這類共三百六十億元高風險產品，包裝成債券在市場流通。
銀行前線員工推銷手法不當，自然難辭其咎。但原來這種包裝為「迷你債券」的結構性產品，其始作俑者，是新鴻基公司旗下的資產管理業務部門。在其公司網站的業務介紹上，還自誇為「the pioneer of Minibond products in Hong Kong market」（發行迷你債券的先驅者）。由○三年至今，新鴻基推出了一共三十六個迷你債券系列，累計認購額超過一百四十億港元。不過，雷曼爆煲後，新鴻基金融已即時把這些「威水史」刪除。
新鴻基金融，是香港首間設計迷你債券的金融機構，而事件幕後主腦，就是其資產管理業務部的行政總裁李建平。
迷你債券這種近年的「劃時代產品」，主要是由李建平構想出來。「形式就好似做一個fund of hedge fund；佢諗好晒個債券嘅結構、條款、風險後，將條橋sell俾雷曼兄弟等發行人，發行人認為有得諗就落實去做。咁佢就變身大拆家，將債券拆俾銀行銷售。你諗吓呢個『量』係幾咁大，可以賺幾多錢！」一對沖基金經理說。
早在○二年，李建平就親自向雷曼敲門，主動為其公司設計迷你債券，由雷曼兄弟開設一間附屬公司Pacific International Finance Limited，負責發行和持有該產品；而新鴻基金融則擔任雷曼兄弟與銀行之間的中介人，負責製作產品及市場推廣。
首隻迷你債券是於○二年面世的「和黃迷你債券」，李建平更親身上陣宣傳，產品是與和黃的信貸風險掛鈎，由雷曼負責發行。由於當時香港經濟低迷，銀行息口非常低，故這批年息四釐三的債券十分受歡迎，總共獲得八千零五十萬美元認購申請，較原定最高發行金額五千萬美元，超額認購約百分之六十。而一年內，新鴻基金融更前後三次推出這款迷你債券。
能夠把迷你債券成功推出至零售層面，全因李建平懂得把複雜的迷你債券化繁為簡。迷你債券牽涉信貸掛鈎公司、擔保公司、發行人，還包括衍生工具及掉期合約，但李建平以往向外界推介時，就把迷你債券簡略為拆散了的債券，因此入場費較低。一般市面上的債券，入場費動輒要十萬美元，但迷你債券只需要五萬港元。
有見反應熱烈，而且證券行的目標客戶有限，雷曼兄弟抽起其他分銷的證券行，並殺入前線的零售銀行，於是加入中銀、集友、南商和永亨等銀行銷售，並由李建平的新鴻基金融安排協調。為這些迷你債券，作不同包裝及推廣。
然而，投資者對其中的風險都摸不着頭腦，有的還以為迷你債券的意思，是將大型企業債券斬件銷售，讓零售投資者也可從中分一杯羹。這類「高風險低回報」的產品，由於大部分零售銀行參與經銷，近年開始普及。而由李建平掌舵的新鴻基金融資產管理業務，○五年總收益只有四千多萬，但至去年已跳升至二億二千多萬，升幅多達四倍。今年中期亦已有八千多萬收益。
但諷刺的是，李建平不但是另類投資基金公會（香港）的主席，更是證監會（SFC）的諮詢委員會委員。證
監會正是迷你債券的「把關人」。但至今，證監會對迷你債券事件沒採取任何積極行動。
據行內人士計算，負責推廣的新鴻基金融及負責承銷的零售銀行，分別可取得百分之二至三的佣金，牽涉金額約十億元。
由於迷你債券屬零售性質，產品需經證監會批准，但一名接近證監會人士說：「證監會只會批核發行人提交的銷售文件及宣傳單張，查看披露的產品性質、條款及風險等是否足夠及詳細，並唔會理會呢啲投資工具嘅結構。證監都唔知抵押品中的CDO包含啲咩，只要評級屬AAA或AA就可過關。」那究竟為何條文如此複雜的結構性產品，會獲批銷售予對財務毫不認識的師奶阿伯？發行人有否刻意隱瞞其中風險？又或根本是證監會疏忽？證監會至今對此仍未表態。據知在新加坡及台灣亦有同類型的結構性產品出售，但命名為「minibond」，則是香港獨有。由於雷曼在亞洲區中，以在香港最活躍，故雷曼爆煲，影響香港的層面亦最廣。而部分苦主懷疑受銀行誤導才購買，一向聲稱對銀行監管嚴格的金管局，也難辭其咎。
金融管理局於九三年成立，由外匯基金管理局與銀行業監理處合併而成，本來外匯基金管理局及銀監處性質不同，應當分家，但「金融沙皇」任志剛促成下，本來獨立的銀監處就劃歸金管局管轄，並由任志剛出任主席至今。
The Shanghai Commercial Bank former manager in San Po Kong or former branch manager had commit bank frauds of cold call me about 和黃迷你債券 as Hutchison bonds in year 2002 which I did not bought at that time. So HK police had commit crimes in cover up bank frauds by not searching Shanghai Commercial Bank records of the sales of bonds in their computer since 2002. There should be also promotion of these minibonds in the radio by 李建平 that need police investigations.
For Minibonds 20, Thomas Lo, the bank manager of Shanghai Commercial Bank in San Po Kong, beside told me that the Minibonds consists of seven bonds, which was a lie. He also informed me that there were a second layer where Lehman used money market funds to trade securities which I did not have to worry for Jenny Cheung had checked and looked after these securities(which later known as CDO), so there were two protections for these Minibonds. This was a lie and SCB no doubt had committed banks frauds.
For Constellation and Victory Peak series notes, the sold of these products were thru telephone by Jenny Cheung. Constellation and Victory Peak series notes were all different in contents then Minibonds, and there were no explainations about these products. Also no risk level documents were done by Shanghai Commercial Bank were done for all of these cases. The risk level of Constellation and Victory Peak series were very high due to the fact that two of these products sold to me had Lehman as one of the CDO (even as bonds which SCB lied to me) for there were no protection if Lehman defaults and the bank should knew these. This was a very series crimes of SCB in pretending these products were low risks as they had promised me before that no Lehman related structure products should be sold to me and they broke their promises by not giving me any informations during the sales. So these were pure cold call products sales and all were against rules of HKMA. And no investigations of these products were made by HKMA up to now and HKMA in facts were delaying investigatoins of these products and involved in crimes of cover up of bank frauds.
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